§ 138. Power to Regulate Public Warehouses and Warehousing.—The right of a State to regulate its domestic affairs is not affected by the limitation of the powers of Congress by the Constitution of the United States. And notwithstanding that warehouses are used by persons engaged in interstate commerce, the State legislature may prescribe and enforce regulations as a matter of State concern. In the leading case of Munn v. Illinois, it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States that where wharehouses are situated and their business is carried on exclusively within a State she may, as a matter of domestic concern, prescribe regulations for them, notwithstanding they are used as instruments by those engaged in value, for, if a claimant for stock killed was compelled to pay his attorney's fees, it might well happen that in all cases the amount of his claim-such amounts, being uniformly small-would be consumed by attorney's fees, and so leave the claimant in no better condition than before), we see no reason to hold it beyond the power of the legislature. It is no uncommon thing for legislatures to provide, in cases where a failure to pay seems to imply more than ordinary wrong, that such failure should carry with it something in the nature of a penalty. Sometimes double or treble damages are given. The Iowa stock law gave double damages. Our trespass act provides for both double and treble damages. Ten per cent. may sometimes be added in the discretion of the court. Other illustrations might be suggested." Kansas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Mower, 16 Kan. 573, 582. Contra: See Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Moss, 60 Miss. 641; South., etc. R. Co. v. Morris, 65 Ala. 193; Wilder v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 70 Mich. 382; Schut v. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co., 70 Mich. 433; Ziegler v. South., etc. R. R. Co., 58 Ala. 594; Smith v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 75 Ala. 449; State v. Divine, 98 N. Car. 778; Indiana, etc. R. Co. v. Gapen, 10 Ind. 292; Madison, etc. R. Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 217; St. Louis, etc. R. R. Co. v. Williams, 49 Ark. 492. The rights of every individual must stand or fall by the same general law that governs every member of the body politic in the land, under similar circumstances, therefore a partial law which proposes to affect or destroy the rights of particular persons, or a particular class of persons, is not the law of the land. That part of the statute of June 22, 1867, which gives to the owner of live stock "double the value" of his property accidentally injured or destroyed on a railroad track is void. Atchison & Neb. R. R. Co. v. Baty, 6 Neb. 37. See generally: Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 388; Bull v. Conroe, 13 Wis. 233, 244; Wally v. Kennedy, 2 Yerg. 554; Gordon v. Winchester, 12 Bush, 110; Durkee v. City of Janesville, 28 Wis. 464; Janes v. Reynolds, 2 Tex. 250; Van Zant v. Waddel. 2 Yerg. 260. interstate, as well as in State, commerce; and until Congress acts in reference to their interstate relations, such regulations can be enforced, even though they may indirectly operate upon commerce beyond her immediate jurisdiction. The court does not hold that a case may not arise in which it may be found that a State has, under the form of regulating her own affairs, encroached upon the exclusive domain of Congress in respect to interstate commerce. The ninth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States operates only as a limitation of the powers of Congress, and in no respect affects the States in the regulation of their domestic affairs. The act of the General Assembly of Illinois, entitled "an act to regulate public warehouses and the warehousing and inspection of grain, and to give effect to article 13 of the constitution of this State," is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.1 In a recent case in New York, an act of 1 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113. This case, which is justly considered the leading case on this point, was rendered by a divided court. Its authority was repeatedly attacked and its soundness questioned. However, in the case of Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, Justice Blatchford, in a most convincing decision commencing with these words: "The main question involved in these cases is whether this court will adhere to its decision in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113," clearly and finally upholds the case. He cites in support of the late conclusion, among others: Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U. S. 347, 354; Davis v. State, 68 Ala. 58; Girard Storage Co. v. Southwork Co., 105 Pa. St. 248, 252; Brechbill v. Randall, 102 Ind. 528; Webster Telephone Case, 17 Neb. 126; Zanesville v. Gas Light Co., 47 Ohio, 1; Central Union Telephone Co. v. The State, 118 Ind. 194. 207; Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Balto. & Ohio Telegraph Co., 66 Md. 399, 414. "Since the formation of the State government, the sale of this great staple [tobacco] has been fostered and protected by legislation. The rights and duties of the warehouseman, the buyers and sellers and all the officers connected with the warehouses, have been defined by statute, and no commodity has received the same protection in the way of either general or special legislation. Ninetenths of the tobacco is sold at auction, with the right unquestioned, until the present controversy, of all parties to enter the warehouses as buyers or as sellers, by their warehousemen as their agents, and competition left unrestricted, save the option on the part of the owner to approve or reject the bid. There is no provision, it is true, in any of the statutes now in force, or that existed prior to the law as we now the legislature of New York provided that the maximum charge for elevating, receiving, weighing and discharging grain should not exceed five-eighths of one cent a bushel; and that, in the process of handling grain by means of float find it, compelling the producer of tobacco to take it to the warehouses in the city of Louisville, or to expose it for sale at public auction, but such warehouses have always been regulated by law for the benefit of the producer, as well as those who are the proprietors of these warehouses, and the latter have assumed an obligation to the public that exists so long as they continue public warehousemen. They have assumed a quasi public character under the protection of the law, and will not be allowed to exercise all the privileges that have heretofore belonged to warehousemen, and evade all the duties and responsibilities of their position by the passage of a resolution disclaiming