of premature termination of the relationship imposed by the Conditions. The Conditions expressly provide for receipt of dismissal allowances by employees who secure employment elsewhere; obviously, the securing of such employment does not terminate the relationship. The relationship which the Burlington Conditions impose on the employer and the dismissed employee arises out of the previous employment and has for its purpose the continuation of certain economic benefits enjoyed by the employee in that employment; it is a substantial relationship, with reciprocal rights and liabilities; and it can result in the employee's return to active service. This relationship constitutes an employment relationship for the purpose of determining whether payments are "pay for time lost," regardless of the effect of the abandonment on the employee's opportunity to exercise his seniority rights. In the absence of evidence that the protective period has ended or that any of the specified causes of premature termination (i.e., failure to return to service when notified, resignation, death, retirement on pension, or dismissal for good cause) has occurred in Y's case, there is no basis for holding that his employment relationship with the Company has ended. (Cf. Thompson v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, 113 F. Supp. 900, 901-902 (S.D. Ala., 1953).) The payments made to Y under the Burlington Conditions are therefore pay for time lost, and compensation, under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act and the Railroad Retirement Act. SECTIONS 3(e) AND 5(1) (1) OF THE RAILROAD RETIREMENT ACT-RELATIONSHIP-VALIDITY OF ADOPTION IN YUGOSLAVIA 20 CFR 225.6 L-61-360 The action taken in Yugoslavia by an annuitant effected a valid adoption of a child and produces an increase in his annuity under the social security minimum provision. The issue is whether B may be found to have been legally adopted by A on June 18, 1957, and whether he may be recognized as his "child" after June 17, 1960, for the purpose of paying an increased annuity to A. A retired and has been receiving an annuity since January 1, 1947. In 1950 he returned to his birthplace, Smokvica, Yugoslavia, where he is still domiciled. In a letter dated July 12, 1957, he informed the Board that on June 18, 1957, he had adopted a child, B, who had been born on April 30, 1950, and inquired as to whether or not his adopted son was entitled to a pension. He was informed that, on the third anniversary of the adoption, consideration would be given to increasing his annuity under the special social security minimum provision of the Act by virtue of having in his care a minor child. He submitted evidence of the child's birth on April 30, 1950, at Korcula, Yugoslavia, and a marginal notation on the birth certificate indicates that the boy was adopted by A, retirement annuitant, of Smokvica, in accordance with decree issued June 18, 1957, by the District Court of Korcula, Yugoslavia. He also submitted the adoption decree and a translation of the decree from the United States Department of State. This document shows that on June 18, 1957, the matter of the adoption of B was considered by the People's Committee of the Community of Korcula, Social Service Division; that the hearing was before the chief of the Social Service Division; that A and the parents of the child were present; that the reports submitted concerning the adoption were read; that A declared his intention of adopting B and giving him all the rights of inheritance; that the parents of the child declared their consent to the adoption; that the chief of the Division read into the record the laws on adoption; that the facts of the case were verified, and that the chief of the Division declared the adoption concluded. The seal of the People's Republic of Croatia, District of Dburovnik, People's Committee of the Community of Korcula, Municipal Office of Smokvica, is on the document. Section 3(e) of the Railroad Retirement Act provides: * if for any entire month in which an annuity accrues and is payable under this Act the annuity to which an employee is entitled under this Act (or would have been entitled except for a reduction pursuant to section 2 (a) 3 or a joint and survivor election), together with his or her spouse's annuity, if any, or the total of survivor annuities under this Act deriving from the same employee, is less than 110 per centum of the amount, or 110 per centum of the additional amount which would have been payable to all persons for such month under the Social Security Act *** if such employee's service as an employee after December 31, 1936, were included in the term "employment" as defined in that Act and quarters of coverage were determined in accordance with section 5(1)(4) of this Act, such annuity or annuities, shall be increased proportionately to a total of 110 per centum of such amount or 110 per centum of such additional amount. Section 5(1)(1) of the Railroad Retirement Act provides: In determining *** whether an applicant is the *** child *** of an employee as claimed, the rules set forth in section 216(h) (1) of the Social Security Act, as in effect prior to 1957, shall be applied. Section 216(h) (1) of the Social Security Act as in effect prior to 1957 provides: In determining whether an applicant is the