A party may also appear for himself or by means of his agent or attorney in fact in proceedings for arbitration, conciliation, etc., in justice of the peace and other minor causes, interlocutory matters, formal proceedings and those involving only voluntary jurisdiction. Acceptance of authority to appear is presumed from its exercise, and having accepted it a procurador is bound to conduct the cause in conjunction with an abogado. Such authority continues until revoked or voluntarily withdrawn, or until the litigant or the procurador dies or the former discontinues the action or defense, transfers his interest in the litigation, or his capacity ceases or the suit is terminated.10 The courts are empowered and directed to provide gratuitous representation for impecunious litigants.11

COMPARENDO. In Spanish law, a citation to a defendant, civil or criminal, to appear; used more commonly in ecclesiastical courts.12

COMPARICION. In Spanish law, one of several terms for appearance; also the written order of the judge directing one's appearance.13

COMPARISON.14 The act of comparing;15 an examination of two or more objects with the view of discovering the resemblance or differences; 16 the act of bringing together for the purpose of observing, not only likenesses, but differences as well;17 relative estimate.18 A familiar mode of comparison is the contrast.19

COMPARTE. In Spanish law, one who is jointly interested with another as a party to a cause, civil or criminal.20

If there is no letrado in the vicinity the judge may dispense with this requirement. In the absence of a notary public in the town the procurador may appear before the judge stating the conditions of his authority. In the absence of a procurador a litigant may have any literate citizen of the town of lawful age and enjoying civil rights as his representative conferring authority as already provided. Spanish L. Civ. Proc. art 3.

8. Spanish L. Civ. Proc. art 4. In certain proceedings, including those for conciliation, a litigant may also avail himself of the aid of law yers as next friends (hombres buenos) or attorneys in fact. Spanish L. Civ. Proc. art 11.

9. Spanish L. Civ. Proc. art 5. 10. Spanish L. Civ. Proc. art 9. 11. Spanish L. Civ. Proc. art 13

et seq.

12. Escriche Diccionario, 13. Escriche Diccionario. 14. Comparison of hands or handwriting see Evidence [17 Cyc 163183].

15. Webster D. [quot Johnson v. Des Moines L. Ins. Co., 105 Iowa 273, 276, 75 NW 101].

16. Webster D. [quot Johnson v. Des Moines L. Ins. Co., 105 Iowa 273, 276, 75 NW 101].

[a] "Construction" compared. Strictly, the term [construction] signifies determining the meaning and proper effect of language by a consideration of the subject-matter and attendant circumstances in connection with the words employed.' It is by comparison of two documents that we have ascertained the differences between them, while by construction we determine whether the differences are such as that the purported copy is or is not a substantial copy of the original." Johnson v. Des Moines L. Ins. Co., 105 Iowa 273, 276, 277, 75 NW 101. 17. Baker's Succ., 129 La. 74, 75, 55 S 714, AnnCas1912D 1181.

18. Webster D. [quot Johnson v. Des Moines L. Ins. Co., 105 Iowa 273, 276, 75 NW 101].

19. Baker's Succ., 129 La. 74, 75, 55 S 714, AnnCas1912D 1181.

20.
21.

Escriche Diccionario.
Wharton L. Lex.

22. See also Dip [14 Cyc 290];
Mines and Minerals [27 Cyc 537].
. 23. King v. Amy, etc., Cons. Min.
Co., 9 Mont. 543, 566, 24 P 200.

[a] Variations in the direction of
the dip. "The dip, in different veins,
and in the same vein sometimes,
varies from a perpendicular to the
earth's surface to an angle, perhaps,
only a few degrees below the hori-
zon. The dip is spoken of from
three different points of view:-1.
As to its inclination from a perpen-
dicular or a horizontal, as so many
degrees from the perpendicular or
from the horizontal. Α vein is
thus described as having a dip
of 20 degrees, 30 degrees, etc. 2.
As to the direction it takes from
the strike or apex, by the points_of
the compass. If the strike were due
east and west, and the vein in its
course downward departed from the
perpendicular at an angle, so that a
perpendicular shaft sunk at the apex
would leave the vein to the north of
such shaft, the dip, in this point of
view, would be said to be due north,
or, the conditions reversed, due
south. In this respect the dip-that
is, the direction of the dip-is said
to be, and is, at right angles to the
strike. 3. The dip is again spoken
of as the portions of the vein suc-
cessively encountered in going down
and away from the apex. The miner
follows the dip when he works down-
ward, leaving the apex further from
and above him at each advance. He
follows the strike when he works
lengthways of the vein on a level;
that is, when he is advancing along
the vein, neither rising towards the
surface of the ground nor descend-
ing, but going on a level with the
plane of the earth's surface." King
v. Amy, etc., Cons. Min. Co., 9 Mont.
543, 565, 24 P 200.

