"It will not do for a man to enter into a contract, and when called upon to respond to its obligations, to say that he did not read it when he signed it, or did not know what it contained. If this were permitted contracts would not be worth the paper on which they are written. But such is not the law. A contractor must stand by the words of his contract; and, if he will not read what he signs, he alone is responsible for his omission."

(See also 9 Cyc. 388, and cases cited.) A different rule prevails where the party is misled as to the nature of the writing, and is not himself negligent. (Western Mfg. Co. v. Cotton, 126 Ky. 749.)

In I. Greenleaf on Evidence, Section 275, it is said: "When parties have deliberately put their engagements into writing, in such terms as import a legal obligation, without any uncertainty as to the object or extent of such engagement, it is conclusively presumed that the whole engagement of the parties, and the extent and manner of their undertaking, was reduced to writing; and all oral testimony of a previous colloquium between the parties or of conversation or declarations at the time when it was completed, or afterwards, as it would tend in many instances to substitute a new and different contract for the one which was really agreed upon, to the prejudice, possibly, of one of the parties, is rejected." (To same effect see O'Neil v. Rumley, 21 R., 936; Warland v. Secrest, 106 Ky., 711; Crane v. Williamson, 111 Ky., 271; Beattyville Bank v. Roberts, 117 Ky., 689.)

The defendant's own testimony does not show that a fraud was practiced upon him; it only shows that he entered into and signed the contract without reading it, refusing to allow it to be read to him, and leaving his copy of the contract in the hands of another for safe keeping. His own testimony also shows that he knew the writing contained "a good guarantee." He did not comply with the written warranty, and there being a written warranty, no warranty is implied. The court should therefore have instructed the jury peremptorily that the written contract was binding on the defendant.

The defendant testified that when the first note came due on September 1, 1907, he refused to pay it for the reason that the machine was defective and would not do the work; that Carter, the agent through whom he purchased, urged him to pay and promised him that if he

would pay it, the machine would be put in good order, and made to work right, and to comply with the warranty as to durability and suitableness for threshing grain, and in reliance upon this promise he paid the first note. Carter testified that he saw Mattingly about September 28, 1907, and that Mattingly agreed that he would pay the note if they would come down and fix the machine the next year; that on June 25, 1908, he got a letter from Mattingly, telling him he would like to have the machine fixed; and that he took a man there then and did put the machine in order. On June 25, 1908, and after this work was done, Mattingly wrote the company the following letter:

"Versailles, Ky., 6-25-1908.

"J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co.,

"Gentlemen:

"Racine, Wisconsin.

"Your Mr. J. C. McKinstry has rendered us the desired assistance in operating the machinery recently purchased from you, and we are well pleased and satisfied with it. Very truly, "G. W. MATTINGLY."

He did not pay the note due September 1, 1908, and on September 29, which was after the close of the threshing season of that year, he wrote the company this letter:

"Versailles, Ky., Sept. 29, 1908.

"J. I. Case T. M. Co.,

"Gentlemen:

"Racine, Wis.

"Your Mr. C. T. Bishop and W. H. Fitzhugh have today agreed to send an expert to overhaul my separator bought of you last year, and I hereby agree to pay my note which was due September 1st, 1908, in favor of your firm by November 1st, 1908, provided the work on separator is done by that time. They further agreed that you would send a man to start my separator the threshing season of 1909, provided I give you notice when I will be ready to start.

"G. W. MATTINGLY."

The company had their men to go to Mattingly's and fix the machine, and after the work was done, on October 28, he wrote them this letter:

"J. I. Case T. M. Co.,

"Gentlemen:

"Versailles, Ky., Oct. 28, 1908.

“Louisville, Ky.

"Your Mr. W. T. Antill has been here and fixed extension to straw rack and grain pan and conveyor sieve and stopped leak under cylinder.

"G. W. MATTINGLY."

These are the letters he wrote the company as far as the record shows. He at no time complained in any letter that he wrote them that the work that had been promised to be done on the machine had not been done. He did not give the company an opportunity to remedy any defects which he thought existed. It was incumbent on him if there was such an agreement as he alleges to call the company's attention to the defects which he complained of, and give it an opportunity to remedy them. He did not pay the note due November 1, and this suit was brought the following February. In view of his own letters he cannot maintain his defense on the ground that the company agreed to make the machine good when he paid the first note but failed to do so.

