being dissatisfied with the order, now moved that it might be discharged.

The Order of the Lord Chancellor was, that the said sum of 42351., the cash paid into the bank pursuant to the said order dated the 17th day of November instant, on the credit of the said cause, should be laid out in the purchase of bank three pounds per cent. annuities, in the name and with the privity of the Accountant-General, in trust in the said cause; and the said Accountant-General was to declare the trust thereof accordingly, subject to the further order of the Court: and it was ordered, that the interest to accrue due on the said bank annuities when so purchased, and accumulations of interest should be from time to time, as and when the same should amount to a competent sum, laid out in the purchase of like bank three per cent. annuities, in the name and with the privity of the said Accountant-General, in trust in the said cause; and the said Accountant-General was to declare the trust thereof accordingly, subject to the further order of the Court, &c. But that order and the order of the 17th day of November instant, were to be without prejudice to any question as to the rents and profits of the said purchased premises, and to the interest on the purchase-money for the same: and the said bank three per cent. annuities, when so purchased, were not to be sold, transferred, or otherwise disposed of, without notice to the said Henry Batchelor, the purchaser.

Mr. Chandless for the appeal motion; Mr. Cooper and Mr. Girdlestone against it.

So Maurice v. Wainwright, V. C., November, 1833. See also Barker v. Harper, Cooper, 32.

M. R.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. NEWBURY CORPORATION. December 22,

1838.

payment

of

UPON a motion for enforcing an order for payment of a In orders for sum of money in a month from the date, the question arose whether a lunar or calendar month was meant. The means a lunar

money month

month,

Master of the Rolls said, that in most orders of the Courts of Law and Equity the word month must be construed a lunar month (a).

Mr. Cooper for the motion.

In Lacon v. Hooper, 6 Term Reports, 224; S. C. 1 Espinasse, 246, Lord Kenyon said, that in the uniform legal construction, a month so generally described was a lunar month, unless the context required a different construction that he confessed he wished, when the rule was first established, it had been decided that months should be understood to mean calendar and not lunar months; but the contrary had been determined so long and so frequently, that it ought not again to be brought in question. See further what was said by Lord Eldon in Windale v. Fall, 3 Brown C. C. 11, Mr. Belt's edition in the note. Of the numerous authorities Barksdale v. Morgan, 4 Modern, 185, and Coke Littleton, 135 b, may be referred to.

The student will meet, both in law and in equity, with many exceptions to the above mode of computing months. One remarkable exception in equity is in decrees for foreclosure. The time for redeeming is there reckoned according to calendar months. Anon. Barnardiston C. C. 324.

By a general Order of the Irish Chancery (29th November, 1834, No. II.), when by any general order, or by the practice of the Court, time is to be computed by the month, it shall be construed calendar month.

(a) See Cresswell v. Harris, 2 Simons & Stuart, 476; Tullet v. Linfield, 3 Burrows, 1455; S. C. 1 W. Blackstone, 450, and Soper v. Curtis, 2 Dowling, 237.

ERRATA IN PART I.

Page 75, the last line in the note, for "or such trust estate" read " of such trust estate."

Page 168, line 16, for "confirmed" read" affirmed."

Page 175, the last line but one, for " These are the joint debts" read "There are the joint debts."

END OF PART II.

CASES IN CHANCERY.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL V. FISHMONGERS' COMPANY.

(Sir Thomas Kneseworth's Charity.)

L. C. July 18, 1838.

amend, after

Sir publication, but no witnesses The examined, by

The exa
in introducing a

THIS information was filed for the establishment of a Application to charity alleged to have been created by a will of Thomas Kneseworth, dated the 13th April, 1513. original of this will was lost, but it had been enrolled the Court of Hustings. Publication having passed in Easter term, 1837, the cause was set down to be heard

document and

otherwise touching the same, refused, the

amendments not being suffi

before the Master of the Rolls in Trinity term following, and in June, 1838 it was about sixty out of the paper. ciently specified. Shortly before this period the solicitors of the relators. accidentally discovered that Sir Thomas Kneseworth had made another will dated the 4th June, 1513, and which had been proved in the usual way in the Prerogative Court of the Archbishop of Canterbury. This will of June, of the existence of which the defendants had been equally ignorant with the relators, gave money in augmentation of the charity aforesaid, and as no witnesses had been examined on either side, a motion was made (14th June, 1838,) on the part of the relators, before the Master of the Rolls, that they might be at liberty to amend their information by introducing the said will, and otherwise touching the same, as counsel might advise, and that the cause might stand over in the meantime and until the same could be properly brought on for hearing. The motion was supported by the affidavit of the relators' solicitors, which merely stated the finding of this second will. His Lordship thought he could not grant the motion, inasmuch as the relators had not set forth more particularly the amendments which they sought to introduce, and he was pleased to order that the relators should pay to the

