Take away from the voter the illusive assurance that requiring a confirmation by the legislative body, or one branch thereof, would insure good appointments, even though the Mayor is not entirely a satisfactory man. If anything is able to arouse intelligent and aggressive interest of all voters in the result of the municipal campaign, it seems to me it must be when the responsibility is concentrated and the voters know that the condition of the streets, the purity of the food which is eaten and the water which is used, and even of the air which is breathed, depends, to a large extent, upon the efficiency of the man who is elected Mayor. Let the Council have the power of the purse. Let it determine the questions of policy in accordance with the popular will, but leave the execution of that policy to other hands, and make it as easy as possible to determine the efficiency of the results.

I take it that the discussion of the paper of Dr. Goodnow may properly include not merely the necessity of distinguishing legislation from administration, but also the place of the Mayor in the municipal organization. With the conclusion of the committee that the Mayor should have the absolute power of the appointment of all heads of departments, I am in thorough accord.

It seems to me, however, that subordinate officers and employes should be appointed by the heads of departments, and not by the Mayor. I am aware that with the bona fide enforcement of civil service regulations these suggestions would not be necessary, but when we remember how far the administration of city affairs, and how far also is public sentiment from the ideal condition in this respect, I think we are all agreed that it is desirable to make the city charter aid the enforcement of such laws and the growth of public sentiment.

I feel great diffidence in disagreeing with the committee, which has given so great and efficient thought to this subject. My own observation, however, has led to the very decided conviction that the Mayor will better perform the duties imposed upon him, and the heads of departments will be able to produce better results where the Mayor does not interfere with the subordinates in the various departments. We must recognize that many, perhaps most, Mayors of American cities consider their administration of their office with reference to future political life. This is not the ideal condition, but it exists, and increasing this power of the Mayor will not diminish the political ambition of future Mayors. One method of using the Mayor's office to advance political prospects is by a capable administration, which shall be the best argument for the promotion of a faithful servant. That this method is successful is evidenced in our own day by the fact, known of all uen, that the business administration of one Mayor made him Governor of his State and President of the United States, but many Mayors have neither the sagacity nor the firmness, but rely upon the appreciation of this kind of power. They seek a personal following; they build a political machine. Nothing is so favorable to a political machine as the

authority of the Mayor to fill up all of the city departments with his adherents. Even an average Mayor will usually appoint reasonably capable heads of departments. These are offices of some prominence and dignity, and public opinion is likely to resent any gross mistakes in this respect.

A Mayor will not ordinarily appoint an incompetent City Physician when he knows that any serious results to the public health will ruin his political prospects. He may, however, be perfectly willing to take the chances of appointing assistant physicians and sanitary inspectors from among his political adherents, and, if misfortune comes, will point to the capable head of the department and attribute all ill effects to the dispensation of Providence.

The same holds true in regard to the City Engineer, Water Commissioners, Park Boards, City Counsellor, and other heads of departments. It may be urged that these heads of departments will be just as ready to organize their respective departments as political machines. My observation is otherwise. I have known lawyers elected Mayors make appointments to subordinate positions on political grounds, who, if they had held the office of City Counsellor, with power to appoint their own assistants, would have organized their particular department simply upon grounds of efficiency. A City Counsellor, with his professional reputation at stake, will be apt to decide that satisfactory results of his department mean much more to him than does the opportunity to give a salary to some man merely useful in a political campaign. A City Physician understands that his professional reputation is staked upon the efficiency of his department. A City Engineer knows that he occupies a position where his ability to produce satisfactory results may be observed by profitable clients. These opportunities to the heads of departments are of much more importance than to be simply a wheel in a political machine. Then, too, the Mayor is pretty nearly driven to the conclusion that the only way to make his official career mean advancement for the future is by the appointment of such heads of departments as will give results satisfactory to the public. More than this, many a Mayor would welcome such a law. As long as the Mayor is given the power of appointing all subordinates, the persistent appeals for office are annoying and oppressive. Make it necessary for him to refer the greedy applicant to the head of the department, and it is not likely that the force of the City Engineer's office would be recruited from the saloon, the grocery, the peanut stand and the barber shop. This is no imaginary picture. I have seen it done without even consulting the City Engineer.

Let the Mayor be relieved of the labor of appointing subordinates. Let him appoint the heads of departments, and hold them responsible for results. Let the heads of departments know that they are absolutely free from the personal interference of any one, and have absolute authority to control their departments, subject only to the provisions of

the law. Let them understand that any failure to produce satisfactory results must be their own failure. Their professional pride will be aroused, and the best results may be expected. Even with the best of civil service regulations, the good faith with which they are carried out will very largely determine their efficiency. Heads of departments who recognize them as aids in accomplishing desired results are likely to obey them in spirit, as well as in letter, much more than some man who sees in them only obstacles to his political ambition.