wife, husband, widow, widower, child, or parent of a fully insured or currently insured individual for purposes of this title, the Secretary shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which such insured individual is domiciled at the time such applicant files application, or, if such insured individual is dead, by the courts of the State in which he was domiciled at the time of his death, or if such insured individual is or was not so domiciled in any State by the courts of the District of Columbia. Applicants who according to such law would have the same status relative to taking intestate personal property as a wife, husband, widow, widower, child, or parent shall be deemed such. Since A is domiciled outside the United States of America the law of the District of Columbia will be applied in determining the relationship of the child. The courts of the District of Columbia will recognize a relationship acquired according to the law of the place where acquired (Associate General Counsel's opinion L-59-168). The document submitted by A appears regular on its face and establishes that the provisions of the Yugoslavia law on adoption were complied with, that a decision was rendered by the chief of the Social Security Division that B was thereby adopted by A and that the adoption is a matter of public record. Documents of proceedings by a People's Committee, which appears to be the legal authority having jurisdiction in Yugoslavia, may be accepted as evidence. (Associate General Counsel's opinion L-58–205.) An adoption valid under the laws of a foreign nation if not against the public policy of the District of Columbia will be recognized as valid, and an adopted child gains inheritance rights from the adoptive parent under the law of the District of Columbia (Associate General Counsel's opinion L-58139). It is held that B may be found to have been legally adopted by A on June 18, 1957, for the purpose of paying an increased annuity to A after June 17, 1960. SECTION 3(g) OF THE RAILROAD RETIREMENT ACT-ANNUITY NOT PAYABLE FOR THE MONTH IN WHICH AN ANNUITANT DIES CONTROLLING TIME L-61-368 Where annuitant died on July 31, 1961, at 10:10 p.m. mountain standard time, that time controls and check made payable to him for July 1961 must be returned to the Board. The question was raised as to whether a check dated August 1, 1961, in the amount of $144.60 was payable to the deceased employee, A, for the month during which he died. Section 3(g) of the Railroad Retirement Act provides that "No annuity shall accrue with respect to the calendar month in which an annuitant dies." A died in Santa Fe, N.M., on July 31, 1961, at 10:10 p.m., mountain standard time. This time is controlling in view of Section 262 of Title 15 of the United States Code Annotated, which reads in pertinent part as follows: In all statutes, orders, rules, and regulations relating to the time of performance of any act by an officer or department of the United States, whether in the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the Government, or relating to the time within which any rights shall accrue or determine, or within which any act shall or shall not be performed by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, it shall be understood and intended that the time shall be the United States standard time of the zone within which the act is to be performed. (See 33 Comp. Gen. 51.) Since A died on July 31, 1961, no annuity was payable to him for the month of July. The check dated August 1, 1961, should, therefore, be returned to the Board. SECTION 2 OF THE TEMPORARY EXTENDED RAILROAD UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS ACT OF 1961-ESTABLISHMENT OF CLAIM L-61-422 In determining whether payment should be made under the Temporary Extended Railroad Unemployment Insurance Benefits Act of 1961 or the Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1961, the filing dates of the claims filed under the two Acts are controlling, and payment should be made under that Act under which the individual first filed a claim, provided the claim is finally allowed. Section 2 of the Temporary Extended Railroad Unemployment Insurance Benefits Act of 1961 (Public Law 87-7, approved March 24, 1961) provides in part: An employee who has filed, and established, a first claim for benefits under the provisions of the Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1961, may not thereafter establish a claim under this section, and an employee who has registered for, and established, a claim under this section may not thereafter establish a claim under the provisions of the Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1961. This provision was explained as follows in the Committee Reports on H.R. 5075, 87th Congress: To avoid duplication of temporary benefits in the case of an employee covered otherwise by a State system as well as by the railroad system, the bill would provide for paying him only under the system under which he first claimed and established a right to temporary benefits payable to him by reason of the enactment of this act or the Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1961. (Report No. 54 of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th Congress, 1st Session, page 5; Report No. 72 of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 87th Congress, 1st Session, page 