This rule is sustained by the American courts. In a recent case in New York, the rule was stated by the court, as follows: "In the general consideration of the subject it must be premised that the organization or the co-operation of and the wages to be paid them, and have discouraged and, as far as they could, prevented those who do not belong to their societies from procuring work; that by force, in one instance, they took complainant's laborers from its mine to their hall, where, upon such laborers refusing to comply with their demands to join them, and abide by their laws, they actually ordered their banishment from the State, and in a manner deserving the most severe condemnation, enforced their lawless decree, and against men who, by reason of their birth, and not through the grace of the government, were entitled to all the rights of American citizenship; that in such numbers, and under such circumstances as were necessary, they have requested non-union men to cease work, and to such have applied in an offensive and threatening manner most opprobious epithets and in other ways have annoyed and vexed laborers who refuse to join their association. I am not unmindful that they meet these charges by alleging in effect that when such things were done it was without their authority and that the meeting referred to was held by citizens; but such defense is too transparent to conceal the truth. Such meeting was held in their hall, was composed largely of miners. and was presided over by defendant who says he was, and now is, the president of the Miners' Union of Burke,' and he also says that the meeting voted that they [the men banished] should be marched up the canyon, upon the ground that if they proceeded down the canyon violence might be apprehended from outsiders.' Such explanations cannot be received in exculpation of the wrong done by defendants, but on the contrary they cast a shadow over all their statements." Beatty, J., in Coeur D'Alene Mining Co. v. Miners' Union, 51 Fed. Rep. 260; S. C., 19 L. R. A. 382, 384. "Under our law every workman assumes many risks arising from the incompetency or negligence of his fellow workmen, it would be an anomalous doctrine to hold that after their fellows have concluded that he was not a safe, or even a desirable companion, they must continue to work with him, under the penalty of paying damages, if by their refusal to do so the works are for a time stopped and he thrown out of employment, we cannot believe it to be in accordance with the spirit of our institution or the law of the land to say that a body of workmen must respond in damages because they, without malice or any evil motive, peaceably and quietly quit work, which they are not required to continue, rather than remain at work with one who is for any reason unsatisfactory to them. To hold so would be subversive of their natural and legal rights, and tend to place them in a condition of involuntary servitude." Gavin, J., in Clemmitt v. Watson, 14 Ind. App. 38, 42; s. C., 42 N. E. Rep. workingmen is not against any public policy. Indeed, it must be regarded as having the sanction of law when it is for such legitimate purposes as that of obtaining an advancein the rate of wages or compensation, or of maintaining such rate. It is proper and praiseworthy, and, perhaps, falls within that general view of human society which perceives an underlying law, that men should unite to achieve that which each by himself cannot achieve, or can achieve less readily, but the social principle which justifies such organizations is departed from when they are so extended in their operation as either to intend or to accomplish injury to others. Public policy and the interests of society favor the utmost freedom in the citizen to pursue his lawful trade or calling, and if the purpose of an organization or combination of workingmen be to hamper or restrict that freedom, and through contracts or arrangements. with employers, to coerce other working men to become members of the organization and to come under its rules. and conditions, under the penalty of the loss of their positions and of deprivation of employment, then that purpose seems clearly unlawful, and militates against the spirit of our government and nature of our institutions. The effectuation of such a purpose would conflict with that principle of public policy which prohibits monopolies and exclusive privileges. It would tend to deprive the public of the services of men in useful employments and capacities." It would, to use the language of Mr. Justice Barrett, in People v. Smith, "impoverish and crush a citizen for no reason connected in the slightest degree with the advancement of wages or the maintenance of the rate." 367. A business firm sued a trade union for losses charged to a malicious conspiracy to injure plaintiff's business. Held, that an attempt to injure the business as a coercive measure to regulate the employment of workmen constituted an unlawful and actionable conspiracy; and that plaintiffs might show declarations made by their customers at the time they withdrew their trade, as to their reason for its withdrawal. Moores v. Bricklayers' Union No. 1, 7 Ry. & Corp. Law J. 108; s. C., 23 Wkly. Law Bull. 48. 1 People v. Smith, 5 N. Y. Cr. R. 513. 2 Curran v. Galen (1897), 152 N. Y. 33; s. C., 46 N. E. Rep. 297, § 114. Remedy by Civil Action.—An attempt on the part of a combination or of an individual to compel employes to abandon the service of their employer by violence or by intimidation of any sort is unlawful, and constitutes a ground for a civil action for any damage that may be caused by such acts. In the leading English case of Bowen v. Hall, it was held that an action lies against a third person, who maliciously induces another to break his contract of exclusive personal service with an employer, which thereby would naturally cause, and did in fact cause, an injury to such employer, although the relation of master and servant may not strictly exist between the employer and employed. Where, in such an action, the employed was also a defendant, but as against him the plaintiff claimed only an injunction and not damages, it was held that damages might, in the discretion of the court, be given under Lord Cairns' Act, and that the jury, therefore, should be directed by the judge, in the event of the verdict for the plaintiff, to find such damages as should be awarded: first, if the court should think it a proper case both for injunction and damages; and secondly, if the court should think it a proper case for damages only, and not also for an injunction. This doctrine is fully upheld by the 298. All combinations and associations designed to coerce workmen to become members of such combinations or associations, or to obstruct or annoy them in working, or in obtaining work, because they are not members, or in order to induce them to become members, or designed to prevent employers from making a just discrimination in the rate of wages, or to interfere with the perfect freedom of employers in the proper management and control of their lawful business, or to dictate in any particular the terms upon which their business shall be conducted, by means of threats of injury or loss, by interference with their property or traffic, or with their lawful employment of other persons, are pro tanto illegal combinations or associations, and all acts done in furtherance of such intention by such means and accompanied by damage are actionable. Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. McKenna, 30 Fed. Rep. 48. 1 Bowen v. Hall, L. R. 6 Q. B. Div. 333. See also People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 1; s. C., 28 Am. Dec. 501; State v. Donaldson, 32 N. J. L. 151; s. c.. 90 Am. Dec. 649; Johnston Harvester Co. v. Meinhardt, 9 Abb. N. Cas. 393; s. c.. 60 How. Pr. 168; Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N. H. 456; s. c., 22 Am. Rep. 475; Haskins v. Royster, 70 N. American courts. In a case before the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, it was held that all combinations and associations designed to coerce workmen to become members of such combinations or associations, or to interfere with, obstruct, vex or annoy Car. 603; s. c.. 16 Am. Rep. 780; People v. Wilzig, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 423; Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1; s. c., 6 Am. Rep. 287; Hart v. Aldridge, 1 Cowp. 54; Gunter v. Astor, 4 Moore. 12; Boston Glass Manufactory v. Binney, 4 Pick. 425; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; Salter v. Howard, 43 Ga. 601; Jones v. Blocker, 43 Ga. 331; Dickson v. Dickson, 33 La. Ann. 1261; Mapstrick v. Ramge, 9 Neb. 390; s. c., 31 Am. Rep. 415; Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. McKenna, 30 Fed. Rep. 48; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Kimball v. Harman, 34 Md. 407; Buffalo Lubricating Oil Co. v. Everest, 30 Hun, 586; Payne v. Western, etc. R. Co., 13 Lea, 509; Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216; Butterfield v. Ashley, 2 Gray, 254; Campbell v. Cooper, 34 N. H. 49; Evans v. Walton, L. R. 2 C. P.615; Lee v. West, 47 Ga. 311; Hudson v. State, 46 Ga. 624; Blake v. Lanyon. 6 T. R. 221; Milburn v. Byrne, 1 Cranch C. C. 239; Winsmore v. Greenbank, Willes, 577. In Caughey v. Smith, 47 N. Y. 244, Folger, J., said: "The complaint in this action is for enticing from the service of the plaintiff, his minor son, who still owed service to him. But to maintain an action for enticement from service, it must appear that the child, apprentice or servant, was at the time in the actual service of the parent or master, and that the moving cause of desertion was the inducement held out by the de fendant. If before the child, apprentice or servant, had ever met or communicated with the defendant, there had been an abandonment of the services, it cannot be maintained that there was an enticement therefrom by the defendant. Butterfield v. Ashley, 6 Cush. 249. The solicitation to leave must be shown. Stuart v. Simpson, 1 Wend. 376, 379; Blake v. Layton, 6 T. R. 221. And there must be an actual state of service then subsisting. Butterfield v. Ashley. 2 Gray, 254." In Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1, 13, Chapman, C. J., says: "We have no doubt that a conspiracy against a mechanic, who is under the necessity of employing workmen in order to carry on his business, to obtain a sum of money from him, which he is under no legal liability to pay, by inducing his workmen to leave him, and by deterring others from entering into his employment, or by threatening to do this, so that he is induced to pay the money demanded, under a reasonable apprehension that he cannot carry on his business without yielding to the illegal demand, is an illegal, if not a criminal conspiracy; that the acts done under it are illegal, and that the money thus obtained may be recovered back, and, if the parties succeed in injuring his business, they are liable to pay all the damage thus done to him. It is a species of annoyance and extortion which the common law has never tolerated." In Walker v. them in working, or in obtaining work, because they are not members, or in order to induce them to become members, or designed to prevent employers from making a just discrimination in the rate of wages paid to the skillful and the unskillful; to the diligent and to the lazy; to the efficient and to the inefficient; and all associations designed to interfere with the perfect freedom of employers in the proper management and control of their lawful business, or to dictate in any particular the terms upon which their business shall be conducted, by means of threats of injury or loss, by interference with their property or traffic, or Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, it is held that an action in tort may be maintained upon a count which alleges that a certain shoemaker was in the plaintiff's service and employment on a specified day, and for a valuable consideration on that day agreed to make three cases of shoes for the plaintiff within one month; that the defendant, well knowing this, contriving to defraud the plaintiff of the profit and benefit of said service and of the performance of said contract, did, on another day, specified as being before the expiration of the month, entice and procure, the shoemaker, then being in the plaintiff's service, and before he had performed said contract, as the defendant well knew, to leave the plaintiff's service and refuse to perform the contract, without the plaintiff's leave and against the plaintiff's will, by means of which enticement the shoemaker on the last named day did leave said service and neglect and refuse to perform said contract, without the leave and against the will of the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff thereby lost profits and benefits which would otherwise have accrued to him from said service and by the performance of said contract. "A person who, knowing the premises, entices or persuades one to break a subsisting contract of service, or who retains one in his employ after notice that he owes his services to another, under a contract still existing, or who knowingly persuades or entices a servant to leave the employ of his master, in whose service he then is, although no binding contract to continue to serve him exists, and he is a mere servant at will, or who prevents a person from entering the service of another by menaces, threats or other means is liable for all the damages sustained by the person to whom the services are due, which are the natural and necessary result of his wrongful and tortious acts. An action for en ticing and harboring may be joined, and a recovery may be had for harboring even though no enticing away is proved, and employment of one's servant by another is prima facie evidence of enticement. But in order to recover upon the latter ground, knowledge or notice must be shown on the part of the defendant that the services of the servant were due to the plaintiff and a retention of the servant after such notice." Wood's Master and Servant, 454. |