70

69

COMPLAINANT.68 In practice, one who applies to the courts for legal redress,® as the complaining witness, or private prosecutor in a criminal action;' one who exhibits a bill of complaint. The term is usually applied to describe the complaining party in an equity suit," though "plaintiff" is often used in equity proceedings as well as at law."

71

amount.79

see

59. Rapalje & L. L. D. "Abridgment" distinguished Abridgment 1 C. J. p 340 note 50 [b].

60. See Compilation ante p 237.

61. Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. No. 13,497, 4 McLean 306, 314 (where it is said: "In this the judgment may be said to be exercised to some extent in selecting and combining the extracts. Such a work entitles the compiler, under the statute, to a right of property. This right may be compared to that of a patentee, who, by a combination of known mechanical structures, has produced a new result").

62. See Compiled Statutes post this page; and generally Statutes [36 Cyc 1067]. See also Code 11 C. J. p' 940.

63. Black L. D.

[a] "Code" distinguished. "Such a collection of statutes differs from a code in this, that none of the laws so compiled derives any new force or undergoes any modification in its relation to other statutes in pari materia from the fact of the compilation, while a code is a re-enactment of the whole body of the positive law and is to be read and interpreted as one entire and homogeneous whole." Black L. D. See also Code 11 C. J. p 940.

64. See Complainant post this page; Complaint post this page. 65. Webster D.

[a] "Act complained of."-In an action against a justice of the peace for an act done by him in execution of his office (false imprisonment) it was held that the commitment and not the quashing of the conviction on the application of the party imprisoned is the "act complained of" within the meaning of the term as used in a statute providing that the action must be commenced "within six calendar months next after the act complained of shall have been committed." Haylock v. Sparke, 1 E. & B 471, 484, 72 ECL 471, 118 Reprint 512.

[b] "Complained of" as equivalent to "petitioned against." It has been held that the terms are equivalents, within the meaning of a statute providing that a person who has been elected to office, and who knows that his election will be moved against, can at once, and before his election is complained of, disclaim, and so avoid the delay and expense of a contest. Paterson v. Brown, 11 Man. 612. 615.

66. Webster D.

67. Southern Indiana R. Co. v. Davis, 32 Ind. A. 569, 69 NE 550, 553, 68 NE 191.

68. Complainant: In: Civil case generally see Parties [30 Cyc 21].

69. Black L. D.

70. State v. Bailey, 21 Me. 62, 67 (where it was held that a witness appearing voluntarily before the grand jury and testifying relative to double voting will not be treated as the "complainant," thus rendering his evidence on the trial incompetent, on the ground that he is entitled to half the penalty, where the record does not show that he was the complainant; the complainant must be such throughout; he cannot be a complainant at one stage of the proceedings and cease to be such at another). See also Criminal Law [12 Cyc 292]. 71. Black L. D.

73

77

or

COMPLAINT.74 A term not always limited to charges of crime or wrong, 75 and it may be that, as used in some statutes, it comprehends oral as well as written allegations;76 but, whenever used, it means the making of a statement of fact as the basis for the taking of legal action." As signifying illness, there is no material difference between the words "complaint" and "ailment.'' 78 COMPLEMENT. Full quantity, number, Of a number, the difference between sary. It has been held that the term as used in a statute providing that a county board of equalization should have power to hear complaint, and to equalize valuations by taking from or adding to the value placed on personal property does not mean a formal complaint at law, but that the board might, of its own motion, proceed to make an equalization of valuations. Pulaski County Bd. of Equalization Cases, 49 Ark. 518. 6 SW 1. But see State v. Dodge County, 20 Nebr. 595, 31 NW 117 (where it was held that to justify the board of equalization in increasing the assessment of an individual, a complaint must be made; such complaint, if oral, must be reduced to writing and spread on the records as the foundation of its action, and a mere recital that oral complaint was made to such board, without setting out the complaint, is not sufficient). [b] Election contest distinguished. contest is not a "suit, complaint, or plea," within the meaning of the phrase as used in defining a constitutional jurisdiction of a district court. Williamson v. Lane, 52 Tex. 335, 344. See also Gibson v. Templeton, 62 Tex. 555 (where, in construing the same constitutional provision, it was held that the difference between the contest of an election and a suit for an office was that the former involved a political or rather extrajudicial question, to be regulated by the political authority of the state, while the latter was a suit in the legal meaning of the word).