5.) A question arose as to when an employee should be regarded as having "filed, and established, a first claim" under the Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1961 (Public Law 87-6, approved March 24, 1961), and when an employee should be considered to have "registered for, and established, a claim" under Public Law 87-7. The Bureau of Employment Security in the Department of Labor secured an opinion on this point from an assistant solicitor of that Department. He reached the conclusion that the filing dates of the claims filed under the two Acts are controlling, and that the "establishment" of a claim should be regarded as a condition subsequent. He therefore held that payment should be made under that Act under which the individual first filed a claim, provided the claim is finally allowed. In support of this ruling the assistant solictor pointed out that in the portion of Public Law 87-7 quoted above, the words "and established" are set off by commas; he relied on this to show that those words "function as a proviso" or condition subsequent. He also argued that if the determination date, rather than the filing date, of a claim were controlling, the application of the two Acts might depend on the internal operations of the agencies involved, or what he referred to as "a race to determine claims." We agree with the conclusion reached in the assistant solicitor's opinion. It would certainly be undesirable, in a case in which an individual claimed benefits under Public Law 87-6 and also under Public Law 87-7, to require payment by the agency which was more prompt in making a determination. Congress could not have intended this result, and its intention will be effectuated by reading the words "and established" in the manner which the assistant solicitor suggests. Consequently, payment of temporary extended benefits should be made under that Act under which the individual first claimed such benefits, provided the claim is finally allowed. SECTION 12 (0) OF THE RAILROAD UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ACT-PAYMENTS UNDER UNINSURED MOTORIST CLAUSE OF INSURANCE POLICY L-61-430 Board not entitled to reimbursement for payment of sickness benefits from sum paid by insurance company under employee's policy providing protection against bodily injury caused by uninsured automobile. The attorneys for S state that his automobile insurance carrier, the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, has paid him the sum of $9,000 under an endorsement to his policy, referred to as "coverage U," relating to bodily injuries caused by uninsured automobiles. From this payment the attorneys have withheld the sum of $754.80, the amount of sickness benefits paid him by the Board based on the infirmity with respect to which he received the insurance payments. However, they express the view that, since the settlement was made by the claimant's own insurance carrier, it should be treated the same as a payment under a health and accident policy, or Blue Cross, and that consequently the Board is not entitled to reimbursement under section 12(o) of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act. The "coverage U" endorsement provides that the insurance carrier will pay all sums, up to a specified maximum, which the policy holder or his legal representative is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile as damages for bodily injuries caused by such uninsured automobile. The endorsement also provides that the insurer will be entitled to subrogation to the extent of any payments made by it, and that the policy holder will cooperate fully with the insurer in any steps which it may wish to take in the matter. The insurance company has expressed the opinion that a clause in the endorsement, referred to as "exclusion (b)," would prevent it from reimbursing the Board under section 12(o). This clause provides that the uninsured automobile coverage does not apply "so as to inure directly or indirectly to the benefit of any workmen's compensation or disability benefits carrier or any person or organization qualifying as a self-insurer under any workmen's compensation or disability benefits law or any similar law." It is obvious that the insurance carrier's contention is not well founded, since the Board is not a "workmen's compensation or disability benefits carrier,” or a "self-insurer," and therefore could not be affected by "exclusion (b)." Section 12(o) provides that if the Board pays benefits to an employee with respect to an infirmity it is entitled to reimbursement for such benefits "from any sum or damages paid or payable to such employee or other person through suit, compromise, settlement, judgment, or otherwise on account of any liability (other than a liability under a health, sickness, accident, or similar insurance policy) based upon such infirmity." "Coverage U" differs in one important respect from coverage under a health, sickness, accident or similar insurance policy, payments under which are specifically excepted from the operation of this section. Under "coverage U" the establishment of the uninsured tort-feasor's liability for causing the infirmity is an essential prerequisite to the establishment of liability under the policy. However, while liability for causing the infirmity is thus involved, the insurance carrier's own |