and sister less evidence besides would be required to establish that they lived
together as a family, than if they were strangers. If he shows that they so
lived, the jury ought not to find an implied promise. Id.

11. T. was under a contract to deliver to a company, in Pennsylvania, certain
quantities of ore each month, and received monthly payments. A suit hav-
ing arisen, the court of chancery during its pendency, by consent of the par-
ties, placed a manager in charge of the business to deliver ore and receive
payments. A writ of attachment was issued in Pennsylvania, by a creditor
of T., and the money due for ore was attached in the hands of the company,
who thereupon refrained from making a monthly payment. On account of
which the manager stopped shipments for three months. Held, that a decree
ordering that the company should, after the expiration of this time, receive,
in addition to their regular monthly quotas, parts of the ore which had been
detained by the manager, was erroneous. Lehigh Zinc and Iron Co., Limited,
v. Trotter, N. J., 187.

See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, 364; ESTOPPEL, 459; MARRIED WOMAN, 473; SUN-
DAY, 305; USURY, 376.

CONTRIBUTION.

See CONTRACT, 448.

CONVERSION.

Title.] The will of a testator peremptorily directed a sale of his real estate upon
the death of his wife, and a distribution of the proceeds among his children;
after the death of the widow, the children effected an amicable partition, ex-
ecuting and delivering deeds to each other for their respective purparts.
Held, they took as purchasers and were vested with the fee. Appeal of Pat-
terson, Penn., 401.

See EVIDENCE, 82.

CORPORATION.

1. Creditor must have judgment.] A creditor of a corporation who seeks to
enforce his claim against its officers, under Public Statutes, chapter 106,
must first obtain judgment against the corporation. If the judgment remain
unpaid for thirty days he may then bring the action in behalf of himself and
all other creditors of the company, but the statute gives him no right which
he can enforce in behalf of himself alone. George Woods Co. v. Stocer, Mass.,
277.

2. Foreign-bill of discovery.] The creditors of an Ohio corporation,
whose officers having possession of its books reside in this State, may main-
tain a bill of discovery in the courts of this State to ascertain the names and
residences of stockholders liable for the debts of the company by the laws of
Ohio, and thus to enable them to institute a suit in the courts of that State
against such corporation and its stockholders. Post & Co. v. Toledo, etc.,
Railroad Co., Mass., 269.

3. Mutual-insurance - companies - dissolution

distribution of as-

sets.] The personal property of a mutual fire insurance company, in excess
of the amount required to pay all legal liabilities, vests in the State upon
dissolution of the company Titcomb v. Kennebunk Mutual Fire Insurance
Company, Me., 1005.

4. Power to borrow. A corporation is impliedly authorized to borrow money,
and has the incidental power to give security for its payment. Orr v. Mer-
cer Co. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., Penn., 135.

5. Seal to deed - evidence to show without authority.] Where certain
instruments purporting to be the deeds of a private corporation are shown to
be sealed with the corporate seal, the testimony of a single corporate officer,
whose duty might or might not make him cognizant of their execution, that
he had no knowledge of corporate authority having been given to execute
the instruments, should be deemed legally insufficient to overcome the pre-

sumption of due execution, to which the affixing of the corporate seal gives
rise. Parker v. Receiver of the Washoe Manufacturing Company, N. J., 228.
6. Stock -- shareholder.] The shares in a corporation constitute a species of
property entirely distinct from the corporate property; a shareholder has no
distinct and individual title to the moneys or property of the corporation,
nor any actual control over it; the shares represent a right to participate in
profits only. Bidwell v. Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. Co., Penn., 421.
7. Stockholder indebtedness

