credit union. He received remuneration of $15.00 per month and $30.00 per month, respectively for these services. Service to both these organizations ceased January 31, 1960. It is claimed by employee his annuity should begin as of June 27, 1959, upon his cessation of service with the railway company. Section 2(a) of the Railroad Retirement Act provides that an employee shall be eligible for an annuity only after he shall "have ceased to render compensated service to any person, whether or not an employer as defined in section 1(a) (but with the right to engage in other employment to the extent not prohibited by subsection (d))". Section 2(d) of the Act provides as follows: No annuity shall be paid with respect to any month in which an individual in receipt of an annuity hereunder shall render compensated service to an employer or to the last person by whom he was employed prior to the date on which the annuity began to accrue. Section 2(c) of the Act provides that an annuity cannot begin to accrue "before the date following the last day of compensated service of the applicant". No distinction is made in the statute between service that is substantial or casual, regular or intermittent, or full time or part time, except that service to a local lodge of a railway labor organization is to be disregarded for annuity eligibility purposes if the compensation for such service is less than $3.00 a month. Held, no annuity may be awarded the employee until after he ceased his service to the credit union and, since he received more than the exempt amount in pay for it, after he ceased service to the local unit of the labor organization. SECTION 3(e) OF THE RAILROAD RETIREMENT ACT-SECTION 216(h) (1) OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 20 CFR 237.306, 237.409 L-60-204 Where State (Colorado) statute provides only one method of legitimation of children (with consequent inheritance rights) when the children's parents have not married, non-compliance with such legitimation provisions precludes children from having status as "children" for purposes of the "social-securityminimum" provision of section 3 (e) of the Railroad Retirement Act. The children in question were born of an informal relationship begun in November, 1941 at Rifle, Colorado, between one E and the disability annuitant employee. E was previously married to M from whom she separated in October 1941. M, who is still alive, stated he divorced E in October 1941, but there is no record of divorce or annulment in any of the jurisdictions in which either M or E lived after separating, although a record was found of the initiation of divorce proceedings by him which were not carried through. It is held that a valid marriage cannot be established between E and the employee. Also, that the children born of their relationship cannot be considered legitimate and entitled to inheritance rights in the employee's intestate property. Section 46-3-6 of the Colorado Revised Statutes (1953), Vol. 3, provides: No decree annulling a marriage shall affect the legitimacy of any children born as the issue of such void or voidable marriage, and any such child shall be deemed to be the legitimate child of each of said parents. This is the only legislation providing for legitimation, with consequent inheritance rights, in the absence of valid marriage between the children's parents. And the Colorado Supreme Court has held that this section has no application when, as in the instant case, the parents could not be married because of the continued existence of a previous valid marriage to which one of the parents was a party, even though otherwise a good common-law marriage might have been found. Valdez v. Shaw, 66 P. 2d 325 (1937). Since without inheritance rights as children of the employee the children may not be considered the employee's "children" for purposes of social security benefits (section 216(h) (1) of the Social Security Act), it is held that they may not be so considered for purposes of section 3 (e) of the Railroad Retirement Act, which provides that the annuity of a single employee cannot be less than 110 percent of the amount or additional amount payable to him, and to members of his family on his employment, under the Social Security Act, were his railroad employment covered by that Act. SECTION 5(f) (2) OF THE RAILROAD RETIREMENT ACT- 20 CFR 238 L-60-205 Lump sum under section 5(f) (2) (“residual” benefit) payable to employee's estate when employee survived by maternal cousins who under applicable state law could inherit employee's intestate personal property. The deceased employee D died domiciled in the State of Indiana on December 25, 1957. No application form has been filed in this case and there is no evidence of the existence of any survivors in this country but there is information that D was survived by eight maternal cousins living abroad. No information is available as to surviving relatives on the paternal side. No attempt has been made to secure administration of D's estate because of the belief of the Counsul General of the country of D's origin that since it is not known what relatives, if any, on the paternal side survive, the estate would