ment of the mill property, damages may be allowed to the whole tract, for taking away and separating necessary portions of the establishment, although the lots may be separated from each other by a public street.1 The same doctrine has been applied to the case of a brick-yard, where the different lots were used together, and where the owners were prevented from enlarging by proximity to the railroad." The fact that a tract had been laid out into city lots, but not used as such, will not prevent the consideration of the damages to the entire tract. The court is not to consider the map, but the land as it stands, and the use to which it is applicable. The division into lots is accidental. Hence an eighty-acre tract, separated from the rest of a farm by a public road, may be considered as a part of the farm, if actually so in fact. The tract is to be a compact tract, and not two farms separated by a high bluff and distant from each other, through only one of which the railroad passed." When the blocks and tracts are not used together, no damages can be allowed for blocks separated by streets from the block in which the land is taken; and if a strip is taken adjoining an existing railroad, there would be no damages for land on the other side of the existing railroad.' The question cannot arise in considering damages to vacant and unoccupied land. Where the company institutes proceedings, and describes the land in its petition, the damages are to be confined to the land mentioned in the petition, unless the owner, by cross-bill, shows that he owns contiguous land 1 Chapman v. Oshkosh R. R., 33 Wis. 629. Contra (in a case almost exactly similar), Fleming v. Chicago R. R., 34 Iowa, 353. 2 Sherwood v. St. Paul R. R., 21 Minn. 127; s. c., 21 Minn. 122. 3 Welch v. Milwaukee R. R., 27 Wis. 108; Driver v. Western R. R., 32 Wis. 569. St. Paul R. R. v. Murphy, 19 Minn. 500. 5 Minnesota R. R. v. Doran, 15 Minn. 230. 6 Matter of New York Central R. R., 13 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 149. 7 Ibid. 8 Walker v. Old Colony R. R., 103 Mass. 10; Presbrey v. Old Colony R. R., 103 Mass. 1. which will be damaged.1 The English Lands Clauses Act provides, that if a tract of land of less than half an acre is separated by the railway from the main tract of land, the owners may insist on the company's taking the same; or, if the expense of making suitable communication with the separated piece is greater than the value of such tract, the company may insist on purchasing at a valuation. 4 3 § 168. Market value. — The owner is entitled, not simply to such sum as the property would bring at forced sale, or under peculiar circumstances, but to such sum as the property is worth in the market, that is, to persons generally,if those desiring to purchase were found, who were willing to pay its just and full value. It is not proper to consider what one would give rather than be turned out of the premises; or what was given as a compromise price by the public, when there could be no other purchaser, and the seller had the option of selling, or awaiting condemnation proceedings to assess the price. Nor is it proper to add to the value because the land was necessary and indispensable to the railroad." Offers by way of compromise are not admissible. The question whether an offer was made by way of compromise is a question of law, to be settled by the court before the evidence would be admissible as competent. The market value must be arrived at by the opinions of witnesses, the value of whose testimony may be shown by cross-examination. Value rests merely in 1 Jones v. Chicago R. R., 68 Ill. 380; Mix v. Lafayette R. R., 67 Ill. 319. 28 & 9 Vict., c. 18, 22 93, 94. Patterson v. Boom Co., 3 Dill. 465; Lawrence v. Boston, 119 Mass. 126; Somerville R. R. v. Doughty, 22 N. J. L. 495; Robb v. Maysville Turnpike, 3 Metc. (Ky.) 117; Memphis v. Bolton, 9 Heisk. 508. Lawrence v. Boston, 119 Mass. 126; Tufts v. Charlestown, 4 Gray, 537; Robb v. Maysville Turnpike, 3 Metc. (Ky.) 117. 5 Cobb v. Boston, 112 Mass. 181; Fall River Works v. Fall River, 110 Mass. 428; Howard v. Providence, 6 R. I. 514. • Virginia R. R. v. Elliott, 5 Nev. 358; Penny v. Penny, 37 L. J. (Ch.) 340. Davis v. Charles River R. R., 11 Cush. 506. • Snow v. Boston R. R., 65 Me. 230; Dwight v. Hampden, 11 Cush. 201; 3 2 opinion. Hence persons acquainted with the value of the property may state their opinions as to the value and the amount of damages; and such persons are not necessarily experts.1 Knowledge acquired as a county commissioner, assessor, or selectman, in laying out public ways or assessing damages, or from sales of other property in the vicinity, make a person a proper witness. The price which the owner gave may be put in evidence; and then the owner may be permitted to show the circumstances under which he bought, and the improvements made by him, and in so doing may put in his deeds. It is not proper to ask the average annual net profits of the strip taken. Profits vary with cost of labor, etc. The basis should be the market value of the land. Market value would not include the price of coal or minerals in land, because that would necessitate inquiry into the cost of raising it; and hence what would be given for the land with the coal in it is the only rule. The market value of the land is to be considered, and the jury should not consider the expenditures that may have been made upon the property. The expenditures may not have increased the value to the amount of the expenditures. Whether the expenditures which had been made upon the land were wise or unwise, whether voluntarily or compulsorily made in order to abate a nuisance, the cost of such expenditures is not necessarily to be taken as additional value to the land as it would have been without such expenditures." Pennsylvania R. R. v. Bunnell, 81 Pa. 414; Lafayette R. R. v. Winslow, 66 Ill. 219; Illinois R. R. v. Von Horn, 18 Ill. 257; Simmons v. St. Paul R. R., 18 Minn. 184. 