Opinion. Va. 88, 20 S. E. 888, as construed by Furst-Kerber, etc., Co. v. Wells, 116 Va. 95, 81 S. E. 22, and the Virginia case of Breed v. Glasgow Investment Company (C. C.), 92 Fed. 768, establishes the following principles in the construction of the statute: [3] 1. That the statement in the account that certain work was done, or materials furnished, under agreement, or contract, for a specific sum, is equivalent to saying that it was under an "express contract," or "was contracted for as an entirety." And 2. That where the account contains such statement, and the fact that the work or materials were contracted for as an entirety is established by the evidence, a general statement of the fact and the sum charged therefor under the contract will suffice. [4] Approaching, then, the consideration of the liens which have been disallowed by the commissioner in the light of these principles, we find the first item in the account of the petitioner in error, H. N. Francis & Co., Inc. (unquestionably the most general in statement of the series): "By contract, $10,000.00." It may well be that this item standing alone would be insufficient to entitle the claimant to relief under the mechanic's lien statute (and upon that theory it was rejected by the commissioner); but, as we have seen, it does not have to stand alone, and whether it shall stand or fall depends upon its sufficiency aided by the evidence adduced in support of it. It should be noted, also, that the account on its face bears evidence of the character of work in which the claimant was engaged and the materials it was furnishing; and the principle is elementary that the entire paper must be looked to and read together in giving it effect. Diebold v. Tatterson, 115 Va. 766, 771, 80 S. E. 585. The evidence aliunde shows that the contract referred to was a standard contract covering several pages of closely printed matter, and abundantly establishes every Opinion. thing with respect to the item that reasonably could be required. As to the remaining items of the account, without discussing them in detail, it is sufficient to say that the "extras" called for appear to have been furnished upon orders, and the account shows the amount and character of materials supplied and prices charged for each. The same may be affirmed in regard to the account for work done; the nature and character of the work and the price charged therefor is specifically set out as to each item. Moreover, the account shows payments made, and the balance due, and is verified by the oath of the claimant or its agent, with a statement attached declaring its intention to claim the benefit of the lien, and giving a sufficient brief description of the property upon which the lien is to operate. The entire account is in substantial conformity to the statute, and ought to have been upheld. What has been said of H. N. Francis & Co.'s account applies with more force to the claims asserted by the Pittsburg Plate Glass Company and the Standard Engineering Company, whose accounts afford illustrations of, perhaps, a stricter compliance with the statute (invoking where needed the aid of ample admissible extrinsic evidence) than the first-mentioned account. Let it be observed of all these accounts that no question is raised as to their bona fides. They were disallowed upon technical grounds, based largely, we conceive, upon a too literal adherence to some of the language used in the opinion in Taylor v. Netherwood. The court there was dealing with the facts of the particular case, and held the account sufficient; but it neither decided, nor intended to decide, that the sufficiency of all other accounts was to-be measured by the account filed in that case. The reporter will set out all three of these accounts in reporting the case, and it would serve no good purpose and uselessly add to the length of the opinion, to notice in detail the various items of the last-mentioned claims. Both should have been allowed. Opinion. [5] Upon the case as a whole, our conclusions may be summarized as follows: 1. That there is no personal liability upon the Hotel Rueger, Inc., for any of the liens set out in this record. When notified of the H. N. Francis & Co. claim of lien, it set apart a fund sufficient to discharge it; which fund was afterwards paid into court, and is now the subject of controversy. 2. That the commissioner was in error in rejecting the liens of H. N. Francis & Co., the Standard Engineering Company and the Pittsburg Plate Glass Company on the ground of deficiency of statement. [6] 3. That the claim of Warren-Ehret Company was rightly disallowed because barred by the six-months' limitation. 'Section 2481 of the Code provides that no suit shall be brought or petition filed to enforce a mechanic's lien after six months from the time when the whole amount covered by the lien has become payable. By contract the whole amount sought to be covered by the Warren-Ehret lien became payable November 15, 1913, and the six-months' limitation expired May 15, 1914. The suit by Hotel Rueger to which this claimant was a party was not brought until June 4, 1914, too late to stop the running of the statute of limitations as to that lien. Warren-Ehret Company was not a party to either of the other two suits, and the account of liens ordered in each was not made until after the lien was barred. 4. That the Engleby & Bro. Co.'s claim, to the extent to which it was allowed, is sufficiently definite within the meaning of the statute. [7] 5. That the liens allowed must share ratably in the fund on deposit to the order of the court, after first deducting therefrom the cost of litigation with respect to the allowed claims. Opinion. For these reasons, the decree of the Chancery Court of the city of Richmond, appealed from, will be affirmed, in so far as it denied personal liability on Hotel Rueger for any of the liens asserted in this case, and disallowed the claim of Warren-Ehret Company, and allowed, in part, the claim of Engleby & Bro. Co. And the decree will be reversed for the disallowance of the liens of H. N. Francis & Co., Inc., Pittsburg Plate Glass Company and the Standard Engineering Company. And the cause will be remanded to the chancery court for further proceedings to be had therein not in conflict with the views expressed in this opinion. Affirmed in part; reversed in part. Syllabus. Wytheville. HUGO AND OTHERS V. CLARK. June 12, 1919. Absent, Whittle, P. 1. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS Communications to Attorney Execution of Will Revoking Prior Will-Case at Bar.-In a testamentary contest between the heirs at law on the one side, claiming that the decedent died intestate, and a devisee claiming that a paper offered for probate is the true last will and testament of the decedent, the heirs at law offered to prove by the attorneys of the decedent that they drew for the decedent a later will than the paper offered for probate, which, in express terms, revoked that paper, one of the attorneys who drew the later will being one of the attesting witnesses thereto. The court only permitted the attorneys to testify that a paper was duly executed as the last will and testament of the decedent, and refused to permit them to testify as to the contents of the paper, upon the ground that these constituted privileged communications by the decedent to his attorneys, and hence were inadmissible. Held: That the evidence of both the attorneys as to the contents of the second will should have been permitted for the consideration of the jury. 2. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS-Attorney and Client-Limitation of Rule-Death of Client-Litigation between Parties who Claim under the Client.-It is generally considered that the rule of privilege does not apply in litigation, after the client's death, between parties, all of whom claim under the client; and so, where the question before the court is as to the validity or genuineness of an alleged will, the attorney of the testator may, according to the weight of authority, testify to all matters relevant to the issue, although his testimony involves a disclosure of confidential communications between himself and his client, at least when such attorney is one of the subscribing witnesses to the will, as in such case the testator must be considered as having waived the privilege by requesting the attorney to sign as a witness. A decedent's attorney has also been held competent to prove the existence and con |