federal government attaches as long as the goods remain unsold on the shelves of the importer, regardless of whether they are in the small package immediately containing them or in the larger outside package;56 and that, where an agent receives from his company, located in another state, several packages in a box, and opens the box and delivers the packages to customers in accordance with their previous orders, the particular packages involved being delivered in the form in which the company received them from the manufacturer, the whole transaction constitutes interstate commerce, not subject to a state pure food law.57 58 [31] (b) Wilson Act. So. far as intoxicating liquors are concerned, the effect of the original package cases has been obviated to a certain extent by the act of congress known as the Wilson Act, which has been sustained as a constitutional exereise by congress of its power to regulate interstate commerce, and which has been held to be not a delegation to the states of the power to regulate commerce, nor an adoption of state laws as a regulation of such commerce. 59 On the contrary, it is said that in enacting that law congress has taken its own course and made its own regulation, applying to these subjects of interstate commerce one common rule whose uniformity is not affected by variations in state laws dealing with such property.60 This statute provides that intoxicating 61 Liquid Extracts, 170 Fed. 449 [aff 175 Fed. 1022, 99 CCA 667]. 56. McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 E. S. 115, 33 SCt 431, 57 L. ed. 754, 47 LRANS 984. 57. State v. Eckenrode, 148 Iowa 173. 127 NW 56. 58. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 SCt 865, 35 L. ed. 572 [rev 43 Fed. 556. 10 LRA 444]; In re Van Vliet, 43 Fed. 761, 10 LRA 451; State v. Bengsch, 170 Mo. 81, 70 SW 710; Harrell v. Speed, 113 Tenn. 224, 81 SW 840, 106 AmSR 814, 1 LRANS 639 and note, 3 AnnCas 260; Floppiano V. Speed, 113 Tenn. 167, 82 SW 222. 59. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 SCt 865, 35 L. ed. 572; In re Spickler, 43 Fed. 653, 10 LRA 446; State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 102 Me. 385, 67 A 312, 120 AmSR 504; State Fraser, 1 N. D. 425, 48 NW 343. V. 60. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 SCt 865, 35 L. ed. 572; State Fraser, 1 N. D. 425, 48 NW 343. V. 61. 26 U. S. St. at L. 313 c 728. 62. Minneapolis Brewing Co. V. McGillivray, 104 Fed. 258. [a] Purpose of act."In reason it is certain that the purpose which led to the enactment of the law was to give the several States power to deal with all liquors coming from outside their limits upon arrival and before sale, thus rendering the state police authority more complete and efficacious on the subject." De Barry V. Louisiana, 227 U. S. 108, 110, 33 SCt 239, 57 L. ed. 441 [aff 130 La. 1090, 58 S 892]. 63. Meyer v. Mobile, 147 Fed. 843; Bailey Liquor Co. v. Austin, 82 Fed. 785; Moore v. Bahr, 82 Fed. 19; State V. Intoxicating Liquors, 106 Me. 138. 76 A 265, 29 LRANS 745 and note, 20 AnnCas 668 and note; Stevens v. State, 61 Oh. St. 597, 56 NE 478; State v. Miller, 66 W. Va. 436, 66 SE 522, 19 AnnCas 604. 64. In re Bergen, 115 Fed. 339. 65. State v. Allen, 161 N. C. 226, 75 SE 1082. 66. Adams Express Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 147, 26 SCt 185, 49 L. ed. 424 [rev (Iowa) 95 NW 1129]; American Express Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 133. 25 SCt 182, 49 L. ed. 417 [rev 118 Iowa 447, 92 NW 66]; State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 94 Me. 335, 47 A 531. Validity of particular state regu[12 C. J.-3] 62 liquors transported into any state for sale or storage | lations pertaining to transportation | 241. State v. Parker Distilling Co., 68. Corbin v. McConnell, 71 N. H. 350, 52 A 447. 69. Jervey v. The Carolina, 66 Fed. Power of state to forbid importa- State v. Spence, 127 La. 336, 71. 72. U. S. Rossi v. Pennsylvania, 238 U. S. 62, 35 SCt 677, 59 L. ed. 1201 [rev 53 Pa. Super. 210]; Kirmeyer v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 568, 35 SCt 419, 59 L. ed. 721 [rev 88 Kan.. 589, 128 P 1114]; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co., 223 U. S. 70, 32 SCt 189, 56 L. ed. 355; Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U. S. 218, 29 SCt 633, 53 L. ed. 972; Heymann V. Southern R. Co., 203 U. S. 270, 27 SCt 104, 51 L. ed. 178, 7 AnnCas 1130 and note [rev 122 Ga. 608, 50 SE 342]; Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 438, 18 SCt 674, 42 L. ed. 1100 [aff in part 80 Fed, 786]; Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 68 67 69 [a] Actual and constructive delivery to consignee.