72. Motley v. Detroit Steel, etc., Co., 161 Fed. 389, 393. 73. Black L. D.

[a] "Plaintiff" distinguished.—(1) In actions at law the complaining-It has been held that an election party is usually known as "plaintiff.' The complaint itself determines whether the action is at law or in equity. The complainant is certainly the plaintiff when he brings suit, and a plaintiff is always a complainant. Motley v. Detroit Steel, etc., Co., 161 Fed. 389, 393. (2) In construing the Illinois Practice Act of 1853, the court said: "And to guard against misapprehension, the terms 'plaintiff' and 'complainant' are used, the former term being applicable to the actor in suits at law, and the latter to the actor in suits in chancery." Railway Pass., etc., Mut. Aid, etc., Assoc. v. Robinson, 147 Ill. 138. 151. 35 NE 168.

74. Complaint: Admiralty proceeding see Admiralty § 184.

Civil action generally see Pleading
[31 Cyc 92].
Criminal prosecution generally see
Criminal Law [12 Cyc 82. 2901.
Equity see Equity [16 Cyc 216].
Quo Warranto proceeding see Quo
Warranto [32 Cyc 1448].

To interstate commerce commission see Commerce ante p 1.

75. See cases infra notes 76, 77. 76. Asbell V. Kan. 610, 613, 66 P 641; Central Pac. R. Edwards, 63 Co. v. Standing, 13 Utah 488, 490, 45 P 344 (holding that, within the meaning of Sess. L. [1890] p 52, providing that the county court shall have power to determine all complaints made in regard to the assessed value of any property, and that on hearing of complaints the board may subpena and administer orders to witnesses, etc., the word "complaints" is not used in the technical sense in which the word "complaint" is used in the civil code, and hence it is not necessary that a formal allegation or charge in writing should be filed in order to confer jurisdiction on the board).

77. Asbell v. Edwards, 63 Kan. 610, 613, 66 P 641 (holding that a notice directed to a sheriff commanding him to place certain cattle in temporary quarantine is not a complaint within the meaning of the term as used in a statute authorizing the sheriff to seize and quarantine cattle on a complaint made to him that such cattle were capable of communicating or liable to impart fever).

78. Providence L. Assur. Soc. v. Reutlinger, 58 Ark. 528, 540, 25 SW 835 [quot McDermott V. Modern Woodmen of America, 97 Mo. A. 636, 658, 71 SW 833]; (where it was held that the object of asking "for what complaint" in a question to an applicant for insurance, "when, and by what physician were you last treated and for what complaint?" was not to ascertain if he had any serious illness or personal injury, but that such words were added to ascertain what the sickness was, without regard to its being serious or trivial, and to show what kind of attendance of a physician was referred to). 79. Webster D.

[a] Complement of land.-It has been held that the term, as used in a statute providing that one who has not purchased one complement of land under this act or former law prior to the filing of his application

87

swears to such a state of facts as to make the presence of defendant at the scene of the crime in some degree improbable, although not reasonably impossible; hence a defend

he has introduced witnesses who testify to a state of facts which render his presence reasonably impossible, whether the witnesses are, in the eyes of the jury, credible or not).

95. Bentley v. Cleaveland, 22 Ala. 814, 817 (where it was held that the word, as used in the statute providing that no decree pro confesso shall be set aside but on filing a full and complete answer to the plea, gives no strength to the sentence, nor does it enlarge the meaning, hence a "full" answer is as extensive a term in describing one which is ample and sufficient as if the term had been "complete," the latter being mere tautology).

85. Webster D. [quot Checotah v. Eufaula, 31 Okl. 85, 94, 119 P 1014]. 86. Webster D. [quot State v. Bissell, 4 Greene (Iowa) 328, 333, per Greene, J., dis. op.].

87. Webster D. [quot Checotah v. Eufaula, 31 Okl. 85, 94, 119 P 1014]. 88. Century D. [quot Honolulu Rapid Transit Co. v. Hawaiian Tramways Co., 13 Hawaii 363, 370]; Webster D. [quot Stewart v. Keteltas, 22 N. Y. Super. 261, 282; Checotah v. Eufaula, 31 Okl. 85, 119 P 1014].

89. Century D. [quot Honolulu Rapid Transit Co. v. Hawaiian Tramways Co., 13 Hawaii 363, 370].

90. Century D. [quot Honolulu Rapid Transit Co. v. Hawaiian Tramways Co., 13 Hawaii 363, 370].

91. Webster D. [quot Checotah v. Eufaula, 31 Okl. 85, 94, 119 P 1014]. 92. Black L. D.

[a] "Correct" compared.-In construing an agreement submitting mutual accounts between the parties to arbitration, with a stipulation that the party should accept the annexed statement of disbursements and collections as correct to date, it was held that the word "correct" could not have meant "complete," so as to exclude all omitted items of disbursements or collections, but that the meaning and intent of the phrase was that the schedule should be taken to be "correct" as far as they went, and as to the items therein specified. Adams v. Macfarlane, 65 Me. 143, 151. See also Correct [10 Cyc 1365].

