public good, according to his own honest opinions and convictions of duty. If for money or other personal profit he agrees to exert his influence against what he believes to be for the public good, he is corrupt, and the agreement void, even though in the actual exercise of his influence against his conscience he resorts to no unlawful means. Such bargains cannot be enforced in law. And the reason why they cannot be enforced is not merely because they are made criminal acts by statute or are opposed to the provisions of the constitution, but because of their own inherent turpitude, because they are corrupt and corrupting, because they are destructive to public virtue and the welfare of the community. In republican governments, especially, whatever tends to destroy the purity of elections should be guarded against with the strictest watchfulness and pursued with the most prompt condemnation by courts and legislators."1 § 23. The Subject Continued.-While the rule as above stated is well established, it will not apply to any proper expenditures in the conduct of an election. While all contracts relating to the purchase of votes or of political influence will be held void, as plainly in contravention of public policy, covenants for services in setting forth the claims of candidates to the confidence and support of the voter, and all contracts for compensation for printing and distributing the announcements of candidates, or for the discussion of the issues of the election, either by the press or by public addresses, or for the circulation of literature devoted to a discussion of the merits of a candidate, or to the support of the political principle of which he is a representative, will be sustained. In the case of Keating v. Hyde, this distinction is set forth by the court, as follows: "There is a clear distinction between the purchase of services to be devoted only to an advertising of the fact that one is, or desires to be, a candidate, and the purchase of service to be employed in advocating his peculiar merits 'Nichols v. Mudgett, 32 Vt. 546. See also Fawrie v. Morin's Syndics, 4 Mart. (La.) 39; Meacham v. Dow, 32 Vt. 721; Keating v. Hyde, 23 Mo. App. 555. and eligibility, so as to influence the choice of the voter. No public policy forbids the making of compensation, under agreement or otherwise, for printing or distributing announcements, or for the employment of any proper agency which may bring the fact of a person's candidacy more prominently before the public eye. The information thus disseminated is essential to the intelligent determination of the voter's choice. But it becomes a very different thing when money is paid or promised for efforts to control the voter's free agency in selecting the object of his suffrage. In the present case, the promise or agreement shown in the testimony and remarked upon in the instruction belongs to the last mentioned class. The defendant was to 'work for' the plaintiff's nomination; not as an advertiser only, but as an advocate. We think that the circuit court committed no error in holding that the agreement was void, as against public policy.' § 24. For Withdrawal of Opposing Candidate.Where two persons are applicants to the president, to a governor, or. to any other constitutional appointing power for an office, and they enter into an agreement by which one is to withdraw and to aid the other in securing the appointment, the covenant is not enforceable. In a leading case it was held that: Where two persons apply to the governor of the State to be appointed to the same office, 1 Keating v. Hyde, 23 Mo. App. 555, 560. A promise, in consideration of the governor being prevailed on by the promisee to appoint the promisor to the office, is not binding. Fawrie v. Morin's Syndics, 4 Mart. (La.) (O. S.) 39, at page 49, the court says: "From the instrument itself, it is manifest that the only consideration on which it rests is the illegal condition on which it is stated that the office was obtained. This condition is contrary to sound policy. Offices are to be granted absolutely without any condition. It is not in the power of the grantor to lessen the emoluments which the law has affixed to the discharge of official duties; it matters not to what use the share of the emolument thus carried out is applied. The public will be ill served, if the circle, within which an officer is to be selected, is narrowed by a reduction of the legal emoluments. If these are withdrawn from the incumbent he may be placed under the temptation of compensating himself by speculation, extortion and fraud.” and it is agreed that one of them shall withdraw his application and aid the other in procuring the appointment, in consideration of which the fees and emoluments of the office are to be divided between them, such contract is illegal and void. Such an agreement, it seems, is not within the statute respecting the sale of offices, but is void by the common law.1 In the opinion in this case the court said: 1 Gray v. Hook, 4 Comst. 