1 Shattuck v. Stoneham R. R., 6 Allen, 115; Swan v. Middlesex, 101 Mass. 173; Whitman v. Boston R. R., 7 Allen, 313; Wyman v. Lexington R. R., 13 Metc. 316; Inhabitants of West Newbury v. Chase, 5 Gray, 421; Walker v. Boston, 8 Cush. 279. 2 Swan v. Middlesex, 101 Mass. 173; Sexton v. New Bridgewater, 116 Mass. 200; Dickenson v. Fitchburg, 13 Gray, 546. 3 Ham v. Salem, 100 Mass. 350; The Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh R. R., 58 Pa. 26. Stockton R. R. v. Galgiani, 49 Cal. 139. § 169. Expert witnesses. There must be some special knowledge on the part of the witness to render him admissible as a witness to give an opinion on values. A farmer cannot be a witness as to the value of a fishing-privilege.1 The true inquiry is, whether the witness is sufficiently informed on the subject to give evidence of the value of the property. How that information or knowledge was acquired is quite immaterial, if it really exist. The witness may be called upon to state his reasons for fixing the damages at the sum stated. The jury can perceive the force of reasoning, the soundness of logic, and the capacity to give an opinion. The admission of expert testimony is largely in the discretion of the court, that is, as to whether or not the witness is properly an expert. The credibility of a witness and his capacity as an expert may be shaken by cross-examination. It is not necessary that the witness should have been actually on the premises. He may be acquainted with the mwithout having gone on them; and facts tending to weaken his testimony as an expert may be brought out on cross-examination. An inhabitant of a town can testify as to the value of lands in the town, if familiar with the lot and with sales in the town, although he may have bought no other land than that on which he lives, or even if he lives on leased ground. A shoemaker who has been in this country seventeen years, and has occupied different houses in the city, and sublet the house he was in, would not be admitted to prove the value of real estate, because it did not appear that the witness had ever bought and sold real estate, or had means of forming an 1 Boston R. R. v. Montgomery, 119 Mass. 114. 2 Whitman v. Boston R. R., 7 Allen, 313. Sexton v. New Bridgewater, 116 Mass. 200. Howard v. Providence, 6 R. I. 514; Buffum v. New York R. R., 4 R. I. 221. 5 Fowler v. Middlesex, 6 Allen, 92; Dickenson v. Fitchburg, 13 Gray, 546; Central Pacific R. R. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 247. 6 Lehmicke v. St. Paul R. R., 19 Minn. 464. Pinkham v. Chelmsford, 109 Mass. 225; Whitman v. Boston R. R., 7 Allen, 313; Rondout R. R. v. Deyo, 5 Lans. 298. 209 intelligent opinion derived from an adequate knowledge of the nature and kind of property in question.1 Experts cannot give an opinion as to the value of a reversion in land under a railroad, for no one can know how long it will continue. The opinions of experts should be confined to the land in controversy, and the consideration of damages must be confined to the land in controversy, and evidence is not admissible of damages on other lands, or damages caused by the construction of another railroad.1 2 3 § 170. Sales of similar property. — Ordinarily, sales of property similar to that proposed to be condemned are not admissible in evidence, for the reason that the jury cannot determine what motives of necessity or fancy may have dictated the prices obtained. If evidence of sales were admissible, the other side would have the right to controvert each transaction and investigate it on its merits, which Iwould lead to interminable issues. Evidence cannot be given of offers to sell by others, or of purchase by the party condemning, as an evidence of value. If, however, the property is of such a nature that there cannot be considered a market demand for it, such sales may be admitted in evidence to determine value. In some of the states, evidence 8 1 Whitney v. Boston, 98 Mass. 312. 2 Boston R. R. v. Old Colony R. R., 3 Allen, 142. 8 Rand v. Newton, 6 Allen, 38; Wyman v. Lexington R. R., 13 Metc. 316. Brunswick R. R. v. McLaren, 47 Ga. 546. 5 Pennsylvania R. R. v. Bunnell, 81 Pa. 414; Pittsburgh R. R. v. Rose, 74 Pa. 362; East Pennsylvania R. R. v. Hiester, 40 Pa. 53; Greenville R. R. v. Partlow, 5 Rich. L. 428; Selma R. R. v. Keith, 53 Ga. 178; Lehmicke v. St. Paul R. R., 19 Minn. 464; Central Pacific R. R. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 247. 6 Central Pacific R. R. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 247. 7 Winnisimmet Co. v. Grueby, 111 Mass. 543; Fowler v. Middlesex, 6 Allen, 92; Dickenson v. Fitchburg, 13 Gray, 546; Davis v. Charles River R. R., 11 Cush. 506; Chapin v. Boston R. R., 6 Cush. 422; Montclair R. R. v. Benson, 36 N. J. L. 557. 8 Upton v. South Reading R. R., 8 Cush. 600; St. Joseph R. R. v. Orr, 8 Kan. 419; Central Pacific R. R. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 247. 9 Patterson v. Boom Co., 3 Dill. 465. |