several departments of the new college created by the act of 1865, and authorizing the trustees of it to locate them either at Cannonsburg, Washington, or some other suitable place within the commonwealth; they giving to whichever of the two towns named had the college taken away from it, or to both if it was taken away from both, an academy, normal school, or other institution of a grade lower than a college, with some property of the college for its use. It was held that the legislature of Pennsylvania, by its act of 1869, had not passed any law violating the obligation of a contract.40 This decision was followed in another case under the following circumstances, viz.: The citizens of Millersburg, Kentucky, raised a fund for the purpose of establishing a collegiate institute in that place or its vicinity, and invited the Kentucky Annual Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, to take charge of it when established. The invitation was accepted, and the legislature of the State incorporated the Institute by an act, one provision in which was a reservation to the legislature of the right to amend or repeal it. Large additions were then made to the fund from other sources, and in 1860 another act was passed incorporating the Board of Education of that Conference of the Methodist Church. In this act, after reciting the raising of the money, and the establishment of the institution at Millersburg, the control of the college and the disposition of the sums raised were placed in the hands of the Conference. This act, also, was passed subject to the right of the legislature to amend or repeal. In 1861, the legislature passed another act, in which, as construed by the courts, power was conferred upon the Conference to remove the college from Millersburg to any other place within the bounds of Kentucky Annual Conference. It was decided that the latter act did not 40 This case is cited in New York & N. E. R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 567, 38 L. ed. 269, 14 Sup. Ct. 437; Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13, 18, 26 L. ed. 961; Railway Co. v. Philadelphia, 101 U. S. 528, 540, 25 L. ed. 912; Railroad Co. v. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359, 366, 25 L. ed. 185; Holyoke Co. v. Lyman, 15 Wall. (82 U. S.) 500, 511, 522, 21 L. ed. 133; Miller v. State, 15 Wall. (82 U. S.) 478, 488, 495, 497, 21 L. ed. 98. impair any contract created by the former statutes and proceedings.4 § 332. Eminent Domain-Obligation of Contracts.—The Constitution of the United States cannot be so construed as to take away the right of eminent domain from the States. Nor does the exercise of this right interfere with the inviolability of contracts. All property is held by tenure from the State, and all contracts are made subject to the right of eminent domain. No contract is, therefore, violated by the exercise of the right. The Constitution of the United States intended to prohibit all such laws impairing the obligation of contracts as interpolate some new term or condition, foreign to the original agreement.42 Nor in the proceeding to condemn property for public use, is there anything in the nature of a contract between the owner and the State, or the corporation which the State in virtue of her right of eminent domain authorizes to take the property; all that the constitution of the State or of the United States or justice require in such cases is that a just compensation shall be made to the owner, his property can then be taken without his consent.43 Again, while the legislative power to amend or repeal a statute cannot be availed of to take away property already acquired, or to deprive a corporation of fruits of contracts lawfully made, already reduced to possession, the capacity to acquire land by condemnation for the construction of a railroad attends the franchise to be a railroad corporation, and, when unexecuted, cannot be held to be in itself a vested right surviving the existence of the franchise, or an authorized circumscription of its scope.44 Nor is the right to proceed in a certain prescribed 41 Bryan v. Board of Education, See Baltimore & F. Turnpike Road Kentucky Conference, 151 U. S. 639, v. Baltimore, C. & E. M. P. R. Co., 38 L. ed. 297, 14 Sup. Ct., cited in 81 Md. 247, 31 Atl. 854. Mobile & Ohio Rd. v. Tennessee, 153 U. S. 486, 495, 14 Sup. Ct. 968, 38 L. ed. 793. 42 West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. (47 U. S.) 507, 12 L. ed. 535. 43 Garrison v. New York, 21 Wall. (88 U. S.) 196, 22 L. ed. 612. "Adirondack Ry. Co. v. New York, 176 U. S. 335, 20 Sup. Ct. 460, 44 L. ed., 20 Sup. Ct. 460, aff'g manner a vested right, under a charter authorizing a corporation to acquire real estate under the exercise of the power of eminent domain, and such right may be repealed by the legislature notwithstanding there is no reservation of power to alter or repeal.45 It is also within the power of a State to provide for condemnation of minority shares of stock in railroad and other corporations where the majority of the shares are held by another railroad corporation, if public interest demands; and the improvement of the railroad owning the majority of stock of another corporation may be a public use if the state court so declare, and the condemnation under the Public Laws of Connecticut 46 of such minority shares of a corporation is not void under the impairment clause of the constitution either because it impairs the obligation of a lease made by the corporation to the corporation obtaining the shares by condemnation, or because it impairs the contract rights of the stockholder.47 Where the highest court of a State held that there was no property in a naked railroad route in such State which the State was obliged to pay for when it needed the land covered by that route for a great public use, and its officers were by appropriate legislation authorized to act, the Federal Supreme Court accepted the views of the state court, and accordingly held that the proceedings on the part of the State which were complained of in the case, impaired the obligation of no contract between it and the railroad company.48 § 333. Same Subject-Instances.