New York, a party to an illegal combination withdrew from the trust, and commenced an action against the trustee and the contracting corporations to dissolve the trust. The result was the appointment of a receiver of the property. In ment the parties thereto and transferees of the certificates, were the beneficiaries under the trust. By the terms of the certificates they were transferable only on the books of the trustees on surrendering the certificates, and it was provided that the holder of a certificate should be subject to all terms of the agreement or the by-laws adopted in pursuance thereof as fully as if he had signed the same. Upon the back of each was a blank form for a transfer thereof by the terms of which the transferee was appointed attorney with authority to make the necessary transfer upon the books. These certificates were dealt in, in the open market in the city of New York. Plaintiff purchased in said market one of said certificates which was delivered to him with the transfer on the back made out to him by the person to whom it had been issued. Plaintiff presented the certificate to the trustees, with a demand that a transfer be made on the books and a new certificate issued to him, by offering upon receipt thereof to surrender the old certificate. The transfer was refused. Held, that an action to compel such transfer was maintainable; that while to give plaintiff the character of transferer for the purposes of recognition by the trust, a transfer on its books was necessary, this was for the benefit and protection of the trust, and as by the agreement and form of the certificate, the quality of transferability was given to it, this imported the right to make the transfer effectual by transfer on the books. Rice v. Rockefeller, 134 N. Y. 174. See, also, Bean v. American Loan & T. Co., 122 N. Y. 622. Where the business specified in the charter of a corporation is a perfectly legitimate business, and the corporation is legally created, the subsequent abuse or perversion of its corporate powers, though it may furnish a reason why the legislature or the courts should amend the charter and annul the corporation, will not destroy the body corporate. It is still a legal entity, and bound to answer the claims of creditors, although the intention of those who participated in its creation was to effect illegal purposes. Where the purposes attempted to be accomplished through a corporation are illegal, contracts and agreements entered into to secure the end must be equally so. But as it is possible that a party may enter into contracts which may give effect to the illegal purpose, in ignorance of the unlawful design, it is necessary for those assailing such agreements to show that the agreements were entered into with knowledge of the illegal object. Clancey v. Onondaga Fine Salt Mfg. Co., 62 Barb. 395. In an action under Federal Anti-Trust Law which forbids combinations in restraint of interstate commerce, and gives a right of action to any person injured by acts in violation of its provisions, a declaration which does not aver that the goods manufactured by plaintiff, and in respect of which he claims to be an action brought by said party to recover money due from a debtor of the trust, the money was paid into court by the debtor. The court found that the contract to combine was made for unlawful purposes, and was illegal; that the trust was then insolvent, and its assets, including the claim against the debtor, insufficient to pay its creditors. It was held farther that, as between the plaintiff and the receiver, the latter was entitled to the fund; that the plaintiff stood in the position of a party to an illegal contract claiming a fund which, if the contract was valid, belonged to the trust combination, and to sustain the action would permit it to escape from the operation of the rule which derives affirmative relief to a party to an illegal contract. With regard to the legal position of the receiver in such a case, the court, in the opinion in the case above cited, said: "The general rule is well established that a receiver takes the title of the corporation or individul whose receiver he is, and that any defense which would have been good against the former may be asserted against the latter. But there is a recognized exception which prevents a receiver of an insolvent individual or corporation, in the interests of creditors, to disaffirm dealings of the debtor in fraud of their rights.2 Assuming that the trustee could not have recovered of the debtor for the reasons suggested, it would be a very strange application of the doctrine that no right of action can spring from an illegal transaction, which should deny to innocent creditors of the combination, or to the receiver who represents them, the right to have the debt collected and applied in satisfaction of their claim. The just rule of the common law, that courts will not lend their aid to enforce illegal transactions at the instance of a party to the illegality, injured, are a subject of interstate commerce, or that the acts complained of have anything to do with any contract in restraint of trade, or that the parties are citizens of different States, is demurrable. Bishop v. American Preservers' Co., 51 Fed. Rep. 272. 1 Pittsburg Carbon Co. v. MeMillan, 119 N. Y. 46. 2 Gillett v. Moody, 3 N. Y. 479; Porter v. Williams, 9 N. Y. 142; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9, 108. would be misapplied if permitted to be used to present the application of the fund in question to the payment of creditors of the combination." In Illinois it has been held that a foreign corporation, although abusing the privilege which it enjoys of doing business in this State, is not to be considered as an outlaw, having no right to sue for the property it owns. The organization of a foreign corporation cannot be attacked collaterally for the supposed violation of the law in regard to trusts.2 1 Pittsburg Carbon Co. v. McMillan, 119 N. Y. 46, 53. 2 Bishop v. American Preservers' Co., 51 Ill. App. 417. See, also, Catskill Bank v. Gray, 4 Barb. 479. Where the government contracts with a railroad corporation, the lessee of several roads, to carry the mail over its leased line, it is no defense to an action for compensation that the leases were void, as operated by a combination intended to neutralize competition. Southern Pac. Co. v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 77. One who requests and accepts services of a tug for towage purposes cannot escape paying the reasonable value of the services rendered, on the ground that the tug owners are members of an association which is illegal under the Act of July 2, 1890, relating to trusts and monopolies. The Charles E. Wiswell, 74 Fed. Rep. 802. § 183. Introductory.—Legislation relating to illegal combinations of the nature of the modern "trust" is of recent date. Decisions of the courts and legislative acts in regard to monopolies and the contracts in restraint of trade commenced at an early period. The courts and legislators were impressed with the necessity of such decisions and acts, and what was commenced at a remote period has continued to the present time. But the proportions attained by the comparatively recent trust combinations and the threatening attitude assumed by the more powerful of the great "trusts" has excited the apprehensions of thoughtful men, and moved legislators to some vigorous efforts for the protection of the public interests. Many of the States have adopted some very comprehensive and drastic statutes for the regulation or suppression of such combinations. Legislation of this character is not equally important to all of the States. Those States in which the great centers of commercial operations are located or are in a degree under the influence of such cities, have recognized the necessity of vigorous and positive anti-trust legislation, and where the legislatures have not been subject to the control of these combinations or of some great corporation statutes of this character have been enacted. In some of the States laws have been passed that effectually suppress all combinations, the object of which is to create a monopoly, or to increase or to maintain prices, by the suppression of competition, while in others anti-trust legislation has been of the nature of a farce. The design has been to satisfy the popular demand without at all interfering with the operations of the "trust." But the indications are that the time is drawing nigh when the popular indignation against such combinations will find expression in language which mercenary and venal legislators will not deem it prudent to disregard. The following sections contain the Federal Anti-Trust Act of 1890, and the statutes of all the States that have enacted laws on this subject. These statutes are all of comparatively recent date, and a number are as late as the sessions of 1897. In some of the States, where there has been no |