-(1) The mere placing of an interstate shipment of intoxicating liquors in the carrier's warehouse to await delivery to the consignees does not constitute their arrival in the state within the meaning of the Wilson Act. Heymann v. Southern R. Co., 203 U. S. 270, 27 SCt 104, 51 L. ed. 178, 7 AnnCas 1130 [rev 122 Ga. 608, 50 SE 342]. (2) While, within the meaning of the act, the goods have arrived when there has been a delivery to the agent of the shippers (Stevens v. Ohio, 93 Fed. 793; Toole v. State, 170 Ala. 41, 54 S 195), (3) or a constructive delivery to the consignee, as where he pays the freight, surrenders the bill of lading, and receives an order for the delivery of the liquors (Shaw v. Atlanta, 11 Ga. A. 391, 75 SE 486), (4) still a constructive delivery can be effected only by an agreement between the carrier or middleman and the buyer, whereby the former agrees to hold the goods for the latter for some purpose other than that of carriage to, and delivery at, their original destination; and, in the absence of an agreement with the buyer to the contrary, the carrier will be presumed to hold in its original ca 412, 18 SCt 664, 42 L. ed. 1088 [rev pacity, and the carrier cannot con 90 Iowa 496, 58 NW 887, 24 LRA Ala.-Preist v. State, 5 Ala. A. 171, v. Atlanta, 11 Ga. A. stitute itself the buyer's agent for the custody of the goods, nor can the buyer, without the carrier's consent, make it his agent for custody (State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 104 Me. 502, 71 A 758). (5) In one case, respondent, having been advised by an express company that it held an interstate shipment of intoxicating liquors addressed to him, paid the express charges and signed a receipt therefor, but told the company to keep the package until he found out whether it was his. Seven hours later the package was seized under search and seizure process while in the company's office. The court held that, at the time of seizure, there had been no constructive delivery to respondent, and that the liquors were still in interstate commerce, and hence not subject to search and seizure on state process. State v. Parshley, 108 Me. 410, 81 A 484, 37 LRANS 444. (6) The agreement of 74 84 85 [34] 7. Navigation. Commerce includes navigation, and the power of congress to regulate commerce extends to navigation and all its incidents on practically all navigable waters within the United 78. Tinker v. State, 90 Ala. 638, 8 S 814 (holding that, on the passage of the Wilson Bill, imported liquors in the state became subject immediately to the provisions of existing state law). necessity of delivery is the same whether the consignee is known to the carrier or not, and whether the name of the consignee is fictitious or not.73 Stated in another way, the Wilson Act only modifies existing rules by causing interstate commerce shipments of intoxicating liquors to come under state control at an earlier date than they otherwise would, that is, after delivery but before sale in the original packages. In case the consignée has ordered the liquors for his own personal use, he has the right to remove the liquors, or to have them removed, from the depot to his residence or place of business, and delivery to him is not complete until they are at his residence or place of business; but the rule is otherwise where he intends to sell the same in violation of law,76 and he has no right to use the depot as a warehouse for general distribution." The statute has been held to apply to liquors imported the local agent of an express company to hold for a few days a C. O. D. interstate shipment of intoxicating liquors, to suit the convenience of the consignee in paying for such liquor and taking it away, does not destroy the character of the transaction as interstate commerce. Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 206 U. S. 129, 27 SCt 606, 51 L. ed. 987 [rev 87 SW 1111, 27 KyL 1096]. (7) A constructive delivery may take place where the liquors remain in the custody of the carrier for an unreasonable time after arrival at their destination. Thus in one case, "the liquors were consigned to the shipper, but it was never contemplated that they were to be delivered to him, but it was the expectation of the parties that the one who was to be notified would become the consignee. The consignor conferred upon him alone the power and authority of determining when the liquors should be delivered. He was the agent of the shipper to the extent of deciding when the liquors were to be removed, in so far as their delivery within a reasonable time was involved. The ruling that liquors were subject to the laws of the state, after they had remained a reasonable time in the hands of the carrier, was based upon public policy. which is paramount to the rights of private parties. The consignors are presumed to know the law, and that it is against public policy for liquors to remain in the custody of the carrier after a reasonable time for their removal. The important fact to be determined in all these cases is whether the liquors were allowed to remain an unreasonable length of time, and not the fact as to which of the parties, as between themselves, was responsible for the failure to remove them. The question under consideration is not to be determined by principles regulating the relations between the consignor and consignee, but by the laws fixing the time within which the liquors shall become subject to the laws of the state." Charleston, etc., R. Co. v. Gosnell, (S. C.) 90 SE 264. 267. V. 73. State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 102 Me. 385, 67 A 312, 120 AmSR 504. 74. Rosenberger Pacific Express Co., 241 U. S. 48, 36 SCt 510, 60 L. ed. 880. 75. State V. 79. