advantages of public and endowed schools were equally extended to them in 1868 and 1869.1 Progress of public opinion after Toleration Act. -From and after the period of the Revolution, from time to time champions of toleration arose, first among great writers, and at a later date in Parliament itself, who saw the futility of the Statutes of Intolerance. Locke, following Chillingworth, had urged that "All the life and power of religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind; and it is impossible for the understanding to be compelled to the belief of anything by the force of the magistrate's power." 2 He also taught, that "every man has the care of his own eternal happiness, the attainment whereof can neither be facilitated by another man's industry, nor the loss of it turn to another man's prejudice, nor the hope of it be forced from him by any external violence." 3 It is true that leading statesmen, a century later, adhered to the older opinions. Lord North, in 1790, still represented, as Blackstone himself had also done a little before that time, that the Test Act was the great bulwark of the Constitution; while Pitt urged, that to allow dissenters to hold office in the civil service or the army, or in corporations, was the same thing as to allow them to subvert the establishment of the country. On the other hand Beaufoy, at the same date, urged that the Test Act had "degraded the sacrament into a qualification for gauging beer-barrels and soap-tubs, and for seizing smuggled beer. And Locke himself had long before observed, that the sacrament was required to be taken as a qualification to get alehouse licences.5 Fox also urged that "Intolerance proceeded on the grand error, that one man could judge better of the religious opinions of another than that other himself could do; and all this was deduced merely from the supposed tendency and not from any actual conduct." 9:6 He contended that "it was not in the power of man to surrender his opinion, and therefore the society which demanded him to make this sacrifice demanded an impossibility. What, then, did this lead to? 1 31 & 32 Vic. cc. 32, 118; acts. 2 Letters, Toler. 56 Locke's Wks. 372. 29 Parl. Hist. 1376. 4 32 & 33 Vic. cc. 56, 58, and amending In That no man shall be deprived of any part of his liberty with respect to his opinions, unless his actions derived from such opinions are clearly prejudicial to the state. In this country we were governed by King, Lords, and Commons. No man would contend that any of these powers was infallible. Then why should the members of the Established Church proceed as if they were infallible? for so they did, if they claimed exclusive privileges and enforced penalties on those who differed from them. An establishment was only to be maintained on the principle of its being agreeable to the opinion of the majority of the people, and not surely upon the slightest pretence of infallibility. To refuse to any man any civil right and an equal participation of civil advantages on account of his religious opinions was in itself persecution. What was the principle of persecution? The condemnation of a man before he had committed a breach of the law." 1812 Lord Grenville told his fellow peers, that it "is the inveterate habit of intolerance to impute to the followers of every rival sect opinions which they disclaim, and to deduce from these tenets conclusions which they utterly deny. Justice and charity, on the contrary, give to others the same liberty which we claim for ourselves-the liberty to form our opinions by the light of our own reason, to adopt, to investigate, to interpret for ourselves the tenets which we embrace, and to be credited in our exposition of them until our own practice shall have proved its insincerity."2 Canning, in 1812, also said in the House of Commons, " I assume, as a general rule, that citizens of the same state, subjects living under the same government, are entitled, primâ facie, to equal political rights and privileges. And it is also desirable to create and to maintain the strictest union, the most perfect identity of interest and of feeling amongst all the members of the same community." And finally, in 1828, Lord J. Russell urged, that " the constitution of this country is intended to give to every man those rewards, that honour, that estimation, to which his character and talent entitle him."4 1 29 Parl. Hist. 1374. 2 22 Parl. Deb. 668. 3 23 Parl. Deb. 635. 95 Parl. Deb. (3) 1250. "The whole of the penal statutes against dissenters went upon one unfortunate and absurd mistake. Our ancestors, whom (I know not why) we are in the habit of calling Dissenters' trust property and mode of preserving it. Since the passing of the Toleration Act, charitable trusts for promoting the religious opinions of Protestant dissenters, such as maintaining chapels, schools, and ministers of a certain creed, have been held as valid as any other trusts.1 And though it was once deemed illegal to devote property to the purpose of promoting doctrines contrary to the established religion, persons professing such doctrines might be the subjects of charitable bequests. 2 When a chapel is erected with or without endowment, the mode of transmitting the property to the successive preachers and their congregations is by a deed vesting the legal estate in trustees with a power of renewing their number on vacancies caused by death, and upon trust to permit the preacher and congregation for the time being to have the use and enjoyment of it. When the trust is expressed to be in favour of any class of dissenters, the courts will support and carry out such trust. When the words and objects are very vague, as for example "the worship of God" or "for godly learning," it used to be held that the established form of religion will be preferred. And in like manner where the trustees of a religious charity were to be honest persons of the parish" the court has held, that dissenters should not be elected.3 And yet, except it be to avoid uncertainty, it is difficult now to see, why this exclusiveness should any longer be acted on, since all religions, not involving a criminal offence or breach of the peace, are now equally established. Mode of interpreting dissenters' trust deeds.