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is to be distributed according to the ownership of the land.1 The commissioners assessing the damages to the land taken are not to pass on the validity of the conflicting claims." After the money is paid into court, the company paying it can have no further interest in the contest, and cannot appeal.3 There is no occasion for appeal, because the court will see to the proper distribution of the fund. When the entire amount is paid in, it does not signify that owners of some interests have not been notified. All claims are discharged by the payment. If the company fail to pay, the old actions still remain. The only defence must be payment." The court, in distributing the fund, will examine into the various titles and claims, and require unknown owners to make their proofs of right, and may require the claimants to make publication of notice of their application, and to give security in case the real owner is subsequently found. Owners claiming by unrecorded deeds cannot enjoin construction, when they knew of the entry and gave no notice of ownership.10 They may be entitled to compensation, but not to such a harsh measure as an injunction, when they are principally in fault in causing the failure to pay

1 Matter of New York Central R. R., 60 N. Y. 116; Ross v. Adams, 28 N. J. L. 160. When the interests in the lots were undivided ones of several different owners, and there were adverse conflicting claims, by tax-titles, attachments, and judgment-liens, it is proper to report the compensation to which the owners of each particular lot were entitled, leaving it for the court to determine in regard to the rights of the respective claimants to the money awarded. Chicago R. R. v. Chamberlain, 84 Ill. 333.

2 Ross v. Elizabethtown R. R., 20 N. J. L. 230; McIntire v. Easton R. R., 26 N. J. Eq. 425.

3 Haswell v. Vermont Central R. R., 23 Vt. 228; Van Vorst, ex parte, 2 N. J. Eq. 292.

Columbia Bridge Co. v. Geisse, 34 N. J. L. 268; McIntire v. Easton R. R., 26 N. J. Eq. 425; Reese v. Addams, 16 Serg. & R. 40.

5 Tide-Water Co. v. Archer, 9 Gill & J. 479.

• Philadelphia v. Dyer, 41 Pa. 463.

7 Fisher v. New York, 57 N. Y. 344.

8 Fisher v. New York, 57 N. Y. 344; Noble St., 1 Ashm. 276.

9 Matter of Art St., 20 Wend. 685.

10 Pickert v. Ridgefield Park R. R., 25 N. J. Eq. 316.

compensation by concealing from the company their ownership and claim for damages. The English Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 Vict., c. 18, § 54, provides that "the purchase-money or compensation to be paid for any lands to be purchased or taken by the promoters of the undertaking from any party who, by reason of absence from the kingdom, is prevented from treating, or who cannot after diligent inquiry be found, or who shall not appear at the time appointed for the inquiry before the jury as hereinbefore provided for, after due notice thereof, and the compensation to be paid for any permanent injury to such lands, shall be such as shall be determined by the valuation of such able practical surveyor as two justices shall nominate as hereinafter mentioned," and the amount awarded is to be invested in bank for the owner.

§ 77. Duty of condemning party to ascertain ownership of property taken. The statutes may require the condemning party to ascertain and set out the names of owners. The assessment of damages should appear in the report to have been made to the parties entitled, by name, for the confirmation of the report is in the nature of a judgment in favor of that party. The condemning party can certainly go to the records, for the recording of a deed imparts notice of ownership.' The party in possession should be considered, because adverse possession may have ripened into title, and such owner be entitled to compensation. The presumption is certainly in his favor as between him and the condemning party,' and he is entitled to compensation before dispossession, notwithstanding the commissioners reported that the title was claimed by other parties.3

1 Curran v. Shattuck, 24 Cal. 427.

2 Hawkins v. County Commissioners, 2 Allen, 254; Trustees v. Worcester, 1 Metc. 437; St. Paul R. R. v. Matthews, 16 Minn. 341; Missouri R. R. v. Owen, 8 Kan. 409.

3 Sacramento R. R. v. Moffatt, 7 Cal. 577.

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3

The payees who are to receive the compensation are entitled to know with certainty the amounts set apart to them individually, and cannot be put off with an order to pay "to the owner or occupant, or to the person entitled thereto." An assessment to A. B. and others is bad, for each name should be set out,' especially when objection is made by such owner; and if an owner is omitted, the report will be set aside. The use of such expressions as "estate of," "burying-ground," "descendants of J. C., deceased," "Cornelia Jackson's trustee," "estate of Cowenhoven," "unknown owners, heirs and devisees," etc., is not sufficient. The names of owners petitioning for a highway must be given in full, and it is not sufficient compliance to sign with initials, or with firm-names. The petition may be amended so as to show ownership of tracts when all parties have been served."