-

appearance

-

limitations
A bill in equity

waiver
-discharge assignment - proceeding - liability.
was filed March, 1878, by a creditor against several stockholders of an insol-
vent corporation, incorporated June, 1873; the bill was for the purpose of
compelling the payment of unpaid capital stock in discharge of company
indebtedness; by an amendment, filed February, 1879, B., a stockholder, was
joined as a party; in 1880 he entered an appearance and filed an answer mak-
ing a defense. Held, that if B. had not been notified, he had by his action
waived notice; and, further, the statute of limitations ceased to run from the
time of the amendment. To discharge a stockholder of a corporation from
liability, because of having assigned his shares of stock, there must be an
actual, bona fide, completed assignment. In a proceeding to enforce the
equitable obligation of stockholders, in an insolvent corporation, to pay the
unpaid portions of capital stock due by them, in order that the corporation's
indebtedness may be paid to the extent of such unpaid capital, there must be
an account taken of the amount of debts, assets, and unpaid capital,
and a decree for an assessment of the amount due by each stockholder as
stated in Lane's Appeal, 9 Out. 49. Messersmith v. Sharon Savings Bank, 96
Penn. St. 440, is not to be understood as deciding, generally, that the
transferee of stock in a corporation which has become insolvent is not liable
for the payment of the unpaid portion of the shares held by him, when the
unpaid capital is required for the payment of the debts of the corporation.
Appeal of Bell, Penn., 655.

Exemption from taxation.] See TAXATION, 797.

1. N. Y. Code of Civil Procedure, §§ 3246, 3239.] Section 3246 of Code of
Civil Procedure expressly authorized costs against plaintiffs as executors. Hav-
ing awarded costs upon the appeal from the judgment, the court had no power
to award costs upon the appeal from the order. Code § 3239, subd. 2. Syms
v. Mayor, N. Y., 819.

2. Discretion as to.] This court in its discretion, will refuse costs in this court
to a complainant whose decree has been affirmed when it appears that the
costs of the suit have been exorbitantly increased by superfluous recitals and
statements in the bill of complaint. Vliet v. Wyckoff, N. J., 231.

COUNTY TREASURER.

Tax collector-bond - surety — release — discharge.] A county treas-
urer has no power to substitute the judgment note of a tax collector for his
bond given to the Commonwealth, and thus release the sureties upon the
bond. Templeton v. Commonwealth, Penn., 17.

COURTS.

1. Deliberation-duty- Allegheny county-equity-tax-sale-vol-
untary payment - divesting.] It is the duty of courts of original juris-
diction to give full consideration to every cause brought before them. A.
owned real estate in Allegheny city, B. held a mortgage against it, upon
which mortgage he issued a levari facias, and at the sale in July, 1878, became
the purchaser. A. had failed to pay his city, poor and water taxes for 1877
and 1878, and in 1879 the city filed claims, and issued execution thereon, and
was about to sell the property, when B. filed bills in equity asking for in-
junctions and the removal of the alleged liens, but the prayer was not granted;
he then paid the taxes under protest, and instituted an action on the case to

recover the amount so paid by him. Held, the sheriff's sale had divested the
tax liens, and the tax claimant was remitted to the proceeds of sale for pay-
ment. Held, also, the payment of the taxes by B. was not a voluntary pay-
ment, such as would prevent his recovery. Held, also, he should have been
granted the relief he sought in equity. Shaw v. City of Allegheny, Penn.,

628.

2. Summary action of- exemption - appraisement - setting aside.]
A court cannot, by summary action, deprive one whose property has been
taken in execution, of his right to the $300 exemption; it may, however, for
any proper reason, set aside the appraisement, even though it become neces-
sary to pass incidentally upon the right itself, as that, from the nature of the
action, the defendant had not the right claimed; that there was a waiver; or,
that the right had not been asserted by the proper person; that the demand
for an appraisement had not been made in time; or, that there was fraud or
misbehavior in the holding of the appraisement. Tasker v. Sheldon, Penn.,
707.

CREDITOR'S ACTION.

Reaching trust fund.] The testatrix placed a share of her estate in the hands
of her executors, and directed them to apply the income thereof to the sup-
port and maintenance of William E. Hoy and his family during his life, and,
after his death, to pay the income to his surviving children "until they reach
the age of twenty-one years, when the principal is to be divided among them,
share and share alike;" and in case William should die without lawful issue
surviving him, or in case all his children should die subsequently to his
decease, before reaching the age of twenty-one years, and without leaving
issue, then she directs the share to be divided equally among all her three
surviving children and the children of any deceased child. William sur-
vived, and had a wife and two children. In an action brought by a judg-
ment creditor of the son to procure satisfaction of his judgment out of the
fund in the hands of his executors, on the ground that the trusts created for
the son's benefit were void, because the ownership of the property was
thereby suspended for a longer period than authorized by statute, held, that
plaintiff was not entitled to recover, as the trust for the son was separate in
itself and unconnected with the trust intended to take effect after his death,
and it could stand alone. Kennedy v. Hoy, N. Y., 811.

