JUSTICES HARLAN, GRAY, WHITE and MCKENNA, dissenting. judgment, entitle the question to be considered at rest; unless, indeed, the interpretation of the Constitution is to be delivered over to interminable doubt throughout the whole progress of legislation and of national operations. Congress, the executive and the judiciary have, upon various occasions, acted upon this as sound and reasonable doctrine"-citing among other cases that of Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299. In The Laura, 114 U. S. 411, 416, in which the question arose as to the validity of an act of Congress approved March 3, 1797, 1 Stat. 506, c. 13, authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to remit a forfeiture of property after final sentence of condemnation, this court said: "Touching the objection now raised as to the constitutionality of the legislation in question, it is sufficient to say, as was said in an early case, that the practice and acquiescence under it, 'commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most forcible nature. This practical exposition is too strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled. Of course, the question is at rest, and ought not now to be disturbed.' Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 308. The same principle was announced in Burrow Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U. S. 53, 57, where a question arose as to the constitutionality of certain statutory provisions reproduced from some of the earliest statutes enacted by Congress. The court said: 'The construction placed upon the Constitution by the first act of 1790, and the act of 1802, by the men who were contemporary with its formation, many of whom were members of the Convention which framed it, is, of itself, entitled to very great weight; and when it is remembered that the rights thus established have not been disputed during a period of nearly a century, it is [almost] conclusive." This quotation in The Laura from the opinion in Sarony's case was defective in that it omitted, by mistake in printing, the word "almost" before "conclusive." But the error does not affect the substance of the decision rendered, as the court, in the case of The Laura, approved and reaffirmed what was said in Stuart v. Laird. In Schell's Executors v. Fauché, 138 U. S. 562, this court, JUSTICES HARLAN, GRAY, WHITE and MCKENNA, dissenting. speaking by Mr. Justice Brown, cited with approval what is above quoted from Stuart v. Laird, adding: "In all cases of ambiguity, the contemporaneous construction, not only of the courts, but of the departments, and even of the officers whose duty it is to carry the law into effect, is universally held to be controlling." In McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 27, this court, speaking by the present Chief Justice, said: "The framers of the Constitution employed words in their natural sense; and where they are plain and clear, resort to collateral aids to interpretation is unnecessary and cannot be indulged in to narrow or enlarge the text; but where there is ambiguity or doubt, or where two views may well be entertained, contemporaneous and subsequent practical construction are entitled to the greatest weight. Certainly, plaintiffs in error cannot reasonably assert that the clause of the Constitution under consideration so plainly sustains their position as to entitle them to object that contemporaneous history and practical construction are not to be allowed their legitimate force, and, conceding that their argument inspires a doubt sufficient to justify resort to the aids of interpretation thus afforded, we are of opinion that such doubt is thereby resolved against them, the contemporaneous practical exposition of the Constitution being too strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled. Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299, 309." Cases almost without number could be referred to in which the same principles of constitutional construction are announced as in the cases above cited. In the latest case-Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 56-this court had occasion in its review of taxing legislation by Congress, to refer to the act of July 6, 1797, the very act in which Congress first imposed a stamp duty on vellum, parchment or paper upon which was written a bill of lading for articles to be exported. Touching the objection that Congress could not constitutionally impose, as by that act was imposed, a tax on inheritances or legacies, this court, speaking by Mr. Justice White, said: "It is to be remarked that this proposition denies to Congress the right to tax a subjectmatter which was conceded to be within the scope of its power very early in the history of the Government. The act of 1797, VOL, CLXXXI-21 JUSTICES HARLAN, GRAY, WHITE and MCKENNA, dissenting. which ordained legacy taxes, was adopted at a time when the founders of our Government and framers of our Constitution were actively participating in public affairs, thus giving a practical construction to the Constitution which they had helped to establish. Even the then members of the Congress who had not been delegates to the Convention which framed the Constitution, must have had a keen appreciation of the influences which had shaped the Constitution and the restrictions which it embodied, since all questions which related to the Constitution and its adoption must have been, at that early date, vividly impressed on their minds. It would, under these conditions, be indeed surprising if a tax should have been levied without question upon objects deemed to be beyond the grasp of Congress because exclusively within state authority." Many cases have been cited which hold that the uniform, contemporaneous construction by executive officers charged with the enforcement of a doubtful or ambiguous law is entitled to great weight and