Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and CooperationThe term "Prisoner's Dilemma" comes from the original anecdote used to illustrate this game of strategy. Two prisoners, held incommunicado, are charged with the same crime. They can be convicted only if either confesses. If both prisoners confess, their payoff is minus one. If neither confesses, it is plus one. If only one confesses, he is set free for having turned state's evidence and is given a reward of plus two to boot. The prisoner who holds out is convicted on the strength of the other's testimony and is given a more severe sentence than if he had confessed. His payoff is minus two. It is in the interest of each to confess no matter what the other does, but it is in their collective interest to hold out.There is no satisfactory solution to the paradox of this game. Its simplicity is misleading. What seems rational from your own point of view, turns out to be detrimental in the end. This book is an account of many experiments in which Prisoner's Dilemma was played. Analyzing the results, one can learn how people are motivated to trust or distrust their partners, to keep faith or to betray, to be guided by joint or selfish interest. The method represents an important step toward building a bridge between psychology which is based on hard data and reproducible experiments and psychology which is concerned with internal conflict. |
Contents
In Search of an Index | 33 |
Effects of Mixing Games and Concealing the Matrix | 50 |
Effects of Interaction | 56 |
The Contingent Propensities | 67 |
The Time Courses | 87 |
General Remarks | 105 |
Markov Chain Models | 114 |
Equilibrium Models with Adjustable Parameters | 129 |
Comparing Populations | 185 |
Summary of Results | 198 |
Concluding Remarks | 204 |
Instructions Given to Subjects Playing Prisoners Dilemma in the Pure Matrix Condition | 228 |
Estimates of Significance Games Compared | 230 |
Estimates of Significance Populations Compared | 235 |
Effect of Initial Response | 237 |
Glossary of Symbols | 240 |
Stochastic Learning Models | 135 |
Classical Dynamic Models | 141 |
Testing the Models | 153 |
Simulation | 174 |
Notes | 248 |
| 256 | |
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Common terms and phrases
assumed average become behavior Block C₁ Chapter choice choose column compared comparison consequence Consider constant cooperative cooperative responses correlations corresponding course defecting depend derived described determined distribution dynamic effect equations estimate examine example expected experiments fact Figure four fraction frequencies give given greater Hypothesis increases independent indices individual initial interaction interesting learning least less lock-in Markov mathematical means Mixed move namely Note observed obtained occurs operating other's outcome pairs parameters payoffs performance play player population positive possible Prisoner's Dilemma probability propensities psychological Pure Matrix Condition question rank order rational reason remains represented respect responses runs shown significance situation stochastic strategy subjects Suppose Table tend theory tion turn unilateral values variables women zero