business on the grounds connected with its stations has not been definitely and finally determined. But it is well settled that in their regulations relating to this matter they cannot discriminate in favor of one person and against another engaged in the same branch of business. They cannot admit the omnibus or hack of one person or company to their grounds and exclude that of another. And they cannot give one person or company any advantage over a competitor. Their treatment of all engaged in this branch of business must be strictly fair and impartial. In the leading case on this subject it was held that a railroad company cannot legally give to one hack and bus company the right to the use and occupancy of a portion of its depot grounds to the exclusion of others engaged in the like business of the carriage of passengers and freight to and from its depot. The statute requiring all railroad companies to grant equal facilities for the transportation of passengers and freight to all persons, companies or corporations does not relate entirely to the mere carriage in the cars of the road, but includes the receiving of such passengers and freight at its depots, and by other "persons, companies or corporations" at the point upon its road where the carriage ends. A railroad company can make all needful, reasonable rules and regulations concerning the use of its depot and grounds, and can exclude all persons therefrom who have no business with the railroad or passengers going to and coming from its trains or depots, and it probably can prohibit all persons from soliciting business for themselves upon its premises; but it cannot, arbitrarily, admit one common carrier of passengers or freight to its depots or grounds and exclude all others, for no other reason than that it is for its own profit or pleasure to do so.1 In the 1 Kalamazoo Hack & Bus Co. v. Sootsma, 84 Mich. 194. See also Marriott v. Ry. Co., 1 C. B. (N.S.) 499; In re Palmer, L. R. 6 C. P. 194; In re Parkinson, L. R. 6 C. P. 554; Camblos v. Railroad Co., 9 Phila. 411; New England Express Co. v. Railroad Co., 57 Me. 188: Beadell v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co., 5 Com. B. (N. S.) 509; Painter v. London, Brighton & S. C. Rỵ. Co.. 5 Com. B. (N. S.) 70; Barker v. Midland Ry. Co., 18 Com. B. 46; Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H. opinion in this case the doctrine is stated by the court, as follows: "The plea is made that the railway company, owning these grounds, or having the actual occupancy and possession thereof, has the same right of control over them 523. "The exclusive privilege which the plaintiffs claim under their license from the railroad company's station agent of occupying the space beside the railroad platform of easiest approach thereto, next to the station building, the objective point for the discharge of railroad passengers, is a valuable one, giving the plaintiffs an advantage in carrying on their business over the defendants, their rivals in the same line of business. The business of both parties is that of common carriers for hire, on the same line, and, by their connection with the railroad, forming one continuous line by which passengers are transported to the same general destination; the railroad company carrying them to its station near the city, and the plaintiffs and defendants carrying them to their severals destinations in the city. As common carriers it is the duty of each of the parties to transport all persons who offer to take and pay for passage with them; and they are charged with grave and responsible duties to such persons when they have once taken passage. They must make the trip whether they have one or many passengers. As a corollary of this duty to carry all, there ought to be a corresponding right upon the part of each to have the same facilities afforded them to obtain the passage in their respective vehicles of all such passengers as are brought to the point of connection by the connecting carrier, the railroad company on the same general route. In this way the enterprise of each is encouraged, competition is stimulated, the price of transportation is kept within reasonable bounds, the safest, best and most comfortable means of conveyance, a rapid passage, and polite and agreeable service are apt to be secured to the traveling public. On the other hand, if better facilities are afforded to one carrier than another by the connecting carrier competition is discouraged, a monopoly created, and the traveling public are apt to receive a slow, uncomfortable, slovenly, negligent and expensive service. Monopolies are obnoxious to the spirit of our laws, and ought to be discouraged. This is the spirit of our constitutional provision which prohibits discrimination in charges, or facilities in transportation between transportation companies and individuals or in favor of either.' Article 12, § 23. And in this case we do not think the railroad company could give the plaintiffs the exclusive privilege of approach to nearly one-half of its platform and that the most desirable and advantageous half for procuring passengers and thereby deny it to the defendants, both being there for the same purpose, and in the same business, of forwarding the railroads passengers to their places of destination from the point where the railroad company landed them." Cravens v. Rodgers. 101 Mo. 247, 252; s. C., 14 S. W. Rep. 106. A railroad * * that any citizen would have under similar circumstances, provided only that it discharges its duties to the public, with reference thereto, as a common carrier. This is true. But when the ground is used in its business as common car company may not grant to one person the exclusive right to the use of a portion of its depot platform to deliver passengers departing, and to receive and solicit the patronage of incoming passengers, to the exclusion of all other persons from the exercise of such rights, as such grant is against public policy and contrary to the provisions of Article XV., § 7, of the constitution, which provides that no discrimination in charges, or facilities for transportation of freight or passengers of the same class shall be made by any railroad or transportation or express company, between persons or places within this State.' Passengers arriving at or departing from the station of a common carrier are entitled to whatever benefit of competition may grow out of the contests of others to supply the public demands and receive the compensation therefor. A rule or regulation as applied to the government of the conduct of persons, or of a