private party.1 In the case of Murphy v. The Farmers' Bank of Schuylkill County of Pennsylvania, the court said: "The authorities show that they do not give a private relator the writ of quo warranto in a case of public prerogative involving no individnal grievance. On this point the authorities are full, direct and harmonious. The usurpation of an office, established by the constitution, under color of an executive appointment, and the abuse of a public franchise under color of a legislative grant, are public wrongs, and not private injuries, and the remedy by quo warranto, in this court at least, must be on the suggestion of the attorney-general, or some authorized agent of the commonwealth. For the authorities I refer myself to those cited in the argument of the respondent's counsel. They establish this as the uniform construction in questions involving the existence of a corporation. In questions involving merely the administration of corporate functions, or duties which touch only individual rights, such as the election of officers, admission of a corporate officer or member, and the like, the writ may issue at the suit of the attorney-general, or of any person or persons desiring to prosecute the same. These are general views which harmonize with the doctrine of the cases, and, therefore, whilst I recognize the right of any relator to have a quo warranto in the supreme court who is desirous to prosecute the same to redress any private grievance that falls within that remedy, I deny the right of any party except the attorney-general or other officer of the commonwealth to sue for it to dissolve a corporation." § 222. Pleadings and Averments.-A proceeding by information in quo warranto, though it still retains its original form as a criminal process, is now regarded in nearly all the States as a civil remedy for the determination of civil rights. No uniform system has been adopted, but in ordinary cases it is not necessary for the relator to allege 1 The People v. North Chicago Railway Co., 88 Ill. 537. 2 Murphy v. Farmers' Bank, 20 Pa. St. 415, 418. and prove his title to the thing in controversy.1 At present the weight of authority favors the rule that where an information is filed against a corporation by its corporate name, and process is issued and served upon it by that 1 People v. Clark, 4 Cow. 95; State v. Com. Bank, 10 Ohio, 535. "The demurrer to the information filed by the solicitor-general rests upon the ground: first, that it does not follow the application, but enlarges the same. We do not understand that the officer of the State who is required ex officio to prepare the information and make out the declaration on which the State, ex relatione of the relators, rests its case is narrowed to the rigid rule of strictly following the petition of the relators. He may amplify and enlarge the facts and the prayer, not going out of the substantial subject-matter complained of before the judge and the judgment granting the prayer and directing the information filed. Secondly, it alleges that, even with the original petition or application, the two together make no case for the writ or judgment of ouster. It will be seen above that we differ from the learned counsel for plaintiffs in error, because we hold that the petition alone makes a sufficient case." Whelchel V. State, 76 Ga. 644, 648. The code rules of pleading do not apply to proceedings in the nature of quo warranto. Pleading in such cases is governed by the rules in force at the time of the adoption of the code. At common law, unaided by statute, double pleading was not allowable; and as the proceeding by information, in the nature of quo warranto, was regarded in England as a criminal prosecution, as well to punish the usurper by 16, § 4, fine for the usurpation of the franchise, as to oust him or seize it for the crown, such proceeding was held not to be embraced in the statute of 4 Anne, chap. allowing defendants to plead to more than one plea. Cole on Criminal Information, 112, 113, 129; Rex v. Newland, Sayres, 96; Rex v. Leigh, 4 Burr. 2146. But in this State the proceeding has been divested of its criminal character, and is treated by the statute merely in the nature of a civil proceeding. No punishment is authorized to be inflicted by fine or otherwise, except where the party is adjudged guilty of contempt in disobeying the order of the court." State v. McDaniel, 22 Ohio St. 354, 360. "In proceedings by information in the nature of quo warranto, the range of inquiry is limited to the charges in the information; and matter set up by way of plea is only material in so far as it shows warrant in law for the exercise of the authority alleged in the information to be usurped. State v. City of Cincinnati, 23 Ohio St. 445, 465. A plea is a sufficint response to an information in the nature of a quo warranto, if it sets up facts showing a right to exercise the office or franchise alleged to have been usurped. Where a statute prescribes a qualification for exercising an office or franchise, the plea need not be framed in the words of the law. It is sufficient if the facts set up show clearly the right. rel. v. Jones, 16 Fla. 306. State ex "In Mud name, its legal existence as a corporation is thereby admitted. Where the corporation appears and makes answer by its corporate name, it is not competent for the State, by Creek Draining Co. v. State, 43 Ind. 236, the court says: "This first paragraph was clearly bad. It is not against certain persons claiming to be a corporation, but against the corporation by its corporate name. It is brought into court as a corporation to answer on allegation that it is not and never was a corporation. When a corporation is brought into court by its corporate name, its existence is thereby admitted.' In this case the corporation being made a party, its existence is admitted. It must follow, therefore, that there is no cause of action stated as against it. But there are other defendants sued jointly with it, and charged with having jointly with such corporation usurped the rights of a corporation, etc. There is no question made in the record or in the briefs as to misjoinder of these parties. But we are clear that the people cannot bring both a corporation and the individuals who compose it before the court, by information in the nature of quo warranto, and claim the nonexistence of the corporation thus brought before the court, and that the other defendants jointly with it are claiming to be and exercise the rights and privileges of such corporation. To permit such a course would be subversive of all rules of pleading. If we are right in the position taken, that by suing the corporation as such its existence is admitted, this is an end of the matter, so far as this count of the complaint is concerned, for the reason that the whole force of its applications, as against