bequest for purchasing the discharge of poachers, "committed to prison for non-payment of fines, fees or expenses under the game laws," was held void as encouraging Md. 273, 278. A contract conditioned for the execution and deposit of certain promissory notes by one under sentence for the commission of a crime, to be delivered to the prosecuting witness upon certain conditions, one of which was that the maker should receive a pardon or be acquitted on retrial, was held illegal and void as against public policy. Haines v. Lewis, 54 Iowa, 301. Contra: Bird v. Breedlove, 24 Ga. 623. An agreement to procure a pardon from the governor, for a convict in the penitentiary, by the proper use of all legitimate means, is neither immoral nor against the public policy. Formby v. Pryor, 15 Ga. 258. Agreements to procure a pardon tend to obstruct a correct administration of government, and are calculated to induce persons to use their influence in such manner as to defeat public justice. But, otherwise, where an attorney undertook, by the use of his personal influence with the military commander, to save from impending danger of threatened execution, or unauthorized and illegal imprisonment a prisoner who had been convicted by a military court which was unauthorized by law, "such an act cannot be regarded as an agreement to obstruct the proper administration of justice nor to defeat the ends of public justice.' Thompson v. Wharton, 70 Ky. 563. It is not at once apparent that it is not lawful and proper for a party who is suffering the punishment of crime, to apply to the pardoning power for a remission of his sentence; and, so far as we are aware, no censure has been regarded as attaching to such an application, either in law or morals. It seems to us equally reasonable for any other person, who believes it his duty to make such application in behalf of another, to present the case to the executive, with such petitions, memorials, statements of facts and evidence as are suitable to satisfy the pardoning power of the propriety of the relief desired, and we think no censure can be justly attached to any person for his exertions in such a case, if the measures adopted are consistent with the facts of the case, and with the truth and honesty of all parties concerned, while any effort to obtain such pardon by falsehood, and misrepresentation, or by any species of fraudulent contrivance, or by prostituting the influence resulting from official station or from personal relation to the pardoning power, is entirely forbidden by law. A person in prison can do little to aid himself in bringing his case to the consideration of the executive. For everything that must be done without the walls of the prison the convict is compelled to rely on the assistance of those who have their liberty. Such assistance may be afforded from motives of charity and compassion, or the motive may be in part kindness and in part an expectation that the party relieved will be ready to afford a suitable compensation for the services and expenses; or the party in prison may employ another to do such acts as may be rightfully and properly done for his relief, and contract to offenses and opposed to public policy. In a case before the Supreme Court of the United States, the court said: "The pardoning power, committed to the executive, should be exercised as free from any improper bias or influence as the trial of the convict before the court; consequently the law will not enforce a contract to pay money for soliciting petitions, or using influence to obtain a pardon.” This rule will not be inoperative, and its application will not be in any degree modified where the service is for the purpose of procuring a commutation of a criminal sentence. In Kribben v. Haycraft, the court said: "It is a principle of law dictated by the soundest policy that an agreement cannot be enforced by which one person promises to pay another for obtaining or trying to obtain a pardon. The cases are founded on the obvious reason that such contracts are illegal, inasmuch as they tend to encourage the use of improper means to accomplish the object, and are in conflict with the intelligent and proper exercise of the pardoning power. But it is insisted that the promise in this case is not to obtain a pardon but a commutation of the punishment, and that there is nothing in the contract obnoxious to public policy. The distinction is nominal, for the principle is the same in both cases, and all the considerations that uphold the propriety and wisdom of the rule in the one case apply to the other."3 $ 26. For Services which are in Violation of Public Duty.-All agreements to perform any act which is punishable in a criminal sense, or to prevent a criminal prosecution, or to suppress evidence in relation to it, are illegal and void. In England it has been held that a printer cannot recover against a publisher for printing a work which con pay him for his services and to repay him his expenses. Such a contract, if the parties contemplate only a resort to legal and proper measures, is free from any just exception, and binding upon the parties." Chadwick v. Knox, 31 N. H. 226, 234. 125. Thrupp v. Collett, 26 Beav. 2 Marshall v. Balto. & Ohio R. R. Co., 16 How. 314, 334. 3 Kribben v. Haycraft, 26 Mo. 396. tains the life of a prostitute, and the history of her amours with various persons, and it is no answer that the parties are in pari delicto.1 In a case in Georgia it was held that on the trial of an issue whether a promissory note sued on is illegal, because given for the compounding of a felony, it is not necessary that the defendant shall prove that the party charged was actually guilty of the felony; it is sufficient, if there be an act done, of which he is charged to be guilty, which is prima facie felony. An offense which may, in the discretion of the court, be punished by confinement in the penitentiary, is so far a felony that compounding of it is illegal. Although one 1 Poplett v. Stockdale, 2 Carr. & P. 198. A covenant in a deed not to convey or lease land to a Chinaman is void, as contrary to the public policy of the government, in contravention of its treaty with China, and in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution, and is not enforceable in equity. Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. Rep. 181. A contract whereby one aided another in obtaining title to land, sold by an administrator at a price much less than its value, to the injury of the creditors and heirs of the intestate, will not support an action. Smith v. Humphreys, 88 Me. 345; s. C., 34 Atl. Rep. 166. A contract by which plaintiff agreed to refrain from forming a corporation for the construction of waterworks in a certain city, and from carrying on or prosecuting such work, in order that defendant might incorporate for that purpose and conduct the business without competition. is not void as against public policy. Oakes v. Cattarangus Water Co., 143 N. Y. 430; s. c., 38 N. E. Rep. 461. A deed, after reciting that differences existed between a husband and wife, and that they de sired to adjust such differences and provide an adequate support for the wife, conveyed land to a trustee for the purpose of allowing the husband and wife to have the rents and profits, and to "support the wife in such manner as she has heretofore lived." Held, that the deed is not prima facie invalid on the ground that it was made in view of a separation of husband and wife. Barnes v. Barnes, 104 N. Car. 613; s. c., 10 S. E. Rep. 304. A contract by a State authorizing a person to prosecute a claim and providing that his compensation should be a certain per cent. of the amount collected by him, to be paid out of the proceeds thereof, is not void as against public policy, because making the payment of compensation contingent on success; the contract being authorized by the legislature, which empowers the governor and council, on behalf of the State, to appoint an agent to prosecute the claim and fix his compensation to be paid out of any amount received therefrom. Davis v. Commonwealth, 164 Mass. 241; s. C., 41 N E. Rep. 292. may legally take a promissory note as compensation for a personal injury, yet, if the injury was a crime, such as by our law the parties cannot settle between themselves, and if there be any attempt, by giving of the note, to suppress a prosecution for the offense, it vitiates the whole agreement, even though the note be for less than the actual damages received. It is not necessary that there should be an agreement in terms to compound a crime. It is sufficient that that was the intention of the parties, and that the agreement was entered into for the purpose of carrying out that intention. It is not necessary that the person receiving the consideration should agree not to commence proceedings against the person accused.2 The effect will be the same if he binds himself to release the accused from a pending prosecution. Where a Where a third person makes a promise to indemnify an officer for neglecting his duty in the service of a warrant, the promise is based upon an illegal consideration, and, in consequence, is void.3 In an English case, a petition having been presented to the House of Commons, against the return of a member, on the ground of bribery, the petitioner entered into an agreement, in consideration of a sum of money, and upon other terms, to proceed no further with the petition. It was held that this 1 Chandler v. Johnson, 39 Ga. 85; Fivaz v. Nicholls, 2 C. B. 501; Porter v. Jones, 6 Coldw. 313; Gorham v. Keyes, 137 Mass. 583; Kimbrough v. Lane, 11 Bush, 556; Lindsay v. Smith, 78 N. Car. 328; Baker v. Farris, 61 Mo. 389; Shaw v. Reed, 30 Me. 105; Shaw v. Spooner, 9 N. H. 197; Badger v. Williams, 1 D. Chip. 137; Goodwin v. Crowell, 56 Ga. 566; Snider v. Willey, 33 Mich. 483; Sumner v. Sumner, 54 Mo. 340; Wright v. Rindskopf, 43 Wis. 344; Roll v. Raguet, 4 Ohio, 400; Vanover v. Thompson, 4 Jones L. 485; Halthaus v. Kuntz, 17 Ill. App. 434; Henderson v. Palmer, 71 Ill. 579; Taylor v. Jaques, 106 Mass. 291; Peed v. McKee, 42 Iowa, 689; 3 Hodsdon v. Wilkins, 7 Greenl. 113; Ayer v. Hutchins, 4 Mass. 370; Churchill v. Perkins, 5 Mass. 541; Denny v. Lincoln, 5 Mass. 385; Webber v. Blunt, 19 Wend. 188; Clark v. Foxcroft, 6 Greenl. 296. A contract to reprint a book in violation of a copyright belonging to a third party is void. Nichols v. Ruggles, 3 Day, 145. agreement was illegal. It was held, also, that the written agreement was admissible in evidence, for the purpose of insisting on the illegality of the transaction, in answer to an action for the sum so agreed to be paid, without its being stamped.1 In Vermont it has been held that the consideration of a contract must not only be valuable, but lawful; hence there can be no recovery by one for his time and service, the purpose and tendency of whose employment was to obstruct the administration of justice, by influencing State witnesses, and by inducing the State's attorney to hold back in the discharge of his official duty in prosecuting the defendant charged with adultery.2 § 27. For Services in Opposing a Public Enterprise.— It is well established that all covenants that have as their object the defeat or obstruction of any public enterprise are in contravention of public policy and void. The courts will not lend their aid to the enforcement of any agreement of this nature, and they will not afford relief to any person who has put his property in peril for any purpose of this character. Among cases that fall under this rule are those relating to the opening of a street, or of a public road. In Smith v. Applegate, it was held that a promissory note given by the applicants for a public road to a caveator against such road, in consideration of the caveator's withdrawing his opposition to the road, and permitting the return to be recorded, is void, being founded on an illegal consideration. A contract on the part of the caveator to withdraw his opposition to the laying out of a highway, is against the policy of the law, and, therefore, void. In the opinion in this case, the court said: "The same considerations apply with increased force to a controversy touching the laying out of a public highway. Any one aggrieved is at liberty to caveat against the road. He is under no obligation to do so. He may, at his pleasure, abandon his opposition. But he may not lawfully bind himself to withdraw his opposition, nor may he contract to receive a price 1 Coppack v. Bower, 4 Mees. & W. 361. 2 Barron v. Tucker, 53 Vt. 338. |