the principle. In none of the cases cited was the party bound to bid; but, being at liberty to bid, he suffered himself to be bought off in a way which might prevent a fair competition. The abstaining from bidding, upon concert, and by agreement, under the promise of a benefit for thus abstaining, is the very evil the law intends to repress. A public auction is open to every one; but there must be no combination among persons competent to bid silencing such bidders, for the tendency to sacrifice the debtor's property is inevitable. The principle is of too salutary a nature to permit any refinements which go to sap or subvert it; and in England, the judges have uniformly held a strict hand over every attempt at fraud or circumvention at auctions."1 In a case in Massachusetts, it was held that by-bidding at an auction sale, advertised "to be positive," of land in lots, tract not to bid at a sheriff's sale, so as to defraud the defendant in the execution, or his creditors, will be declared void. Here, however, there was evidence which justified submitting to the jury that the defendant in the execution, and all his creditors affected by the sale, had notice of the arrangement between the parties in this case. The verdict removes all pretext that any person interested in the sale was defrauded. The plaintiff in error cannot now invoke the rule, that under many circumstances his contract might have been contrary to public policy, and therefore void." Maffet v. Ijams, 103 Pa. St. 266. "The confederation of bidders being admitted or established by proof, it devolved upon the plaintiff to show that it was for the joint prosecution of a business enterprise, and not a mere desire to shut off or reduce competition. Now they depose that they had no design to get an advantage of the State, or to suppress bidding by which we suppose they mean bid ding by persons outside of the 1 * * Thompson v. Davies, 13 Johns. 112, 115. will render the sale voidable by a purchaser influenced by such bidding, whether that bidding was upon the lot purchased by him or upon lots previously offered, even though such bidding was instigated by the auctioneer without the seller's knowledge; but if it appears that he was not so influenced the sale is valid.1 In a case in Illinois, the rule in regard to bids by sealed proposals is stated by the court, as follows: "There is never to be found in the terms of an auction sale a clause prohibiting the bidders from combining together to prevent competition, still it is none the less unlawful for them to do so. The law implies everything which good faith and fair dealing require, and none the less so in the case of sales by sealed proposals than by open bids. In both cases effects and consequences are to be considered, in determining what fair dealing and the true intent of the transaction required. This principle has long been applied to sales by open bids, and we cannot doubt that it ought to be applied where the bids are by sealed proposals." § 85. Combination to Destroy Competition.-In ordinary business affairs one person may refuse to buy or to sell to another, or in anywise to transact business with him. And what one person may do in this direction, two or more persons may unite in doing. A combination to refuse to buy of a particular individual, or to sell to him, is not a conspiracy or an offense. But a combination to induce a third person to refuse to sell to another, is a conspiracy, and a ground for a civil action. In a recent case it was held that no action for conspiracy will lie by a butcher against several dealers in beef cattle because they have combined to refuse to sell him beeves; but where the petition further alleges that defendants also induced a certain dealer in slaughtered meat likewise to refuse to sell him, such interference with his business is a cause of action, and it is error to sustain a demurrer to the petition. In the opinion. 1 Curtis v. Aspinwall, 114 Mass. 187. 268. Webster v. French, 11 Ill. 254, 3 Delz v. Winfree, 80 Tex. 400; s. C., 16 S. W. Rep. 111. "It cannot be held that defendants had the right to prevent plaintiffs from in this case the court said: "Plaintiff's petition goes further than to charge that each of the defendants refused to sell to him. It charges that they not only did that, but that they induced a third person to refuse to sell to him. It does not appear from the petition that their interference with the business of plaintiff was done to serve some legitimate purpose of their own, but that it was done wantonly selling to consumers, or that such interference by them (defendants) was serving a legitimate purpose connected with their own business. To break plaintiffs down as competitors for the consumers trade might, it is true, result in benefit to defendants; but such a benefit, obtained in such manner, could not be deemed a legitimate purpose, within the meaning of the opinion quoted. Delz v. Winfree, 80 Tex. 400; s. c., 16 S. W. Rep. 111; Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. St. 173. Plaintiffs had the right to sell at wholesale or retail, or both, to the retail dealer and the actual consumer; and defendants had the same right, as well as the right to solicit and secure trade from plaintiffs' customers by underselling them. This would be legitimate. They could do this, and would not be responsible for the injurious consequences to plaintiffs' business; but they could not, without some legal purpose directly serving their own business, maliciously induce third persons not to trade with plaintiffs, and so injure them. Plaintiffs cannot recover for any injury, except such as results from the wanton and unlawful interference with plaintiffs' business in influencing third persons not to trade with them, and only for the injury that has occurred." Olive v. Van Patten (1894), 7 Tex. Civ. App. 630; s. c., 25 S. W. Rep. 428. The plaintiff's