escheat to the State. Section 6-201, Vol. 3, Burns Indiana Statutes, sets forth general rules of descent and provides that if decedent was not survived by relatives on his father's side who would be heirs, his eight maternal cousins would be his heirs. Held that "residual payment" would not escheat to State if paid to employee's estate but would be payable to maternal cousins through such estate; and, therefore, that payment of benefit may be made to the estate. SECTION 5(1) (1) OF THE RAILROAD RETIREMENT ACT-WIDOWSEPARATION FROM BED AND BOARD 20 CFR 237.304 L-60-214 Held-applicant cannot be found to be "widow" of the employee whom she married after employee's first wife had secured divorce from bed and board but no absolute divorce. The employee D died domiciled in the State of Virginia on March 12, 1959. The applicant W and the employee went through a marriage ceremony on May 25, 1929. W states that D was previously married to one A, but that D and A were divorced from bed and board on September 16, 1927, in the court of Law and Chancery for the City of Roanoke, Virginia. No record of an absolute divorce is on file in that Court. W stated that she and D were of the opinion they were legally married because of the divorce decree dated September 16, 1927, and that she did not know until after D's death that the divorce was from bed and board only. In determining whether W is the widow of D under section 5(1)(1) of the Railroad Retirement Act she must meet the conditions set forth in section 216(h) (1) of the Social Security Act in effect prior to 1957 as follows: In determining whether an applicant is the *** widow * * * the Secretary [of Health, Education, and Welfare] shall apply such law as would be applied *** by the courts of the State in which he was domiciled at the time of his death, * * *. Applicants who according to such law would have the same status relative to taking intestate personal property as a * widow *shall be deemed such. Under Virginia law (Code of Virginia, sections 20-91, 20-95, 20-121) the grounds of cruelty and willful abandonment alleged here are sufficient for divorce from bed and board but are not adequate for absolute divorce until the separation persists for two years and a petition is then filed and ruled upon. Here A could have petitioned for an absolute divorce in May 1929, the month and year in which D married W but there is no official records or other evidence that she did so. Accordingly, and since legal status as wife is necessary for inheritance status as widow in Virginia (Code of Virginia, section 64-11) held W may not be found to be the widow of D for purposes of the Railroad Retirement Act. SECTION 5(1) (1) OF THE RAILROAD RETIREMENT ACT-CHILD'S ANNUITY 20 CFR 237.306, 237.409 L-60-216 Where illegitimate child of employee not legitimated in accordance with provisions of law of state where employee died domiciled and therefore not entitled to inherit as employee's child held that child is not to be recognized as “child” of employee eligible for a child's annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act. Section 5(1)(1) of the Railroad Retirement Act, applicable in determining who is "child" for purposes of child's annuity, provides through incorporation of section 216(h) (1) of the Social Security Act (as in effect before 1957), that: child * ✦✦ of a fully In determining whether an applicant is the insured or currently insured individual * * * the Secretary shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which such insured individual is domiciled at the time such applicant files application, or, if such insured individual is dead, by the courts of the State in which he was domiciled at the time of his death ***. Applicants who according to such law would have the same status relative to taking intestate personal property as a ** child shall be deemed such. The deceased employee D was found guilty of the charge of nonsupport of a child and verbally admitted to the District Attorney at Sacramento, California, that he was the father of the child born to M on July 23, 1954. Later, D paid $35 per month through the District Attorney's office for the support of the child. There is no evidence, however, that he ever acknowledged himself to be the child's father in writing or that he received the child into his family as his child. Further, there is no evidence of a marriage or attempted marriage between D and M. Section 230, West's California Civil Code provides: The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as such, with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into his family, and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate child, thereby adopts it as such: and such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of its birth The evidence is that these provisions have not been met. The circumstance that D was found guilty of the charge of non-support of the child is not in itself sufficient to legitimate the child, or give it inheritance rights, since the charge is applicable to non-support of illegitimate children as well as to non-support of legitimate children (section 270 West's California Penal Code). Under the