Let the Mayor have the power of removal of the heads of depart ments, upon giving the reasons therefor. Let the heads of departments have the power of removal upon the same conditions, and the power of appointment, subject to the provisions of the law. The general manager of a railroad does not hire the train crew or the section hands.

My idea is that the administrative service of a municipal corporation should be organized upon the best models evolved by large and successful business concerns. I do not believe these succeed without giving to the heads of departments the right to remove and appoint their immediate subordinates under proper regulations.

This matter has doubtless been carefully considered by the Committee, and their recommendation made upon reasons which seem to them controlling. This discussion has been suggested from a firm conviction of the wisdom of a different course, and from the desire to hear the reasons of the conclusion of the Committee.

MR. PALMER: After preparing the paper just read, I submitted the question to an ex-city counsellor, who filled his office with ability; to our city engineer; to the engineer of our Park Board. I do not wonder that when the members of this League come together year after year, and when they think of the great multitude of cities affected, that they feel that the way may be long before the desired results are reached; but it seems to me that the report from Evansville, Indiana, was very encouraging. When the plan is carried out, so that the different cities can see what they are getting for their money, and other cities can see what they are getting, then the change will come about. It is natural that the metropolitan journals should notice this meeting; but yesterday, as I came through Sedalia, Missouri, I found that the editorial page of the "Evening Democrat," of that place, contained an editorial on this meeting, the closing words of which were as follows:

"That the national movement for municipal reform is steadily gaining strength should be a source of general satisfaction.

The wise, progressive and honest management of the

large cities is earnestly to be desired for the public good. Proper municipal government is a plain business proposition, and the sooner the people at large steadily regard it from a purely business point of view, the better it will be for the many interests vitally concerned.

"The annual Conference for Good City Government is accomplishing a great work. It is educating the people to a knowledge of the importance of the problem and the necessity for a wise solution. When the people are educated, political parties will have to recognize their intelligent demand for the nomination of the best material on city tickets, and for the practical and business-like administration of municipal affairs. When this shall have been accomplished, the Conference for Good City Government may rest content with an achievement of the greatest promise to American cities and American municipal politics."

With this evidence that the country newspapers have begun to take notice of the meeting here carried on, I believe we may look forward with hope and know that the day is not far distant when men from the city and country will come together and elect the proper people to the Legislature.

MR. DEMING: I wish, Mr. Palmer, to know why the Committee adopted some parts of the report. Mr. Palmer suggests that the Mayor appoint the heads of city departments, and that the heads of city departments should appoint subordinates, on the analogy of a business house.

The Mayor, under our scheme, appoints and removes the heads of city departments at pleasure, so that if you have the kind of Mayor that is feared and is described, he would indirectly appoint every subordinate in those departments, or off would go the head of the department if he did not follow the Mayor's will.

Experience has shown that, unlike private business, the head of a great department of public business is the last man to appoint his subordinates. Experience has shown that that man is put under pressure, as they call it, to such an extent that he does not follow his business judgment in naming his subordi

nates.

Our proposed Charter makes, as an integral part of it,

the subordinate civil service of the city, so far as appointment is concerned, independent both of the Mayor and of the heads of departments. It throws it open to the free competition of every citizen who wants employment. There is a civil service which makes rules which the Mayor cannot unmake, and which prescribes the examinations under which the competition shall take place; and so far as the appointment is concerned, neither the Mayor nor the heads of departments appoint according to their personal predilections, be they for ill or good, but take the best man found by the competitive test for that place.

And lastly: While the Mayor has this power to remove, he has it under this restriction: He must file his reasons; the reasons must not be political; the removed appointee has a chance to give his answer, and if he wishes, both the reason for the employe's removal and his defense are made a matter of public record known of all citizens of the city.

We think, under those circumstances, it is a wiser, more long-headed scheme for all the cities of the country than a scheme which attempts to distribute responsibility instead of concentrating it. At the same time, we recognize that this is a suggestive charter, and if any city should get so far along as to desire to consider a municipal charter of this kind and prefers to divide its responsibility without an efficient civil service law, no doubt the method suggested by Mr. Palmer would be the best under those circumstances.

THE CHAIRMAN: Edward J. McDermott, Esq., Louisville, Ky., will follow Mr. Palmer in the general discussion.

MR. MCDERMOTT: I must express my sincere admiration for the work of the gentlemen who have prepared the Constitutional Amendments, the Legislative Act for the Government of Cities, and the masterly essays that have been presented. While I was acting as Chairman of the Commission that prepared the Charter of Louisville, a few years ago, I had to spend many months in studying municipal affairs, both practically and theoretically. Hence, in writing upon the same topic which Professor Goodnow has so ably treated, I wish to be as direct and practical as possible, and I shall go into details. His paper is lucid and strong, and to nearly all of it I give my hearty assent.