should not be overturned unless it be plainly or obviously erroneous. If such respect be accorded to the action of mere executive officers, how much greater respect is due to the legislative department when it has at different periods in the history of the country exercised a power as belonging to it under the Constitution, and no one in the course of a century questioned the existence of the power so exercised. Besides, we have here a question of the constitutional power of Congress under the Constitution, and not a question relating merely to the practice of executive officers acting under a law susceptible of different interpretations. No one of the acts of Congress imposing a stamp duty on the vellum, parchment or paper on which a bill of lading of articles to be exported was written, can be classed among laws that are doubtful or ambiguous in their meaning. No person, however skilful in the use of words, who attempts to frame a statute imposing a stamp duty, pure and simple, on such vellum, parchment or paper, could possibly employ language expressing that thought more distinctly than Congress has done in the several acts relating to stamp duties of that character. The words of those acts are clear, and are capable of but one construction; and the court determines the JUSTICES HARLAN, GRAY, WHITE and MCKENNA, dissenting. case upon the ground alone of want of power in Congress to impose the stamp duty in question. Without further discussion or citation of authorities, we submit that the denial, at this late day, of the power of Congress to impose what is strictly a stamp duty on the vellum, parchment or paper upon which is written or printed a bill of lading for goods to be exported to a foreign port or place, involves not only a departure from canons of constitutional construction by which it has been controlled for more than a century, but, in the words of Prigg v. Commonwealth, delivers the interpretation of the Constitution "over to interminable doubt throughout the whole progress of legislation and of national operations." Practically no weight has been given in the opinion just filed to the fact that the power now denied to Congress has been exercised since the organization of the Government without any suggestion or even intimation by a single jurist or statesman during all that period that the Constitution forbade its exercise. It is said that the question of power never was presented for judicial determination prior to the present case, and therefore this court is at liberty to determine the matter as if now for the first time presented. But the answer to that suggestion is that, in view of the frequent legislation by Congress and its enforcement for nearly a century, the question must have arisen if it had been supposed by any one that such legislation infringed the constitutional rights of the citizen. Within the rule announced in Stuart v. Laird, and in other cases, the question should be considered at rest. In view of the importance of the case, we have deemed it appropriate to state the reasons of our dissent from the opinion and judgment just rendered. Syllabus. FRENCH v. BARBER ASPHALT PAVING COMPANY. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI. No. 498. Argued February 25, 26, 27, 1901.-Decided April 29, 1901. In this case the court proceeds on the assumption that the legal import of the phrase "due process of law" is the same both in the Fifth and in the Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States; and that it cannot be supposed that it was intended by the Fourteenth Amendment to impose on the States, when exercising their powers of taxation, any more rigid or stricter curb than that imposed on the Federal Government by the Fifth Amendment in a similar exercise of power. It was not the intention of the Fourteenth Amendment to subvert the systems of the States pertaining to general and special taxation: that Amendment legitimately operates to extend to the citizens and residents of the States, the same protection against arbitrary state legislation, affecting life, liberty and property, as is afforded by the Fifth Amendment against similar legislation by Congress, and the Federal Courts ought not to interfere when what is complained of is the enforcement of the settled laws of the State, applicable to all persons in like circumstances and conditions, but only when there is some abuse of law, amounting to confiscation of property, or deprivation of personal rights. The conclusions reached by this court in many cases cited and summarized by the court in its opinion are thus stated by two writers, (Cooley and Dillon) whose views this court adopts: "The major part of the cost of a local work is sometimes collected by general tax, while a smaller portion is levied upon the estates specially benefited. The major part is sometimes assessed on estates benefited, while the general public is taxed a smaller portion in consideration of a smaller participation in the benefits. The whole cost in other cases is levied on lands in the immediate vicinity of the work. In a constitutional point of view, either of these methods is admissible, and one may sometimes be just, and another at other times. In other cases it may be deemed reasonable to make the whole cost a general charge, and levy no special assessment whatever. The question is legislative, and, like all legislative questions, may be decided erroneously; but it is reasonable to expect that, with such latitude of choice, the tax will be more just and equal than it would be were the legislature required to levy it by one inflexible and arbitrary rule." "The courts are very generally agreed that the authority to require the property specially benefited, to bear the expense of local improvements is a branch of the taxing power, or included within it. . . Whether the expense of making such improvements shall be paid out of the gen |