action is for an injury resulting from the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner. A person, with or without reason, may refuse to trade with another, so may ten or fifty persons refuse. An individual may advise his neighbor or friend not to trade with another neighbor; he may even command, when the command amounts only to earnest advice. It is not an unlawful interference with the trade of another to advise people to deal with his competitor, or to decline to do business with him. Nor is it now unlawful to combine to raise the rate of wages. More v. Bennett, 41 Ill. App. 164; Heywood v. Tilson, 75 Me. 231; Payne v. Western Ry. 81 Tenn. 507; Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, L. R. 21 Q. B. Div. 544; s. C., 23 Q. B. Div. 598; L. R. (1892) App. Cas. 25; Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223; s. C., 55 N. W. Rep. 1119; Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1. and maliciously, and that it caused, as they intended it should, pecuniary loss to him. We think the petition stated a cause of action, and that the demurrer should have been overruled."1 But in a recent case it was held that where the contract between a railroad company and the proprietor of one of its eating houses does not require it to stop its trains at his hotel in order that passengers may take their meals there, it does not constitute an actionable conspiracy, on the part of the company, against such proprietor, for it to induce another to start an eating house a short distance from him by agreeing to stop its trains there for meals. In the opinion in this case the court said: "We see nothing in the petition which charges an actionable conspiracy. Defendant had a right to run its trains as it saw fit, and also had the right to supply meals to its passengers at any place it desired. The lease made between plaintiff and defendant did not obligate defendant to stop its trains for meals at his house. In doing what is charged against it, defendant was neither doing an unlawful act nor a lawful act in an unlawful manner. The motive with which one 1 Delz v. Winfree, 80 Tex. 400; not to enter into new contracts S. C., 16 S. W. Rep. 111. 2 Kelly v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 93 Iowa, 436; s. c., 61 N. W. Rep. 957. "In Bowen v. Hall (6 Q. B. Div. 333; 50 L. J. Q. B. 305; 44 L. T. 75; 29 W. R. 367), the broad principle is laid down that if a man induces one of two parties to a contract to break that contract, with the intent to injure the other party or to do himself a benefit, he thereby commits an actionable wrong. In this case the jury, in answer to the first question put to them, found that the defendants did maliciously induce persons who had entered into contracts with the plaintiff to break those contracts. I think there was abundant evidence to support that finding. The second question in the case is as to inducing persons with the plaintiff. The jury were asked whether the defendants maliciously conspired to induce persons not to enter into such contracts with the plaintiff, and whether such persons were thereby induced not to enter into such contracts; and they answered in the affirmative. Does that answer amount to a finding of an actionable wrong? I think it does. The law appears to me to be that a combination by two or more persons to induce others not to deal with a particular individual or to enter into contracts with him, if it is done with an intent to injure that individual, and if he is thereby injured, is an actionable wrong." Temperton v. Russell, 4 Rep. (English) 376, 383. does an act furnishes no cause of action unless there be some legal wrong, and not then if it relates to a breach of contract.' 1 § 86. Conspiracy for Severing the Relation of a Minister to his Congregation.-The call of a minister to the pastoral charge of a congregation is a free act. There is no law, civil or ecclesiastical, that requires any congregation to call a particular minister. And where the pastoral or ministeral relation has been established and has proved unsatisfactory to the congregation, such proper and orderly steps as are provided for by the constitution of the church may be taken for the severing of such relation. But, while the pastor is amenable to authority, civil and ecclesiastical, he has certain rights, not only as a citizen, but also as a pastor, which the courts will enforce. The contract of a church or congregation is not less binding than that of an individual, and any attempt to break up the pastoral relation that assumes the form of a conspiracy will be held to be an actionable offense. In a recent case in Wisconsin, it was held that a complaint, reciting plaintiff's employment as minister by church officers, and charging defendants with "unlawfully, maliciously and without just cause conspiring, conniving and contriving to injure the plaintiff, and break up his relations with the congregation as their minister, and to drive him from his position as minister, and to deprive him of the support of said congregation," followed by a recital of many acts done by defendants in pursuance of "the purpose aforesaid," is sufficiently definite and certain, and states but one cause of action (unlawful conspiracy), though it also recites that part of the defendants were trustees of the church, who employed plaintiff as minister.2 1 Kelly v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1895), 93 Iowa, 436; s. c., 61 N. W. Rep. 957, 962. 2 Fisher v. Schuri, 73 Wis. 370; s. C., 41 N. W. Rep. 527. "If the defendants had a legal right to rescind their contract on the ground of anterior immorality on his part (a point which need not be decided now), yet we are of opinion that they could not do so by vote without stating that as the reason for rescission, and reciting it in their vote. They gave him no notice of the reason for their vote, and ought not to be permitted |