93. Davis v. Fant, (Tex. Civ. A.) 93 SW 193, 195 (holding that the phrase within the meaning of a contract for the sale of land, requiring the vendors to deliver a "complete abstract" to the vendees, means an abstract that is certified up to date by the abstractor).

94. Smith v. State, 3 Ga. A. 803, 805, 61 SE 737 (holding that the word "complete," as applied to an alibi, has no reference to the quality of the testimony on the subject, but only to the quantity, and that a witness testifies to a complete alibi when he swears to such a state of facts as to make the presence of defendant at the scene of the erime

96. Simon v. Schmitt, 118 NYS 326, 333 (holding that a covenant to renew a lease at an appraised value, although unilateral in the sense that the tenant makes no agreement to make a new lease, can be enforced as a "completed bargain" to the extent of compelling an appraisal as the lease provides).

97. Hunter v. Fry, 2 B. & Ald. 421, 426, 106 Reprint 420 (holding that a charter party requiring a ship of two hundred and sixty-one tons to load a "full and complete cargo" requires the ship to put on board as much goods as she is capable of carrying with safety, not necessarily two hundred and sixty-one tons); Cuthbert v. Cumming, 11 Exch. 405, 408, 156 Reprint 889.

98. Beach Contracts § 1 [quot Kernan v. Carter, 104 SW 308, 309, 31 KyL 865] (where it is said: "The elements of a 'complete contract' are: A lawful subject-matter, a sufficient consideration, and the aggregatio mentium, or natural assent of the parties"). See also 6 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. § 764 [quot Van Dyke v. Norfolk Southern R. Co., 112 Va. 835, 851, 72 SE 659] (where it is said: "The element of completeness denotes that the contract embraces all the material terms; that of certainty denotes that each one of these terms is expressed in a sufficiently exact and definite manner. An incomplete contract, therefore, is one from which one or more material terms have been entirely omitted. An uncertain contract is one which may, indeed, embrace all the material terms, but one or more of them is expressed in so inexact, indefinite or obscure language, that the intent of the parties cannot be sufficiently ascertained to enable the court to carry it into effect"). See also Completeness post p 243. 99.

Ward v. Long, [1906] 2 Ch. 550, 559 (per Kekewich, J.). 1. Thompson v. Chapman, 57 Ga. 16.

2. See Destruction [14 Cyc 232 note 57].

3. McMahon v. Allen, 12 HowPr (N. Y.) 39, 45 [quot Chapman v. Forbes, 123 N. Y. 532, 538, 26 NE 3; Shanks v. National Casket Co., 95 App. Div. 187, 88 NYS 839. 841: Bauer v. Platt, 72 Hun 326, 25 NYS 426, 430; Walsh v. National Broadway Bank, 11 Misc. 249, 32 NYS 734. 735] (holding that the phrase as used in Code Civ. Proc. § 452, provid

4. Imlay v. Huntington, 20 Conn. 146 [quot Mathewson v. Mathewson, 79 Conn. 23, 30, 63 A 285, 289, 5 LRA NS 611, 6 AnnCas 1027] (where the court said: "A married woman incidental to her ownership of a separate estate had power of disposing of her property in equity as a feme sole. It was competent for her to exercise such right in favor of her husband, which power of a married woman in equity over her separate estate is described as 'complete dominion' over her separate property").

5. McGaw v. O'Beirne, 126 La. 584, 588, 52 S 775 (holding that a contract by a former husband with his divorced wife to pay for the "complete education" of the children of the marriage will be construed with reference to the social and financial standing of the parties at the time and in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, and where the former husband was worth about fifteen thousand dollars and a son had been given a six-year preparatory course costing five hundred and twenty dollars, two years in the electrical and mechanical engineering department of a university of the state would be a compliance with the contract, and a three year post-graduate course in a distant university costing three thousand dollars is not required).

6.

Benson Min., etc., Co. v. Alta Min., etc., Co., 145 U. S. 428, 430, 12 SCt 877, 36 L. ed. 762 (holding that the complete equitable title which one may obtain under the mining laws of the United States accrues immediately on purchase, as an entry entitling the purchaser to a patent, and the right to a patent once vested is equivalent to a patent issued).