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 SCt 865, 35 L. ed. 572 [rev 43 Fed. 556, 10 LRA 444]; In re Spickler, 43 Fed. 653, 10 LRA 446; State Fraser, 1 N. D. 425, 48 NW 343. 80. De Bary V. Louisiana, U. S. 108, 33 SCt 239, 57 L. ed. 441 [aff 130 La. 1090, 58 S 892]. 227 81. 37 U. S. St. at L. 699 c 90. Effect of Webb-Kenyon Law on interstate transportation of liquors see infra § 119. 82. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, 24 L. ed. 248. 83. U. S.-Manchester V. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240, 11 SCt 559, 35 L. ed. 159 [aff 152 Mass. 230, 25 NE 113, 23 AmSR 820, 9 LRA 236]. Me.-Fuller v. Spear, 14 Me. 417. Mass.-Dunham V. Lamphere, Gray 268. 3 Miss.-Ex p. Fritz, 86 Miss. 210, 38 S 722, 109 AmSR 700. N. H.-State v. Roberts, 59 N. H. 256, 47 AmR 199. Pa.-Com. v. Bender, 7 Pa. Co. 620. Va.-Morgan v. Com., 98 Va. 812, 35 SE 448. Fish and game laws as an interference with interstate commerce see infra § 74. 84. U. S.-In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 15 SCt 900, 39 L. ed. 1092; Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 26 L. ed. 238; State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wali. 204, 20 L. ed. 370; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 18 L. ed. 96; U. S. v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407, 18 L. ed. 182; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 12 L. ed. 702; New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102, 9 L. ed. 648; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23; U. S. v. Greene, 146 Fed. 803 [aff 154 Fed. 401, 85 CCA 251 (certiorari den 207 U. $. 596 mem, 28 SCt 261 mem, 52 L. ed. 357 mem)]; U. S. v. Union Bridge Co., 143 Fed. 377 [aff 204 U. S. 364, 27 SCt 367, 51 L. ed. 523]; In re Grand Jury, 62 Fed. 840; Pacific Coast SS. Co. v. Railroad Comrs., 18 Fed. 10, 9 Sawy. 253; The Chusan, 5 F. Cas. No. 2,717, 2 Story 455; King v. American Transp. Co., 14 F. Cas. No. 7,787, 1 Flipp. 1; The Lewellen, 15 F. Cas. No. 8,307, 4 Biss. 156; The Wilson v. U. S., 30 F. Cas. No. 17.846, 1 Brock. 423. Ala.-Pilotage Comrs. v. The Cuba, 28 Ala. 185. Fla.-Webb v. Dunn, 18 Fla. 721. Iowa.-Fuller v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 31 Iowa 187. "From the adoption of the constitution, till this time, the universal sense of America has been, that the word 'commerce,' as used in that instrument, is to be considered a generic term, comprehending navigation." The Wilson v. U. S., 30 F. Cas. No. 17,846, 1 Brock. 423. "If commerce does not include navigation, the government of the Union has no direct power over that subject, and can make no law prescribing what shall constitute American vessels, or requiring that they shall be navigated by American seamen. Yet this power has been exercised from the commencement of the government, has been exercised with the consent of all, and has been understood by all to be a commercial regulation. All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word 'commerce,' to comprehend navigation." Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, 190, 6 L. ed. 23. 85. U. S. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 5 SCt $26. 29 L. ed. 158; Lord v. Goodall SS. Co., 102 U. S. 541, 26 L. ed. 224; South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S. 4, 23 L. ed. 782; Henderson v. Wickham, 92 U. S. 259, 23 L. ed. 543; Gibbons V. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23; Scranton v. Wheeler, 57 Fed. 803, 6 CCA 585 [rev on other grounds 163 U. S. 703 mem, 16 SCt 1206 mem, 41 L. ed. 318 mem]; The Katie, 40 Fed. 480, 7 LRA 55 and note; The Salem, 37 Fed. 846, 13 Sawy. 607, 2 LRA 380 and note; V. Baltimore, Pennsylvania R. Co. etc., R. Co., 37 Fed. 129; Stockton v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 32 Fed. 9 [app dism 140 U. S. 699 mem, 11 SCt 1028 mem, 35 L. ed. 603 mem]; U. S. v. Burlington, etc., Ferry Co., 21 Fed. 331; The Gretna Green, 20 Fed. 901; The Chusan, 5 F. Cas. No. 2,717, 2 Story 455; King v. American Transp. Co., 14 F. Cas. No. 7,787, 1 Flipp. 1; The Lewellen, 15 F. Cas. No. 8,307, 4 Biss. 156; The Wilson v. U. S., 30 F. Cas. No. 17,846, 1 Brock. 423. Ala.-Mobile Bay Pilotage v. The Cuba, 28 Ala. 185. Ga.-Williams v. Fears, 110 Ga. 584, 35 SE 699, 50 LRA 685. Me.-Moor v. Veazie, 32 Me. 343, 52 AmD 655 [aff 14 How. (U. S.) 568, 14 L. ed. 545]; Moor v. Veazie, 31 Me. 360. N. Y. Rumsey v. New York, etc., R. Co., 63 Hun 200, 17 NYS 672; Jencks v. Miller, 17 Misc. 461, 40 NYS Wis. State v. Milwaukee, 156 Wis. 549, 146 NW 775. V. Eighteen Casks of Beer, 24 Okl. 786, 104 1088. P 1093, 25 LRANS 492; Walker v. State, (Okl. Cr.) 127 P 895; Moreland v. State, 2 Okl. Cr. 237, 101 P 138; McCord v. State, 2 Okl. Cr. 214, 101 P 280; Hudson v. State, 2 Okl. Cr. 176, 101 P 275: High v. State, 2 Okl. Cr. 161, 101 P 115. 28 LRANS 162. 76. State V. Eighteen Casks of Beer, 24 Okl. 786, 104 P 1093, 25 LRANS 492. State, (Okl. Cr.) 77. Walker V. 127 P 895. Me.-Moor v. Veazie, 32 Me. 343, 52 AmD 655 [aff 14 How. (U. S.) 568, 14 L. ed. 545]; Moor v. Veazie, 31 Me. 360. Md. Howell v. State, 3 Gill 14. N. Y.