shall not be lawful for any person or persons to erect a bridge within a certain distance of the bridge in question means, not only that no person or association of persons shall erect such a bridge without legislative authority, but that the legislature itself will not make it lawful for any person or association of persons to do so by giving them authority 85 A clause of forfeiture in a law is to be construed differently from a similar clause in an engagement between individuals. A legislature can impose it as a punishment, but individuals can only make it a matter of contract. Being a penalty imposed by law the legislature has the right to remit it.86 Where under an ordinance a street railway company has the right by a written acceptance thereof to designate the streets on which its railway will be constructed and operated, and has also the right to occupy such other streets as may be thereafter designated by resolution of the city council, a permission so grantel to occupy another street does not operate as a new franchise, and the designation by the company of streets relates only to the minimum of mileage.87 A corporate charter by which a corporation, with a grant from another State, obtains all the rights and privileges possessed under the foreign grant, does not confer privileges which conflict with the constitution of the foreign State where such original charter was granted, even though such privileges do not violate the constitution of the other State.88 § 287. Prospective and Retrospective Operation.-A statute operates prospectively only unless a contrary intent very clearly appears.89 There is a presumption against retrospec 85 The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. (70 U. S.) 51, 18 L. ed. 137. * Maryland v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 3 How. (44 U. S.) 534, 11 L. ed. 714. 89 United States: City R. Co. v. Citizens' St. Ry. Co., 166 U. S. 557, 41 L. ed. 1114, 17 Sup. Ct. 653; United States V. Trans-Missouri Freight Assoc., 166 U. S. 290, 41 L. 87 Thurston v. Huston, 123 Iowa, ed. 1007, 17 Sup. Ct. 540, 14 Nat. 157, 98 N. W. 637. Corp. Rep. 116, 148; Chicago & N. 89 Johnston v. State, 91 Ala. 70, W. R. Co. v. United States, 104 U. 9 So. 71. S. 680, 26 L. ed. 891; Harvey v. tive legislation; it is not favored; and words in a statute will not be construed as retroactive unless they clearly can be given no other effect and the legislative intent cannot be otherwise satisfied; in this respect the use in the statute of the future tense must be given weight.90 The Fourteenth Amend Tyler, 2 Wall. (69 U. S.) 328, 17 L. ed. 871; United Mines Co. v. Hatcher (C. C.), 79 Fed. 517, 49 U. S. App. 139, aff'g and partly rev'g 75 Fed. 368. See Wright v. Southern R. Co. (C. C.), 80 Fed. 260. 50 N. J. L. 374, 13 Atl. 251; State, Essex Public Road Board, v. Skinkle, 49 N. J. L. 641, 10 Atl. 379; Fitzgerald v. Phelps & B. Windmill Co., 42 W. Va. 570, 26 S. E. 315. Only laws in existence or prospective laws, and not those then repealed, are within the terms of the statutory construction law of New York. People v. Potter, 82 N. Y. Illinois: Voigt v. Kersten, 164 Ill. Massachusetts: Wild v. Boston & M. R. Co., 171 Mass. 245, 50 N. E. 533. A statute operates prospectively so that it does not cure prior misuser of franchise as a ground of forfeiture of a charter. State, Walker, v. Minnesota: Powers v. St. Paul, 36 Equitable Loan & I. Assoc., 142 Mo. Minn. 87, 30 N. W. 433. Mississippi: Capital State Bank v. Lewis, 64 Miss. 727, 2 So. 243. Nebraska: McIntosh v. Johnson, 51 Neb. 33, 70 N. W. 522; State, City Water Co., v. Kearney, 49 Neb. 325, 68 N. W. 533. South Carolina: Turner v. Interstate Bldg. & Loan Assoc., 51 S. C. 33, 27 S. E. 947, 7 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. (N. S.) 228. Utah: Mercur Gold Min. & Mill. Co. v. Spry, 16 Utah, 222, 52 Pac. 382. West Virginia: Stewart v. Vandervort, 34 W. Va. 524, 12 S. E. 736, 12 L. R. A. 50. 325, 41 S. W. 916. 90 United States: United States v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 202 U. S. 563, 50 L. ed. 1149, 26 Sup. Ct. 717; White v. United States, 191 U. S. 545, 24 Sup. Ct. 171, 48 L. ed. 301; Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S. 536, 28 L. ed. 770, 5 Sup. Ct. 255; United States v. Heth, 3 Cranch (7 U. S.), 399, 2 L. ed. 479; United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 142 Fed. 176. Alabama: State v. Gloss, 83 Ala. 93, 3 So. 745. See Blair v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 400, 26 Sup. Ct. 427, 50 L. ed. 801 (rev'g 132 Fed. 848, where certain statutes were held not unconstitutional under the constitution in force when they were passed); Fowler v. Lewis, 36 W. Va. 112, 14 S. E. 447. California: Webber v. Clarke, 74 Compare State, Jones, v. Landis, Cal. 11, 15 Pac. 431. Arkansas: St. Louis, A. & T. R. Co. v. Phila. F. Assoc., 55 Ark. 163, 18 S. W. 43. ment, however, contains no prohibition of retrospective legislation as such, and, therefore, the mere fact that a statute is retroactive in its operation does not make it repugnant to the Federal Constitution.91 Where the measure of damages under a statute for destruction of property for fire negligently caused by railroad companies is limited by a deduction of the amount of insurance received for such loss, the enactment does not operate retrospectively as to loss of property occasioned before passage of the statute.92 And a statute which limits the liability of a railroad company for fires applies to an insurance policy taken out prior thereto, where the loss is occasioned subsequent to such enactment, and the difference between the amount of the insurance and of the loss is the measure of liability fixed by such statute.93 § 288. Validating Statutes-Waiver or Correction of Defect or Irregularity.