CRIMINAL LAW.

1. "Body stealing" - Penal Code, § 311.] Section 311 of the Penal Code,
which describes every kind of "body stealing" known to the law, does not
apply to exhumations made by legally-constituted public authorities for the
purpose of ascertaining whether crime has been committed in producing the
death of the person whose body is exhumed. People v. Fitzgerald, N. Y., 829.
2. "Book-making" - nuisance.] The business of book-making, carried on
upon the ground of a horse-racing association, although authorized by said
association, and the privilege is paid for, is indictable as a public nuisance.
Mc Clean v. State, N. J., 234.

3. Boycott-sufficiency of counts.] The labor and skill of the workman,
the plant of the manufacturer, and the equipment of the farmer are in equal
sense property; every man has the right to employ his talents, industry and
capital as he pleases, free from the dictation of others; and if two or more
persons combine to coerce his choice in this behalf, it is a criminal conspiracy,
whether the means employed are actual violence or a species of intimidation,
that works upon the mind. A count is sufficient which charges that the
respondents unlawfully combined, conspired and agreed together to prevent
and hinder by violence, threats and intimidation, the Ryegate Granite Works
from retaining and taking into its employ certain workmen. A count is
sufficient which charges that the respondents, with the malicious intent to
control and injure said company, unlawfully conspired to terrify, intimidate
and drive away by threats its workmen. A count is sufficient which merely
charges a conspiracy to do an unlawful act; and a fortiori one that charges

a conspiracy to do an unlawful act by unlawful means; thus, the statute pre-
scribes the punishment for using threats or intimidation to prevent a person
accepting or continuing an employment in a mill, etc. The count charged
that the respondents conspired with intent to prevent a prosecution of the
business of said granite works, and threatened its workmen that they were
"scab shops" that the employees were scabs;" that their names would be
published in the "scab" list in the Granite Cutters' Journal; that they would
be shunned and disgraced in the craft, etc., and that thereby they were
frightened and driven away. Held, to charge a conspiracy to do an act
unlawful at common law, by means unlawful under the statute; and that an
offense is sufficiently set out under the statute. It was unnecessary to aver

that the respondents had knowledge of the wrongful character of the matters
charged against them. State v. Stewart, Vt., 84.

4. Joinder of offenses.] Felonies and misdemeanor, or different felonies, may
be joined in the same indictment, if the counts cover the same transactions.
Id.

5. Motion to quash.] A motion to quash is addressed to the discretion of the
court, and its refusal is not revisable. Id.

6. Conspiracy - evidence-counsel

-

addressing the jury discre-
tion.] On the trial of a prosecution for conspiracy and for riot, a witness for the
Commonwealth, called to testify to the presence of some of the defendants
at or near the scene of the trouble, produced, while on the stand, a postal
card upon which he had written the names of a number of them. Having
testified that he wrote the names on the card on the day, and at the time he
saw the defendants there, and the card itself showing erasures and altera-
tions, some portions of the writing being fresher than others, the defendants
offered to exhibit the card to the jury by way of cross-examination. The
Commonwealth objected, and the court sustained the objection. Held no
error. During the course of his remarks, counsel for the prosecution offered
to exhibit to the jury & copy of "Puck," an illustrated weekly paper, con-
taining a representation of a laborer and family seated about the table, in
the center of which was a porridge dish with tubes leading from the bottom
thereof to the mouths of figures under the table, designated by the artist as
"walking delegate," "agitator," etc., etc., and under each figure the name
of one of the defendants written by the counsel. Defendants objected, but
the court overruled the objection. Held, that, as the matter was one of dis-
cretion with the quarter sessions, the supreme court would not review the
action taken by it, unless such action had been the means of working serious
wrong to the prisoners on trial. Newman v. Com., Penn., 375.

7. Indictment clerk of school district.] An indictment against the clerk
of a school district for not recording the warrant for an annual meeting of the
district, and discharging other duties of his office with respect to such meet-
ing, must show that a warrant for the meeting was issued and given unto
him as required by the statute. State v. Demerrit, N. H., 131.

8.

9.

