of the term the defendant should not carry on that business in London, or in any of the towns or places in England or Scotland where the plaintiffs might have been practicing before the expiration of said service. The declaration alleged as breaches: First, that after the term the defendant carried on the said business in London; secondly, that the plaintiffs had, during the said term, carried on business in Great Russell street, Bloomsburg, yet the defendant, after the term, carried on the said business in the same place. Plea to the first breach that London was a large and populous district containing 1,500,000 inhabitants, and that the stipulation in the agreement was an undue, unreasonable and unlawful restriction of trade. Plea to the second breach that before the expiration of the service the plaintiff had practiced in very many towns in England, and, amongst others, London, Preston, Oswestry, etc., and that divers of said towns were distant from each other 150 miles; wherefore the said stipulation was an unreasonable restriction of trade, and the said agreement as to so much was wholly void. It was held that the first plea was bad, as the covenant not to practice in London was valid, the limit of London not being too large for the profession in question. Held, secondly, that the stipulation as to not practicing in towns where the plaintiff might have been practicing during the service was an unreasonable restriction, and, therefore, illegal and void. But that the stipulation as to not practicing in London was not affected by the illegality of the other part. In another English case it was held that an agreement that defendant, a moderately skillful dentist, would abstain from practicing over a district 200 miles in diameter in consideration of receiving instructions and a salary from the plaintiff, determinable at three months' notice, was held unreasonable and void." In a leading case in Connecticut, the plaintiff, for a sufficient consideration, bought of the defendant his business as a dentist and the latter executed a contract not to practice dentistry "within a radius of ten miles of Litchfield." The town of Litch

1 Mallan v. May. 11 M. & W. 653. 2 Horner v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735.

field has an extensive territory and an irregular outline, and contains the village of Litchfield in which the defendant dwelt and had his office at the time and where the contract was drawn and executed. It was held that the contract was not void in not fixing a period within which the defendant was not to practice dentistry within those limits. It seems that where a contract is reasonable when made, subsequent circumstances, such as the covenantee's ceasing to do business, do not affect its operation. In Clark v. Crosby, where upon consideration that the plaintiff, a dentist, would keep himself supplied with mineral teeth by purchases of the defendant, the latter agreed not to sell such teeth to any other person in the place where the plaintiff resided, it was held that the contract, being only in partial restraint of trade, was not illegal.2

1 Cook v. Johnson. 47 Conn. 175. As this belongs to the class of contracts in restraint of trade, three requisites are essential to its validity: 1st. It must be partial or restricted in its operation in respect either to time or place. 2d. It must be on some good consideration. 3d. It must be reasonable, that is, it should afford only a fair protection to the interests of the party in whose favor it is made, and must not be so large in its operation as to interfere with the interests of the public. The motion does not disclose that it was claimed in the court below that the contract was lacking in any of these elements, but only that it was too indefinite and uncertain in its language to be enforced. The respondent admits the making of the contract, and full performance on the part of the petitioner, but concedes that he has paid no attention to it whatever, except to keep the money paid under it. This is not very creditable, to say the least, and the exeuse given does not at all relieve him in a moral point of view.

He says. in effect, that inasmuch as he did not understand, by the language which he used in the contract, where the circle with its ten mile radius would be drawn, he will locate within the town of Litchfield, where he can do the other party the most injury, and appropriate to himself the good will of the business he had sold, knowing absolutely such conduct to be contrary even to his own understanding of the contract. Such a position might well excuse court of equity from giving any construction to the contract merely for his future guidance." Ibid., 176.

a

2 Clark v. Crosby, 37 Vt. 188. An instrument under seal was executed upon a sale made by the plaintiff to the defendants, by which the former sold to the latter all his interest in the manufacture and sale of porcelain teeth in the city of New York, with his stock on hand, and the good will of the business. The plaintiff covenanted to instruct one of the defendants in the art of manufacturing porcelain and in

§ 62. Application of the Rule to the Profession of Teaching. Where a school building, or the privilege of conducting a school at an established rate of tuition, is sold by one teacher to another, a contract binding the grantor not to open a school within a fixed territorial limit, if reasonable, will be sustained. Where A, a school teacher, was induced by B, another school teacher, to purchase of B the lease of an academy under inducements held out by B that, if he could sell, he would quit teaching in the locality, and on these inducements the purchase was made, it was held that equity would enjoin B from teaching a school in the locality during the lease.1

§ 63. Restraint upon the Services of Artists and Actors. An engagement on the part of an artist or an actor under which the party is prohibited from entering the service of a rival concern, during a designated period, if the restraint is not unreasonable, will be sustained. In Fredericks v. Mayer, it was held that an artist who has entered into a written agreement to perform his professional services for a party, for a limited time, at a stipulated price, and binds himself not to work for any other house or person during said time, and the agreement is mutual that the party who engages shall employ and pay him according to the agreement, may be restrained by injunction from performing such services, during the term, for any other person than the party to the agreement, without the consent of the latter. The principle is this: That services which involve the exercise of powers of mind which, in many cases, as of writers and performers, are purely and largely intellectual, may form a class in which the court will interfere. Such services are generally individual and peculiar. They exist in nature, or in degree, with some modification of character or expression in the one person. This element of mind exhibited in the subject. of the contract, as distinguished from what is mechanical and material, furnishes a rule of distinction and decision.1

places have the right to provide for education in languages without coming to Providence. It is hard to believe, and the bill does not aver, that losing the few, if any, from such place, who might leave the complainant, if the respondent were to teach there, would seriously affect the complainant's school. Teaching in Providence, or in any place from which the complainant receives a considerable number of pupils, might affect it, and a restriction limited accordingly might be reasonable; but we think it unreasonable to go further." Herreshoff v. Boutineau, 17 R. I. 3, 7.

1 Fredericks v. Mayer, 13 How. Pr. 566. See also Webster v. Dillon, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 432; Howard v. Hopkins, 2 Atk. 371; Fox v. Scard, 33 Beav. 327; Jones v. Heavens, L. R. 4 Ch. D. 633; Barnes v. McAllister, 18 How. Pr. 534; Nessle v. Reese, 29 How. Pr. 382; Bradley v. Bosley, 1 Barb. Ch. 125; Dupre v. Thompson, 4 Barb. 279. "It appears to me, on the plainest ground, that an engagement to perform for nine months at theater A, is a contract not to perform at theater B, or at any other theater whatever. How is a man to perform his duty to the proprietor of

In the leading English case a lady, not of age, and her father, by writing signed in a foreign country, agreed with a theatrical manager to sing at his theater for a definite period. By a clause subsequently acceded to and signed