THE

CALCUTTA REVIEW.

VI

IRT. I.-Examination of Statements made during a recent debate at the East India House; in a letter to Lieutenant-General Welsh, and the 220 Service Memorialists. By a Proprietor. 2. London. 1852.

SINCE the last enquiry into the working of the Company's Iministration in India, the field of discussion has been much arrowed. There is no commercial question now to be agitatd; and the political question seems to have been pretty well et at rest, by the notorious mis-government of the Crown coloies. No one hesitates to admit, in these days, that of all the reign dependencies of Great Britain, India, though the most xtensive and the most important, is infinitely the best governd. Now, therefore, that the great question of the future adXinistration of the affairs of our Eastern Empire is again.

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rought under Parliamentary discussion, and largely debated in he public prints, scarcely one sane man is found hardy enough 1.0 jeopardise his reputation, by recommending that the Governnent of our Indian dependencies should be transferred to the 2. Crown.

The questions, therefore, which are now likely to engage the attention of the Parliamentary committees, and to be discussed by journalists, pamphleteers and reviewers, are, for the nost part, questions of secondary interest and importance. If any changes are to be introduced into the system of administration now in force, they are not fundamental changes. It is admitted, on all hands, that as a whole, the machinery works vell. Even Lord Ellenborough does not recommend the abotion of the Leadenhall-street Council. He would reduce e number of Directors, and he would extend the electoral anchise; he would, of course, deprive the Company of the right of recall," and otherwise limit their powers, if he could; it he is still obliged, at least constructively, to acknowledge, at the system on the whole is the best that can be devised, ad that India must, in future, as heretofore, be governed by Pae magnates of Leadenhall-street and Cannon Row.

On one point-and a very important one, as it affects the hole body of the Indian Executive-there seems to be a re

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markable concurrence of opinion. It is admitted by men of all varieties of political faith, that the great bulk of the Indian patronage must remain in the hands of the East India Company. "It would be dangerous," it is said, " to transfer it to the Crown." One man has one scheme to propose for the future distribution of a portion of this patronage; a second proposes another project; a third has also his scheme; but all are agreed in opinion, regarding the expediency of leaving the great bulk of the India House patronage in the hands of the East India Directors. The changes proposed are rather changes of degree than of kind. There is sufficient faith among all classes of men, in the character of the Court of Directors, to induce them, confidently, to leave in the hands of that great body the appointment of the mass of covenanted officers, civil and military, to whom the administration of the affairs of India is entrusted. There may be ignorant men, or disappointed men-men who think they have some particular grievance of their own, or are smarting under the effects of mortified vanity, or are altogether reckless and unscrupulous,-there may be men of this kind, professing to believe that the patronage of the East India Company has been grossly abused, and that nothing but nepotism and corruption run riot in the cavernous abysses of the great mansion of Leadenhall-street. But the general impression is that, on the whole, the patronage is fairly and wisely distributed, and that it would be well to leave it as it is.

We shall not, therefore, take the trouble to discuss a question where, in reality, no question is. If the present system be not a faultless one, it is, on the whole, the best that can be devised. We do not deny that it is open to some objections. What system is not? But as the transfer of the patronage to other hands would be open to many more objections, and as this fact is generally acknowledged, we should only be wasting our own and our readers' time, by making a moot point of that which, in reality, is never mooted.

But the subject of India House patronage, generally, is one of much interest and importance; and it is one too regarding which, in spite of the general estimate of which we have spoken, some misapprehensions exist even in candid and impartial minds. We propose to give, therefore, some account of the system under which the patronage of the Company is distributed; to touch upon some of the historical events connected with the public discussion of the subject, and to consider some of the plans which have been proposed for the improvement of the system which now exists.

The Court of Directors of the East India Company consists

of thirty members, of whom six go out every year by rotation, and constitute a kind of non-effective list. There are, therefore, twenty-four acting Directors, including a Chairman and a Deputy Chairman elected annually by their own body. The Directors are elected as vacancies occur, for life, by the proprietors of East India stock. The possession of £1,000 stock confers on a proprietor one vote; £3,000 stock gives two votes ; £6,000 three; and £10,000 and upwards, four votes. No proprietor can hold more than four votes. Widows and spinsters are allowed to vote, according to their stock; but trustees have not the electoral privilege.

The manner of election is this. When a vacancy occurs, by death, resignation or disqualification, a day is fixed for the election of a new member of the Court, and publicly advertised.* It is necessary that the candidate should possess £2,000 stock. If he has held office in India, he must have resided two years in England, before he is eligible for election. It seldom happens that more than two candidates go to the poll, though many more are, probably, in the field. The result of the canvass is generally ascertainable before the election takes place, but the defeated candidate at one election is generally, though not always, the favorite for the next; and few men have the good fortune to be elected without sustaining one defeat.