449. A promise by a candidate to perform the duties of the office for less than the legal salary will avoid the election. State v. Purdy, 36 Wis. 213; State v. Collier, 72 Mo. 13; Carrothers v. Russell, 53 Iowa, 350; Nichols v. Mudgett, 32 Vt. 546; Cook v. Shipman, 24 Ill. 614; Tucker v. Aikin, 7 N. H. 113; State V. Olin, 23 Wis. 309. "The doctrine which we think is established by the foregoing authorities and which we believe to be sound in principle, is, that a vote given for a candidate for a public office in consideration of his promise, in case he shall be elected, to donate a sum of money or other valuable thing to a third party, whether such party be an individual, a county or any other corporation, is void. The power to reject such vote is not vested in the election canvassers, but is vested in the court which is called upon to determine judicially the result of the election. The grounds upon which this doctrine is based are SO clearly and fully stated in the above authorities that it seems unnecessary to repeat them. Indeed, every intelligent person knows that free, unbiased and (in the language of some of the books) indifferent elections are absolutely essential to the existence of free institutions. * Promises made to the people by candidates * for public office that, if elected, they will practice a rigid economy in the expenditures of their several departments, are unobjectionable; and if the successful candidate fulfills his pledges in that behalf he is entitled to commendation. In such case, the candidate only promises to perform a legal and moral duty. For example, should a candidate for governor promise that, if elected, he would discharge all persons employed by the State whose services are not needed, or that he would prevent all unnecessary expenditures of public funds, so far as he may have power to do so, this is only a promise that, if elected, he will, in those respects, faithfully perform the duties of his office. In other words, it is a promise that he will not violate his official oath. But should such candidate propose to the voters and tax payers of the estate, that if they will elect him to the office of governor he will serve the State there in gratuitously or for one-half of the salary allowed by the constitution, and pay the rent of an executive office, and the expenses of fuel, stationery and other incidentals pertaining thereto, out of his own pocket, his proposition has an entirely different aspect. In the one case, the candidate promises that if he is elected he will regard his official duty, while in the other case he proposes to "I think that this contract was void because it stipulated that I should have a pecuniary compensation for withdrawing his application by which he had probably driven off competition, and contributed to reduce the number of applicants to himself and G. I have no doubt that it is void, because it stipulated that H should have a pecuniary compensation for aiding G to obtain the appointment. And I have no doubt that any agreement between two citizens, by which one stipulates to pay the other a proportion of the fees and emoluments of a public office which he is seeking, in consideration that that other will aid him in obtaining it, is void." In a case in Pennsylvania where plaintiff and defendant being applicants for appointment as United States assessor, plaintiff agreed to withdraw, defendant agreeing if he should be appointed to divide the receipts, it was held that the contract was against public policy and the plaintiff could not recover for services rendered. An alleged agreement after the appointment on the same terms held to be void as being in pursuance of the original contract, which could not be ratified.2 buy the office with promises to pay therefor in personal services, or money, or both. The one tends to economy and true reform, but the tendency of the other is to introduce into elections a mischievous element very nearly allied to bribery; an element which never has been tolerated (and never can be with safety) by any free government." State v. Purdy, 36 Wis. 213, 222. "In the closing and degenerate days of Rome's august empire, preceding its immediate downfall, the imperial purple was sold at public auction to the highest bidder. Equally base and equally significant of pre-ent decay and impending downfall would be the toleration of the private purchase of electorial votes. That which is wrong when done directly is equally wrong when done indirectly. Salaries are paid by tax ation, and when a candidate offers § 25. For Services in Procuring a Pardon.—An agreement to pay for labor expended, or for expense incurred in procuring a pardon for a person convicted of a criminal offense, by procuring signatures to a petition or otherwise, falls under the rule as discussed in the preceding sections. The tendency of such an act is to encourage crime and disobedience of law, and as such is immoral and in contravention of public policy. In the leading case of Hatzfield v. Gulden, before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the court said: "The power to pardon is a constitutional power, to alleviate or remit punishment where perhaps there is doubt of guilt, or where the offense was committed under circumstances extenuating the crime, etc. The general and spontaneous expression of opinion has had, and ought to have, weight with the governor. But if undue means are used to obtain petitioners, it may be a great imposition on the governor. The power to pardon may be considered as a part of the penal code of the State; it operates after trial to be sure, generally, but may be exercised before. It is as important that it should be free from bias, or prejudice, or crime, as that the trial should No man would say that if it were possible to procure a pardon by direct payment to a governor it would be lawful to give one. To bribe others to deceive and impose on him only differs in degree." In a case in England a be so. power from abuse through the in- 1 Hatzfeld v. Gulden, 7 Watts, 152, 155. See also Haines v. Lewis, 54 Iowa, 301. "Courts of justice are generally open to suitors for the recovery of just claims, but considerations of public policy are often deemed paramount to private rights, and where they are opposed the latter must yield. There is no doctrine better settled than that agreements to obtain executive clemency, by means of pardons or writs of nolle prosequi, cannot be enforced. The reasons are obvious. They are designed to protect the exercise of this demand." Wildey v. Collier, 7 |