In J. I. Case T. M. Co. v. Lyons, 72 S. W., 356; Wis-dom v. Nichols and Shepherd Co., 97 S. W., 18; J. I. Case T. M. Co. v. Patterson, 137 Ky., 180; J. I. Case T. M. Co. v. Combs, 125 S. W., 289, we held under contracts like that made here, and on facts not practically different, that the company could not be required to take back the property and that the purchaser, having failed to comply with the written warranty, was liable on the notes he had executed. We do not see that this case can be distinguished from those cited. Mattingly's letters to the company nowhere allude to such an agreement as he alleges was made in September, 1907. On the contrary, his letter written the following June before the threshing season of that year began, and his letter written in September, after it closed and when he had used the thresher throughout the entire season, are utterly inconsistent with the existence of such a contract. On the admitted facts he could not maintain his counterclaim, and the jury should have been instructed peremptorily to find for the plaintiff.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

Robinson, et al. v. Robinson.

(Decided March 7, 1911.)

Appeal from Boone Circuit Court.

Inheritance-Investment of Proceeds-Reasonable Time.-The head of a family who inherits a share in an indivisible tract of land has reasonable time to procure a sale of the land, and the investment of the proceeds of his share in a homestead, and a year or cighteen months is not an unreasonable time for this purpose where he is a convict in the penitentiary.

J. G. TOMLIN, JNO. L. VEST and D. E. CASTLEMAN for appellant.

O. M. ROGERS for appellee.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE HOBSONAffirming.

Elizabeth Glackin died in Boone county the owner in fee of a tract of 56 acres of land. Afterwards her husband, John H. Glackin, died in the year 1907. She left two children surviving her, and this suit was brought for the sale of the land and the division of the proceeds between them, after the father's death. A. P. Glackin, one of the children, had executed a note to his father for $690. The administrator of his father's estate sought to subject to the debt, A. P. Glackin's interest in the land which was worth less than $1,000. A. P. Glackin set up that he was a housekeeper with a family, consisting of his wife and four children, and claimed the land as a homestead. The court adjudged him the homestead, and the plaintiff appeals.

The facts are these: A. P. Glackin had not moved upon the land. His family was living upon a piece of land owned by his wife. He was in the penitentiary, and had been there for some years. The land was indivisible, and had to be sold for the division of the proceeds between the parties entitled thereto. He did not set up his claim to a homestead until he filed his answer in this suit, brought about a year after his father's death. He filed his answer six months after the suit was instituted. We have held in a long line of opinions that a bona fide housekeeper with a family who acquires an interest in land by descent, is entitled within a reasonable time. after the death of his ancestor, to have his share set apart

to him and to occupy it as a homestead, when it is devisible, or to obtain a sale if it is indivisible, and re-invest the proceeds in a homestead. (Jewell v. Clark, 78 Ky., 398; Spratt v. Allen, 106 Ky., 274; Roark v. Bach, 116 Ky., 460, and cases cited.) The father was entitled to the land as tenant by the curtesy, and A. P. Glackin was not entitled to the possession of it until his father's death. When his father died he was in the penitentiary, an1 when the suit was brought for the sale of the land, he set up his right to the homestead. In view of his unfortunate condition, and the situation of his family, we do not see that there has been any such unreasonable delay as should deny him his right to a homestead. (Roberts v Adams, 29 R., 848.)

Judgment affirmed.

Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Renfro's Admr.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

(Decided March 7, 1911.)

Appeal from Bell Circuit Court.

Carriers-Duty and Liability Under Separate Coach Law. If the conductor of a passenger train permits a passenger to be or remain in a coach or compartment set apart for passengers of the other race, the company will be liable for any act of misconduct or violence committed by such passenger to the injury of a passenger rightfully occupying the coach or compartment. "Conductor" or "Manager."-The statute imposes upon the conductor or manager of passenger trains the duty of observing its provisions, and the company will not be civilly liable for the failure of brakemen or porters to compel obedience to the statute. Conductor-Duty of.-When a conductor knows or has information that a passenger is in a coach or compartment set apart for passengers of another race, he should as soon as practicable and within a reasonable time remove him.

Brakemen and Porters.-It is the duty of brakemen and porters to require passengers to obey the law, but the company will not be civilly liable for their failure to do so if as soon as practicable and within a reasonable time after having notice that the statute is violated they give such information to the conductor. "Conductor" or "Manager."-These words are used interchangeably and mean the person who has charge of the train.

PENJAMIN D. WARFIELD, C. W. METCALF, J. W. ALCORN, for

appellant.

W. T. DAVIS, for appellee. vol. 142-32