§ 87. Indictment for Conspiracy. An indictment for conspiracy, in order to be valid, must definitely charge the particular offense, stating its peculiar character and setting forth the particular circumstances under which it was committed. It must definitely aver either the criminality of the act, or, if the act is lawful, the criminality of the means employed in accomplishing it. In a leading case in Iowa, an indictment for conspiracy, under the statutes, charged the offense in the following words: "The said J B F and S D P, late of, etc., on etc., at etc., unlawfully and feloniously, did conspire and confederate together, with the fraudulent intent to do an illegal act, injurious to the administration of public justice, to-wit: did conspire and confederate together to show now for the first time what that reason was." Whitmore v. Fourth Cong. Soc., 2 Gray, 306. The trustees of a Methodist Episcopal church closed the church building against the duly appointed preacher, on the ground that it was not for the interest of the church that he should be its pastor, and that he was appointed against the wish of the majority of the members. Held, that they had no right to do so, and after answer a mandatory injunction was issued, requiring them to open the building to the preacher and the church. Whitecar v. Michenor, 37 N. J. Eq. 6. A minister of the gospel, or preacher, who is employed for a given time by his congregation, is entitled to be retained as the minister of the church, unless he loses that right by some fault of his own, and for good cause he may be dismissed by the parish, but they cannot do so arbitrarily, as there is no legal distinction between a contract with a minister and his congregation, and any other civil contract for personal service. Congregation of Israel v. l'eres, 2 Cold. 620. Where some of the charges made against a minister and laid before a council furnish ground for a compulsory dissolution of his contract with his society, and others do not, and the result of the council states that several of the charges were proved, but without specifying which, their recommendation of a dissolution of a contract can have no effect. Parol evidence is not admissible to show which charges the council considered to be proved. An ex parte council should be composed of men who are presumed to be impartial, and who have not prejudged the case: -so that where some of the members of a council, called by the society alone, had been members of a previous council, which had decided against the minister upon the same charges, a similar result of the ex parte council was held to be of no validity. Thompson v. Catholic Cong. Soc., 7 Pick. 160. A priest may be removed from his congregation at the pleasure of the bishop without trial. He cannot. however, be suspended from his priestly functions without specific accusation and trial. Stack v. O'Hara, 98 Pa. St. 213. with the said intent to defeat the enforcement of the prohibitory liquor law, so called, in said county, wrongfully, to-wit with money and other unlawful means, to prevent the grand jury, of said county, at, etc., from finding and presenting bills of indictment for violations of said prohibitory liquor law in, etc., contrary, etc. It was held that the indictment was insufficient in failing to state in what manner money was intended to be used, and to specify more particularly the "other unlawful means." In the opinion in this case, the court said: "In order to constitute the crime of conspiracy the accused must confederate together 1 State v. Potter, 28 Iowa, 554. See also State v. Jones, 13 Iowa, 269; Commonwealth v. East, 1 Cush. 189, 224; Commonwealth v. Shedd, 7 Cush. 514. The offense of conspiracy may, it is true, be complete without the commission of the overt act at which the conspirators agreed to commit. Commonwealth v. Judd, 2 Mass. 328; Commonwealth v. Warren, 6 Mass. 74; State v. Buchanan, 5 Har. & J. 317; State v. Noyes, 25 Vt. 415. It would seem to follow that, though the overt act may have been committed, it is unnecessary to charge it, unless the indictment is drawn under a statute which requires that it should be charged. In 2 Bishop on Criminal Law, § 203, the author says: In conspiracy, the indictment usually sets out the matter aggravating the offense; yet the offense exists without this matter. and, strictly, it need not be stated in the indictment, though some authorities hold otherwise. On this point we observe that in 3 Greenleaf Evidence, § 95, the learned author seems to regard the rule as different from what Bishop does. He says: If the conspiracy was carried out to the full accomplishment of its object, it is neces sary to state what was done and the persons who were thereby injured.' In State v. Mayberry, 48 Me. 218, it was held that if the conspirators carry out the object of the conspiracy, that fact may be alleged in aggravation of the offense, and given in evidence to prove the conspiracy. Though the offense of conspiracy, even where the overt act is committed, is complete before the commission of the overt act, in the sense that nothing more is necessary to constitute the crime, yet the conspiracy must be deemed to continue during the commission of the overt act. Commonwealth V. Corlies. 