-Delaware, etc., Canal Co. v. Lawrence, 2 Hun 163 [aff 56 N. Y. 612 mem]. [a] The whole commercial marine of the country is placed by the constitution under the regulation of congress, and all laws passed by that body in the regulation of navigation and trade, whether foreign or coastwise, are therefore but the exercise of an undisputed power. Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. (U. S.) 227, 16 L. ed. 243. 90 88 [35] 8. Transmission of Intelligence and Information. Communication or intercourse by telegraph or telephone, and the business of conducting such communication between persons in different states, constitute interstate commerce subject to the regulating power of congress. So too the transmission of messages by means of the wireless telegraph to and from a point in a state and ships on the high seas and foreign countries is foreign commerce not subject to state regulation." Where, however, the points of transmission and destination of a telegram are within the same state, the intercourse is intrastate and subject to state regulation,92 even though part of the transmission is over telegraph lines in 86. The Daniel Ball v. U. S., 10 Wall. (U. S.) 557, 19 L. ed. 999. Power of congress over navigable waters see infra § 44. 87. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, 6 L. ed. 23. 94 95 another state; but some courts expressly limit this rule to cases arising before the passage of the act of June 18, 1910, placing telegraph companies under federal control, and hold that since the passage of that statute the transmission of a telegraphic message between two points in the same state over a telegraph line which passes out of the state constitutes interstate commerce." Although it is held that the furnishing of commercial credit reports and the sending of the same through the mails do not constitute interstate commerce and that such business is subject to state regulation, the transmission through the mails of books, papers, apparatus, information, and other means of instruction by a correspondence school to pupils in various states is such intercourse as constitutes interstate commerce. So too the sending through the mails from one state to another, according to contract, of information, advice, and prescriptions constitutes interstate com merce. 98 96 97 [36] 9. Business Incidentally Involving, or Connected with, Commerce. While the running of commerce with foreign countries and 88. Philadelphia, etc., SS. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 7 SCt 1118, 30 L. ed. 1200; Lord v. Goodallgible things, but the telegraph transSS., 102 U. S. 541, 26 L. ed. 224. 89. Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230, 7 SCt 857, 30 L. ed. 888; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 T. S. 196, 5 SCt 826, 29 L. ed. 158. Ferry rates, regulation of see infra $121. 90. C. S.-Western Union Tel. Co. v. James, 162 U. S. 650, 16 SCt 934, 40 L. ed. 1105; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Charleston, 153 U. S. 692, 14 SCt 1094, 38 L. ed. 871; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Alabama State Board, 132 U. S. 472, 10 SCt 161, 33 L. ed. 409; Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 8 SCt 1380, 32 L. ed. 311; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U. S. 347, 7 SCt 1126, 30 L. ed. 1187; Wabash, etc.. R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, 7 SCt 4, 30 L. ed. 244; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, 26 L. ed. 1067; Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1, 24 L. ed. 7; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 207 Fed. 1, 124 CCA 573 [aff 201 Fed. 946]; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Mobile, 179 Fed. 955; Sunset Tel., etc., Co. v. Eureka, 172 Fed. 755; St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 39 Fed. 59 [rev on other grounds 148 U. S. 92, 13 SCt 485, 37 L. ed. 380]. Ind.-Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 95 Ind. 12, 48 AmR 692. Kan-State v. Western Union Tel. Co.. 75 Kan. 609, 90 P 299. Md.-Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. State, 110 Md. 608, 73 A 679. Mo.-Reed v. Western Union Tel. Co., 56 Mo. A. 168. And see Kansas City v. McDonald, 175 SW 917 (dictum). Nev.-Western Union Tel. Co. v. Atlantic, etc., States Tel. Co., 5 Nev. 102. N. J. Matter of Pennsylvania Tel. Co.. 48 N. J. Eq. 91, 20 A 846, 27 AmSR 462. Va.-Western Union Tel. Co. v. Bolling, 91 SE 154; Lacey v. Palmer, 93 Va. 159, 24 SE 930, 57 AmSR 795, 31 LRA 822. "That transmission of intelligence by wire is commerce, either state or interstate, is definitely settled and no longer questioned." Western Union Tel. Co. v. Bolling, (Va.) 91 SE 154, 155. [a] Discussion of telegraphic intercourse as commerce.-Although intercourse by telegraphic messages between the states is held to be interstate commerce, it differs in material particulars from that portion of re [b] Stock quotations.—(1) The sending of the quotations of a stock exchange from New York to Boston over wires in the ordinary course of telegraphy is a transaction of interstate commerce. Western Union Tel, Co. v. Foster, 224 Mass. 365, 113 NE 192. (2) However, the distribution by telegraph companies of quotations received from a stock exchange in another state over the ordinary wires by means of tickers, the quotations being transferred by the employees of the telegraph company to these instruments after receipt in the ordinary course of telegraphy, does not constitute interstate Western Union Tel. Co. v. Foster, supra. commerce. Telephone and telegraph as instruments of commerce see infra § 40. Telegraph company as agency of commerce see infra § 58. 91. Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. Com., 218 Mass. 558, 106 NE 310, Ann Cas1916C 214 (holding that the same principle applies as in the case of the transmission of ideas, thoughts, and news by the telegraph operated by electricity conducted through wire as a medium). 92. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. State, 110 Md. 608, 73 A 679; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hughes, 104 Va. 240, 51 SE 225. Validity of state statutes regulating sending, transmission, and delivery of telegrams see infra § 103. 93. Western Union Tel. Co. V. Sharp, 121 Ark. 135. 180 SW 504; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Taylor, 57 Ind. A. 93, 104 NE 771; State v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 N. C. 213, 18 SE 389, 22 LRA 570; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hughes, 104 Va. 240, 51 SE 225. Transportation of freight between termini in same state over route partly in another state see supra § 23. 94. Western Union Tel. Co. V. Bassett. 111 Miss. 468. 71 S 750. 95. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Boll ing, (Va.) 91 SE 154 [foll Western Union Tel. Co. v. Mahone, (Va.) 91 SE 157]. "Inasmuch, however, as under the express provisions of the act to regulate commerce, telegraph and telephone companies are common carriers, these decided cases are conclusive of the question here involved. Since the case of Hanley v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 187 U. S. 617, 23 SCt 214, 47 L. ed. 333, there has been no dissent from the proposition that, although the point of shipment and the point of delivery are within the same state, if during the course of transportation the property passes without the boundaries of the state, such a shipment is interstate commerce. principle we cannot conceive how any different doctrine can be applied to telegraphic messages between points within the state, which in the course of their transmission pass without the state into any other state or the District of Columbia. We conclude, therefore, that under the authorities the message involved herein was interstate commerce." Western Union Tel. Co. v. Bolling, (Va.) 91 SE 154, 155. Upon 96. U. S. Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Com., 139 Ky. 27, 129 SW 314, 47 LRA NS 648 and note, AnnCas1912B 333 and note; State v. Morgan, 2 S. D. 32, 48 NW 314. 97. International Text-Book Co. v. Lynch, 218 U. S. 664, 31 SCt 225, 54 L. ed. 1201 [rev 81 Vt. 101, 69 A 541]; International Text-Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 107, 30 SCt 481, 54 L. ed. 678, 27 LRANS 493 and note, 18 Ann Cas 1103 and note [rev 76 Kan. 328, 91 P 74, and foll International TextBook Co. v. Peterson, 218 U. S. 664, 31 SCt 225, 54 L. ed. 1201 (rev 113 Wis. 302, 113 NW 730, 14 AnnCas 965 and note)] (where the court said: "If intercourse between persons in different States by means of telegraphic messages conveying intelligence or information is commerce among the States, which no State may directly burden or unnecessarily encumber, we cannot doubt that intercourse or communication between persons in different States, by means of correspondence through the mails, is commerce among the States within the meaning of the Constitution, especially where, as here, such intercourse and communication really relates to matters of regular, continuous business and to the making of contracts and the transportation of books, papers, etc., appertaining to such business"); International TextBook Co. v. Gillespie, 229 Mo. 397, 129 SW 922. 98. Peterson v. Hoftiezer, 35 S. D. 101, 150 NW 934 (holding that, where contract holders were entitled to re 99 16 obligation to make title to property in another an agency for the furtherance of commerce is an operation of commerce," every private enterprise which may be carried on chiefly or in part by means of interstate shipments is not necessarily to be regarded as so related to interstate commerce as to come within the regulating power of congress.1 It is not necessarily commerce among the states to carry on a business which may involve transactions of, or in aid of, interstate commerce, or which may become incidentally related to interstate commerce,* or which consists in the supplying of commodities or instrumentalities of commerce. More specifically, commerce does not comprehend the building of ships, the loaning of money, the dealing in bills of exchange, the subscription of stock, the sale of an ceive from a farmers' general service | be matured, or the loan would be company advice through its veteri- paid. It is the usual form of savings nary department, prescriptions found and loan contracts; and is like a polnecessary by its veterinary staff, and icy of insurance which is to be paid information from the company's staff upon the happening of a particular of assistants and correspondents re- event and depends altogether upon lating to scientific farming and hor- the performance of the contract and ticulture, the supplying of such mat- of the responsibility of the parties. ter through the mails constituted It is in no sense interstate commerce"). interstate commerce). 