effect upon the country, but take pains to explain with more or less qualification that they approve the general scope of the bill, or at least they do not seriously object to its other provisions.

If the very able gentlemen who manage the railroads of the United States find only two points of serious attack in a measure which is intended to bring about, in many important particulars, a reversal of existing railway practices and methods of management, we have a right to assume that the bill is not, aside from the features which they specially criticise, unduly oppressive toward the railroads, or very far from right in its main provisions and regulations. And if these gentlemen are mistaken in their view of the probable effect of the two features which they attack, their objections to the enactment of the proposed law fall to the ground. I think they are mistaken, and that this will be made to appear during the course of the present debate; but, if I am mistaken and they are correct, I would be unwilling to give the measure my support.

STATE LEGISLATION NECESSARY TO RENDER THE LAW OF CONGRESS EFFECTIVE.

It must be borne in mind, however, that any measure which Congress can enact upon this subject may prove to some extent ineffective and unsatisfactory until it has been supplemented by similar State legislation, just as the State legislation now in force in many of the States has been found ineffective and unsatisfactory in some respects because of the absence of national legislation. There is no way in which the entire in ternal commerce of the country can be subjected at once to the same uniform plan of regulation under the Constitution as it stands. Much of this commerce is beyond the jurisdiction of Congress, but if we will apply just and proper regulations to the interstate commerce now subject to our control under the Constitution, I am satisfied that within a few years the States which have not already done so will enact similar regulations, and that eventually the entire internal commerce of the country will be placed under a substantially uniform plan of regulation.

Until that time comes, however, it may be possible for the railroads to obstruct and interfere with the successful operation of the law to some extent, because of the divided jurisdiction of the States and the general government over the subject, in case the railroads should not be disposed to accept in good faith the regulations Congress may impose upon them. But I do not look for factious or unreasonable opposition on the part of the leading railroads of the country. When once the bill goes into force, if it should become a law, I believe that the railroads will, as a rule, seek to give the law a fair interpretation and endeavor to live up to it.

UNJUST DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED.

But, however that may prove to be, we must expect a great deal of friction in attempting to put into practical operation a new and heretofore untried system of regulation-untried, at least, as to the interstate commerce of the United States. The questions that may arise can not possibly all be foreseen or guarded against. The requirements of the bill against unjust discrimination and favoritism as between persons, places, and particular classes of traffic will pinch very hard in a good many quarters. The "big fish" will be placed upon an equality with the little

ones, or more nearly so, and we must be prepared to hear very energetic and very vigorous protests from those who have been enjoying all kinds of special privileges and advantages at the expense of the general public, and who will be convinced that the country is going to everlasting smash if their privileges are cut off. But I take it that it is our duty to legislate here with a view to securing the greatest good to the greatest number, and I have faith that, if the legislation now proposed can be fairly tested, its enactment will prove beneficial alike to the railroads and to the general public when it is once fairly in operation and when business has adjusted itself to the changed conditions which it will bring about.

I come now to the consideration of the much debated "short-haul" section.

The objection made to this section as it now stands, which, if it were well founded, I should regard as the most serious, is that it is indefinite and ambiguous, that it is open to more than one construction. Of course, we can not undertake to say positively what construction will be put upon the language used by the courts if they shall be called upon to determine the meaning of the section. It seems to me, however, that but one construction can be reasonably and properly placed upon this section, especially when it is considered, as it must be, in connection with the other provisions of the bill, and that its meaning is perfectly clear. But in view of the erroneous construction that seems to have been put upon this section in some quarters I deem it proper to state that there seems to be no difference of opinion as to its meaning among the conferees on the part of the Senate. I do not know that I ought to say this, but I venture to do so; and yet it may be that as to the minutiae of my statement the other conferees of the Senate may not agree with me.

I think the Senator from Connecticut [MR. PLATT] and the Senator from Tennessee [MR. HARRIS] understand the section as I do, and I think I am justified in saying that we would not approve it if we supposed or believed it to mean what some have claimed that it does mean or may be made to mean.