3 Brewst. 575. The conclusion which we reach is that where the overt act is charged, it does not follow, necessarily, that the indictment was designed to charge anything more than conspiracy. If it should be so drawn as to show a design to claim a conviction for the injury committed, though the evidence should fail to sustain the charge of conspiracy, such indictment manifestly could not be sustained, unless the offense could be regarded as a compound offense." State v. Winston, 66 Iowa, 143, 146. to do a criminal act, or an act that is not criminal by illegal means. In the first case, an indictment for an offense is sufficient, if it be described by the proper name or terms by which it is generally known in the law. In the other instance, the unlawful means by which the act constituting the basis of the offense, under the combination or agreement, is charged to have been intended to be done, must be particularly set forth. The reason of the rule is obvious. To do an act that is not an offense, by means that are not unlawful, cannot constitute a crime; neither can a combination of two or more to do such an act in the same manner be criminal. If such a combination would amount to an offense, we would have the strange and absurd result of an intention being criminal. In the case, then, of a conspiracy to do an act that is not criminal, the gist of the offense is the illegal means. It is plain under the statutory provisions above cited that the acts constituting these means which are 'the particular circumstances of the offense' must be specifically charged.' In a case before the United States Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts, the court said: "Neither the letter of the statute nor the philosophy of pleading conspiracies requires that it should appear that the purpose was to engross, monopolize or grasp into the hands of one of the persons indicted, or that the defendants were interested in behalf of the party for whose benefit they combined to monopolize, engross or grasp, or, indeed, what their relations were to that party. Even if the statute should finally be held to be limited to combinations to engross, monopolize or grasp in behalf of some party to the combination, yet there remains the well known rule of law that it is unnecessary to indict all the persons involved in a conspiracy. Of course, the court would have felt less doubt in meeting this objection if it had been alleged that the corporation named was a party to the conspiracy, or if the relation of the accused to it or some other matter of a kindred character had been set out.”2 556. 1יי State v. Potter. 28 Iowa, 554, 2 United States v. Patterson, 59 Fed. Rep. 280, 283. The claim § 88. Statutory Regulations.-In many of the States the law relating to conspiracies in restraint of trade is fixed by statute. In a case in Illinois, where the statute of 1891 declares that if any corporation, partnership or individual that the indictment should negative the ownership of patents by the defendants, and also set out that the commerce carried, or proposed to be carried, on by the National Cash Register Company, was a lawful one, and perhaps some other matters of that character, proved on the hypothesis that its allegations should be certain to every intent, a rule which applies only to pleas in abatement. All such are matters of defense, not to be anticipated by the prosecutor. The claim that these counts left it for the prosecutor, and not for the court, to decide whether they state subject-matters of interstate commerce, and also that it is necessary that they should set out in detail the operations supposed to constitute interstate commerce, are maintainable, because, so far as this feature of the indictment is concerned, it is clearly sufficient, according to numerous decisions of the Supreme Court, which need not be cited, to use the language of the statute. The suggestion of the court, in the opinion passed down February 28th, that the statute is not one of a class where it is sufficient to declare in the words of the enactment related to the particular proposition