that they are operating their houses in the capacity of warehousemen, but as commission merchants." Nash v. Page, 80 Ky. 539, 542. "The power of the legislature to regulate the charge for elevating grain where the business is carried on by individuals upon their own premises, depends upon the question whether the regulation falls within the scope of what is called the police power, which is but another name for that authority which reside in every sovereignty to pass all laws for the internal regulation and government of the State, necessary for the public welfare. The existence of this power is universally recognized. All property, all business, every private interest may be affected by it and be brought within its influence. Under this power the legislature regulates the uses of property, prescribes rules of personal conduct, and in numberless ways, through its pervading and ever present authority, supervises and controls the affairs of men in their relations to each other and the community at large to secure the mutual and equal rights of all, and promote the interests of society. It has limitations; it cannot be arbitrarily exercised so as to deprive the citizen of his liberty or property. But a statute does not work such a deprivation in the constitutional sense, simply because it imposes burdens or abridges freedom of action, or regulates occupations, or subjects individuals or property to restraints in matters indifferent, except as they affect public interests or the rights of others. Legislation under the police power infringes the constitutional guaranty only when it extends to subjects not within its scope and purview, as that power was defined and understood when the constitution was adopted. The generality of the terms employed by jurists and publicists in defining this power, while they show its breadth and the universality of its presence, nevertheless leave its boundaries and limitations indefinite, and impose upon the court the necessity and duty, as each case is presented, to determine whether the particular statute falls within or outside of its appropriate limits. There are elements of publicity in the business of elevating grain which pecu ing and stationary elevators, the lake vessels or propellers, the ocean vessels or steamships and canal boats should only be required to pay the actual cost of trimming or shovelling to the leg of the elevator when unloading, and trimming liarly affect it with a public interest. They are found in the nature and extent of the business, its relation to the commerce of the State and country, and the practical monopoly enjoyed by those engaged in it. The extent of the business is shown by the facts to which we have referred. A large proportion of the surplus cereals of the country passes through the elevators at Buffalo and finds its way through the Erie canal and Hudson river to the seaboard at New York, from whence they are distributed to the markets of the world. The business of elevating grain is an incident to the business of transportation. The elevators are indispensable instrumentalities in the business of the common carrier. It is scarcely too much to say that, in a broad sense, the elevators perform the work of carriers. They are located upon or adjacent to the waters of the State, and transfer from the lake vessels to the canal boats, or from the canal boats to the ocean vessels, the cargoes of grain, and thereby perform an essential service in transportation. It is by means of the elevators that transportation of grain by water from the upper lakes to the seaboard is rendered possible. It needs no argument to show that the business of elevating grain has a vital relation to commerce in one of its most important aspects. Every excessive charge made in the course of the transportation of grain is a tax on commerce, and the public have a deep It interest that no exorbitant charges shall be exacted at any point upon the business of 'transportation." People v. Budd, 117 N. Y. 1, 22. "The defendants' business [stock yards] is of recent origin, Their duties and liabilities are wholly undefined, except as they may be deduced from the application of well-established legal principles to other corporations in analogous cases. No case was cited on the argument, and none is known to exist, in which the duties of a body corporate, like the defendants', have been the subject of judicial consideration. The business of the defendants has no exact counterpart or model in any of the established instruments of commerce, or agencies used by the public in the transaction of business. bears a closer resemblance to the business carried on by warehousemen than to any other business known to the law. Except in the character of the property, which is the subject of the bailment, the business of the defendants corresponds, in many respects, with that of the warehouseman. That is the only business which can, in my judgment, be safely used, by way of analogy, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not, according to established principles of general law, the defendants are subject to the duty which the complainants ask the court to compel them to perform. There can be no doubt, I think, that a warehouseman is not required, by any general rule of law, to receive cargo when loading, it was held that the act was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State over a business affected with a public interest, and did not violate the Constitution of the United States and was valid.'1 § 139. Effect of Statutory Regulations.-The business of conducting a warehouse for the accommodation of the public is subject to legislative control. It is subject not only to any statutory regulations that may have been in force at the time that the business was commenced, but, as well, to any changes that may subsequently be made in the statute by which they are controlled. In Munn v. Illinois, the rule is stated by the court, as follows: "It matters not in this case that these plaintiffs in error had built their warehouses and established their business before the regulations complained of were adopted. What they did was from the beginning subject to the power of the body politic to require them to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good. They entered upon their business and provided themselves with the means to carry it on subject to this condition. they did not wish to submit themselves to such interference, they should not have clothed the public with an interest in their concerns. The same principle applies to them that does to the proprietor of a hackney carriage, and as to him it has never been supposed that he was exempt from regulating statutes or ordinances, because he had purchased his horses and carriage and established his business before the If |