6 99. McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104, 10 SCt 881, 34 L. ed. 392. 1. Addyston Pipe, etc., Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S. 211, 20 SCt 96, 44 L. ed. 136. [a] Sugar refining.-The acquisition of sugar refineries in one state by a corporation created in another state, and the business of refining sugar in the former state, bear no direct relation to commerce between the states or with foreign nations. U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 15 SCt 249, 39 L. ed. 325. 2. Hopkins v. U. S., 171 U. S. 578, 19 SCt 40, 43 L. ed. 290 [rev 82 Fed. 5291; Muskegon v. Hanes, 149 Mich. 460, 112 NW 1077; State v. Preferred Tontine Mercantile Co., 184 Mo. 160, 82 SW 1075; Zachary v. North Carolina R. Co., 156 N. C. 496, 72 SE 858. 3. Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, 12 Set 468, 36 L. ed. 247 [aff 117 N. Y. 1, 22 NE 670, 682, 15 AmSR 460, 5 LRA 559 and note]; Zachary v. North Carolina R. Co., 156 N. C. 496, 72 SE 858; Altoona v. O'Leary, (Pa.)| 98 A 798. [a] Furnishing gas for lighting railroad cars.-A gas company, which manufactures its product within the limits of Pennsylvan'a and sells its entire product within the same limits to a railroad company and a sleeping car company for lighting cars, is not engaged in interstate commerce, although the cars themselves are operated in interstate traffic. Altoona City v. O'Leary, 60 Pa. Super. 159. 4. Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648. 15 SCt 207, 39 L. ed. 297; Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert, 128 Tenn. 417, 161 SW 488. 5. Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. (U. S.) 73, 12 L. ed. 992. 7. Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. (U. S.) 73, 12 L. ed. 992. 8. State v. Schofield, 136 La. 702, 67 S 557. 9. State v. Agey, 171 N. C. 831, 833, 88 SE 726. 20 labor. There is no commodity created of which the ownership is changed. It is simply a personal contract based on a valuable consideration, having no element of a commercial transaction falling within the protection of this clause of the Constitution." Smith v. Jackson, 103 Tenn. 673, 675, 54 SW 981, 47 LRA 416. Imposition of license tax on agent of laundry located in another state see infra § 150. 19. Kansas City v. Seaman, (Kan.) 160 P 1139. "This transaction took place entirely within the State of North Carolina, and is subject to the police power of this State. There can be no interstate commerce unless, as a part of the transaction, there is in contemplation some act of transpor-ligence. But certain services are tation between two or more States. In this case the defendant was selling to a citizen of this State an obligation to make title to real estate in Georgia, and, upon compliance with the terms therein stated, to make title to a certain small lot of land in Georgia. There is nothing to be transported either from this State to Georgia or from Georgia to this State. There is no element of interstate commerce involved." State v. Agey, supra. 10. Portland Co. v. Hall, etc.. Constr. Co., 121 App. Div. 779, 106 NYS 649. 11. American League Baseball Club v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, 149 NYS 6. 12. Standard Home Co. v. Davis, 217 Fed. 904. 13. Delaware, etc., Co. v. Yurkonis, 220 Fed. 429, 137 CCA 23 [app_dism 238 U. S. 439. 35 SCt 902, 59 L. ed. 1397]; Arkansas v. Kansas, etc., Coal Co., 96 Fed. 353 [rev on other grounds 183 U. S. 185, 22 SCt 47, 46 L. ed. 144]. 14. Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U. S 128, 31 SCt 190, 55 L. ed. 128 [aff 182 Fed. 365]. V. 15. Tittabawassee Boom Co. Cunning. How. N. P. (Mich.) 82. 16. State Ala. v. Stripling, 113 120, 21 S 409, 36 LRA 81; Ames v. Kirby, 71 N. J. L. 442, 59 A 558. 17. Peo. v. Klaw, 55 Misc. 72, 106 NYS 341. 18. Smith v. Jackson, 103 Tenn. €73. 54 SW 981, 47 LRA 416. 6. Standard Home Co. v. Davis. 217 Fed. 904 (holding that loans of money by an investment company to its clients for the purpose of enabling them to acquire homes are not commerce); Padgett y. Gulfport Fertilizer Co., 11 Ala. A. 366. 66 S 866; State v. Schofield, 136 La. 702, 67 S 557 (holding that the selling of heretofore unissued bonds is not interstate commerce, as it is not in reality a sale or transaction of commerce, but is merely a contract of loan); State v. Merrill, 83 Wash. 8, 16, 144 P 925 (where, in holding that a savings and loan contract is neither interstate nor foreign commerce. the court said: "The National Mercantile Company Limited mentioned in the information, issued a contract in the usual form of building and loan or savings and loan contracts. The contract provided that, upon a certain rumber of monthly payments a certain loan, would be made in its order upon the contract. That, after a certain rumber of payments, the contract would receive compensation equal to this [a] Reason for rule.