7. Minier v. Burt County, 95 Nebr. 473, 480, 481, 145 NW 977, 1104 (holding that an act, to be complete in itself within the above rule, must have "but one main and general subject," and must not be in "effect simply amendatory," and such an act does not violate the provision of a state court that "no law shall be amended unless the new act contain the section or sections so amended and the section or sections So amended shall be repealed," although it may by implication repeal or modify some existing statute affecting the general subject of the new act).

8. St. Landry Wholesale Mercantile Co. v. Teutonia Ins. Co., 113 La. 1053, 1059, 37 S 967 (holding that a rough inventory taken in pencil and on tablet paper, subject to revision and correction, and afterward to be copied in ink in a bound book, according to custom, is not a "complete itemized inventory" contemplated by the iron-safe clause of an insurance policy, to be kept in a fire proof safe or other place of security); Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Walker, (Tex. Civ. A.) 153 SW 398, 400 (holding

chine,''

66

that in a provision in a policy that insured should take a "complete itemized inventory of stock on hand,' the word "inventory" had the ordinary meaning of a list or schedule of particular property by article or item, the word "itemized" expressly required the stating of each item or article separately, and the word "complete" required that the list or schedule should be full and not partial, so that it was not necessary that the cost or value of the articles listed both in detail and, in total be given).

9. Murphy v. Collector of Customs, 11 Philippine 456, 458 (holding that a turbine engine and generator, although intended for use in the generation of electricity, do not constitute a complete machine for that purpose, and the component parts must, therefore, be considered separately, such machinery being properly classified as "other-machinery" under subdivision (b) of paragraph 257 of Act No. 230); Murphy v. U. S., 8 Philippine 479 (holding that a traction engine as a part of a threshing machine, for cleaning rice and preparing it for the market, should be considered together as one complete machine and should be classified under par 245 of the Tariff Law of the Philippine Islands at the rate of twentyfive cents per one hundred kilos, gross weight).

10. Seaboard Air-Line R. Co. v. Rock, 133 Ga. 120, 65 SE 288 (where the court, in referring to the communications passing between a train dispatcher and a telegraph operator, and differentiating between a "hold" or "waiting order" and a "complete" order, said: "When the order had been repeated back to the train dispatcher and had been, to use the language of the witnesses, 'OK'd' by him, the order was, under the rules, a 'hold' or waiting order for the train to which it was addressed, requiring that train to be held at the station where the order was received until the order was rendered 'complete.' The further steps necessary to be taken to render the order 'complete,' so as to change it from a 'hold' or waiting order to one for the government of the movement of train, were as follows: When the train arrived at the station where the order was awaiting it, it was the duty of the telegraph operator who had received the order from the dispatcher's office to present the order to the conductor, or other train employee, to whom it was addressed, and have him sign his name in the space at the bottom of the form on which the order was written by the operator, after which the operator was required to repeat the signature, by wire, to the train dispatcher's office and then wait until he received the response 'complete' before presenting the order to the conductor or trainman to whom it was addressed, as a complete or final order; the operator being required to enter the word 'complete' upon the order and the time when this word was received from the train dispatcher"). 11. See Complete Purchaser infra text and notes 27, 28.

V.

12. Central Trust Co. v. Condon, 67 Fed. 84, 91, 14 CCA 314 (holding that a contract to build and "complete" a railroad does not impose on the contractor an obligation to equip it with rolling stock). 13. Everett-Ridley-Regan Co. Traders' Ins. Co., 121 Ga. 228, 229, 48 SE 918, 104 AmSR 99 (holding that a clause in a fire policy, requiring the insured to keep a set of books which shall present "a complete record of business transacted, including all purchases, sales, and shipments, both for cash and credit," is not complied

66

14. See Equity [16 Cyc 106]. 15. Finch v. State, 6 Ga. A. 388, 64 SE 1007 (holding that a sale of whisky in Georgia since Jan. 1, 1908, whether for cash or on credit, or whether subsequently paid for or not, constitutes a violation of law). To same effect Cook v. State, 124 Ga. 653, 53 SE 104; Lupo v. State, 118 Ga. 759, 45 SE 602. See also W. R. Trigg Co. v. Bucyrus Co., 104 Va. 79, 51 SE 174 (holding that on delivery of machinery and payment of the first installment of the purchase price there was a "completed sale," and not a mere ballment of the machinery).

