$ to effect a public benefit by means of a road, and that is publici juris. In earlier times there seems to have been a necessity upon governments, or at least it was a settled policy with them, to effect everything of this sort by the direct and sole agency of the government. The highways were made by the public, and the use was accordingly free company is, by the combination of the warehousing act with the act by which they were originally constituted, and with the actually existing state of things in the port of London, whereby they alone have the warehousing of these wines, they be not, according to the doctrine of Lord Hale, obliged to limit themselves to a reasonable compensation for such warehousing. And, according to him, whenever the accident of time casts upon a party the benefit of having a legal monopoly of landing goods in a public port, as where he is the owner of the only wharf authorized to receive goods which happens to be built in a port newly erected, he is confined to take reasonable compensation only for the use of the wharf.' And further on (p. 539): 'It is enough that there exists in the place and for the commodity in question, a virtual monopoly of the warehousing for this purpose, on which the principle of law attaches, as laid down by Lord Hale in the passage referred to [that from De Portibus Maris already quoted] which includes the good sense as well as the law on the subject,' and in the same case Le Blanche, J., said (p. 541): ‘Then admitting these warehouses to be private property, and that the company might discontinue the application of them, or that they might have made what terms they pleased in the first instance, yet having, as they now have, this monopoly, the question is, whether the warehouses be not private property clothed with a public right, and, if so, the principle of law attaches upon them. The privilege, then, of bonding these wines being at present confined by the act of Parliament to the company's warehouses, is it not the privilege of the public, and shall not that which is for the good of the public attach on the monopoly, that they shall not be bound to pay an arbitrary but reasonable rent? But upon this record the company resist having their demand for warehouse rent confined within any limit,' and though it does not follow that the rent in fact fixed by them is unreasonable, they do not choose to insist on its being reasonable for the purpose of raising the question.. For this purpose, therefore, the question may be taken to be whether they may claim an unreasonable rent. But though this be private property yet the principle laid down by Lord Hale attaches upon it, that when private property is affected with a public interest it ceases to be juris privati only; and, in case of its dedication to such a purpose as this, the owners cannot take arbitrary and excessive duties, but the duties must be reasonable.' We have quoted thus largely the words of these eminent expounders of the common law, because, as we think, we find in them the principle which supports the legislation to the public. The government assumed the exclusive direction as well as authority, as if they chose to be seen and felt in everything, and would avoid even a remote connection between private interests and public institutions. An immense and beneficial revolution has been brought we are now examining. Of Lord Hale, it was once said by a learned American judge: 'In England, even on rights of prerogative, they scan his words with as much care as if they had been found in Magna Charta; and the meaning, once ascertained, they do not trouble themselves to search any further.' 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 536, note." "The power of regulation in these cases does not turn upon the fact that the entities affected by the legislation are corporations deriving their existence from the State, but upon the fact that the corporations are common carriers and, therefore, subject to legislative control. The State in constituting a corporation may prescribe or limit its powers and reserve such control as it sees fit, and the body accepting the charter takes it subject to such limitations and reservations, and is bound by them. The considerations upon which a corporation holds its franchises are the duties and obligations imposed by the act of incorporation. But when a corporation is created it has the same rights and the same duties, within the scope marked out for its action, that a natural person has. property is secured to it by same constitutional guaranties, and in the management of its property and business is subject to regulation by the legislature to the same extent only as natural persons, except as the power may be extended by its charter. The mere fact of a corporate character does Its not extend the power of legislative regulation. For illustration, it could not be justly contended that the Act of 1888 would be a valid exercise of legislative power as to corporations organized for the purpose of elevating grain, although invalid as to private persons conducting the same business. The conceded power of legislation over common carriers is adverse to the claim that the police power does not in any case include the power to fix the price of the uses of private property, and of services connected with such use unless there is a legal monopoly, or special governmental privileges or protection has been bestowed. It is said that the control which the legislature is permitted to exercise over the business of common carriers is a survival of that class of legislation which in former times extended to the details of personal conduct and assumed to regulate the private affairs and business of men in the minutest particulars. This is true. But it has survived because it was entitled to survive. By reason of the changed conditions of society and a truer appreciation of the proper functions of government, many things have fallen out of the range of the police power as formerly recognized, the regulation of which by legislation would now be regarded as invading personal liberty. But society could not safely surrender the power to regulate by law the business of common carriers. Its value has about in modern times, by engaging individual enterprise, industry and economy, in the execution of public works of internal improvement. The general management has been left to individuals, whose private interests prompt them to conduct it beneficially to the public; but it is not entirely confided to them. From the nature of their undertaking and the character of the work, they are under sufficient responsibilities to insure the construction and preservation of the work, which is the great object of the government. The public interests and control are neither destroyed nor suspended. The control continues as far as it is consistent with the interests granted, and in all cases as far as may be necessary to the public use. The road is a highway, although the tolls may be private property, by force of the grant of the franchise to collect them. It is a common nuisance to allow it to become ruinous, or to obstruct it. The government may, upon sufficient cause, claim a forfeiture of the