-The word "commerce" in the federal constitution "cannot he held to embrace a transaction such as is here presented. It implies, when used by business men, as it is defined by Mr. Webster. the lexicographer, trade or traffic, as in the exchange of specific articles or commodities, or else of these for money or its representative. In a case like the present, nothing in the true commercial sense is sold or exchanged. The agent takes the articles committed to his care, and agrees with the owner that he wi send them across the State line and have certain laber bestowed on them. and, when returned, then he is to [a] Reason for rule.-"It is seriously insisted that interstate commerce has been defined by the federal courts to involve only the transfer of the title to personal property and its transportation, and the business of transporting passengers or intelheld to be commodities. . . . In the ease at bar there was a sale of service involving transportation between the homes of the customers in Kansas and the place where the service was performed in Missouri. Undoubtedly there were some features of the business conducted by the laundry company which involved interstate transactions. The sending of its wagons into another state with agents to collect articles to be laundered, the transporting of the same to its place of business in Missouri, and returning the articles to the owners in Kansas after the work had been completed, involved trade and intercourse. Instances might be multiplied of cases involving transactions between citizens of different states whereby the owner of personal property in one state sends it to an individual, firm, or corporation in another state to have some service or labor performed upon it there, and afterwards to be returned to the owner in Kansas. The collecting and transporting of the thing from one state to another, and the return of it after the labor and service has been performed, is trade and intercourse between citizens of different states. Kansas City v. Seaman, (Kan.) 160 P 1139, 1140. 20. Brodnax v. Missouri, 219 U. s. 285, 31 Set 238, 55 L. ed. 219 [aff 228 Mo. 25, 128 SW 177]: Ware v. Mobile County, 209 U. S. 405, 28 SCt 526. 52 L. ed. 855, 14 AnnCas 1031 and note [aff 146 Ala. 163, 41 S 153, 121 AmSR 21, 14 LRANS 1081]; Hopkins v. U. S. 171 U. S. 578. 19 SCt 40, 43 L. ed. 290 [rev 82 Fed. 529] (basing the decision on the ground that the members of a live stock exchange do not themselves purchase cattle or transport them, but that they simply act as commission merchants in buying and selling cattle and thus furnish a local facility in aid of commerce): Walton v Augusta, 104 Ga. 757, 30 SE 964: Peo. v. Reardon, 184 N. Y. 421, 77 NE 970. 112 AmSR 628 8 LRANS 314, 6 AnnCas 515 [aff 204 U. S. 152, 27 Set 188. 51 Led. 415. 9 AnnCas 736]: Croy v. Obion County, 104 Terr. 525, 58 SW 235. nishing performers or troupes of actors to the owners of theaters situated in various states is only incidentally connected with interstate commerce and does not itself constitute interstate commerce;21 but the contrary has been held as to certain aspects of the business.22 Neither the production nor manufacture of articles or commodities which constitute subjects of commerce, and which are intended for trade and traffic with citizens of other states, nor the preparation for their transportation from the state where they are produced or manufactured prior to the commencement of the actual transfer or transmission thereof to another state, constitutes that interstate commerce which comes within the regulating power of congress.23 It is not an act of interstate commerce to build and rent a bridge for the purpose of interstate commerce. The fact that the yards of a stockyard company are located 78 AmSR 931, 51 LRA 254. To same effect State v. Mohler, 98 Kan. 465, 158 P 408. 21. Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert, 128 Tenn. 417, 161 SW 488. 22. Marienelli v. United Booking Offices of America, 227 Fed. 165, 167 (where, in dealing with the business of a vaudeville booking agency, the court said: "Undeniably certain aspects of the business are interstate commerce, as, for instance, the contracts made by the booking companies under which the performers must go from state to state, throughout the circuit, acting here and there, and fulfilling their contracts as much by the travel as by the acting. Since Wilson v. U. S., 232 U. S. 563, 34 SCt 347, 58 L. ed. 728, and Hoke v. C. S., 227 U. S. 308, 33 SCt 281, 57 L. ed. 523, 43 LRANS 906, AnnCas 1913E 905, it cannot be doubted that this feature of the business was within the complete powers of Congress, for such purposes as it might And to the public interest. This, morover, applies as well to that feature, incidental to the foregoing, which consists in the carriage of the performers' stage properties and paraphernalia from one state to another, a necessary part of the performance of their contracts with the defendants. Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321, 23 SCt 321, 47 L. ed. 492. The same may be said of the scenery and advertising matter sent from state to state by the theaters themselves. In respect of all these details the business, therefore, consists of interstate commerce"). 