service of a quasi public corporation to withdraw therefrom at such time as he sees fit, and the right of the managers of such a corporation to discharge an employe from service whenever they see fit, must be deemed so far absolute that no court of equity will compel him, against his will, to remain in such service, or actually to perform the personal acts required in such employments, or compel such managers, against their will, to keep a particular employe in their service. It was competent for the receivers, in this case, subject to the approval of the court, to adopt a schedule of wages or salaries, and say to employes, 'we will pay according to this schedule, and if you are not willing to accept such wages, you will be discharged.' It was competent for an employe to say, 'I will not remain in your service under that schedule, and if it is to be enforced I will withdraw, leaving you to manage the property as best you may without my assistance.' In the one case, the exercise by the receivers of their right to adopt a new schedule of wages, could not, at least in the case of a general employment without limit as to time, be made to depend upon consideration of hardship and inconvenience to employes. In the other, the exercise by employes of their right to quit in consequence of a proposed reduction of wages, could not be made to depend upon considerations of hardship or inconvenience to those interested in the trust properly or to the public. The fact that employes of railroads may quit under circumstances that would show bad faith upon their part, or a reckless disregard of their contract or of the convenience and interests of both employer and the public, does not justify a departure from the general rule that equity will not compel the actual affirmative performance of merely personal services, or (which is the same thing) require employes, against their will, to remain in the personal service of their employer." The rule in this case in its relation to 1 Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed Rep. 310, 318. See also Toledo, A. A. & N. M. Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 730, 740; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; Rice v. Manley, 66 N. Y. 82; Benton v. Pratt, 2 Wend. 385; Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216; Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q. B. Div. 333, 337. As to issuance of mandatory writs before case the receivers and to the public is farther stated, as follows: "These employes, having taken service first with the company and afterwards with the receivers, under a general contract of employment which did not limit the exercise of heard on its merits, see Robinson v. Byron, 1 Bro. Ch. 588; Lane v. Newdigate, 10 Ves. 192; Hervey v. Smith, 1 Kay & J. 392; Beadel v. Perry, L. R. 3 Eq. 465; London & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Lancashire & Y Ry. Co., L. R. 4 Eq. 174; Whitecar v. Michenor, 37 N. J. Eq. 6; Broome v. Telephone Co., 42 N. J. Eq. 141; s. c., 7 Atl. Rep. 851. The English Trades' Union Act of 1871 contains the following provisions: § 2. The purposes of any trade union shall not, by reason merely that they are in restraint of trade, be deemed to be unlawful, so as to render any member of such trade union liable to criminal prosecution for conspiracy or otherwise. § 3. The purposes of any trade union shall not, by reason merely that they are in restraint of trade, be unlawful so as to render void or voidable any agreement or trust. In Cote v. Murphy (1894), 159 Pa. St. 421, 425, the court says: "It is one of the indefeasible rights of a mechanic or laborer in this commonwealth to fix such value on his services as he sees proper, and under the constitution there is no power lodged anywhere to compel him to work for less than he chooses to accept. But in this case the workmen went further; they agreed that no one of them should work for less than the demand, and by all lawful means, such as reasoning and persuasion, they would prevent other workmen from working for less. Their right to do this is also clear. At common law, this last was a conspiracy and indictable, but under the Acts of 1869, 1872, 1876 and 1891, employes, acting together by agreement, may, with a few exceptions, lawfully do all those things which the common law declared a conspiracy. They are still forbidden, in the prosecution of a strike, preventing anyone of their number, who may desire to labor from doing so, by force or menace of harm to person or property; but the strike here was conducted throughout in an orderly and lawful manner. * * * It is not our business to pass on the soundness of the theories which prompt the enactment of statutes. One thing, however, is clear; the moment the legislature relieved one and by far the larger number of the citizens of the commonwealth from the common law prohibitions against combinations to raise the price of labor, and by a combination the price was raised, down went the foundation on which common law conspiracy was based, as to that particular subject. Before any legislation on the question, it was held that a combination of workmen to raise the price of labor, or of employes to depress it, was unlawful, because such combination interfered with the price which would otherwise be regulated by supply and demand; this interference was in restraint of trade or business, and prejudicial to the public at large. Such combinations made an artificial price; workmen, by reason of the combination, were not willing to work for what otherwise they the right to quit the service, their peaceable co-operation as the result of friendly argument, persuasion or conference among themselves, in asserting the right of each and all to refuse further service under a schedule of reduced wages, would accept; employers would not pay what otherwise they would consider fair wages. Supply and demand consist in the amount of labor for sale, and the needs of the employer who buys. If more men offer to sell labor than are needed, the price goes down and the employer buys cheap; if fewer than required offer, the price goes up and he buys clear; as every seller and buyer is free to bargain for himself. The price is regulated solely by supply and demand. On this reasoning was founded common law conspiracy in this class of cases. But, in this case, the workmen, without regard to the supply of labor or the demand for it, agree upon what, in their judgment, is a fair price, and then combine in a demand for payment of that price; when refused, in pursuance of the combination, they quit work, and agree not to work until the demand is conceded; further, they agree by lawful means to prevent all others, not members of the combination, from going to work until the employers agree to pay the price fixed by the combination. And this, as long as no force was used or menaces to person or property, they had a lawful right to do. And so far as is known to