the indi vidual defendants, rests upon the sole ground that no such corporation exists. If the complaint can be defended on the ground that it admits that such a corporation once existed, but has ceased to exist, it is open to the objection made to it that it does not state the facts showing how and by what means it has ceased to exist. We are of the opinion that it would be sufficient, in an action against individuals charging that they are wrongfully claiming to act as a corporation, to allege, in general terms, that there never was such a corporation. In such case, the allegation that there never was such a corporation covers the whole ground. Nothing can be added to this general statement, which is itself an allegation of a fact. We are equally clear that where the existence of the corporation is expressly averred, or is admitted, it is not sufficient to allege that it has ceased to exist. The facts showing that its existence has terminated must be set forth. And if the claim is, that the corporation is acting as such, but the proceedings under which it is acting are defective, the facts showing that it is so claiming to act, and the defects claimed to exist should be set out specifically." People v. Stanford, 77 Cal. 360, 364. See also State v. Kupferle, 44 Mo. 154; State v. Beecher, 15 Ohio, 723; People v. Bartlett, 6 Wend. 422; Rex v. Leigh, 4 Burr. 2143; People v. Maynom, 5 Mich. 146; State v. Gleason, 12 Fla. 265; Thompson v. People, 23 Wend. 538. replication, to deny the corporate existence of the defendant. If the franchise is to be brought into the question, the proceedings should be against the individuals who have usurped it. Where the charge is that of an unlawful use of a franchise by a corporation, the information should be against the corporation, but if the charge is that of usurping the rights and privileges of a corporation, it should be directed against the individuals who have committed the offense. If the corporation has no legal existence, the parties who are setting up the claim are the offenders and not the alleged corporation. In a recent and leading case in Illi nois, the modern rule is stated by the court, as follows: "The tendency of the courts in modern times being to regard an information in the nature of a quo warranto in the light of a civil remedy, invoked for the determination of civil rights, although still retaining its criminal form and some of the incidents of criminal proceedings, the better doctrine now is that the pleadings should conform, as far as possible, to the general principles and rules which govern in ordinary civil actions. And this is especially so in this State in view of section 10 of our Practice Act, which provides that in cases of this character it shall be sufficient to summon the defendant to appear and answer the plaintiff in an action of quo warranto, and that the issues shall be made up by answering, pleading or demurring to the petition, as in other cases. It has been repeatedly held in this State that in proceedings of this character the defendant must 1 Draining Co. v. State, 43 Ind. 236; People v. Stanford, 77 Cal. 360; s. c., 19 Pac. Rep. 694; State v. Gas Light & Coke Co., 18 Ohio St. 262; Commercial Bank v. State, 6 Sm. & M. 599. The information having been filed by the attorneygeneral, under the Act of May 1, 1852, against the defendant, by its corporate name, charging a usurpation of certain corporate franchises, and process having been issued and served accordingly, and the defendant having appeared and pleaded in a corporate capacity, setting up its charter, etc., it is not competent for the State, by replication, to deny the corporate existence of the defendant. When the franchise to be a corporation is intended to be drawn in question, the proceeding should, under our statutes, be against the individuals who usurp such franchise. State v. Cincinnati Gas Light & Coke Co., 18 Ohio St. 262. either disclaim or justify. If he disclaims, the people are at once entitled to judgment; and if he justifies he must set out his title specially." $223. Judgment Under Proceedings in Quo Warranto. In England a distinction is recognized between a judgment of ouster and a judgment of seizure.2 The distinction of the English courts appears to have been recognized in this country at an early period. In a leading case, 1 Distilling & Cattle Feeding Co. by the dissolution of the corporav. People, 156 Ill. 448, 482. 2 Smith's Case, 4 Mod. 53; Rex v. City of London, 3 Hay. Towns. St. Tr. 545; 1 Blackstone's Commentaries, 485. 8 People v. Bartlett, 6 Wend. 422; People v. Rensselaer, etc. R. Co., 15 Wend. 113. "It is certain, however, that the dissolution of a corporation is effected by a seizure of its franchises, although the franchises themselves are not thereby destroyed, for they exist in the hands of the State and may be afterwards granted to the same or other individuals, in the same manner in which they were originally granted. But the existence of the corporation is terminated. It being so completely lost that it can have no power over nor connection with anything in existence; of course it can no longer be considered as the owner or possessor of lands or goods, rights or credits. But it does not follow that those lands and goods, rights and credits necessarily fall into the hands of the State: much less that they are proper objects to be included in the terms of the judgment. There are but two grounds on which it can be contended, that the corporate effects fall into the hands of the State: First, as a forfeiture for abusing the franchises; or, secondly, for the want of an owner tion. When we examine the first of these grounds, we find nothing in the books to support an idea, that the abuse of corporate franchises occasions a forfeiture of lands or goods, rights or credits, or in fact, occasions any other forfeiture but the franchise themselves. The consequence of a breach of the implied condition on which their liberties were granted, was not that they should forfeit their property or possession if they abused their franchises, but only that they should forfeit the franchises. That which comes out of the hands of the king, is the proper subject of forfeiture; the king, by the seizure, resuming what originally flowed from his bounty. Authorities leading to this conclusion are numerous. See the cases cited in 2 Bac. 32, and in The King v. Emery, 2 T. R. 515. For the forfeiture is the same for non-user, when no property has been held or rights exercised, as for misuser or abuser, after the possession of much property and the exercise of extensive rights and credits; and the judgment is the same in both cases. Consequently, the judgment could not direct a seizure of the corporate possessions as a forfeiture for the violation of the charter. Nor is the second ground,that the property falls to the State |