It generally happens that the success of the candidate is determined by the activity of his canvass. As soon as he has made up his mind to start for the Direction, if in England, he advertises his intention in the public papers. Then he presently begins his canvass. A party of his friends get together, and enroll themselves into a committee. A few members, more active than the rest, probably do all their work; the rest are in the list merely nám ka waste-for the sake of their names. But the candidate himself is the real workman. He goes about with an interleaved list of the Court of Proprietors. He soon knows the residences of all who have votes to give; he knows their histories, their families, their characters; if he cannot approach them directly, he is sure to be familiar with some indirect means of approach, which may be equally cogent. It is a weary and harassing, in some cases, a humiliating task, that he has set himself; but the object is a great one, and the ordeal must be gone through. There is no help for it. An active canvass is the first thing, and the second thing, and the third thing. The highest public character, and the most distinguished public services, if accompanied by inactivity in the field of

*The election is to take place within forty days of the declaration of vacancy, and ten days' notice of the day of election is to be given.

competition, will not avail against the active canvass of an opponent. A large amount of importunity is necessary to success. You must not be disheartened by failure. A proprietor who refuses you his vote this time, may promise it to you for the next election, or for the election after the next. If he will do it for no other reason, perhaps he may do it to get rid of you. It is not altogether impossible, that he may receive you with some discourtesy; and, if he be a vulgar purse-proud man, (and there are such men among the proprietors of India stock,) he may treat you as he would a mendicant. This is not pleasant, we acknowledge; but it must be borne. There is no other alternative except failure.

Wherefore some sensitive people may ask, how any highminded gentlemanly man can submit to the degradation of the canvass. It is very unpleasant, we admit; but rightly considered, it is not degrading. The object is an honorable one; the legitimate means of attainment are not otherwise than honorable. If the proprietor, who is solicited for his vote, conducts himself with any want of courtesy towards a man, who, in all probability, is greatly his superior, he degrades himself; but he does not degrade the candidate. Many men may not think that the object to be attained is worth the trouble indispensable to its attainment. This we can very well understand. But, so long as candidates for the direction only adopt legitimate means of accomplishing the end, they cannot degrade themselves. An insolent voter is really an object of compassion, some may say of contempt; but an honorable candidate for an honorable office cannot degrade himself, by soliciting that which is not to be obtained without solicitation. There is no instance, we believe, on record,-certainly not in modern times,-of any distinguished Indian statesman or warrior being solicited by the Court of Proprietors. The Court of Proprietors must be solicited. They will never go out of their way to carry a man on their shoulders into the direction, with a burst of enthusiastic applause. Every man, who obtains a seat at the India House, must go through the ordeal, must pass over the hot plough-shares with his bare feet. It demands some courage to undertake the task; but there is some satisfaction afterwards in the thought, that he has not shrunk from it, whilst others have recoiled in dismay.

Still, in as much as many very able, very experienced, very honorable, and very distinguished men have recoiled from it, we must admit that there is something bad in a system, which closes the doors of the India House against many of those who are most worthy to enter it. The higher the position, and

the more distinguished the character, of the candidate, the more irksome the canvass to him. He is habituated to command, and he cannot readily adopt the language of entreaty. Moreover, many men of high merit, very sage in council, are naturally of a retired disposition, and of a nature which will not suffer them readily to place themselves under obligations, to either friends or strangers. A question, therefore, suggests itself, as to whether some plan might not be adopted, whereby the services of eminent men might be secured to the direction, without subjecting them to the annoyance of the canvass. For our own parts, not having before us the fear of Lord Ellenborough, and such of his supporters, as would advocate with him an extension of the electoral franchise, we cannot help thinking, that if a certain number of vacancies, say one in every six, were to be filled up by the process of internal election, the Directors alone voting on these occasions, the personnel of the Direction would be greatly improved, and the interests of India promoted. There would be little chance of any abuse of this privilege. Even if indisposed upon abstract principles of honor, for which we would willingly give them credit, to use the discretion vested in them wisely and well, public opinion would declare so loudly against any abuse of the privilege, evidenced by the selection of unworthy men, that there would be sufficient security against it. Whether such a design has ever been considered by the Directors themselves, we have no means of ascertaining; but as the tendencies of the age, generally, are towards the extension of all kinds of electoral franchises, it may be doubted whether any proposal for their restriction would be met with acceptance from the public at large.

But if

There is an evil in the present system of election, at which it is necessary to glance. We have said that there can be nothing really degrading in the canvass, so long as an honorable object is sought to be obtained, by honorable means. other than legitimate and recognized means of obtaining votes are resorted to by the candidate, the canvass at once becomes a really degrading occupation. Among the bye-laws of the Company relating to the election of Directors, is one to the effect, "that if any member of this Company shall, by menaces ' or promises, collusive transfer or transfers of stock, by any fee, present, reward, or remuneration, under the plea of defraying travelling expenses, or under any other plea or pretence whatsoever, directly or indirectly, obtain any vote for the election of himself, or any other, to be a Director, and be declared guilty thereof, at a general court, to be called for that purpose, such person shall be incapable, thereafter, of holding any office, the