1 Lull v. Curry, 10 Mich. 397.

2 The State v. Oliver, 24 N. J. L. 129.

Roberts v. Williams, 15 Ark. 43.

The State v. Bennett, 25 N. J. L. 329.

5 Matter of Flatbush Avenue, 1 Barb. 286; Hughes v. Sellers, 34 Ind. 337; The State v. Blauvelt, 33 N. J. L. 36; Poston v. Terry, 5 J. J. Marsh. 220.

6 Vawter v. Gilliland, 55 Ind. 278.

Hedrick v. Hedrick, 55 Ind. 78.

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§ 78. Interference with tide-waters. An interference with tide-waters can only be justified by legislative grant. The legislative authority prevents the action from being unlawful, but does not protect from the damages resulting to owners of property injuriously affected by a structure interfering with the flow of tide-waters.1 The legislature may authorize a bridge across tide-waters. If a riparian owner is inconvenienced or disturbed by impeding the access to his property on account of the obstruction of the bridge, the damage arising is from a partial impediment of a public right, and the damage resulting is of the nature that the general public suffers, and compensation is not provided for such damage. A riparian owner has no right which is greater than that of others to have vessels in the stream Damages for interfering with the flow of tide-waters can be obtained in action on the case.1

tied to his bank.

1 Lee v. Pembroke Iron Co., 57 Me. 481 (qualifying Parker v. Cutler MillDam, 20 Me. 353).

2 Fitchburg R. R. v. Boston R. R., 3 Cush. 58; O'Brien v. Norwich R. R., 17 Conn. 372.

Boston R. R. v. Old Colony R. R., 12 Cush. 605.

Rogers v. Kennebec R. R., 35 Me. 319.

§ 79. Rights of riparian owners.-Among the rights of a riparian owner, whether he owns to the centre of the river or to the bank,' is that of access to the navigable part of the river from the front of his lot, the right to make a landing, wharf, or pier for his own use or the use of the public, subject to reasonable regulations.2 The property fronting on the river cannot be taken without compensation, or his right to land against his own land be interfered with by the erection of a bridge, railroad, or other structure.4 He also owns the accretions to the soil, although a street may have been established on the bank; 5 and he is entitled to damages for interference with the deposit of sediment upon his land, although the embankment diminishing the deposit is not all on his land. He is entitled to the customary flow of the water, and a diversion of the water for the supply of water-works is a damage requiring compensation. A city owning land bordering on a river cannot take therefrom water sufficient to supply the town, three or five miles distant. The use sanctioned by the common law is that of water sufficient to supply the wants of a riparian owner and his family. Such a water-supply may properly be condemned by a municipal corporation.

1 Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Trone, 28 Pa. 206. In Pennsylvania, the riparian owner owns only to the margin, and has no exclusive rights in the soil or water of the river.

2 Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497; Railroad Co. v. Schurmeir, 7 Wall. 272; Chapman v. Oshkosh R. R., 33 Wis. 629; Hickok v. Hine, 23 Ohio St. 523; Re Cooling, 19 L. J. (Q. B.) 25. Riparian owner possesses the right of constructing suitable landings and wharves for the convenience of commerce and navigation, and to extend such constructions out into the river to the point of navigability. Rippe v. Chicago R. R., 23 Minn. 18.

3 Chicago R. R. v. Stein, 75 Ill. 41.

Hickok v. Hine, 23 Ohio St. 523; Bell v. Hull Rail. Co., 6 Mee. & W. 699. 5 Banks v. Ogden, 2 Wall. 57. This right may be regulated by statute. The case of Baltimore Railroad v. Chase, 43 Md. 23, gives interesting rules in case of irregular fronts.

Concord R. R. v. Greely, 23 N. H. 237.

Burden v. Stein, 27 Ala. 104; Shamleffer v. Peerless Mill Co., 18 Kan. 24. Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130.