class of persons, contemplates uniformity and not discrimination, and the grant by a railroad company of a platform privilege at its depot to one hackman to the exclusion of all others is therefore not such a rule or regulation as applied to the right of a common carrier to make and enforce all reasonable rules and regulations necessary to govern persons coming to its station buildings, platform and grounds. Montana Union Ry. Co. v. Langlois, 9 Mont. 419; S. C., 24 Pac. Rep. 209. A railroad company may make and enforce by its agents reasonable and necessary rules for the transaction of its business, and for the proper and orderly management of its depot and other buildings open to the public. The rules, however, must be reasonable and such as do not unnecessarily infringe upon the rights of the public and others having or carrying on business in connection with railroad traffic and travel. A regulation forbidding hackmen, peddlers, expressmen and loafers from coming within the passenger depot is reasonable. Summitt v. State, 8 Lea (Tenn.), 413. In Massachusetts, in Old Colony Railroad Co. v. Tripp, 147 Mass. 35, a different view is taken. In this case the court held that a railroad corporation may contract with one to furnish the means to carry incoming passengers or their baggage and merchandise from its stations, and may grant to him the exclusive right there to solicit the patronage of such passengers. Such an agreement is not within the Pub. Stats. chap. 112, § 188, which provides that such a corpoporation "shall give to all persons or companies reasonable and equal terms, facilities and accomodations for the use of its depot and other buildings and grounds. The holding was by a nearly equally balanced bench. In the majority opinion, Allen, J., says: "We have not been referred to any decision or dictum in England or in this country, that a common carrier of passengers and their * rier, and for the purpose of the standing or 'setting' of hacks and buses to solicit the patronage of incoming passengers, then it must use it for the benefit of all, and not for the privilege of one. It could probably refuse, if such refusal was reasonable in that there was other proper ground for them to stand upon, to permit any hacks or buses to occupy the ground at all; but if it opens the door to one, all must enter and have equal facilities and privileges, one with the other. No doubt one wrongfully creating disorder or disturbance upon this ground, or defrauding or deceiving passengers, could be lawfully ejected therefrom, and, persisting in such conduct, be forever barred therefrom by the railroad company, but that would be a matter for the railroad company, rather than the plaintiff.”1 § 157. General Powers of Railway Corporations.-In general the powers of a railway company is represented by its board of directors. In the exercise of this power a board of directors is subjected to the restrictions of the charter and by-laws of the company. It must be guided by these rules and by the legal regulations to which such corporations are subject. In a leading case in Indiana, the rule was stated, as follows: "A railroad company is a baggage to and from a railroad station has any right without the consent of the railroad company, to use the grounds, buildings and platforms of the station for the purpose of soliciting the patronage of passengers, or that a regulation of the company which allows such use by particular persons, and denies it to others, violates any right of the latter. Cases at common law or under statutes to determine whether such railroad companies in particular instances gave equal terms and facilities to different parties to whom they furnished transportation and with whom they dealt as common carriers, have no bearing on the case at bar. The defendant in his business of solicitor of the patronage of passengers held no relations with the plaintiff as a common carrier, and had no right to use its station grounds and buildings." 1 Kalamazoo Hack & Bus Co. v. Sootsma, 84 Mich. 194, 201. See generally, McConnell v. Pedigo, 92 Ky. 465; s. c., 18 S. W. Rep. 15; 5 Am. R. & Corp. Rep. 711; New York, etc. R. Co. v. Flynn, 74 Hun, 124; s. c., 26 N. Y. Supl. 859; City of Colorado Springs v. Smith, 19 Colo. 554; s. C., 36 Pac. Rep. 540; Landrigan v. State, 31 Ark. 50; Commonwealth v. Power, 7 Metc. 596. quasi public corporation. It depends on the public for its support, and the public depends upon it for its accommodations. Powers are granted to it which are denied to individuals or partnerships or other corporations, as those for producing, manufacturing, commercial or monetary purposes. It has privileges which are denied to other common carriers, such as lines of ships, steamboats, or stage coaches, or other means of the carrying trade. It exercises the right of eminent domain, which is an attribute of sovereignty. The power of taxation, as in the case before us, is often invoked in its aid. It is, therefore, bound to reciprocal obligations to the State, and owes reciprocal obligations to the public. It must not make contracts beyond its chartered powers, or perform acts injurious to the public, or pursue a course in contravention of public policy. It is created, sustained and protected by the law, and wields power with which private enterprise cannot compete; it must, therefore, obey the law, keep within its powers, and pursue, in its general course, the end and design of its creation. A board of directors represents the general power of a railroad company, subject to the restrictions in the charter and the by-laws of the corporation. Within their general agency their acts will bind the company. They have no power to manage the property or franchises of the road for their own benefit. They may not divert the business of the road, or impair its ability to carry out its duties to the stockholders. Their power, as between themselves and the company, is conferred by the corporators, and must not be exceeded. They cannot subject the capital of the company to risks, or incur liabilities beyond their agency. They cannot sever the road and favor one portion of it to the injury of another, or serve the interests of a part of the stockholders to the injury of other stockholders. They are the agents of the corporation, and are limited in their powers. They cannot change the termini of the road, or its general course and direction, but must in all things subserve the original purpose, design and end of the organization. A board of directors of a railroad company stands as a trustee of the stockholders, in the general |