-The use of a team track and delivery space of a railroad company is not so essential as People v. Adirondack Ry. Co., 160 Ry. Co., 203 U. S. 372, 51 L. ed. 231, 27 Sup. Ct. 72, aff'g 78 Conn. 1, 60 Atl. 740. 48 Adirondack Ry. Co. v. New York, 176 U. S. 335, 44 L. ed. 492, Chattaroi R. Co. v. Kinner, 81 20 Sup. Ct. 460, aff'g People v. Ky. 281, 5 Ky. Law Rep. 33. Adirondack Ry. Co., 160 N. Y. 225, 54 N. E. 689. "Secs. 3694, 3695. "Offield v. New York, N. H. & H. to result in impairing the franchise and use of a railroad company in case another railroad is permitted to use three feet for clearance space, which clearance does not interfere with the running of defendant's trains, nor to an irremediable extent with the use of defendant's team track and delivery space. A railroad corporation having secured a franchise and right of way for the purpose of constructing its tracks upon a locus publicus of a city has the right to expropriate from another railroad corporation sufficient clearance space to enable it to pass its trains free of obstructions and hindrances from the latter, if the use thereof be not of such a character as to be indispensable to the movement of its own trains or its other business.49 In another case it appeared that the legislature of Virginia incorporated the stockholders of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac railroad company, and in the charter pledged itself not to allow any other railroad to be constructed between those places, or any portion of that distance; the probable effect would be to diminish the number of passengers travelling between the one city and the other upon the railroad authorized by that act, or to compel the said company, in order to retain such passengers, to reduce the passage money. Afterwards the legislature incorporated the Louisa Railroad Company, whose road came from the West and struck the first named company's track nearly at right angles, at some distance from Richmond; and the legislature authorized the Louisa Railroad Company to cross the track of the other, and continue their road to Richmond. In this latter grant, the obligation of the contract with the first company was held not to be impaired within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States. It was also decided that in the first charter there was an implied reservation of the power to incorporate companies to transport other than passengers; and if the Louisa Railroad Company should infringe upon the rights of the Richmond Company, there would be a remedy at law, but that the apprehension of it would not justify an 49 Shreveport & R. R. V. R. Co. v. St. Louis S. W. R. Co., 51 La. Ann. 814, 25 So. 424. injunction to prevent them from building their road; and that the obligation of the contract was not impaired by crossing the road, since a franchise may be condemned in the same manner as individual property.50 In Baltimore & Susquehanna R. Co. v. Nesbit,51 the State of Maryland granted a charter to a railroad company, in which provision was made for the condemnation of land to the following effect: namely, that a jury should be summoned to assess the damages, which award should be confirmed by the county court, unless cause to the contrary was shown. The charter further provided, that the payment, or tender of payment, of such valuation should entitle the company to the estate as fully as if it had been conveyed. In 1836 there was an inquisition by a jury, condemning certain lands, which was ratified and confirmed by the county court. In 1841, the legislature passed an act directing the county court to set aside the inquisition and order a new one. On the 18th of April, 1844, the railroad company tendered the amount of the damages, with interest, to the owner of the land, which offer was refused; and on the 26th of April, 1844, the owner applied to the county court to set aside the inquisition, and order a new one, which the court directed to be done. It was decided that the law of 1841 was not a law impairing the obligation of a contract; it neither changed the contract between the company and the State, nor did it divest the company of a vested title to the land. The charter provided that, upon tendering the damages to the owner, the title to the land should become vested in the company. There having been no such tender when the act of 1841 was passed, five years after the inquisition, that act only left the parties in the situation where the charter placed them, and no title was divested out of the company, because they had none. It was further held that the States have a right to direct a rehearing of cases decided in their own courts. The only limit upon the power to pass retrospective laws is, 50 Richmond, F. & P. R. Co. v. 51 10 How. (51 U. S.) 395, 13 L. ed. Louisa. R. R. Co., 13 How. (54 U. S.) 469. 71, 14 L. ed. 55. |