Killing in WarKilling a person is in general among the most seriously wrongful forms of action, yet most of us accept that it can be permissible to kill people on a large scale in war. Does morality become more permissive in a state of war? Jeff McMahan argues that conditions in war make no difference to what morality permits and the justifications for killing people are the same in war as they are in other contexts, such as individual self-defence. This view is radically at odds with the traditional theory of the just war and has implications that challenge common sense views. McMahan argues, for example, that it is wrong to fight in a war that is unjust because it lacks a just cause. |
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accept achievement action actually agent apply argue argument assume authority basis become believe cause civilians claim collective commanded conscientious consent consider considerations course criminal culpability defensive defensive action discussion duress duty earlier effect enemy engage entirely epistemic equality of combatants example Excused Threats fact fight follow force greater grounds harm idea important individual inflicted innocent Innocent Threats institutions intentional intentionally involves justified killing least legitimate less liable to attack lives matter means merely military moral equality morally responsible necessary Nonresponsible Threat noted objectively one’s participation particular perhaps permissible permitted person political pose a threat possible potential prevent principle probability proportionality punishment reason refuse relation relevant requirement risk seems self-defense sense significant simply soldiers status subjective sufficient suggestion Suppose theory threaten true unjust combatants unjust war unjust wars victim violate wide wrong