A GREATER SUM CAN NOT BE CHARGED FOR A SHORTER THAN FOR A LONGER DISTANCE.

The short-haul section simply undertakes to lay down in specific terms a rule or principle which, as I have always contended, is already in effect contained in other provisions of the bill. The first requirement of the bill on the subject of rates is found in the first section, and is that all rates shall be "reasonable and just." This is in effect a declaration that under similar circumstances and conditions a greater sum shall not be charged for a shorter than for a longer distance, because under such circumstances it would not be "reasonable and just" to make such a charge. The next requirement of the bill that affects this question is found in the first part of the third section, which declares—

That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.

This is likewise a declaration that a greater sum shall not be charged

un

for a shorter than for a longer haul under similar circumstances and conditions, because such a charge would be the making or giving of an due or unreasonable preference or advantage" to one particular "locality," or would subject some other particular "locality" to an "undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage."

Now let us see what section 4 says and means. It reads as follows:

SEC. 4.

That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act to charge or receive any greater compensation in the aggregate for the transportation of passengers or of like kind of property, under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line, in the same direction, the shorter being included within the longer distance; but this shall not be construed as authorizing any common carrier within the terms of this act to charge and receive as great compensation for a shorter as for a longer distance: Provided, however, That upon application to the commission appointed under the provisions of this act, such common carrier may, in special cases, after investigation by the commission, be authorized to charge less for longer than for shorter distances for the transportation of passengers or property; and the commission may from time to time prescribe the extent to which such designated common carrier may be relieved from the operation of this section of this act.

A GREATER AGGREGATE SUM SHALL NOT BE CHARGED FOR A SHORTER THAN FOR A LONGER DISTANCE OVER THE SAME LINE IN

THE SAME DIRECTION.

As I understand it, this section as it now stands simply prohibits a railroad corporation from charging a greater aggregate sum-not a higher rate-for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line, in the same direction, and under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, when the shorter is included within the longer distance. There is no other prohibition made in positive terms. The declaration that "this shall not be construed as authorizing any common carrier within the terms of this act to charge and receive as great compensation for a shorter as for a longer distance" does not in terms prohibit the charging as much for a shorter as for a longer distance, but simply withholds the legislative sanction from the making of such a charge. This qualifying clause negatives the inference that might possibly be drawn from the language of the section without these words, namely: that an equal charge for a shorter distance is authorized by inference because only a greater charge is prohibited. This qualification, therefore, leaves the question of whether an equal amount can be charged for the shorter distance to be determined by the provisions of the bill to which I have already referred, requiring all charges to be reasonable, and forbidding the giving of an unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular locality.

ALL CHARGES MUST BE REASONABLE.

MR. HOAR.-I should like to inquire of the Senator from Illinois, with his permission, if he understands that the interpretation of the language of this bill that it only prohibits the charging a larger gross sum for the shorter than for the longer distance, and does not prohibit a larger proportionate charge for the shorter than the longer distance, is the sense in which the House of Representatives, as represented by their conferees, understand the bill, so far as he is informed?

MR. CULLOM.-I have no question but that every member of the conference committees of both Houses unqualifiedly and without mistake understands this not to be a prorate per ton per mile law, but that the

corporations shall not be allowed to charge in the aggregate, in the sum total, the same amount for the short as for the long distance, unless under certain circumstances.

The requirements of the fourth section, then, is that as between shipments of the same kind in the same direction over the same line, and made under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, a greater sum shall not be charged for a shorter than for a longer haul when the shorter comprises part of the longer haul-not that a higher rate shall not be charged per mile, but that a greater aggregate sum shall not be charged. And I desire to say here, Mr. President, that one of the elements of opposition to this bill throughout the country has been the result of a misrepresentation of the meaning of the fourth section of the bill. There has seemed to be, on the part of those who want no legislation, a determination that that section of the bill shall be construed into a pro-rate-per-mile section, when I undertake to say that no man who has been on the committee ever dreamed that the language which is used in that section, and which has been used in it from the beginning since the select committee reported the bill to the Senate, could have that construction placed on the words used.

