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Opinion.

correspondence between counsel for Mr. Merritt and Mrs. Burton, on the one side, and the complainant, Miss Johnson, and her counsel, on the other side. This correspondence manifests a desire on the part of Mr. Merritt and Mrs. Burton and their counsel to give the fullest information as to the litigation about the land. It is too lengthy to be inserted in this opinion. This correspondence gave a full history of the litigation and just what was done in it, and shows that what was done was approved by counsel of Miss Johnson. It may be said of this information as was said by counsel for Miss Johnson in their reply brief with reference to another matter, that "from the correspondence it is manifest that Mr. Maury knew of the attachment proceedings and authorized them, which was knowledge of Miss Johnson regardless of whether or not Mr. Maury fully advised her as to the object and purpose of the said suit." This knowledge was acquired by Miss Johnson, as we have seen, in January, 1913, and the decree of which she now complains was rendered on September 5, 1912. She had been proceeded against as a non-resident and, under the provisions of section 3233 of the Code (1904), had three years from the latter date within which to petition the court to have the case re-heard, or any injustice in the proceedings corrected. She did not avail herself of this privilege, and now, after the lapse of more than five years from the entry of the decree, she files her bill to set aside and impeach the proceedings in that case. Having failed to avail herself of the plain remedy to redress any wrong she may have suffered, it is now too late for her to seek to impeach the proceedings by a separate and independent suit.

[18-20] It is insisted that the court was without jurisdiction to assign the whole tract to Mr. Merritt and Mrs. Burton, and that therefore its decree was void. The court is given this power under certain conditions by section 2564 of the Code (1904). Whether or not the conditions existed

Opinion.

was for the court to decide, but a wrong conclusion on that question would not render its decree void. We have already recited the proceedings by which the whole tract was assigned to Mr. Merritt and Mrs. Burton. These proceedings were in accord with the statute, and the case in this respect is not in conflict with our holding in Roberts v. Hagan, 121 Va. 573, 93 S. E. 619. Nor can the bill in the case in judgment be sustained as a bill to correct a mistake. Mistakes which form the basis of equity jurisdiction are the mistakes of parties to the transaction and not the mistakes of courts in ascertaining the facts from the evidence, or in the application of the law to the facts. Such mistakes of the court are not technically mistakes, but judicial errors, and may be corrected by appeal or bill of review, as the case may be, but not by an original bill such as was filed in this case. If such a bill were allowable, there would be no end to litigation. The time for a bill of review or appeal having expired, if the trial court put a wrong construction on the will of Mrs. Merritt, or erroneously assigned the whole tract to two of the parties, the appellants are without remedy to correct it. The statutes fix the time within which bills of review may be filed or appeals taken, and if litigants permit this time to elapse without availing themselves of the remedies provided for their relief, they are without remedy. The case is not different from any other where a remedy is barred by the statute of limitations. Rawlings' Ex'r v. Rawlings, supra; Jefferson v. Gregory, 113 Va. 61, 73 S. E. 452, and cases cited.

[21-23] The State rightly has and exercises jurisdiction over all property within its territorial limits. It may determine the extent of title to property within its limits and the methods of transferring such title. It cannot bring a non-resident within its limits, but when it has provided convenient and certain methods for giving notice to non-residents and these methods have been

Opinion.

pursued, the decrees of its courts are as much binding upon non-residents as upon residents. A suit to partition land is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, and when the parties interested have been proceeded against in the methods prescribed by law, there is no difference between the conclusive effect of the decree of partition upon residents and non-residents except that non-residents are given three years by the statute in which to have the case re-heard and any injustice in the proceedings corrected, but after the lapse of this time a non-resident is as much bound as a resident. Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 10 Sup. Ct. 557, 33 L. Ed. 918; Code, sec. 3233; Burwell v. Burwell's Guardian, 78 Va. 574; Fayette Land Co. v. L. & N. R. Co., 93 Va. 274, 24 S. E. 1016.