16. Rosenbaum v. Moller, 85 Tenn. 653, 657, 659, 4 SW 10 (holding that Code § 2733, requiring a full and complete schedule to be filed with every assignment by a debtor, does not require a minute and detailed inventory of every article, and where a stock of goods, wares, and merchandise conveyed are scheduled as consisting of "dry goods, boots, shoes, hats,

caps, gentlemen's furnishing goods, clothing, notions, trunks, valises," it is a sufficient schedule within the meaning of the statute).

17. Giltinan v. Lehman, 65 N. J. L. 668, 670, 48 A 540 (where the court, in differentiating between the phrases "complete searches of title" and "title insurance," said: "A brief consideration of the precise meaning of the term 'title insurance,' as distinguished from 'complete searches' of title, as it has grown to be applied and adapted to the security of titles will, I think, satisfy any one that they are not in their essence equivalent terms. That title insurance' has a much broader scope will be evident from a simple definition of its effects. The business of title insurance properly belongs to, and in fact, has fallen into the care and control of financial corporations of large capital and

ex

established responsibility that have, practically, perpetual chartered life, empowering them to issue policies of insurance of titles, operative without limit as to time, i. e., enforceable at any future period as fixed by certain conditions pressed in the policies. In consideration of the payment of cash premiums, the amount of which is fixed by special agreement, guided by rates proportional to the amount insured, these companies issue such policies to owners of lands, or to their mortgagees, agreeing to insure the party interested and his transferees, his heirs, devisees and personal representatives, against all loss or damage, not exceeding the sum named in the policies, which the insured shall sustain, not only by reason of any defects of title, or from encumbrances affecting the designated property, but also against all loss or damage by reason of the unmarketability of the title of the insured in the premises. By force of such policies the liability of the insuring companies extends, not merely in favor of the contracting party and his heirs, &c., but also in favor of any third person to whom he may have transferred the policy; it also extends to defects of title, and to the existence of any encumbrance, whether discoverable or not, by the most thorough and complete searches, provided only that any judgment adverse to the title shall be pronounced, under the conditions named, by any competent court.

encumbrance of lands by these companies must, therefore, in order to protect them against possible losses, reach to facts beyond the range of searches however complete, such as the existence of easements which do not depend upon express grants; the numerous conditions and circumstances constituting title, or encumbrance, arising from the adverse possession of parties not of record, and to many other like matters easily conceivable which complete searches might not disclose, but which might be sufficient to cast a cloud upon the titles and affect, more or less seriously, their market values-a cloud sufficient, perhaps, to deter a bona fide purchaser from buying and cause him to reject the title because of it. Thus it will be perceived that owners of lands, who have become bound by their agents to procure title insurance at the demand of loaning parties, might be obliged to incur an expense not confined to, or at all regulated by, the proper fees and cost of complete searches-an expense enhanced by the additional value of the protection from the consequences of undiscovered defects which the larger resources and longer life of broad terms of the policies and the the insuring companies would afford beyond any indemnification possible to be secured by the responsibility of certified searches. Owners agreeing to furnish such insurance must, ex necessitate, lay bare their titles to the disclosure of every shadow which, though not amounting to defects, may impair the reputation, and consequently the vendibility of their titles.

Indeed, the very success of their applications for loans from any sources might thence depend and they thus be subjected to risks of failure they could not have originally contemplated. But, not to prolong this opinion unduly, I think it is already sufficiently apparent that the making of complete searches of title of landed property and the furnishing of title insurance therefor, are distinctly different essences").

18. Slidell v. Grandjean, 111 U. S. 412, 417, 4 SCt 475, 28 L. ed. 321 (holding that the term as used in Spanish grants means those instruments which constitute evidence of title and not the estate or interest thereby conveyed, as where the governor of a province, on approving a cession of land by Indian tribes, granted the lands to the purchasers, directing them to apply to him for "a complete title"); Teddlie v. McNeely, 104 La. 603, 29 S 247, 249 (holding that a complete title, in the sense that complete Spanish or French titles required no confirmation by the government of the United States, was one where the terms of the granting act or concession not only sufficed to convey the land, but which so described it as to identify and locate it, or following the inchoate grant or concession, and before the cession from France, that was done in the way of a survey or act of location which identified and segregated it from the mass of other lands, and thus perfected the title).

19. Dingey v. Paxton, 60 Miss. 1038, 1054 [cit Blackstone Comm.] (where it was said: "A complete title to land consists of juris et sesinæ conjunctio; the possession, the right of possession and the right of property"). See also Ehle v. Quackenboss, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 537 (where it was held that the question of actual possession of lands is not one of title, within the meaning of the statute providing that a justice of the peace shall have no jurisdiction of cases involving the title of land).