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bind the other.” [Maule, J. The latter part of the 1850. passage in Molloy is against you. Indeed, several of
OWEN the authorities which you have very properly cited, satisfy me that, in principle, your position is not Ván Uster. sustainable.]
Then, there was no sufficient evidence that the defendant was a shareholder. All that the witness stated, was, that he and the defendant and three other persons had, in 1849, agreed to form a company for the purpose of working the mine in question. There was no proof that a company had actually been formed, or that the individuals who so proposed to associate themselves together, had any interest in the mine. In Vice v. Lady Anson (a), in an action for goods supplied for the purpose of working a mine, it appeared that the defendant had paid money for certain shares, and received a certificate that she was a proprietor of those shares ; and that she had acknowledged that she was a shareholder; but no assignment of any interest in the mine had been made to her, -it was held that the action could not be maintained. [Maule, J. That case proceeded upon the ground, not merely that Lady Anson had no interest in the mine, but that she was not in fact, though she had at one time thought she was, a shareholder; and that the plaintiff had not been induced by the supposition of her being a shareholder to trust the concern.
Here, it appears, that four persons agreed to form a company, for the purpose of working a mine; and that a company was formed and the mine worked on that footing; and we find the defendant under his own hand acknowledging that he is acting as manager.] Suppose the four had agreed that certain formalities should be complied with before the company should be considered as formed, and those formalities had not
(a) 7B. & C. 409., 1 M. f R. 113.
been complied with,—would the defendant then be liable?
[Maule, J. That is supposing a case very different OWEN
from this. It is not competent to this person, after his Van Uster. acceptance, to say that the company was not a com
pletely formed company.]
JERVIS, C. J. I am of opinion that there ought to be no rule in this case. The action is brought upon a bill of exchange addressed to certain persons, who are described as “ The Allty-Crib Mining Company," and accepted by the defendant, on their behalf, describing himself as the London manager. Of course, the moment it appeared that the defendant had accepted the bill by procuration, he could not be held to be personally liable, without further evidence. The question, then, is, whether there was evidence to fix him with the acceptance, as a shareholder in the company. If there was no evidence that he was a person interested in the mine, he would not be liable. In Vice v. Lady Anson, the mine was not worked by or on behalf of Lady Anson, unless she was a shareholder in a company duly and completely formed: and the only evidence relied on to prove that she was, consisted of admissions made by her in error.
Here, it appears from the form of the acceptance, that the defendant was the manager of the company; and it appeared from the other evidence in the cause, that four persons had in the year 1849 agreed to form a company for the purpose of working this mine, and that it had been worked accordingly. It was, therefore, a question for the jury, whether or not the defendant was a member of the firm. They found that he was. Being, then, a member of the firm, the next question is, whether the acceptance by one member, in his own name, of a bill addressed to a firm composed of four, imposes any liability upon the individual who so accepts. It seems from the authorities, - and especially
from the passage cited from Molloy, - that, under such circumstances, the acceptance is binding upon the individual so accepting. I think that is ample authority for us in this case.
