jured without default or negligence of the carrier. But the law does not allow a public carrier to abandon altogether his obligations to the public, and to stipulate for exemptions which are unreasonable and improper, amounting to an abnegation of the essential duties of his employment. It being against the policy of the law to allow stipulations which will relieve the railroad company from the exercise of care or diligence, or which, in other words, will excuse it for negligence in the performance of its duty, the company remains liable for such negligence. The analysis of the opinion in Railroad Company v. Lockwood shows that it affirms and rests upon the doctrine that an express stipulation by any common carrier for hire, in a contract of carriage, that he shall be exempt from liability for losses caused by the negligence of himself or his servants, is unreasonable and contrary to public policy, and, consequently, void. And such has always been the understanding of this court, expressed in several later cases." 1 § 30. The Rule in New York.-In New York the rule of the Supreme Court of the United States has not been fully upheld. It is settled in that State, as the result of numerous decisions, that a common carrier may limit his liability by contract, and his contract may provide for immunity from the consequences of his own negligence or carelessness, and from that of his agents or servants. But, in order to accomplish this end, the terms of the contract must be definite and unequivocal. While the decisions on this point are uniform, it is apparent that the conscience of the eminent jurists of that State is not in full accord with the rule, and, in consequence, all contracts of this character are rigidly construed, and no presumptions are entertained in favor of the carrier. In Mynard municated from locomotives, or resulting from negligence of its employes, is not void as against public policy. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 70 Fed. Rep. 201; s. c., 17 C. C. A. 1 Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397, 439. A lease by a railroad company of part of its right of way, on condition that the company shall not be liable for damage to property situated thereon caused by fire com- 62. "Where v. Syracuse Railroad Company, the court said: Mynard v. Syracuse, etc. R. Co., 71 N. Y. 180; Wells v. Steam Nav. Co., 8 N. Y. 375; Steinweg v. Erie R. Co., 43 N. Y. 123; Maguire v. Dinsmore, 56 N. Y. 168; Alexander v. Greer, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 533; Nicholas v. New York Cent. R. Co., 89 N. Y. 370; Holsapple v. Rome, etc. R. Co., 86 N. Y. 275. A carrier may lawfully stipulate a time within which claim for damages must be presented. Case v. Cleveland, etc. R. Co.. 11 Ind. App. 517; s. c., 39 N. E. Rep. 426; United States Express Co. v. Harris, 51 Ind. 127; Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Widman, 9 Ind. App. 190; S. C., 37 N. E. Rep. 554; Westcott v. Fargo, 61 N. Y. 542; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Jones, 95 Ind. 228; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Scircle, 103 Ind. 227; Jennings v. Grank Trunk R. Co., 127 N. Y. 438; s. C., 28 N. E. Rep. 394; Glenn v. Southern Express Co., 86 Tenn. 594; s. c., 8 S. W. Rep. 152; Armstrong v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 53 Minn. 183; s. c., 54 N. W. Rep. 1059; Sprague v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 34 Kan. 347; s. c., 8 Pac. Rep. 465; Western R. Co. v. Harwell, 91 Ala. 340; s. c., 8 So. Rep. 649; Selby v. Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 2 Canfield v. Baltimore, etc. R. shipper of property enters into a contract with a common carrier, whereby, in consideration of an agreement of the latter to transport the property at reduced rates, it is stipulated that in the event of loss or injury resulting from causes which would make the carrier liable, the liability shall be limited to an amount not exceeding a valuation specified, the shipper, in case of loss or injury, is not entitled to recover more than the sum specified. It is incumbent upon a shipper to acquaint himself with the contents of the contract executed by him, and although he fails to do so, he will be held chargeable with knowledge thereof. In the main the New York rule is sustained in Missouri.2 In a number of States the common law rule, as upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States, is accepted." § 31. Contracts in Contravention of Law.—It is well established that all agreements in contravention of a statute are void, and any engagement to render a service or to depend on the value of the animals as given by the shipper, and may limit their liability in case of loss to the valuation so given to establish the rates. Duntley v. Boston & Maine R. R. Co., 66 N. H. 263. 1 Zimmer v. New York Central, etc. R. Co., 137 N. Y. 460; Belger v. Dinsmore, 51 N. Y. 166; Steers v. Liverpool, etc. Steamship Co., 57 N. Y. 1; Madan v. Sherard, 73 N. Y. 329; Grossman v. Dodd,137 N. Y. 599. See also Kellerman v. Kansas City R. Co., 136 Mo. 177; S. C., 34 S. W. Rep. 41; Harvey v. Railroad Co., 74 Mo. 538; Ballou v. Earle, 17 R. I. 441; s. C., 22 Atl. Rep. 1113; Coupland v. Housatonic R. Co., 61 Conn. 531; s. C., 23 Atl. Rep. 870. 2 Kellerman v. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 136 Mo. 177; s. C., 34 S. W. Rep. 41; Hart v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 112 U. S. 331; s. c., 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 151. See also McFadden v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 92 Mo. 343; Rogan v. Wabash Ry. Co., 51 Mo. App. 665; Duvenick v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 57 Mo. App. 550; Conover v. Pacific Express Co., 40 Mo. App. 31. 