24. Black L. D.

36. Century D.

[a] As equivalent to "make.”— Where defendant testified that his brother said that he was going to "ask" decedent to apologize, but it was shown that defendant's mother stated that defendant's brother said that he would "make" decedent apologize, it was held that an instruction that, if defendant and his brother armed themselves intending to compel decedent to apologize and, on his failing so to do, killed him, they would be guilty of murder was not objectionable, since the two words are practically synonymous. Pipkin v. State, (Ark.) 97 SW 61, 63.

[b] As synonymous with "require."-It has been held that the term, as used in a statute providing that a "subpoena shall be issued as follows: To require attendance before a court. To require attendance out of court, before a judge, referee, before whom the attendance is required. To require attendance before a commissioner appointed to take testimony," is synonymous with "compel," and it was not the intention of the act to request. Meagher v. Van Zandt, 18 Nev. 230, 234, 2 P 57.

37.

St. Clair v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 29 Mo. A. 76, 86 (where it was said: "As employed in the instruction, it is not conceivable that it could have conveyed any other im

25. Black L. D. [cit 4 Blackstone pression to the mind of the jury than Comm. 76].

26. Stroud Jud. D.

27. Rapalje & L. L. D.

28. Black L. D.

29.

Compatibility:

Of offices see Officers [29 Cyc 1381

that the two words ["forced" and "compelled"] were used interchangeably and meant about one and the same thing").

[a] "Compelled to disclose."-It has been held that the provision of

that system the practice did not exist as a matter
of right but its application was discretionary with
the judex.53 Later the praetor applied it by incor-
porating into the formula, which he prepared for
the judex, an exceptio doli, that is, an authoriza-
tion to take into account any circumstance which
would render inequitable the enforcement of the
claim.54
The effect was to cause a dismissal of the
claim, however large, if a counterclaim, however
small, were proven and the indirect result was to
compel the actor (plaintiff) to deduct the counter-
claim in advance.55 A rescript of Marcus Aurelius
made such an exceptio self-operating.56 And under
the Justinian law a counterclaim came to have the
effect of suspending the original claim and of can-
celing it pro tanto when confirmed by a judgment.57
[2] 2. In the Modern Law. The doctrine has
been embodied into the modern codes of civil-law
countries, and has also been adopted in principle

58

Rev. St. § 4075, that no physician | court said: "The constitution means
or surgeon shall be "compelled to dis- just what a fair and reasonable in-
close" any information acquired interpretation of its language imports.
his professional capacity, which was No person shall be compelled to be a
necessary to enable him to prescribe witness, that is to testify, against
for a patient, is for the benefit of himself. To use the common phrase,
the patient, and renders the informa- it 'closes the mouth' of the prisoner.
tion privileged, so that the physician A defendant in a criminal case can-
not only cannot be "compelled to dis- not be compelled to give evidence
close" it, but will not be allowed to under oath or affirmation or make
disclose it, without patient's consent. any statement for the purpose of
Boyle v. Northwestern Mut. Relief proving or disproving any question
Assoc., 95 Wis. 312, 320, 70 NW 351. at issue before any tribunal, court.
[b] "Compelled to pay."-It has
judge or magistrate. This is the
been held
shield under which he is protected
that the term means
"whatever by legal process he shall
by the strong arm of the law, and
be obliged to pay, without reference
this protection was given, not for the
to the laws of any particular State." purpose of evading the truth, but, as
Parker v. Thompson, 3 Pick. (Mass.)
before stated, for the reason that in
429, 432. See also Burbank v. Slink-
the sound judgment of the men who
ard, 53 Ind. 493, 495 (where the court
framed the constitution it was
said: "It is a maxim of the law, thought that owing to the weakness
that what one may be compelled to
of human nature and the various mo-
do by suit, he may do without suit. tives that actuate mankind, a de-
No good purpose would have been
fendant accused of a crime might be
subserved by withholding payment tempted to give testimony against
until suit and judgment; but pay-
himself that was not true." State
ment without suit saved useless liti- v. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79, 83, 33 AmR
gation and unnecessary costs. We
530. See also Peo. v. Courtney, 94
are of opinion that where the officer
N. Y. 490 (discussing the same ques-
is liable to the judgment-creditor, tion).
and the latter claims payment of
him, which is accordingly made, the
payment is compulsory, within the
spirit and intent of the statute. All
the analogies of the law, it seems to
us, favor this construction"); Rosen-
baum v. Rosenbaum, 82 Miss. 454,
458, 34 S 324 (holding that the words
"compelled to pay,' in a contract
whereby it was agreed that the party
of the second part's balance of the
purchase money should be held by
the parties of the first part to be ap-
plied to one third of whatever sums
of money the parties of the first 'part
might be compelled to pay on certain
debts, cannot be construed to require
defendants to pay only such claims
as final judgment had been rendered
for; what defendants were legally
bound to pay is what the contract
meant): Taylor v. Coon, 79 Wis. 76,
85, 48 NW 123 (holding that the
words "called upon to pay," as em-
ployed in an agreement, are the
equivalent of "compelled or required
to pay").

