Tomlinson, in support of the demurrer. (a) The way in question is only granted for the use of the premises conveyed: and, if larger, it did not pass by the subsequent conveyances, as appurtenant; but the grant must be considered as a grant in gross. In Cowling v. Higginson (b), in trespass quare clausum fregit, the defendant pleaded, under the 2 & 3 W. 4. c. 71., a right of way for the occupiers of a close for twenty years, for horses, carts, waggons, and carriages, at their free will and pleasure: upon a replication traversing the right as pleaded,—it was held that the plaintiff might shew that the defendant had a right of way for horses, carts, waggons, and carriages, for certain purposes only, and not for all, and was not compelled to new assign; and that he might shew that the purpose for which the defendant had used the road, and in respect of which the action was brought, was not one of those to which his right extended.(c) That case shews that the words here, "for all purposes," mean, for all purposes connected with the occupation of the land conveyed. The context -"and all persons having occasion to resort thereto "— shews that the grant ought to be construed in this limited sense. If the grant be as large as is contended for, then it does not pass to the assignee of the land. In Staple v. Heydon (d), it was agreed by the court

(a) The point marked for argument on the part of the plaintiff, was as follows: "That the right of way granted by the first indenture of release in the fifth plea first mentioned, was a right of way only to and from the land and hereditaments thereby conveyed, and that the defendants, in justifying the alleged trespasses, have not alleged that the same were committed in passing and repassing to and from the land and

hereditaments conveyed by that
deed, but have alleged that the
same were committed in passing
and repassing for the purposes
of them the defendants, without
any limitation of such purposes,

- thereby claiming a more ex-
tensive right than was so granted
by the said indenture."

(b) 4 M. & W. 245.
(c) Quære, the materiality or
relevancy of this fact.

(d) 6 Mod. 3., Com. Dig.
Chimin (D. 1.).

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"that a man cannot claim a way over my ground from
one part thereof to another; but, from one part of his
own ground to another, he may claim a way over my
ground." In pleading such a right, the termini must be
stated with accuracy: Com. Dig. Chimin (D. 2.); Rouse
v. Bardin (a); Simpson v. Lewthwaite. (b) [Maule, J.
The termini are stated at the beginning of the plea.]
Not so; for, one terminus must be in the party's own
land. The right cannot be enlarged by the act of the
grantee: Com. Dig. Chimin (D. 5.); Lawton v.
Ward (c); Howell v. King (d); Senhouse v. Chris-
tian (e); Dand v. Kingscote (g); Allan v. Gomme. (h)
2. A right of way, such as that granted by this deed,
is not assignable. In Sheppard's Touchstone, p. 239.,
it is said Licences and authorities are grantable at
first for the lives of the parties, or for years. But the
grantees of them cannot assign them over. And, there-
fore, if power be given to me to make an award or
livery of seisin, I may not grant over this power to
another. And, if licence be granted me to walk in
another man's garden, or to go through another man's
ground, I may not give or grant this to another." So,
Blackstone, speaking of the right of going over another
man's ground, says (i): "This may be grounded on a
special permission; as, when the owner of the land
grants to another a liberty of passing over his grounds,
to go to church, to market, or the like; in which case
the gift or grant is particular, and confined to the
grantee alone: it dies with the person; and, if the
grantee leaves the country, he cannot assign over his
right to any other; nor can he justify taking another
person in his company." This is analogous to common

(a) 1 H. Blac. 352.

(b) 3 B. & Ad. 226.

(c) 1 Lord Raym. 75., 1

Lutw. 111.

(d) 1 Mod. 190.

(e) 1 T. R. 560.

(g) 6 M. & W. 174.

(h) 11 Ad. & E. 759., S P. & D. 581.