23. U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 15 SCt 249, 39 L. ed. 325 (where it was said that commerce succeeds to manufacture and is not a part of it); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 9 SCt 6, 32 L. ed. 346; Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. (U. S.) 568, 574, 14 L. ed. 545 (where it is said: "A pretension as far reaching as this, would extend to contracts between citizen and citizen of the same State, would control the pursuits of the planter, the grazier, the manufacturer, the mechanic, the immense operations of the collieries and mines and furnaces of the country"); Diamond Glue Co. v. U. S. Glue Co., 103 Fed. 838 [aff 187 U. S. 611, 23 SCt 206, 47 L. ed. 328]; Arkansas v. Kansas, etc., Coal Co., 96 Fed. 353; U. S. v. Boyer, 85 Fed. 425; In re Greene, 52 Fed. 104. [a] Operating a factory under a contract to market the product on a joint account is not an act of interstate commerce merely because large sales of the product are made in other states. Diamond Glue Co. v. U. S. Glue Co., 103 Fed. 838 [aff 187 U. S. 611, 23 SCt 206, 47 L. ed. 328]. 24. Henderson Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 150, 17 SCt 532, 41 L. ed. 953. 25. Scammon v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 41 Mo. A. 194. [a] Stock in two states.-The 24 27 25 26 on both sides of the division line between two states, so that the stock may pass to and fro over the state line in the yards in feeding, handling, etc., does not of itself impress the business with the character of interstate commerce. Packing houses engaged in slaughtering cattle, sheep, and hogs intended for interstate and foreign commerce are not engaged in interstate commerce. The business of insurance is not commerce, nor interstate commerce, even though the insurer and the insured are of different states,28 and this is true in the case of marine,29 fire,30 and life insurance.31 Therefore insurance companies cannot obtain immunity from state control by claiming that their contracts are of an interstate character.3 Under some circumstances the business of leasing chattels may constitute commerce.33 32 [37] 10. Flight of Wild Fowl. The natural facts that a state line runs through | Parsons, 4 Can, S. C. 215. 26. U. S. v. Boyer, 85 Fed. 425. 27. U. S.-Thames, etc., Ins. Co. Ala.- Continental Ins. Co. V. Kan.-State v. Phipps, 50 Kan. 609, Ky.-Com. v. Gregory, 121 Ky. 256, 89 SW 168, 28 KyL 217, 121 Ky. 458, 89 SW 477, 28 KyL 407. La-State v. Allgeyer, 48 La. Ann. Nebr.-State v. Insurance Co. of N. C.-Fisher v. Traders' Mut. L. 663. CP 704. Pa-List v. Com., 118 Pa. 322, 12 A 277 [writ of error dism 131 U. S. 396, 9 SCt 794, 33 L. ed. 222]. Va.-National Council J. O. A. M. v. State Council J. O. U. A. M., 104 Va. 197, 51 SE 166. Wis.-Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. State, 163 Wis. 484, 155 NW 609, 158 NW 328. Eng.-Russell v. Reg., 7 App. Cas. Can. In re Sections Four, etc., 48 28. New York L. Ins. Co. V. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389, 20 SCt 962. 44 L. ed. 1116 [aff 148 Mo. 583, 50 SW 519, 71 AmSR 628, 53 LRA 305]; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 168, 19 L. ed. 357; State v. Phipps, 50 Kan. 609, 31 P 1097, 34 AmSR 152, 18 LRA 657; State v. Insurance Co. of North America, 71 Nebr. 320, 99 NW 36, 100 NW 405, 102 NW 1022, 106 NW 767; D'Arcy v. Connecticut Mut. L Ins. Co., 108 Tenn. 567, 69 SW 768. a [a] In the leading case on this point the court said: "Issuing policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce. The policies are simple contracts of indemnity against loss by fire. These contracts are not articles of commerce in any 8 Wall. (U. S.) 168, 183, 19 L. ed. 29. Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 15 SCt 207, 39 L. ed. 297; State v. Allgeyer, 48 La. Ann. 104, 18 S 904. 30. Philadelphia F. Assoc. v. New York, 119 U. S. 110, 7 SCt 108, 30 L. ed. 342; Liverpool, etc., L., etc., Ins. Co. v. Oliver, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 566, 19 L. ed. 1029; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 168. 19 L. ed. 357. 31. New York L. Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U. S. 495, 34 SCt 167, 58 L. ed. 332 [aff 43 Mont. 243, 115 P 911]; New York L. Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389, 20 SCt 962, 44 L. ed. 1116; Berry v, Mobile L. Ins. Co., 3 F. Cas. No. 1,358. 32. New York L. Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389, 20 SCt 962, 44 L. ed. 1116 [aff 148 Mo. 583, 50 SW 519, 71 AmSR 628, 53 LRA 305]. 33. U. S. V. United Shoe Mach. Co., 234 Fed. 127, 143, 145; Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Hays, (Mo. A.) 181 SW 1183. To like effect Bogata Mercantile Co. v. Outcault Adv. Co., (Tex. Civ. A.) 184 SW 333. "It may be conceded that every lease is not commerce, but that is not conclusive that none may be. Each case must be determined from the peculiar facts shown to exist in that case. When a corporation with millions of capital, doing an annual business amounting to millions of dollars, sees proper to conduct its business by only leasing its chattels, instead of selling them, why is it |