[c] "Compelled to be a witness against himself."-It has been held that to compel a defendant to exhibit his arm in such a manner as to show tattoo marks which, a witness testified, he knew were there, the identity of defendant being the question at issue, was not in violation of a state constitution prohibiting the state from compelling one to be a witness against himself, and the

38. Haworth v. Seevers Mfg. Co.,
87 Iowa 765, 776, 51 NW 68, 62 NW
325.

39. Haworth v. Seevers Mfg. Co.,
87 Iowa 765, 776, 51 NW 68, 62 NW
325 (approving the use of the word
in an instruction in an action for
damages for injuries to an employee
from a defective scaffolding, submit-
ting to the jury the question as to
whether or not defendants were neg-
ligent in directing and compelling
plaintiff to go upon the scaffolding).
A maxim meaning "Abbrevia-
tions are detriments." Wharton L.
Lex. [cit Coke Litt. 305, where it is
further said: "It is ever good to
rely on the book at large, for many
times compendia sunt dispendia"].
41. See Compilation post p 237.
42. Black L. D. See also Abridg-
ment 1 C. J. p 340.
Black L. D.

40.

43.

44.

45.

Black L. D.

Black L. D. See also Com-
pensation post p 229.

46. Black L. D. See Set-Off and
Counterclaim [34 Cyc 632].
47. Black L. D.

crediti inter se contributio. Justinian Dig. lib XVI, II, I [quot Modestinus].

the the

an

[a] Another definition-A proceeding resembling a set-off in common law, being a claim on part of the defendant to have amount due him from the plaintiff deducted from his demand. Black L. D. [cit Dig. 16, 2; Inst. 4, 6, 30, 39; 3 Blackstone Comm. 305]. 53. Sohm Rom. L. (3d ed) 458. 54. Sohm Rom. L. (3d ed) 459. 55. Sohm Rom. L. (3d ed) 459. 56. Sohm Rom. L. (3d ed) 459. 57. Sohm Rom. L. (3d ed) 462, 463.

"When compensation is opposed by the defendant to the demand of the plaintiff, it generally happens that the plaintiff recovers less than what he demands, for the judge proceeding on equitable principles, may deduct from the demand of the plaintiff whatever he owes under the same head to the defendant, and may condemn the defendant to pay the remainder only, as has been already observed." Justinian Inst. lib IV tit VI 39.

et seq.

58. Spain. Civ. Code art 1195 et seq. Louisiana.-Rev. Civ. Code art 2207 "The plea of compensation is one that should be favored as far as the law will permit, as it prevents law suits, and enables parties in one suit to adjust many difficulties." Durnford's Succ., 8 Rob. (La.) 488, 498.

Italy. Civ. Code art 1285 et seq.
Mexico. Civ. Code art 1684 et seq.
Montenegro.-Gen. Code Prop. 615

et seq.

Netherlands.-Civ. Code art 1461

et seq.

Portugal.-Civ. Code art 1165 et
Uruguay. Civ. Code art 1458 et

seq.

seq.