charter, or compel the execution and repairs of the road by those undertaking them by any means applicable to other persons charged with the like duties in respect to other highways. The difference is, that the corporation, in lieu of the sovereign, has the custody and property of the road, and the collection of the tolls in reimbursement of the cost of construction and remuneration for labor and risk of capital. As to the corporation, it is a franchise, like a ferry or any other. As to the public, it is a highway, and, in the strictest sense, publici juris. The land needed for its construction is taken by the public for the public been infinitely increased by the condition of modern commerce, under which the carrying trade of the country is, to a great extent, absorbed by corporations, and, as a check upon the greed of these consolidated interests, the legislative power of regulation is demanded by imperative public interests. The same principle upon which the control of common carriers rest has enabled the State to regulate in the public interest the charges of telephone and telegraph companies, and to make the telephone and telegraph, those important agencies of commerce, subservient to the wants and necessities of society. These regulations in no way interfere with rational liberty-liberty regulated by law." Andrews, J., in People v. Budd, 117 N. Y. 1, 21. use, and not merely for the private advantage of individuals. It is only vested in the company for the purposes of the act; that is, to make the road."1 § 134. Power to Regulate the Business of a Railroad Company. It is the rule, and it is well established, that the incorporation of a railway company by a legislature affects the property and employment of such company with a public use, and thus subjects the business of the company to legislative control. This is a result of the special privileges conferred by the charter of a railway company, and, in particular, of the authority, which it confers, to exercise the right of eminent domain to appropriate private property to its uses, and, also, of the obligation assumed by the company in the acceptance of its charter, to transport passengers and freight at reasonable rates. This regulation of rates extends to the prevention of extortion by unreasonable charges, and of any form of favoritism by improper discrimination.2 In the recent leading case of The Georgia 1 Railroad Company v. Davis, 2 and brought within it, or taken up Dev. & Bat. 451, 468. 2 Georgia Banking Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174, 179. The Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company was, by its charter and the charters of other companies consolidated with it, authorized to demand and receive such sum or sums of money for the transportation of persons and property, and for the storage of property, as it shall deem reasonable." The constitution of Wisconsin in force, when the charters were granted, provides that all acts for the creation of corporations within the State "may be altered or repealed by the legislature at any time after their passage." Held, that the legislature had power to prescribe a maximum of charges to be made by said company for transporting persons or property within the State, or taken up outside the State inside and carried without. Certain Wisconsin railroad corporations were consolidated with others of Illinois on terms which, in effect, required that the consolidated company should, when operating in Wisconsin, be subject to its laws. Held, that Wisconsin can legislate for the company in that State precisely as it could have legislated for its own original companies, if no consolidation had taken place. The Act of Wisconsin, approved March 11, 1874, entitled "an act relating to railroads, express and telegraph companies, in the State of Wisconsin," is confined to State commerce, or such interstate commerce as directly affects the people of Wisconsin. Until Congress shall act in reference to the relations of this consolidated company to interstate commerce, the regulation of its fares, Banking Company v. Smith, before the Supreme Court of the United States, the rule was stated by the court, as follows: "It has been adjudged by the court in numerous instances that the legislature of a State has the power to pre etc., so far as they are of domestic concern, is within the power of the State. Where property has been clothed with a public interest the legislature may fix a limit to that which shall in law be reasonable for its use. Peik v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co., 94 U. S. 164. "Railroad corporations hold their property and exercise their functions for the public benefit and they are, therefore, subject to legislative control. The legislature which has created them may regulate the mode in which they shall transact their business, the price which they shall charge for the transportation of freight and passengers, the speed at which they may run their trains, and the way in which they may cross or run upon highways and turnpikes used for public travel. It may make all such regulations as are appropriate to protect the lives of persons carried upon railroads or passing upon highways crossed by railroads. All this is within the domain of legislative power, although the power to alter and amend the charters of such corporations has not been reserved. Such legislation violates no contract, takes away no property, and interferes with no vested right. But the defendant was incorporated under chapter 917, of the Laws of 1869, by the consolidation of other railroad companies, and hence it took its charter under the constitution, and the laws subject to the right of the legislature to alter or amend it. Under this reserved power, the legislature may impose upon railroad corporations such additional restrictions and burdens as the public good requires. It may not confiscate property, but it cannot be doubted that it can do all that is required by the Act of 1874." People v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 569, 570. See also Albany Northern R. R. Co. v. Brownell, 24 N. Y. 345, 351. "The plaintiffs in error do not contend that it is always or generally unreasonable to restrict the rate for carrying each passenger to three cents a mile. They argue that it is so in this case by reason of the admitted fact that with the same traffic that their road has now, and charging for transportation at the rate of three cents per mile, the net yearly income will pay less than one and a half per cent. on the original cost of the road, and only a little more than two per cent. on the amount of its bonded debt. But there is no evidence whatever as to how much money the bonds cost, or as to the amount of the capital stock of the corporation as reorganized, or as to the sum paid for the road by that corporation or its trustees. It certainly cannot be presumed that the price paid at the sale under the decree of foreclosure equalled the original cost of the road, or the amount of the outstanding bonded debt. Without any proof of the sum invested by the reorganized corporation or its trustees, the court has no means, if it would under any circumstances have the |