In Merritt v. Rives it is stated in the bill that the testatrix, Eliza W. Merritt, "at the time of her death was the owner of an equitable title to a certain tract or parcel of land situate in Totaro magisterial district, in the county of Brunswick, Virginia, containing 1,719% acres." "The said J. L. Merritt, as trustee for the said Eliza W. Merritt, having become the purchaser of the said lands in the chancery suits of Rives v. Merritt and Ezell v. Merritt, now pending in this honorable court." It was a mistake to say that this purchase was made by the trustee in the lifetime of Mrs. Merritt, and that she owned an equitable title to it at the time of her death. The purchase was made after her death by the trustee with the trust funds belonging to her estate, and the conveyance was made to the beneficiaries under her will to be held by them subject to the provisions of her will. This was not such a material mistake as would support the bill filed by the appellants to correct it. We are of opinion that the allegations of fraud, accident or mistake set forth in said bill are not sustained by the evidence.

[24] The consolidation of several causes is a very dif

Opinion.

ferent thing from hearing them together. It is sometimes convenient, economical and appropriate that two or more chancery causes should be heard together, but it has been seriously doubted whether any two chancery causes are so identical that they may be consolidated. The right to consolidate was doubted by Chief Baron Richards, in Forman v. Blake, 7 Price, 654, and was condemned by two out of three judges of this court, in Claiborne v. Gross and Wimbush v. Gross, 7 Leigh (34 Va.) 339. In Barger v. Buckland, 28 Gratt. (69 Va.) 850, 868, it is doubted if such consolidation can be made without consent. 2 Barton's Chy., pr. 861. Whatever may be the law on this subject, however, it is clear that the trial court committed error in consolidating the four causes in the decree complained of. In the case in judgment the parties, the subject matter, and the relief sought were different in the several causes. It was manifestly improper, therefore, for them to have been consolidated. The error, however, under the circumstances of the case, was harmless.

Under the view which we have taken of the case it is not necessary to deal with the question of ratification by the appellants, nor with sundry other questions which were argued both orally and in briefs.

Upon the whole case, we are of opinion that there is no error in the decree of the circuit court, and it is therefore affirmed.

SIMS, J., concurs in the result.

Affirmed.

Syllabus.

Wytheville.

LAVENSTEIN BROS. V. HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY.

June 12, 1919.

1. FIRE INSURANCE "Iron Safe Clause"-Sufficiency of Inventory.— A fire insurance policy required that the assured should take a complete itemized inventory at least once in each calendar year. The inventory of assured taken February 1st did not include purchases made during the preceding January, and, therefore, technically and literally speaking was not a complete itemized inventory of stock on hand as was required by the "Iron Safe Clause" of the policy of insurance, quoad such goods. The purpose, however, of the "Iron Safe Clause" in insurance contracts is to preserve evidence of the actual existence of the property insured, or from which actual existence may be verified; and as the assured preserved the invoices of all of the January purchases in an invoice book and they were subsequently furnished to the insurance company, together with the books of the assured showing such purchases and the items thereof in as much detail as if they had been entered on the inventory, the books and invoices must be taken to be a substantial compliance with the "Iron Safe Clause" requirement of an inventory, so far as such January purchases are concerned.

2. FIRE INSURANCE “Iron Safe Clause"-Substantial Compliance.— Substantial compliance with the "Iron Safe Clause" in fire insurance policies is all that the law requires. A literal compliance is not essential.

3. FIRE INSURANCE "Iron Safe Clause"-Itemizing.-The inventory of assured did not contain the stock numbers of the items of goods or other data touching the identity of the items in order that such items could be traced to former inventories, or to invoices of them, so as to ascertain whether the company was being charged with old or new, out of style or shelf-worn goods, or at original cost prices. As there was no provision in the policy of insurance requiring such description in the inventory, it was unnecessary. The policy required only a "complete itemized inventory of stock on hand" at the time of the inventory, and any description, which is sufficiently detailed

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