*By CHARLES SUMNER LOBINGIER, Ph. D., LL. M; Judge of the United States Court for China; Professorial Lecturer in Law, University of the Philippines. Sometime Judge of the Court of First Instance, Philippines; Member Nebraska Supreme Court Commission; Professor of Law in the University of Nebraska. Author of "The People's Law" (the Macmillan Co. 1909), "Philippine Practice” (1907), "The Evolution of the Civil Law" (1915), "Territories" 38 Cyc 191, and other articles in legal encyclopedias.

by statute in England and other common-law jurisdictions.

60

Under the French law compensation may be (1) legal (by operation of law), (2) by way of exception (claimed in a pleading) and (3) by reconvention.61

Distinguished from other remedial rights. The last named remedy can be pleaded only of a claim connected with the original demand.62 There is authority for applying the same rule to compensation. But compensation is otherwise distinguished from reconvention," as well as from set-off.65

64

[3] B. Requisites-1. Relationship of Parties. Both parties must be equally interested in the respective claims;66 hence as a rule compensation is not effected between a claim prosecuted by a part

Venezuela. Civ. Code art 1252 et

No. 347.

Droit Civ. VII

62. Louisiana.-Coco v. Guyral, 36 La. Ann. 293; Mills v. Fellows, 30 La. Ann. 824; Moss v. Munn, 28 La. Ann. 574; Murphy v. McCarthy, 26 La. Ann. 38; Nuzum v. Gore, 24 La. Ann. 208; Hope v. Howard, 19 La. Ann. 465; Hynson v. Wheeler, 15 La. Ann. 409; D'Armond v. Pullen, 13 La. Ann. 137; Morgan v. Lathrop, 12 La. Ann. 257; Pi v. Vidal, 5 La. Ann. 303; Hamilton v. Hurst, 5 La. Ann. 150; Phelps V. Stone, 3 La. Ann. 617: Senecal v. Smith, 9 Rob. 418; Jonah V. Ferrand, 2 Rob. 216; Bayne v. Fox, 18 La. 80; Wilcoxon v. Buford, 10 La. 183; Fagot v. Porche, 7 La. 562; Lacoste v. Bordere, 7 Mart. N. S. 516.

Texas.-Duncan V. Magette, 25 Tex. 245; Carothers v. Thorp, 21 Tex. 358; Egery v. Power, 5 Tex. 501; Britton v. Thrash, 1 Tex. A. Civ. Cas. § 1237.

63. "The absence of all kind of connection between two claims, is an insurmountable obstacle to a demand in compensation or reconvention." Fagot v. Porche, 7 La. 562, 564. Compare Patterson v. New Orleans, 20 La. Ann. 106. But see Hutchings v. Johnson, 19 La. 437.

64. [a] Distinguished from "reconvention." "There exists, no doubt, a telling disparity between a demand in reconvention and one in compensation. The former may or may not admit the main demand; generally it denies it. The latter impliedly confesses it. Whatever the difference be, however, it does not in the least follow that a demand which might have been set up in reconvention cannot be formulated as one in compensation. When presented under the last term, the main demand is admitted and the burden of proving extinguishment and consequent release from the principal obligation is then assumed by and rests upon the defendant, who sets up the plea invariably at his risk and peril." Per Bermudez, C. J., in Noble v. Flower, 36 La. Ann. 737, 741.