law of California, then, there is no basis for finding that the child is the legitimate child of D or would inherit as a child from him. Held, that child may not be recognized as D's child for purposes of an annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act. SECTIONS 5(1) (1) AND 5(f) (2) OF THE RAILROAD RETIREMENT 20 CFR 238 ACT L-60-217 Where state (Illinois) statute provides for an illegitimate child to inherit intestate personal property of mother (the employee), held that such child could be entitled to receive benefits under section 5(f) (2) of the Railroad Retirement Act as "child" of employee who died domiciled in Illinois. The birth certificate submitted for the claimant child shows her name to be Z and her mother's name (the deceased employee) as J. The mother of J stated that J took the name of J when Z was born to her out of wedlock. Other evidence submitted also tended to show that Z was the daughter of J, although illegitimate. Section 5(1)(1) of the Railroad Retirement Act incorporates, for the purposes of section 5(f) (2) (and other provisions), the provisions of section 216(h) (1) of the Social Security Act as in effect before 1957. Under these provisions, a claimant has "child" status if able to inherit as the employee's child "the intestate personal property" of the employee under the law applied "by the courts of the State in which he was domiciled at the time of his death". Title 3, section 163, Illinois Revised Statutes (1959) provides: *** An illegitimate child is heir of its mother and of any maternal ancestor, and of any person from whom its mother might have inherited, if living; Since Z, though illegitimate, has the capacity to inherit the intestate personal property of J, her mother, under State law, she may be considered J's "child" for purposes of section 5(f) (2) (the "residual" benefit provision) of the Railroad Retirement Act. SECTION 5(1) (1) OF THE RAILROAD RETIREMENT ACT-WIDOW'S ANNUITY EFFECT OF POST-NUPTIAL AGREEMENT BY COUPLE TO GIVE UP INHERITANCE RIGHTS IN THEIR PROPERTY 20 CFR 237.303, 237.406 L-60-218 Where a post-nuptial agreement for the disposal of their respective property is entered into by man and wife and later wife obtained legal separation but court decree does not include terms of post-nuptial agreement and man dies, the wife is not disqualified from being considered the "widow" for purposes of the Railroad Retirement Act. The employee, D, died domiciled in the State of Indiana, on January 21, 1960. Earlier, in May 1957, D and his then wife, W, entered into a postnuptial agreement under which it was agreed that in the event D predeceased W, she was to be the beneficiary of certain insurance on his life, and in addition was to receive certain assets from his farm, and in the event W predeceased D he was to have a life estate in all of her property. Each agreed to take and accept such property in lieu of any and all rights they might otherwise have in the property or estate of the other, and specifically waived and relinquished all rights whatsoever as the surviving spouse in the property and estate of the other. About a year later, the parties separated and in a suit for divorce brought by D, W on her cross-complaint was awarded a separation from bed and board from D for a period of two years. Each party was awarded the possession, custody and control of the property then in the possession of each party and D was ordered to pay $80 per month for W's support. payments were made by D until the time of his death. The The question is whether W may be considered to have the status of a widow relative to taking the intestate property of D. The Railroad Retirement Act provides, in section 5(1) (1), that the determination of whether an applicant is the widow of an employee shall be made in accordance with "the rules set forth in section 216(h) (1) of the Social Security Act, as in effect prior to 1957. Section 216(h)(1) of that Act (as in effect before 1957) provided: widow * * of a fully In determining whether an applicant is the insured or currently insured individual for purposes of this title, the Secretary shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which such insured individual is domiciled at the time such applicant files application, or, if such insured individual is dead, by the courts of the State in which he was domiciled at the time of his death, or if such insured individual is or was not so domiciled in any State, by the courts of the District of Columbia. Applicants who according to such law would have the same status relative to taking intestate personal property as a widow *** shall be deemed such. Here, there was nothing in the Court's decree expressly affecting either party's right to share in the intestate property of the other in the event of the other party's death. The agreement between the parties renouncing their inheritance rights was not an incident of their separation but preceded it by about a year. The court's decree is not based upon but is wholly independent of the post-nuptial agreement between the parties. In this case the wife would have retained the "status" under the state law, "relative to the taking of inte |