already embraced some invariable definition of right and wrong, can never be in a capacity to act thus. Whether their standard be laid in the general consequences of actions which they cannot always appreciate, or in the eternal fitness of things, which they seldom, if ever, understand, or in some supposed natural obligations of morality antecedent to every consideration of a Deity and his will; by which ever of these philosophical rules they presume universally to judge of the operations and commands of God, it is more than possible that they may often judge foolishly and censure in vain. Doubtless the Almighty can never really violate one single principle which philosophy approves; but it is not unreasonable to allow, that there may be cases, especially in the brief histories of more ancient ages, where we may err in the application of the correctest principles. Above all, therefore, it becomes us, in the outset of life, to be cautious in the admission of such universal principles as, if once imbibed into the mind as the infallible criteria of things human and divine, may lead us to reject even our religion, and reprove even our God. LECTURE XV. GOD TEMPTING ABRAHAM, PART II. 66 HEB. ii. 17, 18, 19. By faith Abraham when he was tried, offered up Isaac: and he that had received the promises offered up his only-begotten son,.... Of whom it was said, That in Isaac shall thy seed be called: .... Accounting that God was able to raise him up, even from the dead; from whence also he received him in a figure." To contemplate things fairly, and to form a correct and unobjectionable opinion, especially when the morality of human actions is concerned, it is necessary to view the subject not merely according to its abstract qualities, but also in its actual relations. For as every general principle is susceptible of a variety of limitations, we know not in what manner, or to what exten, that particular principle which is involved in our inquiry ought to be modified, until we have examined it in its bearings upon the question in which we are engaged. Pursuing this course in the preceding Lecture, we arrived at a conclusion directly the reverse of that which the Deist has embraced, upon the command by which Abraham was required to offer up his only son. We saw, from the issue of the transaction, that it never was the purpose of the Most High that the sacrifice of a human being should be carried into actual execution. We saw, from the narrative of Moses, that the primary object of the command was, to try the Patriarch in the severest manner; and from a comparison of the circumstances of the transaction, with the crucifixion of Christ, we were unavoidably led to suppose that a secondary and not less important object was, to prove to those who should live under the Gospel dispensation, that this great event had been typified, and consequently both foreseen and fore-ordained. The inference which we ultimately drew from these considerations was a vindication of the propriety of the command, as one which never could be unworthy of being given by that omniscient God, before whose eye every benefit and consequence which would result from it must have been completely revealed. U He But there is not one of these observations which Abraham could have distinctly made for himself, before he had obeyed the injunction of the Lord, and "stretched forth his hand to slay his son." That his obedience and faith were in reality most severely tried, he would inevitably feel; but he could have no certain knowledge that the command was intended only as a trial, nor could he be at all aware, that what was so solemnly required and circumstantially directed, would be so suddenly interrupted in its progress by the interposition of the heavenly voice. could have little hope that the command would be recalled, and still less can he be imagined to have had that clear insight into its connexion with the death of the Messiah which, in these later ages, we so joyfully recognise. When, therefore, we proceed, as is the purpose of the present discourse, to show the propriety of his obedience to the words he had heard, we must reason either from principles altogether different, or, at least, very differently modified, from those which have been hitherto the foundation of our argument. I mark this distinction the more carefully, because the confusion which has prevailed, from the want of a due separation between the different objections which may be made to this incident, and the different mode in which they are to be answered, has been one great cause of the failure of divines in producing the conviction they desired. The propriety of giving the command, and the propriety of obeying it, are two separate propositions, and whenever they are confounded together in our inquiries, neither will our ideas be clear, nor our arguments con+ clusive. Now in endeavouring to ascertain what might be the considerations which influenced the Patriarch to an act of such painful obedience, we may lay it down as an admitted principle, that he was fully authorised to fulfil both this and every other command, however repugnant to his feelings and thoughts, provided he could be satisfactorily assured that it really proceeded out of the mouth of God. God is the universal and all-mighty Governor of the world. By his wisdom all possibilities are foreseen, and by his power all events are regulated. To every one, therefore, who acknowledges that the Lord is King, and that he ruleth irresistibly over the affairs of men, and who believes, at the same time, that his mercy is over all his works, and that justice and righteousness are the habitation of his seat to every one who thus thinks of the Deity, it must be evident that he has but to know the will of God in order to fulfil it. Such unquestionably was the faith of Abraham. Look |