then under consideration. As to all the propositions touching the existence of commerce in cash registers, or knowledge, or want of allegation of knowledge on the part of the accused, it is sufficient to say that those counts which do allege the existence of such commerce, also allege positively knowledge on the part of the defendants, and those which do not allege such existence are sufficient, because neither the letter of the statute nor its purpose distinguishes between strangling a commerce which has been born, and preventing the birth of a commerce which does not exist. On this point, also, in the opinion of the court, it is sufficient to use the language of the statute." Ibid., 282. See also Commonwealth v. Dyer, 128 Mass. 70; State v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 273; State v. Cook, 38 Vt. 439; State v. Jones, 33 Vt. 443; Reg. v. Rowlands, 17 Q. B. 671. Overt acts need not be alleged when the conspiracy to do the acts is unlawful, as the offense is complete in itself. The Poulterers' Case, 9 Coke, 55; Rex v. Kinnersley, 1 Str. 193; Reg. v. Best. 2 Ld. Raym. 1167; Reg. v. Gompertz. 9 Q. B. 824; Reg. v. Heymann, 12 Cox C. C. 383: Reg. v. Seward, 1 Ad. & El. 706; State v. Bartlett, 30 Me. 132; State v. Ripley, 31 Me. 386; Commonwealth v. Eastman, 55 Mass. 190; s. c., 48 Am. Dec. 596; Commonwealth v. Shedd, 61 Mass. 514; Landringham v. State, 49 Ind. 136; Alderman v. People, 4 Mich. 414; s. C., 51 Am. Dec. 75; Isaacs v. State, 48 Miss. 234; March v. People, 7 Barb. 391; People v. Arnold, 46 Mich. 268; State v. Noyes, 25 Vt. 415; United States v. Dustin, 2 Bond C. C. 332; Johnson v. State, 3 Tex. App. 590; Heine v. Commonwealth, 91 Pa. St. 145; State v. Lounger, 1 Dev. L. 357; People v. Mather, 4 Wend. shall create or enter into any trust or combination or understanding with any other corporation, partnership or individual to fix the price of any article, or shall become a party to any contract or combination to fix or limit the amount of any article to be manufactured or sold, such corporation, partnership or individual shall be guilty of a conspiracy to defraud. It was held that a corporation, which by combination between its stockholders and itself attempted to regulate the price of milk, came within the purview of said act, although it did not combine with any other corporation or with any person other than its own members.1 In a case in 229; s. C.. 21 Am. Dec. 122; State v. Cawood. 3 Stew. 360; Landringham v. State, 49 Ind. 186: Isaacs v. State, 48 Miss. 234; State v. Straw, 42 N. H. 392; State V. Rickey, 9 N. J. L. 293. The purpose, which was the object of the conspiracy, as alleged in the third count, not being criminal in itself, if there is any offense charged, it must consist in the means designed to be employed. These must be specifically stated. State v. Ripley, 31 Me. 386. In this count the means are described only as being false pretenses.' By this the accused could not be sufficiently informed of the acts, against which they were called to answer. The description of the means are too general and not in accordance with the established rules of criminal pleading." State v. Roberts. 34 Me. 320. 1 Ford v. Chicago Milk Shippers Association, 155 Ill. 166; s. c.. 39 N. E. Rep. 651. It is urged that the corporation cannot alone enter into a trust or combination that would be a violation of this statute. Whilst it is true. as a general proposition, that a corporation may be created and constituted a legal entity, existing separate and apart from the natural persons composing it, yet it cannot act independently, or against the will, or abstain from complying with the direction of the natural persons who constitute the corporate body. A corporation is, in fact, an association of persons united in one body, having perpetual succession vested with political rights conferred upon it by the authority creating it. Morawetz on Corporation, § 227; 1 Kyd on Corporations. 13., Such being the nature of the corporate body, acts done by it are the acts of the associated persons, as corporators or as individuals, and in which capacity the act is done must be determined from the nature and character of the act and the purpose for which the corporation was organized. State ex rel. v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio, 137. And when the acts of the corporate body are violative of the statutes of the State and would be a misdemeanor that would subjeet to punishment in accordance with law, such acts are wholly without the lawful power of the corporation, as the State will create no body with authority to violate its laws. And where, in the organization of the corporate body or |