every community and State regarding the very points just mentioned and many others. The "Municipal Program" suggested by the Committee, regarded as an ideal or propaganda in the work of improving municipal government in this country, is, in my opinion, fundamentally admirable, and I believe will be so tegarded by many, if not a large majority, of the members of the body which I am addressing. But as a practical measure for introduction into our State Legislatures, I think it would meet with many serious obstacles. First, because it attempts at one sweep too many reforms and innovations; second, because it proposes a constitutional amendment cortaining too many matters of detail; and, third, because it does not give a sufficient measure of freedom to individual cities as to the form of their government. The first two points I shall not attempt to discuss, except incidentally, but shall ask your attention more particularly to the question of the scope and freedom which should be given to individual cities regarding the fundamental form of their government.

It is admitted without contention that as a pattern to Legislatures for the enactment of municipal laws, the suggested "Municipal Program" can be made of very great benefit, but that it will meet with very radical alterations I have no doubt. Possibly this was contemplated. But it is to be noted that any material changes will destroy that uniformity which I take it was deemed one of the important elements of the Program as drafted. This suggests whether in attempting to frame a general Municipal Program it would not be wise to make it more fundamental and, as to minor matters, more elastic by granting larger provisions and opportunity for individual cities to frame their own constitutions or charters. I assume that the Committee intended that individual cities should have such liberties, and only such liberties, in respect to their form of government as are not expressly or by implication prohibited by the proposed constitutional amendment. I wish to make some suggestions, which may, or may not, have been taken into consideration by the Committee, looking to a larger freedom on the part of individual cities in framing their charters.

But before proceeding further I wish to illustrate from my own State the difficulties which will arise in attempting to secure uniform municipal legislation, even along general lines. Some ten years ago a constitutional amendment was adopted by the State of Minesota embodying a very stringent prohibition against special municipal legislation. This left to the several cities in the State, as the only means of bettering their municipal charters, the adoption of a general law, alike applicable to all cities. Naturally, in a Commonwealth where cities were growing rapidly, amendments to the old charters were at once desired. An attempt was made to frame a general municipal law. In the first Legislature this act got as far as the Judiciary Committee of the Senate. Two years later another attempt was made to adopt a general charter, and the attempt resulted only in a favorable printed re

port of a joint committee of both houses of the Legislature. Two years later a third attempt was made and a general charter law was passed. But it has never been adopted by any city. In the Legislature the greatest discussions and differences of opinion were regarding the fundamental form of the city government-not regarding details of method or in respect to the services which the city should perform. The act consisted of a bundle of compromises. It did not embody any one distinctive general form of municipal government. The differences which arose and the objections urged were regarding many matters which the Committee have introduced into the proposed constitutional amendment and regarding which it is intended that there should be uniformity. For illustration, there was the most radical divergence of judgment upon the question whether or not the Council should exercise executive as well as legislative functions, or whether the Mayor alone should have the appointing power of heads of departments. We in this body may be all agreed that one or the other sort of government is best, or that it is best that there should be uniformity, whatever sort of government there may be. But to get legislative action and the acceptance of the cities upon a uniform program respecting these questions is quite a different matter. I think I am entirely safe in saying that under the circumstances as they now are it would be impossible to persuade the Minnesota Legislature to adopt or propose the constitutional amendment suggested by the Committee-not because there is a general opinion that its provisions are wroug, but rather because there is an honest difference of opinion as to what is best. This condition of things in our State has suggested and forced the adoption of a constitutional amendment permitting each city to frame its own charter. This constitutional amendment is in many respects unsatis factory, however, but I shall not enter upon its discussion here save to state that it embodies broadly the principle of "home rule" for cities. The questions presented by the Committee's Report are: (1) Is uniformity upon the many lines suggested by the Committee in its proposed constitutional amendment desirable or necessary; (2) Is such uniformity attainable, and (3) What shall be the uniform program? A Legislature may fail to settle the last question. It will then never find it necessary to decide either of the other two. If it is not able to itself agree upon what form of municipal government would be best for all cities, then it will necessarily conclude to its entire satifaction that uniformity is not attainable irrespective of whether or not uniformity is desirable.

Dr. Shaw in his paper states: "I deny emphatically, with the full concurrence of your Committee, the proposition that there is any advantage in leaving it to a town to decide for itself whether it will repose the appointing power in the Mayor or in the City Council, or apportion it-giving some of it to the City Council and a good deal of it to a series of administrative boards." Again he says: "It is the

unanimous opinion of the Committee that the main outlines of a municipal system should be uniform throughout all the towns of a State." A perusal of the proposed constitutional amendment clearly indicates the Committee's purpose that for cities having less than twenty-five thousand inhabitants, the Legislature shall, subject to the constitutional amendment, frame, not only the fundamental law, but a compiete uniform charter in detail; that for cities having over twenty-five thousand inhabitants, the general form of government shall be uniform and as prescribed in Articles I, II and III of the proposed constitutional amendment, and that as to all other matters not contained in those articles, such cities may frame their own charters. In other words, in respect to matters contained in Articles I, II and III, the cities, however large or small, and however varied their interests, condition, history or established methods and customs of government, are to have no measure of option whatever. My suggestions are made simply to raise the question whether there are not considerations that would make it wise, first, to reduce the limit of population of cities which may frame their own charters; and, second, to eliminate some of the provisions of the first three articles of the proposed constitutional amendment and permit greater freedom to the larger cities in framing their own charters and less freedom to the Legislature by special laws to interfere in the affairs of cities.