us, the price demanded by them may have been a fair one. But it is nonsense to say that this was a price fixed by supply and demand, it was fixed by a combination of workmen on their combined judgment as to its fairness; and, that the supply might not lessen it, they combined to prevent all other workmen in the market from accepting less. Then followed the combination of employers, not to lower the wages theretofore paid, but to resist the demand of a combination for an advance; not to resist an advance which would naturally follow a limited supply in the market, for the supply, so far as the workmen belonging to the combination was concerned, was by combination wholly withdrawn, and as to workmen other than members, to the extent of their power, they kept them out of the market; by artificial means, the market supply was almost wholly cut off. The combination of the employers, then, was not to interfere with the price of labor as determined by the common law theory, but to defend themselves against a demand made altogether regardless of the price, as regulated by the supply. The element of an unlawful combination to restrain trade because of greed of profit to themselves, or of malice toward plaintiff or others, is lacking, and this is the essential element on which are founded all decisions as to common law conspiracy in this class of cases. And, however unchanged may be the law as to combinations of employers to interfere with wages, when such combinations take the initiative, they certainly do not depress a market price when they combine to resist a combination to artificially advance price." In Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell, 26 Ore. 527, 543; s. c., 38 Pac. Rep. would not have been illegal or criminal, although they may have so acted in the firm belief and expectation that a simultaneous quitting without notice would temporarily inconvenience the receivers and the public. If in good faith and peaceably they exercise their right of quitting the service, means. 547, Wolverton, J., uses this language: "If one person can lawfully quit the service of his employer because of the rate of wages paid or the employment of objectionable persons, cannot several or many persons, first agreeing among themselves to the same purpose, likewise lawfully quit? Conspiracy at common law was a combination between two or more persons to do an unlawful thing, or to do a lawful thing by unlawful Where not under special contract for a definite time a simultaneous severance of the relation between employer and employes at the instance of the employes, and where there was no preconcerted action of such employes, was never considered unlawful. Coming to the means employed, it is not unlawful for several or many employes to agree between themselves to quit their employer. As we have seen. at one time it was held to be an unlawful conspiracy for laborers to combine for the purpose of quitting simultaneously, with the ultimate purpose of raising their wages, or inducing their employer to confine his employment to certain kinds of labor, or the like; but this is not now the law, the principle underlying it having long since been discarded as inconsistent with liberty and the spirit of our free institutions. After workmen have thus combined it is still not unlawful for them, by use of fair means, to communicate the reasons for their design, and to signify their intention of quitting to their employer. 24 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 123; Bohn Manufacturing Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 233; s. c., 21 L. R. A. 337; 40 Am. St. Rep. 319; 55 N. W. Rep. 1119; Walsby v. Auley, 7 Jur. (N. S.) 466; People v. Kostka, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 434; People v. Wilzig, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 417; Rogers v. Evarts, 17 N. Y. Supl. 268. Within these limits a perfectly legitimate strike may be inaugurated and maintained, the object being to better the condition of workmen. Such an object is not only legitimate and lawful, but is just and praiseworthy. It was not wrongful, therefore, for the Multnomah Typographical Union to adopt a rule limiting the number of apprentices, and seek by fair means to enforce the observance thereof, so that its purpose in that respect was lawful. The claim that a monopoly is thus being promoted surely constitutes no grounds for equitable interference by injunction. This whole controversy has arisen because of the existence of the rule referred to and the efforts of the union to require its observance at the hands of the plaintiff. When, however, unlawful means are used to uphold or maintain a strike, or if the purposes for which it is maintained are unlawful, then it follows, as a matter of course, that the strike is in itself unlawful." See also Reynolds v. Everett, 144 N. Y. 189; s. C., 39 N. E. Rep. 72. intending thereby only to better their condition by securing such wages as the deem just, but not to injure or interfere with the free action of others, they cannot be legally charged with any loss to the trust property resulting from their cessation of work in consequence of the refusal of the receivers to accede to the terms upon which they were willing to remain in the service. Such a loss under the circumstances stated would be incidental to the situation, and could not be attributed to employes exercising lawful rights in orderly ways, or to the receivers, when, in good faith and in fidelity to their trust, they declare a reduction of wages, and thereby cause dissatisfaction among employes and their withdrawal from service."1 § 103. Where a Lockout will be Held Lawful.—The right of the employer to the enjoyment of freedom of action in the management of his business rests upon the same basis as that of the workman in pursuing his calling. As the workman may accept an offer of employment or decline it, according to his pleasure, so the employer may accept the offer of service or refuse it, as shall appear to him to be for his interest. To all intents and purposes, the lockout is simply the refusal of an employer to accept the service of workmen on the terms which they have prescribed. His right to do this is unquestioned. It is simply the right to make a contract, and in this regard the rights of employers are the same as those of other men. Where there is an existing contract it must be fulfilled unless nullified by the act of the other party. But in the absence of a contract the employer may close his doors either permanently or for a limited period. The right of combination among employers suggests other questions which will be considered in a following section.2 § 104. Combination of Employers.-It is well established that employers have the same right as employes to combine for mutual protection and support, and that they Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. Rep. 310, 321. 2 Buchanan v. Kerr, 159 Pa. St. 433. |