-When the words of the trust are vague, inquiries into collateral wise, had considered, that belief was an act of the will and not of the understanding. Upon that false assumption they had gone on adding penalty to penalty and statute to statute in the vain endeavour to control, by fear and by force, what was only to be effected by persuasion."-L. J. Russell, H.C. 1828, 18 Parl. Deb. (2nd) 695. "And who were the individuals exposed to these acts? The officers of the army and navy, commissioned and non-commissioned, the officers of the customs and excise, and all in the service of the chartered companies of whatever kind or description."-Ibid. 1 Att.-Gen. v Pearson, 3 Meriv. 353. 2 Da Costa v De Pas, 2 Swanst. 487 n.; Strauss v Goldsmid, 8 Sim. 614. 3 Baker v Lee, 8 H. L. C. 495. In this case four law peers were equally divided. M&M matters are often necessary, in order to discover what class of dissenters was intended to be benefited. In these inquiries the instrument declaring the trust is always the first matter to be considered, and its interpretation. And if that is doubtful, then the usage of the congregation that has taken place under it is the best guide to the true meaning. In the case of Lady Hewley's charities, she had executed deeds in 1704 and 1707, soon after the Toleration Act, and she described the objects of the trust to be "godly preachers for the time being of Christ's Holy Gospel"; and she ordered none to be admitted, but such as were of "the Protestant religion and able to repeat the Lord's Prayer, the Creed, ten Commandments, and Bowles' Catechism." At those dates the Unitarian religion was not within the protection of the Toleration Act of 1688, though it was brought within it a century later, namely, in 1813. In course of time the Hewley charity estates became vested in trustees of whom the majority were Unitarians, and the rents were applied for the benefit of 237 chapels. Some thirty-eight of these had at first been Presbyterian congregations, but they afterwards became Unitarians, and these Unitarians were assisted for about seventy years. In a suit to displace the Unitarians, the House of Lords held, that neither Unitarians nor members of the Church of England but Protestant dissenters only were entitled to the benefit of those charities, and all the Unitarian members were accordingly removed from the office of trustees. That result was arrived at, not because Unitarians since 1813 were incapable of being objects of trust as much as any other religious body, but because the extensive evidence brought to bear on the construction of the Hewley deeds showed, that Lady Hewley was a member of a Trinitarian congregation, and the words she used were at the time commonly applied to denote the Presbyterians, Independents, and Baptists, all of whom were believers in the doctrine of the Trinity.1 And thus it was, that the Unitarians were excluded. But owing to the hardship of interfering with so long a course of usage, a statute soon afterwards passed in 1844, which regulated in future the construction of these foundations. 1. Shore v Wilson, 9 Cl. & F. 355. It enacted, that all such deeds shall be construed as if the Toleration Acts from 1688 to 1807 had been in force at the founding of the meeting-houses, schools, and other charitable foundations in question. When no particular religious doctrines or opinions or modes of worship are mentioned expressly, or by reference in the original deeds, then the usage for the twenty-five years immediately preceding the suit is to be taken as conclusive evidence of the meaning, and as to the title to any meeting-house, burial-ground, Sunday or day-school, or minister's house. But whenever the deed or will states expressly or by reference the particular religious doctrines or opinions, then those are to be followed, notwithstanding any contrary usage.1 Dissenting congregations and their pastors.-The minister of a meeting-house is only a tenant at will of the trustees, who can therefore at any moment terminate his tenancy by demand of possession, and even without notice. And he cannot claim to hold his office for life, even though no offence be proved.2 Nevertheless care will be taken, that a minister is not removed without the rules of the religious body or congregation being complied with. If, for example, he cannot be removed legally, except by a decision of the congregation regularly convened at a meeting, the charges intended to be brought against him must be specified in the notice calling the meeting, and the minister himself must be apprised of the nature of the charges; and all the usual forms must be complied with, for this is only in accordance with the ordinary principles of justice. Yet when a majority of the congregation has in regular form passed a resolution for the removal of their pastor, it is the business of the courts of law to give effect to it, and prevent his officiating against their will. The court cannot assume, that a congregation so expressing their wish act capriciously; and there can be no remedy if they do so. In one case a minority of the trustees of a Baptist chapel called a meeting of the congregation, but not according to the ordinances of their society, and elected a pastor, and the court ordered 1 7 & 8 Vic. c. 45. 4 2 Cooper v Gordon, L. R., 8 Eq. 249. 3 Dean v Bennett, L. R., 6 Ch. 489. Cooper v Gordon, L. R., Eq. 249. |