67

69

nership and one due defendant from an individual partner. But it has been held that an individual partner's claim may be compensated by one due defendant from the partnership.68 Under the Roman law, a claim against a principal debtor could not be compensated by a debt due his surety from the creditor, although the surety might offset to the creditor's demand a claim against the latter by the principal debtor.70 The modern codes generally preserve these doctrines."1 Under the French law, a joint and several debtor cannot set off what his creditor owes a codebtor.72 Nor can an individual debt compensate a partnership claim.73 But if the codebtor assents to compensation it may be allowed by way of exception.74 And the individual debt of a joint contractor may be pleaded in compensation of creditor or debtor. This principle | what you owe me. Patrick answers, is unknown to the common-law juris- pay me also what you owe me. Bliss prudence, except in the single in- rejoins, it is the partnership of Jones stance of running accounts between and Bliss that owes you. Patrick merchants, and by analogy we felt can successfully respond, that is ourselves authorized, in the case of true; but you, also, are my debtor Hall v. Hodges, 2 Tex. 323, to ex- for that very debt. As a commercial tend it to running accounts between partner, you are bound to me in parties not merchants. Set-off was solido. Had I chosen to bring also unknown to the common law. suit against you alone, not joining Each party was left to his cross- either the partnership or Jones as coaction for the collection of their re- defendants with you, I could have spective debts. It is the creation of maintained my action. How, then, the statute. (Richardson, Judge, in can you refuse me the right to use Chandler v. Drew, 6 N. H. 469, 26 that as a means of defense which I AmD 704). Our statute authorizing could have used as a means of atdiscounts and set-offs does not in- tack? It must be borne in mind, that troduce the civil-law doctrine of the motive of the law of compensacompensation; and as the common tion is, to avoid useless transfers law is the law of our court in regu- of money, and circuity of action." lating rights and remedies accruing But see Abat v. Penny, 19 La. Ann. since the introduction of the common 289; Walsh v. Wells, 7 La. 337. law, we do not feel authorized to extend the principle of compensation beyond what we have heretofore done." Holliman v. Rogers, 6 Tex. 91, 98.

289.

66. Abat v. Penny, 19 La. Ann.
Mc-
322;

V.

196;

67. Louisiana.-Smith
Micken, 3 La. Ann. 319,
Lewis V. Moore, 9 Rob.
Morton V. Graham, 11 La. 449;
Blanchard v. Cole, 8 La. 160; Terran
v. De Lastra, 2 La. 324; Ward v.
Brandt, 11 Mart. 331, 13 AmD 352.
France.-Pardessus pt 4 tit 1 c 1

§ 3.

a

70.

Mackenzie Rom. L. 280. 71. Spain.-Civ. Code arts 1196 (1), 1197; Sentence Supr. Trib. March 21, 1898, 83 Jur. Civ. 679.

Louisiana.-Rev. Civ. Code art 2211. A surety on an appeal bond can set up by way of compensation a judgment recovered by his principal against plaintiff. Ellis v. Fisher, 10 La. Ann. 479. A husband's debt cannot be pleaded in compensation of his wife's demand in her own right. Defau v. Pelane, 15 La. 273. Philippine. Civ. Code arts 1196 (1), 1197.

Porto Rico.-Civ. Code §§ 1164 (1), 1165.

Argentina.-Civ. Code art 819 et

68. Louisiana.-Ellis v. Fisher, 10 La. Ann. 479; Bliss v. Patrick, 6 La. Ann. 546, 547, the court saying: "There is a just and satisfactory reason for the well settled doctrine, that a debtor of the partnership cannot, when sued, plead in compensation a debt due to him by one of the partners individually. Corpus societatis aget, non ille. It is the partnership that sues, not the partner. What is the partnership? It is a moral being, distinct from the persons who compose it. Tictæ cujasdam personæ vicen obtinet. All its assets, including, of course, all debts due to it, are a fund which, in legal contemplation, does not belong to the individuals who compose it. Their interest is merely residuary. The fund belongs to the partnership; is affected by a lien, or preference, in favor of partnership creditors; and is not to be applied to the individual benefit of 1464. member of the firm, except upon a partition, after a full settlement of the partnership liabilities. When, therefore, a debtor of 65. [a] Distinguished from "set-off." the firm attempts to set off a debt -"Some confusion has arisen on this of an individual partner, he subsubject by confounding compensa- stantially attempts to abstract so tion with set-off. The former is an much from the assets of the partacknowledged principle of the civil- nership, in violation of the rights of law jurisprudence. Whenever there partnership creditors, and of the were cross-debts, as soon as it oc- other partners, and apply it to the curred, without the act of either individual use of the partner who is party, or even their knowledge at the his debtor. But the case before us time of the existence of such cross- is a very different one. Patrick atdebts, it by operation of the law tempts to violate no right of the struck the balance between the par- partnership of Jones and Bliss, or of ties. A demand so held was pay- its creditors. He seeks not to ment to the extent of its amount, abstract anything from the social and the balance defined the character' fund. Bliss says to him, pay

Portugal. Civ. Code arts 772, 775.
Uruguay.-Civ. Code arts 1460,

Venezuela.-Civ. Code art 1253 et

seq.