10.

general law, chap. 87.] An indictment charging the prudential com-
mittee of a school district with willfully neglecting to give the district clerk
the warrant for a district meeting with the affidavit of posting indorsed
thereon, as required by General Laws, chapter 87, section 5, is bad if it does
not allege that the warrant was duly issued and a copy or copies seasonably
posted. State v. Corbett, N. H., 449.

plea in abatement.] In a plea in abatement to an indictment, alleg-
ing that one H. by presenting himself as grand juryman prevented the
attendance of C. and M., who were drawn as grand jurors according to law,
notified to attend and ready and willing to serve, it is the duty of the defend-
ant to show, affirmatively, by his plea, that C. and M. were legally drawn.
State v. Mead, R. I., 297.

-] Defendant pleaded in abatement to an indictment that "one of the
grand jurors who participated in the deliberations of the grand jury which
has found said indictment, and who was drawn by the town council of the
town of N. to serve on said grand jury, to-wit, B., was not, at the time he

was drawn as aforesaid, qualified to vote upon any proposition to impose a
tax or for the expenditure of money in said N." Held, on demurrer, that the
plea was bad, as not alleging wherein B. was not qualified, and as involving
simply a question of law. Defendant pleaded in abatement to an indictment
that "one of the grand jurors who participated in the deliberations of the
grand jury which has found said indictment, to-wit, H., was not drawn to
serve upon said grand jury by the town council of any of the towns within
and for said county of Newport, nor by the city council of the city of New-
port, in said county, nor was the said H. summoned to serve on said grand
jury by writ of renire coming out of this honorable court, nor was the said
H. upon said jury by virtue of any legal process whatsoever, but improperly
intruded himself upon said jury and its deliberations." Held, on demurrer,
that the plea was bad, as jurors in the city of Newport are to be drawn by
the board of aldermen, not by the city council. State v. Duggan, R. I., 294.
11. Libel.] An indictment under a statute which makes it a criminal offense to
"send or convey" an insulting, lascivious, indecent, disgusting, offensive or
annoying letter or communication to any female, which charges that the ac-
cused did "send and convey" is technically defective, the words "send" and
"convey" importing a different mode of transmission. But this defect may
be cured by amendment, and, therefore, to be available, the objection must
be taken by demurrer or motion to quash, before the jury is sworn. The de-
scription in an indictment of the offensive writing - which was sent by mail
inclosed in an envelope — as a "letter and communication," is not erroneous
-- there being no incongruity or inconsistency in describing it as a letter and
communication, for it was both. A communication is sent within the mean-
ing of the statute when it is put in the course of transmission by the accused
with intent that it should reach the person to whom it is charged in the in-
dictment to have been sent, provided that in fact it reaches such person. The
indictment charged that the communication was sent to Henrietta C. Mrs.
C. was a married woman, residing with her husband. The communication
was inclosed in a sealed envelope, directed to her husband at his post-office
address, and sent by mail. In the same envelope was a letter to the hus-
band, requesting him to hand the inclosed to his wife. Mrs. C.'s son got the
letter from the post-office, and took it home and handed it to her. She
opened it and read it. Held, that an instruction that if the accused intended
the communication for Mrs. C., having taken the means for her to get it, it
was a sending to her by the accused, no matter what means he employed for
it to reach her, or from what source she received it, was substantially correct.
The statute makes the offense indictable only when the communication is
sent to a female against her consent. If there be any evidence, direct or
circumstantial, tending to show that there was no consent, the question is
one for the jury. Where the authorship of the communication is in dis-
pute, a conversation between the accused and third persons, in the course of
which things occurred and expressions were used which tended to connect
the accused with the contents of the communication, is competent evidence
to connect him with the authorship of the communication. But a charge
made against the accused in the same conversation, having no relation to the
subject-matter of the communication, such as a charge that the accused had
been guilty of indecent and criminal conduct with another female, is incom-
petent. Larrison v. State, N. J., 317.

12. Lord's day - no defense that Hebrew.] It is no defense to a charge of
violating the statute in reference to the Lord's day that the accused was a
Hebrew, who conscientiously believed that the seventh day of the week was
the Sabbath, and that he kept his shop open on Sunday solely for the pur-
pose of selling meat to Hebrews. Commonwealth v. Starr, Mass., 221.
13. Privy verdict - assault with intent to murder.] The rule derived
from common-law authorities is that in criminal cases the character of the
punishment determines the power of the jury to render a privy verdict, or,
what is the same thing, a verdict in the absence of the accused. The cir-
cumstance that takes away such power is that the case is one involving life