(i) 2 Bl. Comm. 35.

without stint, which is not grantable over,- per Treby, C. J., in Weekly v. Wildman. (a) But, if it were assignable, the deed here does not assign it: it only conveys the premises, with the appurtenances. Formerly, a way could not be claimed as appurtenant to a messuage, Godley v. Frith (b), as common of turbary might-Solme v. Bullock. (c) Appurtenant may mean "appertaining and belonging," that is, essential to the use or enjoyment of the land or house conveyed. If the way be incident to the house, it will pass without the word "appurtenances;" but, if it be not, the addition of that word will not help. In Barlow v. Rhodes (d), it was held that the words "with all ways thereto belonging, or in any wise appertaining," in a conveyance, will not pass a way not strictly appurtenant, unless the parties appear to have intended to use those words in a sense larger than their ordinary legal sense. So, in Plant v. James (e), where two coheiresses, being seised each of an undivided moiety of two estates, conveyed to H., in fee, for the purpose of making partition, one of the estates, called Parkhall, to which they were entitled by descent as co-parceners in fec, and another, called Woodseaves, of which they were tenants in tail, together with all houses, outhouses, edifices, orchards, ways, paths, passages, rights, members, and appurtenances whatsoever to the said several messuages, tenements, lands, and hereditaments belonging, or therewith usually held or occupied; to hold Parkhall to H., in fee, to certain uses, and Woodseaves to H., in fee, to the use of H. and his heirs, to make him tenant to the præcipe, in order to suffer a common recovery. The deed contained a covenant to levy a fine of the moiety of one of the co-heiresses in Parkhall,

(a) 1 Lord Raym. 407. (b) Yelv. 159.; and see 3 Salk. 40.

(e) 3 Ler. 165.
(d) 1 C. & M. 439.
(e) 5 B. & Ad. 791.

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and a declaration that a recovery should be suffered of Woodseaves, and then declared the uses of the fine, recovery, and conveyance, as to Parkhall, with the buildings, lands, hereditaments, and appurtenances thereto respectively belonging, to be, to such uses as the husband of that co-heiress should appoint, and, as to Woodseaves, with the buildings, lands, hereditaments, and appurtenances thereunto belonging, to the use of the other co-heiress, in fee. The fine was levied, and the recovery suffered. And it was held, that a way from the King's highway over the Woodseaves estate to the Parkhall estate, which, before the conveyance, fine, and recovery, had always been used by the occupiers of Parkhall, did not pass by the deed of partition, fine, and recovery, to the owner of Parkhall.

Then, the plea is ambiguous as to the nature of the way claimed; and although it follows the words of the grant, it does not give their legal effect. It is so vague and uncertain that the plaintiff cannot new-assign. "If the meaning of words used in pleading be equivocal, they shall be taken most strongly against the party pleading them: " per Buller, J., in Dovaston v. Payne. (a)

T. F. Ellis, contrà. The questions for the decision of the court in this case are, in effect, two,-first, what was the precise nature of the right which the grantee took under the deed of the 27th of September, 1837; secondly, whether, supposing that the right which the parties took was a right to use the way for all purposes, and not merely a right to use it for the purpose of passing to and from the land conveyed, he could assign that right as annexed to the occupation of the land.

(a) 2 H. Blac. 531. But, where, instead of demurring, the opposite party has pleaded over, an equivocal expression is

to be taken in that sense which will support the ambiguous pleading: antè, Vol. VI. 749, n.; Vol. VII. 329.

1. There is no rule of law which prevents a party from giving the more extended right here claimed. It is assumed, in Wood v. Leadbitter (a), that such a right may be conferred by deed, though not by parol. This is not claimed in the ordinary sense of a way, but as a right of passage not confined between termini. The words are general; the right is granted for all purposes; and these words are not to be limited by the other words used in the deed, which, according to the well-known rule, is to be construed most strongly against the grantor. The circumstance of the grantee's covenanting to contribute towards the expense of repairing the road, in proportion to the extent of his user of it, affords a strong argument in favour of the validity of the grant. No doubt, where the grant is of a way from A. to B., it should be so described: but that is not the true nature of this claim.

2. Assuming this to be a grant of an unrestricted right of way, can it be assigned so as to pass with the land? This is not like the case of a mere licence, which, whether by deed or by parol, is revocable: but is a grant of an easement essential to the full enjoyment of the land conveyed. The principle relied on by the other side, that land cannot be appurtenant to land, has no application here.

3. There is no ambiguity in the plea. It is impossible to conceive any purpose for which the grantee or his assigns would not have the right of passing and repassing over and along the road in question: the case, therefore, is wholly unaffected by the doctrine laid down in Dovaston v. Payne.

Tomlinson, in reply. Both the deed and the plea shew that this is claimed as a way, in the ordinary

(a) 13 M. & W. 838. And see Coble v. Allen, Hutton, 10.

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