3 Abrams v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 87 Wis. 485; s. c., 56 N. Y. 780; Betts v. Farmers',, etc. Trust Co., 21 Wis. 80; Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. Lawler, 40 Neb. 356; s. C., 58 N. W. Rep. 968; Welsh v. Pittsburg, etc. R. Co., 10 Ohio St. 65; Morrison v. Phillips, etc. Construction Co., 44 Wis. 405; Baughman v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 94 Ky. 150; s. c., 21 S. W. Rep. 757; Johnstone v. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 39 S. Car. 55; s. c., 17 S. E. Rep. 512; Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Faylor, 126 Ind. 126; s. c., 25 N. E. Rep. 869. See general note 1 to section 29, ante. to perform an act which is in contravention of the policy of an act of a legislature, though it may not be a literal violation of any of its requirements, will be held illegal, as in contravention of public policy. All instruments made for an illegal agreement are the purpose of giving effect to tainted with the illegality, and cannot be enforced in a court of equity.2 In a case in Massachusetts, it was held that an agreement by an insolvent debtor to pay some of his creditors a portion of their claims, in consideration that they would not "trouble or oppose his discharge, and would say a good word to other creditors to induce them not to oppose a discharge," is void, as contravening the 1 Jackson v. Davison, 4 Barn. & Ald. 695; Rogers v. Kingston, 10 Moore. 102; s. c., 2 Bing. 441; Murray v. Reeves, 8 Barn. & Cr. 425; Hall v. Dyson, 16 Jur. 270; S. C., 21 L. J. Q. B. 224; Hills v. Mittson, 8 Excheq. 758; Cannon v. Cannon, 26 N. J. Eq. 316; Keppell v. Bailey, 2 Myl. & K. 517; Smith v. City of Albany, 7 Lans. 14; Philpotts v. Philpotts, 10 C. B. 85; Barrell v. Hanrick, 42 Ala. 60; Blossom v. Van Amringe, 1 Phil. Eq. 133; Black v. Oliver, 1 Ala. 449; Jackson v. Walker, 5 Hill, 27; Cantur v. Bennett, 39 Tex. 303; Pratt v. Draughon, 21 La. Ann. 194; McWilliams v. Bryan, 21 La. Ann. 211; Overby v. Overby, 21 La. Ann. 493; Swanger v. Mayberry, 59 Cal. 91; Scudder Andrews, 2 McLean, 464; Downing v. Ringer, 7 Mo. 585; Boies v. Blake, 13 Me. 381; Russell v. De Grand, 15 Mass. 35; Touro v. Cassin, 1 Nott & M. 172; Gray v. Swiss, 3 Wash. C. C. 276; Benton v. Hope, 19 La. Ann. 463; Schwartz v. Tyson, 4 H. & J. 288; Shiffner v. Gordon, 12 East, 296; Williams v. Woodman, 8 Pick. 77; Upton v. Haines, 55 N. H. 283; Milton v. Haden, 32 Ala. 30; De Groot v. V. Vanduzen, 20 Wend. 390; Mayor 1 2 Blasdell v. Fowle, 120 Mass. 447. See also Cockshott v. Bennett. 2 T. R. 763; Phelps v. Thomas, 6 Gray, 327; Case v. Gerrish, 15 Pick. 49; Coates v. Blush, 1 Cush. 564; Partridge v. Messer, 14 Gray, 180; Dexter v. Snow, 12 Cush. 594; Downs v. Lewis, 11 Cush. 76; Ramsdell v. Edgarton, 8 Met. 227; Smith v. Bromley, 2 Doug. 696. policy of the insolvent laws. In a case in New Jersey, it has been held that a contract which contravenes either the provisions or policy of a public law is void; but a transaction to be void in law, as a contract, must first have life as a completed treaty between the parties. In an English case, Lord Ellenborough said: "It may be taken as a received rule of law that what is done in contravention of the provisions of an act of Parliament cannot be made the subjectmatter of an action."3 § 32. For Influencing the Administration of Justice.Covenants relating to any service or to any acts the object of which is to influence the administration of justice by the courts are in contravention of public policy and void. It is not necessary that there should be a positive attempt to corrupt the court, or that any actual subversion of justice should result. In a recent case in Indiana, it was held that all agreements for pecuniary consideration to control the regular administration of justice are void as against public policy, regardless of the good faith of the parties, and without reference to the question as to whether improper means are contemplated or used in their execution. In 1 Dexter v. Snow, 12 Cush. 594. 2 Cannon v. Cannon, 26 N. J. Eq. 316. 3 Langston v. Hughes, 1 Maule & Selw. 596. See also Smith v. Cuff, 6 Maule & Selw. 160; Leicester v. Rose, 4 East, 380; Fawcett v. Gee, 3 Anst. 910; Ex parte Sadler, 15 Ves. 52; Breck v. Cole, 4 Sandf. 83; Knight v. Hunt, 5 Bing. 433; Howden v. Haigh, 11 Ad. & El. 1038; Mallalieu v. Hodgson, 16 Ad. & El. 678; Turner v. Hoole, Dowl. & Ryl. N. P. 27. When a person has entered as much coal land as the statutes of the United States permit, a contract, whereby another person is to enter additional coal land, obtain the title, and then convey it to the first, is contrary to public policy. John son v. Leonhard (Wash. Ter.), 20 Pac. Rep. 591. 4 Brown v. First Nat'l Bank, 137 Ind. 655; Wood v. Humphrey, 114 Mass. 185; Pearl v. Harris, 121 Mass. 390; Vass v. Wales, 129 Mass. 38; White v. Railroad Co., 135 Mass. 216; Hill v. More, 40 Me. 515; Gray v. Wilson, 4 Watts, 39; Randal v. C. & D. Canal Co., 1 Harr. 233; Stone v. Dennis, 3 Port. (Ala.) 231; Haggart v. Morgan, 5 N. Y. 422; Hurst v. Litchfield, 39 N. Y. 377; McGunn v. Hanlin, 29 Mich. 476; March v. Railroad Co., 40 N. H. 548. An agreement between a fidelity insurance company and the employe whose honesty is guaranteed that the voucher showing payment by the company to the employer of |