MAULE, J. I am of the same opinion. The cases have been very industriously sifted, and their result very accurately stated by the learned counsel. That result shews that an acceptance by one, of a bill of exchange addressed to four, renders the actual acceptor personally liable. And I do not think that the case is at all varied by the circumstance of his having falsely affirmed that he had authority to accept for the firm. Such misrepresentation possibly might give the plaintiff another sort of remedy against him: but it clearly does not deprive him of his direct remedy against him as the acceptor of the bill. With respect to the evidence of the defendant's being a shareholder, — it appears that a witness stated, that himself, the defendant, and two other persons, had in the year 1849 agreed to form themselves into a company for the purpose of working the mine in question, and that the mine had accordingly been worked by them under that agreement: and the defendant, in his acceptance, states that he is the London manager of The Allty-Crib Mining Company. That was ample evidence that those four individuals were jointly engaged in working the mine, and clearly fixed the defendant as one of the persons for whose benefit and on whose behalf the bill was accepted. In Vice v. Lady Anson, the defendant. was held not to be liable, because she had no legal interest in the mine. The question arose in this way:
- In order to make Lady Anson liable in respect of of expenses incurred in working the mine, it was necessary to shew that she was a person interested therein, and so one upon whose behalf those expenses had been
1850. incurred. The only evidence to shew that she was
interested in the mine, was, that she had in conversation OWEN
stated that she was a shareholder in the concern. That Van Uster. was disposed of by shewing that she made that state
ment under a misimpression. It was sought to be shewn that she had a legal interest in the mine; but that failed. That case by no means shews that there is no way of proving a person to be a worker of a mine, except by shewing that he has a legal interest in it: it only shews, that, if legal interest is the evidence relied on to establish a liability in respect of the working of the mine, that interest must be properly proved. It clearly was not necessary in this case to shew that the defendant had any legal interest in this mine; for, it was distinctly proved that he was one of the persons on whose behalf the mine was being worked.
WILLIAMS, J. I am of the same opinion. I think there was abundant evidence to shew that the defendant was a member of The Allty-Crib Mining Company, and one of those to whom the bill in question was addressed ; and, con sequently, that he was liable upon his acceptance.
TALFOURD, J., concurred. .
Rule refused. (a)
(a) Beawes impliedly, and ance of both : in the latter case, Molloy expressly, draws the
an acceptance by one would be distinction between an accepte void as against the drawer and ance by one of two joint-drawers as against all indorsers precedwho are partners, and an ac ing the party who obtained, ceptance by one of two joint and acquiesced in, the defective drawers who are not partners. In acceptance. In the principal the former case, there being an case, the adventurers were not implied authority arising out of partners, and the defendant had the partnership relation, an ac no authority to bind his coceptance by one is the accepte. adventurers.
H. B. W. Hilcoat v. John Birn, Lord Archbishop
of CANTERBURY, and THOMAS, Lord Archbishop of YORK.
June 24. CASE. The first count of the declaration stated, By an act for
that, by an act of parliament passed in the session making a rail. of parliament holden at Westminster, in the 9th and Way, the com
authorised to purchase the church of St. M., in Liverpool, and certain ground and buildings attached thereto, not forming part of the site of the church, but that nothing in the act contained should enable the company to take down or interfere with the said church or ground, without the consent in writing of the diocesan first obtained, upon the previous payment by the company to him and the Archbishop of York, for the time being, of such sum as should be agreed upon between the said archbishop and bishop and the company, in ascertaining which sum, regard was to be had to the cost of a site for a new church, and of erecting and completing the same, and also to the value of such part of the premises as did not form the site of the church; and that, upon payment of the sum so to be agreed upon, the then present church, and the ground attached thereto, not forming the site of the church, and the freehold and inheritance thereof, should vest in the company; and that the sum so paid to the archbishop and bishop should be employed by them, among other purposes, in making payment to the person entitled thereto of the value of the said ground and buildings, not forming part of the site of the church.
The archbishop and bishop, having agreed with the company, offered the plaintiff, the incumbent of the church of St. M., and the person entitled to the ground and buildings not forming part of the site of the church, 3001. as the value of his interest therein,- upon the assumption, that, being consecrated ground, it was in his hands inapplicable to any secular purpose, and was therefore only worth that sum. The plaintiff thereupon brought an action upon the case against them.
The declaration, after setting forth the provision of the act above referred to, stated, that the plaintiff was entitled to the value of the land and premises not forming the site of the church ; that it was afterwards agreed between the company and the defendants, that the sum of 77321. 178. should be paid by the company to the defendants, as the sum upon the payment whereof the company were to be authorised to take possession of the said church and premises, and take down the church, with the consent of the diocesan ; that the said sum was paid to the defendants, and thereupon the premises became and were vested in the company, and the bishop gave his consent accordingly; that the said sum was sufficient to purchase a site, and complete the new intended church, and also to pay the value of so much of the said ground and buildings as did not form the