The principle of "home rule" for cities is so well understood that it needs no explanation. Broadly, it includes a freedom on the part of a city, not only in the matter of the services to be rendered by it, but also in respect to the laws under which it acts. The proper measure and scope of the freedom of each city as to its form of government is debatable and will be the matter under discussion. That each municipality should be entirely free to render to its own inhabitants whatever municipal services it may deem best is so ably presented in Dr. Shaw's paper and so generally admitted that it needs, I think, no further argument. At least, I shall not discuss it. But the service rendered is one thing and the law or legal machinery by which it shall be rendered is quite a different thing. As a matter of fact, practices and the manner of doing things are far more likely to be uniform throughout a country than the laws or theories under which things are done. People seem to be as tenacious of their theories and forms of government as they are of their theological opinions. Undoubtedly there is a general agreement that there should be a limitation upon the powers of cities in such matters, for illustration, as the incurring of debts, granting of franchises, and the like. In practice, too, all cities agree readily that in matters of water, sanitation, streets and other like interests, there should be good municipal service; but when it comes to deciding the form of government under which this service shall be rendered-whether, for illustration, it shall be a council gov ernment or a federal government, there is a wide divergence of opin

ion. We may say that the service can be best rendered under a certain form of government, or that it can be rendered as well under one form of government as another, but, nevertheless, others may and do think quite differently. Is the form fundamental? That we should discover the best form of municipal government and attempt to make it uniform may be laudable, but that such uniformity is an absolutely necessary prerequisite for the betterment of municipal service in this country I think is to be doubted. That we have, in fact, discovered the best form of city government will be questionel, and thus at the threshold will be raised a question over the matter of form that does not go to the more vital matters, such as the proper limitations upon the powers of cities or the scope of the services to be rendered by them.

Denial to cities of the right in a large measure to frame their own form of government and their own charters results in two vices: First, in depriving the urban citizens of responsibility and consequently of interest; and, second, in making necessary some kind of special legis lation by the State Legislature, which is a species of legislation without representation.

The Committee (Section 7, Article III, of the Proposed Constitutional Amendment) would permit the enactment of special laws which will require the affirmative vote of two-thirds of all the members of the State Legislature, and which shall not be valid' in any city unless they receive the formal approval of its legislative authority; but if disapproved by the legislative authority of the city, may, nevertheless, be passed by the affirmative vote of two-thirds of all the members of the State Legislature, which two-thirds shall include three-fourths of the members of the Legislature from districts outside of the city or cities affected. Many of the States already have constitutional provisions absolutely prohibiting special municipal legislation, and others have stronger checks than the one here proposed. In all such States the suggested provision would be a letting down of the bars in the matter of special legislation. Undoubtedly the provision, although somewhat complicated, is an improvement over an unchecked license on the part of the Legislature to enact special laws. It would secure publicity and consequently discussion of any proposed amendment of the local charter. It would also secure delay-in fact, a delay which in some States would extend beyond the period for which the State Legislature is permitted to remain convened. Moreover, in giving the local Legislature a veto power, it dignifies that body, and, not unlikely, it would eventually in practice give it the initiation, as well as the veto, of the special acts.

But it is to be noted that this provision does not call for the approval of the voters of the city itself, and that the Legislature can by a sufficient vote pass any special law in spite of the disapproval of the local Council or Legislature. Such a provision, or any provision permitting special legislation, in practice results generally in legislation

for the city by those members of the Legislature, and those members only, who are elected from territory covered by the city. Usually legislative courtesy permits the legislative delegates or representatives from any particular city to propose and have enacted without opposition any law which the city delegates desire or think best for their own city. Unless it relates to some subject that vitally affects the whole State, the legislators from any particular city can usually get the unanımous consent of the remainder of the Legislature for the enactment of laws proposed by them affecting only their own city. The restriction requiring a two-thirds or three-fourths vote suggested by the Committee in its report may, therefore, practically be no restriction at all. If this is true, then this provision, and in any case any provision which permits special legislation would perpetuate the old evil of legislative interference in cities-a system which has so many evils that it would seem to be unnecessary to recount them.

The city as such has no representatives in a State Legislature. Members of that Legislature are elected on other issues and from other territory. Special laws in their nature would not usually affect more than one city, otherwise they would tend to be general. In matters in which one city only is interested, representatives from the whole State, elected on other issues, are called upon to legislate. Either the raatter will not have sufficient consideration or it may receive attention from those who are improperly interested. The result is legislation without representation and without the approval of the city. The city has forced upon it laws neither initiated by it nor approved; laws which it may not want or cannot enforce. On a matter which may be a proper subject for special legislation, why should the voters of the city themselves not be permitted to pass? If radicalism or ill-considered action is feared, then I have no hesitation in saying that the vote of the mass of the citizens is far more likely to be conservative than legislative action. Moreover, there is no question but that a special act, submitted to a vote of the people of a city as an amendment to their constitution or charter, would receive more thorough consideration than in a Legislature, but best of all, it would quicken the interest and intelligence of every voter as well as sharpen his sense of responsibility.

It has been suggested that changes in municipal law have been supported for the benefit of one or another set of individuals holding temporarily advantageous positions, but this in the past has usually been done through State legislative enactments, and doubtless can be done more easily through State legislation, which really depends upon the will of but a few men who happen to be delegates from the city interested, than it would be by a vote of the people of the city. And, for that matter, there are continually, and always will be, measures, without as well as within the limitations proposed by the Committee. which one or another set of privileged individuals will desire shall be passed. Will it not be best, on the whole and in the end, that the voters