or to bring an action against the seller. The maxim, caveat emptor is equally applicable to a purchaser of a racehorse as to any other commodity.

To entitle a purchaser to repudiate the sale and return the horse, and demand back the price, he must prove one of two things.

First. That by the terms of the bargain it was agreed, that in the event of the horse not turning out as represented, or having engagements, or of there being unpaid stakes or forfeits due for him, the purchaser should be at liberty to return him; or in other words, that the sale was conditional upon the horse turning out as represented, and upon his engagements and all unpaid stakes and forfeits being fully disclosed: or,

Secondly. That he was induced to purchase by the fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment by the seller, or his agent, of matter material to be known by the purchaser, to enable him as a prudent man to make his bargain.

But in order to entitle the purchaser, in any case, to return the horse and recover back his purchase-money, he must repudiate the contract immediately he becomes aware of the circumstances which entitle him to return it; and he must also be in a condition to return the horse in

the same state and condition as he was at the time he was received.

For a simple breach of warranty the only remedy is an action for damages; the measure of such damages being the difference between the horse as he really was at the time of the sale, and the value of which he would have been had he been as he was warranted to be; and also such expenses as have been fairly and reasonably incurred by reason of that breach of warranty.

Subject to what has already been stated, a purchaser who has been induced by the fraud of the seller to purchase a horse may either return him and recover back the price, or sue for the damages which he has sustained.

For a mere representation made without fraud, which turns out to be untrue, the purchaser has no remedy whatever.

As a general rule it may be taken that, in all cases, where there is no writing binding the parties, the question whether there was a warranty or not-or whether there was fraud on the part of the seller, is one of fact to be determined by a jury, if the parties do not agree upon any other tribunal to settle their differences.

ON THE OFFICE OF STEWARD.

It will be well for every gentleman who undertakes the duties of a Steward at a county race meeting to be informed of the liabilities he takes upon himself in accepting that office, and of the rights and privileges conferred upon him by virtue of it.

In law, a Steward is liable in respect of all things done or ordered in his name, by his authority, either expressly or impliedly given; and he cannot shelter himself from that liability by proving that the funds at his disposal are inadequate to the demands upon him, unless, indeed, he can also prove that the persons whose claims are in question agreed to look to the funds alone, and not to the individual responsibility of the Stewards.

A Steward is not bound to make good any deficiency in the stakes advertised to be run for. Nor is he the person to whom the winner can look in law for payment of the stakes won, unless he, or any agent of his, has received the money. The Clerk of the Course usually is the person with whom the stakes are deposited as stakeholder, and he, as such stakeholder, is independently respon

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sible for all moneys which come to his hands. Those moneys he holds, not as agent or servant to the Stewards, but as an independent official, subject, however, to the judgment of the Stewards whenever disputes arise as to the person who is entitled to receive them as winner.

Of course, the Stewards may, if they please, treat the Clerk of the Course as their mere agent, or appoint any other person as their servant, to receive and hold the stakes in their name; in which case they would be liable for them. But, unless they do so, they are in nowise responsible.

The duty of appointing the Judge and the Starter devolves upon the Stewards, who should take care that those offices are efficiently filled; for there is no appeal against the decision of either Judge or Starter upon those matters which it is their province to decide.

The decision of the Judge is final upon the question of the order in which the horses pass the winning-post, unless, indeed, it can be shown that his decision is corrupt and wilfully at variance with the fact. The decision of the Starter as to the start is equally final.

Appeal, however, may be made to the Stewards upon all other questions. Such, for instance, as questions as to the disqualification of any horse

objected to, the weight he carried, the mode in which he was ridden by the jockey, &c.; indeed, any question which involves the right of a horse to be deemed the winner, or to a place in the race, notwithstanding his having first passed the winning-post.

When by the articles it is provided that disputes are to be decided by the Stewards, their decision upon such disputes is final, and cannot be reversed in a court of law,—even though it may be clearly erroneous, provided there be no ground for impeaching it on the ground of fraud or corruption of the Stewards themselves.

So long as a dispute remains under the consideration of the Stewards, the stakes cannot be recovered from the stakeholder. This was expressly decided in a case of Brown against Overbury, tried before Mr. Justice Coleridge, at Warwick Assizes, in 1855, wherein it appeared that, in the spring of that year, a steeplechase was run near Henley. Overbury, the defendant, was treasurer of that race, and Brown, the plaintiff, sought to recover 261., being the amount of the stakes which he alleged were won by his horse 'Minor.' According to the articles, any dispute as to the race was to be decided by the award of four Stewards. A dispute arose. The Stewards met,