-An unconstitutional statute is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no Colorado: City of Colorado Springs v. Weirlle (Colo., 1908), 93 Pac. 1096. Illinois: Cleary v. Hoobler, 207 Ill. 97, 69 N. E. 967. Pennsylvania: Horn & Brannan Mfg. Co. v. Steelman, 215 Pa. 187, 64 Atl. 409. Texas: Rockwell County v. KaufIndiana: Nicklaus v. Conkling, 118 man County, 69 Tex. 172, 6 S. W. Ind. 289, 20 N. E. 797. Montana: State v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (Mont., 1908), 93 Pac. 945; Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. O'Marr, 18 Mont. 568, 46 Pac. 809, 47 Pac. 4. Nebraska: Commercial Bk. v. Eastern Bkg. Co., 51 Neb. 766, 71 N. W. 1024. New Jersey: Roxbury Lodge v. Hocking, 60 N. J. L. 439, 38 Atl. 693, 64 Am. St. Rep. 596. New York: Union College, In re, 129 N. Y. 308, 4 N. Y. St. R. 640, 29 N. E. 460; People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1, 19 N. Y. St. R. 173, 18 N. E. 692, 7 Am. St. Rep. 684, 2 L. R. A. 255. Oregon: State, German Sav. & Loan Soc., v. Sears, 29 Oreg. 580, 46 Pac. 785, rev'g 43 Pac. 482. 431. Virginia: Crabtree v. Old Dominion Bldg. & Loan Assoc., 95 Va. 670, 4 Va. Law Reg. 12, 64 Am. St. Rep. 818, 29 S. E. 741; Richmond v. Henrico County, 83 Va. 204, 2 S. E. 26. Wisconsin: Strike v. Wisconsin Odd Fellows Mut. L. Ins. Co., 95 Wis. 583, 70 N. W. 819. * League v. Texas, 184 U. S. 156, 46 L. ed. 478, 22 Sup. Ct. 475. See Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. (33 U. S.) 88, 8 L. ed. 876. 92 Wild v. Boston & M. R. Co., 171 Mass. 245, 50 N. E. 533. 93 Leavitt v. Canadian Pacific R. Co., 90 Me. 153, 37 Atl. 886, 38 L. R. A. 152. protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed; 94 and it cannot be validated by the legislature,95 nor under an amended constitution. If, however, an act might have been legally authorized in the first instance it may thereafter be confirmed when not prohibited by the constitution.97 And if a statute would be otherwise invalid as for want of the proper signatures it may be ratified by express reference thereto in an accompanying chapter containing supplemental provisions in relation to the same subject-matter.98 So the legislature may waive and correct any want of regularity in the proceedings of a county in a contract between it and a railroad company for the construction of its road therein on a designated line with a terminus, and upon the fulfillment of those conditions to convey to it certain of its unsettled public lands, such power to contract having been conferred by statute. Again, although certain rights, such as the authority of a street car company to become a carrier of freight, have been conferred without legislative power or in violation of law, still such powers as have been lawfully granted will not be affected, and the legislature may by general law affirm and validate such void grants so that the acceptance by such company of the provisions of the validating act makes it a de jure corporation possessed with all the authority and powers vested under the charter. If the legislature possesses the power to authorize 99 "Norton v. Shelby County, 118 770. Compare Sweet v. Syracuse, U. S. 425, 30 L. ed. 178, 6 Sup. Ct. 129 N. Y. 337, 41 N. Y. St. Rep. 649, 1121; Minnesota Sugar Co. v. Iver- 29 N. E. 289. son, 90 Minn. 6, 97 N. W. 454. State, Charleston, Cincinnati, & Chicago Rd. Co., v. Whitesides, 30 S. C. 579, 3 L. R. A. 777, 9 S. E. 661. See Cedar Rapids Water Co. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 118 Iowa, 234, 91 N. W. 1031. Compare Sweet v. Syracuse, 129 N. Y. 337, 41 N. Y. St. R. 649, 29 N. E. 289. "Seneca Min. Co. v. Osman, 82 Mich. 573, 47 N. W. 25, 9 L. R. A. "Steele County v. Erskine, 98 Fed. 215. 98 Wrought-Iron Range Co. Carver, 118 N. C. 328, 24 S. E. 352. V. 99 Roberts v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 158 U. S. 1, 39 L. ed. 873, 15 1 Brown v. Atlanta R. & Power Co., 113 Ga. 462, 39 S. E. 462, 39 S. E. 71. an act to be done, it can by retrospective act cure the evils which existed, because the power thus conferred has been irregularly executed. A municipal subscription to the stock of a railroad company, or in aid of the construction of a railroad, made without authority previously conferred, may be confirmed and legalized by subsequent legislative enactment, when legislation of that character is not prohibited by the constitution, and when that which was done would have been legal had it been done under legislative sanction previously given. If the power of the legislature to legalize, by curative enactments, matters or proceedings which are defective under a former statute, is taken away by a constitutional amendment before passing such curative act, such remedial act is void.4 'Thomas v. Lee County, 3 Wall. (70 U. S.) 327, 18 L. ed. 177. Amendment may cure a defective statute. State, McLorinan, v. Ryno, 49 N. J. L. 603, 10 Atl. 189. 'Grenada County Supervisors v. Brogden, 112 U. S. 261, 28 L. ed. 704, 5 Sup. Ct. 125. Kimball v. Town of Rosendale, 42 Wis. 407, 24 Am. Rep. 421 (act confirming irregular assessment of taxes; constitutional amendment prohibited enactment of special laws for assessment or collection of taxes). |