CC

Orders 4 & 5. Cases upon the New Orders of 1828 and 1833.

defendants their costs of the application, to be taxed by the Master in rotation, and that the relators should be at liberty to amend their notice of motion.

The relators being dissatisfied with this decision, now appealed from the same to the Lord Chancellor, who was of opinion that the order of the Master of the Rolls was right, and observed, that although the new orders do not apply to such an application to amend, yet that the principle upon which they are framed (a) should dispose the Court not to grant it, unless the plaintiff, as was required in many of the cases decided before the passing of those orders (b), specified the intended amendments.

Mr. Cooper for the relators; Mr. Wigram and Mr. Romilly for the defendants.

Cases upon the General Orders of the 3d of April, 1828, including the amendments and additions of the 23d November, 1831; also upon the General Orders of the 21st of December, 1833.

APRIL, 1828.

ORDER 4.- "That in all cases, whether the defendant's answer "be filed in term time or in vacation, the plaintiff shall be allowed "two months to deliver exceptions to such answer; but if the exceptions be not delivered within the two months, the answer shall "thenceforth be deemed sufficient, and the plaintiff shall have no "order to deliver exceptions nunc pro tunc."

See the cases of Jeffray v. M'Cabe, and Bradbury v. Booker, stated and referred to, post, pages 392 and 393.

ORDER 5.-"That when exceptions taken to an answer for insufficiency are not submitted to, the plaintiff may at the end of "eight days after the exceptions are delivered, but not before, "unless in injunction causes, refer such answer for insufficiency ;

(a) See the 18th and 15th orders of April, 1828.

(b) See Dean and Chapter of Christ Church v. Simonds, 2 Merivale, 467, and Wright v. Howard, 6 Maddock, 106. In this last case Sir John Leach said, “I have read the amendments which are proposed in the present bill, &c."

"but if he do not refer the same within the next six days, he shall "be considered as having abandoned the exceptions; in which "latter case such answer shall be thenceforth deemed sufficient."

The order for referring the exceptions must not only be obtained, but it must be served within the time mentioned, being a period of not less than eight, nor more than fourteen, days after delivery of the exceptions to the answer. The time for referring the exceptions expired on the 23d January. The order to refer had been obtained on the 18th, and on the 25th it was left in the Master's office, and a warrant to proceed was taken out; and on the same day a copy of the order and the warrant to proceed were served on the defendant's clerk in court. The Master's report allowing the exceptions was taken off the file, upon the ground that the order of reference ought to have been served on or before the 23d January. Taylor v. Harrison, 1 Mylne & Craig, 274; S. C. 8 Simons, 21.

See Peace v. Hodgson, 7 Simons, 347.

See also Attorney-General v. Clack, 1 Mylne & Craig, 367. It was attempted to distinguish this last case from that of Taylor v. Harrison, inasmuch as the relators had carried the exceptions into the Master's office, and applied for a warrant to proceed upon the order to refer and exceptions, before the time for referring the exceptions had expired.

Consider Mitford v. Mitford, post, page 393.

An application to refer exceptions after the six days elapsed without the order being obtained and served, should be made to the Court and not to the Master.-Exceptions to the answer were delivered the 16th March, 1837, but the order for referring them was not obtained until the 4th April, when it was served. An attempt to obtain it had been made as early as the 29th March, and the order bore that date. Such attempt had been ineffectual by the intervention of the Easter holidays. Under these circumstances the Master had considered himself at liberty to dispense with a strict compliance with the order, and to proceed with the exceptions; but it was held that the Master had acted without authority, and that the plaintiff ought to have come to the Court for a special order to refer the exceptions. Smith v. Webster, M. R. July, 1837; L. C. November, 1837.

By a General Order of the Irish Court of Chancery, November, 1834, No. LXXIX., the Masters in all cases of exceptions for insufficiency, are authorised and directed to issue summonses,

April, 1828.
Order 5.