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gave circulation to it; and the misconception no doubt arose out of the vague manner in which the early statutes about false news, as we have seen, were framed. Such statutes seemed to imply, that if those who repeated a slander only gave up the author's name, they would escape all liability.1 Lord Ellenborough, C. J., so late as 1804, said the rule laid down in Coke's time,2 which was confirmed in a later case,3 was, that, in order to enable a defendant to justify slanderous words upon hearsay, he must disclose at the time of uttering the slander the name of the person from whom he heard it; and it was not sufficient to name him for the first time by his plea. The object of this rule was said to be to give the plaintiff his action in the first instance against the original author of the slander. And yet the same judge held, that repeating a libel was no defence whatever in a criminal proceeding. And another judge added, that it was a very good rule, that if a party will repeat slanderous words which he hears another say, he ought to do so in such a manner as will give the person injured an opportunity of bringing his action against somebody. A little later, however, it was said to be no defence in general to an action, that the name of the author of the libel has been given up, though it might be a good defence in particular circumstances. And the rule to the contrary, once said to be adopted in the time of Coke, was not applicable at least to written words.8 But neither the old rule nor the above modification of it has stood the test of examination, either as regards a written or a spoken calumny. If it were held any defence, that one merely repeated the slander of nother, the slandered person would in many cases have remedy whatever, for the original utterer may be a per, or a prisoner, or a man of straw.10 The result, fore, now is, that he, who repeats a slander, is equally with the originator, and cannot get quit of liability ing the first utterer; nor though he stated it not as 2 Northampton's Case' 4 Woolnoth v 1025. 6 Per

but which he has since discovered to be undeserved, it is part of his duty to communicate this fact, for the privilege lasts as long as anything is undiscovered relating to the subject matter.1 Though a master in giving a character of a servant, when asked for it, is not bound in the first instance to give evidence of its truth, yet if an action is brought by the servant, who gives primâ facie evidence that the character given was not true, it is then incumbent on the master to give some evidence of its truth, otherwise malice may be inferred against him.2 A like privilege also extends to the master when giving an answer separately to two fellow servants who demand each the reason for his dismissal-the answer, for example, being, that both had robbed him.3 And even when a master, on alluding to a dismissed servant, volunteers the reason of such dismissal as a caution to the fellow servants, this statement will be protected as made under a sense of duty. In one case the master dismissed S, a servant, and when asked for a character replied, that he had dismissed S for dishonesty. Afterwards S's brother again asked the master the reason why he was so treating S, and keeping him out of a situation, and the reply was "He has robbed me, and I believe for years." On an action being brought only one instance of robbery was proved; but the court held the whole answer was privileged, though the words were put à little too strongly.5

And even a volunteer may in some cases honestly give information to a master about malpractices of his servant, if the volunteer is also interested in the subject matter of these malpractices. As Tindal, C. J., said, a man who received a letter informing him that his neighbour's house would be plundered or burnt on the night following by A and B, and which he himself believed and had reason to believe to be true, would be justified in showing that letter to the owner of the house, though it should turn out to be a false accusation of A and B. Any restriction on such honest communications, even from a stranger, would

1 Gardiner v Slade, 13 Q. B. 801.

2 Rogers v Clifton, 3 B. & P. 591; Fountain Boodle, 3 Q. B. 5. 3 Manby Witt, 18 C. B. 544. 4. Somerville v Hawkins, 10 C. B. 583. 5 Taylor Hawkins, 16 Q. B. 308. 6 Macdougall v Claridge, 1 Camp. 267. 7 Coxhead v Richards, 2 C. B. 596.

operate as a great restraint upon the performance of the various social duties by which men are bound to each other. In all such occasions of giving a servant's character, it is true, the one master should make the communication to the other master privately; still there is no rule that, if a third party is present, this will of itself destroy the privilege as showing malice, for such nicety of conduct is often impracticable.2 And where the master on giving the character calls in a friend to witness what is said, this will be no evidence whatever of malice in the master, but is often a very prudent precaution for every one to adopt.3

Excuse of slander and libel as between those confidentially related.-A similar excuse for libel exists in those occasions of confidential relationship which naturally lead one relative or friend to communicate to another whatever is of value to their mutual interests. On such occasion a communication with a view to prevent injury to a friend, though volunteered, is privileged, if naturally arising out of the duty of friendship, and if the party is not using that relationship as a pretext for libel or for retailing idle gossip. Such was the case of a son-in-law warning his stepmother, a widow, as to the character of a suitor of hers. And when one friend consults another confidentially as to a matter of business or personal interest to himself, the answer is privileged; as when a tenant on invitation tells his landlord about what he has noticed as to the game on the estate; 5 when a friend is asked as to the character and charges of a solicitor about to be employed; or as to reputed misconduct of a third person. And the same privilege will protect future

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1 Coxhead v Richards, 2 C. B. 596. 2 Toogood v Spyring, 1 C. M. R. 193. 3 Taylor v Hawkins, 16 Q. B. 308.

