A letter from an inhabitant of the district to the trustees complaining of the teacher is privileged, if written with an honest purpose and for the public good. (Tounshend on Slander and Libel, pp. 385, 399; but see 272. See Nolan vs. Kane, Legal News, Mch. 27, 1897. 21 So. R. 593, 60 S W 108)

The English law holds good in this country and is thus stated: "A head-master is not bound to give any character or testimonial to his assistant; but, when he does give one, all statements made therein are privileged, and no action for libel can be brought on them, provided they be made bonafide. This privilege exists because of the duty thrown upon every person by the convenience of society to state fairly all he knows either for or against a former servant which would be likely to influence another person, who contemplates engaging that servant, in deciding upon the fitness of the servant for the purpose for which he requires him. If, then, in accordance with this duty, a head-master states what he honestly believes to be the truth, about his assistant, the law will protect him from any penalties for so doing, even if the things stated are, in fact, untrue. But if he deliberately makes a statement which he knows to be false, and gives his assistant a bad character which he knows he does not deserve, the head-master is not acting in accordance with his duty, and lays himself open to an action for libel at the suit of the injured assistant. Malice being proved destroys the privilege which otherwise would exist, and any deliberate and intentional false statement, or any statement made recklessly, without knowing whether it be true or false, is evidence of malice. If a head-master give his assistant a good character, by means of which he gains another situation, and the head-master subsequently finds out that he was mistaken in giving such a character, and informs his former assistant's new employer of the mistake, this information will be privileged; and indeed it is the duty of the head-master to correct his mistake. (18 LJQ B, 334)

When, however, a head-master hears that a former assistant is about to be appointed to a new post, it is not his duty to

volunteer information as to such assistant's character, and it is much safer for him to wait until asked before making any statement.

Eagerness to prevent a former servant obtaining another place has the appearance of malice, and if it were found that I wrote systematically to every one to whom the plaintiff applied for work, the jury would probably give damages against me. On the other hand, if a person into whose service he was about to enter was an intimate friend or a relation of mine, and there was no other evidence of malice except that I volunteered the information, the occasion would still be privileged.-Odgers on Slander and Libel, p. 202.

In case of a dismissal for gross immorality, however, it is unquestionably the duty as well as the right of the trustees to make known the fact to any school likely to engage the discharged teacher.

Mary Moberly, teacher in Gasport, Ind., when she received her money from the treasurer, James R. Henry, objected to the amount, which was less than that paid the other teachers. Mr. Henry made written protest to the board against her reemployment but she was re-engaged. She sued for libel, but could not recover, as it was a privileged communication. and did not damage her, because it did not prevent her reemployment by those to whom it was read. (Ind A, 1898)

When a superintendent makes report to the board concerning a teacher, it is not necessary to prove that the charges were true, but it is necessary to prove that he thought they were true. (70 At 1036, 15 Conn 74, 67 Conn 504)

On Oct. 5, 1900, Principal Lyman O. Best of Brooklyn reported that Emma Walker, a teacher in his school, was careless in blackboard work, and on March 30, 1901, Sup't Maxwell wrote a letter in which he stated that he never had any doubt Mr. Best's estimate of her was pretty nearly correct. She sued both for libel. The supreme court found in favor of Mr. Best but against Sup't Maxwell in considerable damages and the case was appealed.

The appellate division ruled unanimously that both reports were privileged. Judge Hirschberg said: "Where writings are not libelous in themselves, there can be no recovery at all unless pecuniary injury has been sustained by reason of the publication, and there can be no recovery of punitive damages in the absence of exoress malice; that is, malice in fact as distinguished from malice implied.

"I think that both writings were privileged; that neither was libelous per se, and that in the absence of any claim of special injury, the complaint should have been dismissed as to both defendants. It was clearly the duty of the defendant Best, as principal of the school in which the plaintiff teaches, to note and to record her work and his opinions of her capacity and skill, and no offence attaches to an unfavorable expression which is believed to be truthful and honest. Moreover, the charge of carelessness is not libelous, as might be a charge of unskilfulness or general incapacity. History furnished many instances of genius wasted by a life of carelessness and indifference. The plaintiff is not necessarily injured in her profession by a charge of carelessness in the performance of a particular branch of her work.