72. Louisiana.-Rev. Civ. Code art 2211; Dick v. Byrne, 7 Rob. 465, 466. France. Civ. Code art 1294.

73. Louisiana.-Smith V. McMicken, 3 La. Ann. 319; Blanchard v. Cole, 8 La. 153; Terran v. De Lastra, 2 La. 324; Ward V. Brandt, 11 Mart. 331, 13 AmD 352; Thomas v. Elkins, 4 Mart. 376; Smith v. Duncan, 1 Mart. 24.

France.-Pardessus Droit Commercial pt 4 tit 1 c 1 § 3..

74. Louisiana.-Dick v. Byrne, 7 Rob. 465.

France.-Pothier Obligations pt 2

No. 594.

to be set off against liquidated
ones. Sucrerie Centrale Coloso v.
Esteves, 4 Porto Rico Fed. 25;
Esteves v. Sucrerie Central Coloso,
2 Porto Rico Fed. 422; Fuster v.
Cuello, 2 Porto Rico Fed. 183.

75. Langfitt v. Clinton, etc., R. | Rico has allowed unliquidated claims Co., 2 Rob. (La.) 217, 223, the court saying: "The plaintiffs do not anywhere, either in their pleadings or in the contracts, show that they were partners in any description of partnership known to the law. They are co-contractors or joint obligors, each entitled to his particular share or portion, and as such, we are of opinion that the individual debt of any one of them may be compensated against his share or virile portion."

Texas.-Howard v. Randolph, 73
Tex. 454, 11 SW 495; Egery v. Power,
5 Tex. 501; Campbell v. Park, 11 Tex.
Civ. A. 455, 33 SW 754.

Chili. Civ. Code art 1656.
Colombia.-Civ. Code art 1715.
France.-Civ. Code art 1291.
82. Louisiana.-Rev. Civ. Code art
2209; Goldman v. Goldman, 47 La.
Ann. 1463, 17 S 881; Case v. March-
and, 23 La. Ann. 60; Case v. Hender-
son, 23 La. Ann. 49, 8 AmR 590 (the
two cases last cited were overruled
on another point in Gordon v. Müchler,
34 La. Ann. 604); Hope v. Howard,
19 La. Ann. 465; Baldwin v. Handy,
McG. 189; Godbold v. Harrison, McG.
31.

France.-Toullier Droit Civ. VII

Quebec.-Walshaw v. Rosenfield, 24 Que. Super. 80; Naud v. Marcotte, 2 Que. Pr. 135 [aff 15 Que. Super. 360].

83. Phillips v. W. T. Adams Mach. Co., 52 La. Ann. 442, 27 S 65 (contractual damages); Goldman v. Goldman, 51 La. Ann. 761, 25 S 555; Goldman v. Goldman, 47 La. Ann. 1463, 17 S 881; Burbridge v. Anderson, 32 La. Ann. 877; Berens v. Ker, 28 La. Ann. 96 (attorney's fees); Pike v. Wells, 24 La. Ann. 208 (general damages); Naquin v. Durac, 22 La. Ann. 249; Coleman v. Marble, 9 La. Ann. 476 (open accounts unacknowledged); Owen v. Vanderslice, 9 La. Ann. 189; Pi v. Vidal, 5 La. Ann. 303; Phelps v. Stone, 3 La. Ann. 617; New Orleans Gaslight, etc., Co. v. Hill, 2 La. Ann. 402 (open accounts); Fagot v. Porche, 7 La. 562 (advances, etc.).

[a] The holder of a dishonored check cannot oppose his claim in compensation of a note given by him to the bank which refuses to pay the check. Case v. Henderson, 23 La. Ann. 49, 8 AmR 590.

84. Jonau v. Ferrand, 3 Rob. (La.) La. Ann. 526, 527. Compare Benton 364. 2 Rob. 216.

85. Pike v. Wells. 24 La. Ann. 208; Greene v. Johnson, 21 La. Ann. 464; Hereford v. Babin, 14 La. Ann. 333; New Orleans v. Cordeviolle, 10 La. Ann. 734; Hart v. Cannon, 10 La. Ann. 721; Copley v. Lambeth, 9 Rob. (La.) 137; Havard v. Stone, 5 Mart. N. S. (La.) 126, 127 (the court saying: "It is only when the debt due is liquidated, or susceptible of immediate liquidation, that the defendant can offer it in compensation of an execution; the time given by the Spanish law is ten days. See the