4 Todd v Hawkins, 2 M. & Rob. 21. A mate of a ship wrote to his friend D, giving a long account of the captain's drunken fits and danger thus caused, and D, who had no interest in the ship, informed the shipowner, who discharged the captain. The court was equally divided as to how far this was a privileged communication of D.-Coxhead v Richards, 2 C. B. 605. And the same court was equally divided as to whether a caution given by [A voluntarily to a trader not to trust one D, the reason given being that D owed a large debt to A, was a privileged communication.-Bennett v Deacon, 2 C. B. 628.

5 Cockayne v Hodgkinson, 5 C. & P. 543. Claridge, I Camp. 267.

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Macdougall v

7 Hopwood v Thorn, 8 C. B. 293.

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communications between the confidential parties arising out of the same matter. And if a comparative stranger himself apply to B for information, he may create a confidential relation between them which will estop him or any other from treating B's answer as libellous.2 As where a shopkeeper, believing A's servant had stolen something from his shop, went and told A the reasons of his suspicion, this was held privileged. But there is no confidential relation or privilege between the agents of two members of Parliament which would justify one of them who imputes bribery to a voter for the other. In one case a tradesman received a written order for goods in the name of S, and sent the goods; these S returned, saying he had never ordered them. Thereupon the tradesman sent for inspection to S the written order itself, which S returned with a letter stating, that he believed the order was written by C, who afterwards sued S for libel. But the court held the answer was a fair one to such an inquiry, though rather going beyond it, and therefore being a privileged communication, S was not responsible.5 In another case the incumbents of two parish churches corresponded about the conduct of a member of one of the churches while visiting in the other parish, and a dispute about that member purchasing a horse arose, in which the one incumbent asked the other to be arbitrator. The incumbent so asked to arbitrate on further inquiry reported certain things to the discredit of the purchaser, and the court held that this all arose naturally out of the privileged communication, and was not actionable. And so where P was asked by a subscriber to the same charity to support one of the trustees, and P in answer stated things to the discredit of that trustee, the answer was held protected from liability."

In written communications between parishioners and the clergyman, or between members of a congregation and their pastor, there is no privilege protecting the clergyman quá clergyman. A clergyman has no such close interest in the morals of his parishioners as to justify him in

1 Beatson v Skene, 5 H. & N. 855. 2 Hopwood v Thorn, 8 C. B. 316. 3 Amann Damm, 8 C. B., N. S. 597. 4 Dickeson v 5 Croft v Stevens, 7 H. & N. 570. 7 Cowles v Potts,

Hilliard, L. R., 9 Exch. 79.

6 Whiteley Adams, 15 C. B., N.S. 392. 34 L J., Q. B. 247.

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publishing a circular warning them against sending their children to the school of G, a parishioner, because in the opinion of such clergyman G had committed some infringement of the precepts of Scripture. But a parishioner may well mention to his own parish clergyman suspicions as to the conduct of such clergyman and of his solicitor, who were acting as trustees in a private matter. And where a bishop, commenting on certain charges made about his exercise of patronage, addressed his clergy in convocation in self-vindication, and published this charge, it was held that his interest was such as to justify both the address and its publication. 3

Excuse of libel in protecting pecuniary interest.—On similar principles to those governing friendly and confidential relationships, where a person has a pecuniary interest in the subject matter, and while honestly believing he is protecting it, libels a third party, this also is an excuse for what is done. Such cases arise where a party interested communicates to a bank misconduct of their solicitor; where a ratepayer complains to his parish vestry of their parish constable's accounts; 5 where a creditor gives notice of an act of bankruptcy of his debtor to an auctioneer who is employed by the debtor to sell his goods; where a solicitor writes in self-vindication to his client in answer to a proposal to dispense with such solicitor's services.7 A subscriber to a charity has no such legal interest in the charity, or such relationship to other subscribers as to justify his slandering or libelling to those others the conduct of an official of the charity; but one creditor of a bankrupt has an interest in writing to another creditor about the conduct of their common debtor.9 And one director may rightly complain to his fellow-directors about their common officer.10 But there is no sufficient interest in a voter at an election to justify the latter publishing in a newspaper a libellous statement about the Parliamentary candidate for his

608.

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1 Gilpin v Fowler, 9 Exch. 615. 2 Davis v Snead, L. R., 5 Q. B. 3 Laughton v Sodor, L. R., 4 Priv. C. 495. 4 Macdougall v Claridge, 1 Camp. 266. 5 Spencer v Ameston, 1 M. & Rob. 470. 6 Blackham v Pugh, 2 C. B. 611. 7 Wright Woodgate, 2 C. M. & R. 573. 8 Martin v Strong, 5 A. & E. 538.

9 Spill v Maule, L. R., 4 Exch. 232. 10 Harris v Thompson, 13 C. B. 333.