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"The relation of the parties to the subject matter of the correspondence invests the communication with a privileged character. It is not shown to be untruthful in any respect, or to have been written in bad faith or from unworthy motives. On its face it is only a qualified approval of the approximate correctness of Mr. Best's report, and the plaintiff admits through her counsel on the argument that it would not be regarded as libelous, but for the assertion of the writer that he had known her for some years.

"The general principle of privilege applies."

A teacher who feels himself unjustly treated in being discharged has the option of two methods of redress: appeal to the courts, or appeal to the commissioner of education.

This applies also to withholding and to annulling a certificate, pages 85, 90, and to any other dissension that may arise between the teacher and the trustees or other schoolofficers.

He may apply to the courts for a writing of mandamus, to compel re-instatement (33 Conn 298); or may hold himself ready to perform his part of the contract, and when the time has expired may sue for his wages.

(3 Denio 175, 19 Hun 109, 63 Hun 389, 2 Ill A 458, 17 Ili A 347, 23 JI A 367, 11 Ind 210, 93 Ind 292, 111 Ind 472, 53 Ia 187, 56 Ia 331, 65 Ia 209, 72 Ia 379, 86 Ky 485, 40 Mo A 507 50 Neb 171, 69 N W 772, 38 N Y 58, 2 RI 120, 2 Wend 287, 11 Wend 90)

Some decisions declare mandamus to be the proper remedy.

A teacher, removed by the board of education in a manner not provided by law, may by mandamus compel recognition and permission to perform her duties as a teacher. The intention of the law-making power to retain teachers in schools, unless removed in the manner provided by statute, would render null and void any by-law of the board of education or any rule of government by which the school officers without the removal required, could dispense with the teacher. (43 Hun 537, 57 Hun 33)

In Ind. there is no appeal from the action of the trustees in dismissing a teacher. See also page 125. (42 Ind 200)

It was decided May 7, 1898, in the supreme court of Mississippi, that when a teacher holding a state first-grade license covering the proposed term of employment was elected by the trustees of a school, and the county superintendent refused to employ him, holding that he had the right so to refuse, that while the superintendent may remove or suspend a teacher for causes prescribed by the statute, he can do so only in strict accordance with the statute. The teacher had a valuable right under the license, the loss of which could not be compensated by damages; and hence the possession of the license would entitle him to a mandamus to compel the county

superintendent to employ him. The license gives the holder a right to teach until he is removed on statutory grounds.

Other decisions declare that the proper action is suit for damages.

A principal of a high school is a mere employee, and not an officer of the district, and has no official relations to it. Where he has a valid contract with the high school board, and the latter violates its contract duties, as by installing another principal in his place, his remedy is the very plain and common one that any party has against one with whom he has made a contract which such other neglects or refuses to perform, namely, an action for the recovery of such damages as he has sustained in consequence of such neglect or refusal. Having, therefore, a plain and adequate remedy by action at law, the courts will refuse to interfere by the exercise of their extraordinary jurisdiction by mandamus, to compel his reinstatement as principal of the high school. And even if it could be maintained that the position of teacher is an office, or a right to a place, so as to constitute a franchise, position, or privilege, so that mandamus could be maintained, still, the court holds, a proceeding by mandamus would not be the proper action in which to test the question of his title, where it appeared that there was a person other than the relator of claimant in the place or position in question, who was occupying it under a claim of right or title,-a de facto incumbent, for instance, under a contract of subsequent date. (76 N W 351)

Of course no action can be maintained against the trustees personally for removing a teacher unless malice can be shown. (64 Atl 330, 3 Hun 177, 57 Hun 33, 17 Ill A 347, 42 Ind 200, 21 Ia 590, 26 Ohio 421, 22 Pa 1040, 36 Pa 315, 49 Pa St 151)

Instead of resorting to the courts the teacher may appeal to the commissioner of education either to reinstate him, or to direct the trustees to pay him his wages.

(34 How Pr 336, 18 N Y 272, 11 Wend 90)