MR. MITCHELL, of Oregon.-Section 4 reads:

That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act to charge or receive any greater compensation in the aggregate for the transportation of passengers or of like kind of property, under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, etc.

What I want to get at is the meaning of these words "under substantially similar circumstances and conditions for a shorter than for a longer distance on the same line, * * * * the shorter being included within the longer distance." To explain what I desire to get at, I will make this inquiry of the chairman of the committee: Take a long haul, from San Francisco to Portland, Oreg., over a railroad running from San Francisco to Portland. Transportation by rail over a route like that, of course, is affected to a certain extent by steamship competition, by steamers running between the terminal points. Now suppose a short haul, between points intermediate of those two terminal points, say from Stockton to Roseburgh; would that come within the provisions of the section? Would that short haul, included in this long haul, be subject to the influence of steamboat competition? Is that a haul "under substantially similar circumstances and conditions" as the haul over the whole line of road?

MR. CULLOM. I will touch upon that subject briefly in what I have to say, and shall answer the Senator from Oregon in the course of my remarks.

THE COMMISSION MAY GIVE RELIEF WHERE TRANSPORTATION IS
EFFECTED BY STEAMSHIP COMPETITION.

MR. MITCHELL, of Oregon. I am inquiring for information. I have not yet made up my mind as to the construction of this bill.

MR. CULLOM. I am not objecting to the Senator's inquiry. I was going to say that I shall discuss that point briefly in what I say; but in answer to the Senator I have this to say now: that the words "substantially similar circumstances and conditions" are words of very great im

portance, and words which may be taken for what they say by a court or by a commission who may have something to do with the construction of the law. Whether the section should be constructed so as to give relief as to the water point of competition that the Senator refers to, or not, the section itself does provide that at such a competing point, if the fact does exist, the interstate commission shall have the power to give relief upon a showing of the proper state of facts.

MR. HOAR. The power of suspension is given in a special case.

MR. CULLOM. And of course every case of the kind would be a special case, if, in the judgment of the commission, it was deemed necessary to relieve the railroad company at that particular competing point from the operation of the law.

MR. HARRIS. It does not refer to one single shipment, but to the establishment of a rule by the commission.

MR. CULLOM. Of course a rule applying to all alike.

MR. HOAR. I will put an illustration. The port of Boston, in Massachusetts, has a foreign commerce of about $125,000,000 annually. It was larger than that three or four years ago, but the change is not in the amount of commerce, but in the value of the articles exported and imported. That was the amount last year. Now, probably, of the exports, which are seventy odd millions of dollars, between thirty and forty millions consist of cotton, cattle, wheat, corn, hams and bacon, and lard-the food products of the West and the cotton of the South. Every ton of that produce exported to-day I suppose is taken from a place in the country which is from 150 to 250 miles nearer to New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. Now, the railroads give a rebate of five per cent. on all those exported articles. On that export trade of course depends a corresponding import trade, which otherwise we should not get at that port.

Have we got under this bill to put down all the local business of Massachusetts, the cotton which is taken to her factories to be used there and the food products which are brought to feed her people, to the New York rates, that is to the rates of carriers who do not have to carry the goods so far by 250 miles; or have we got to give up that export trade; or is this great export trade of the second commercial city of the country to depend on whether five commissioners happen to think that is or is not a special case?

THE SAME RATE MAY BE CHARGED FROM THE WEST TO BOSTON AS TO NEW YORK.

MR. CULLOM. Mr. President, it may be said to be rather unfortunate that Boston is a little farther away from the center of gravity than New York; but I do not think myself that there is anything in this bill which prohibits a railroad from carrying to Boston just as cheaply as it carries to New York from Chicago or Omaha or San Francisco, and there is not anything now that prevents it.

MR. HOAR. I do not think the Senator quite apprehends the force of my statement. The bill does not make New York a comparison; but does it not say that a company shall not carry over the same line of road to other points in Massachusetts the same article at a larger price than it charges this foreign commerce-that is the proposition-unless the com