Second Department, November, 1909. [Vol. 134. tion, shall be elected by the electors of such cities, towns and vil lages, or of some division thereof, or appointed by such authorities thereof, as the Legislature shall designate for that purpose. All other officers, whose election or appointment is not provided for by this Constitution, and all officers, whose offices may hereafter be created by law, shall be elected by the people, or appointed, as the Legislature may direct." There are two answers to this criticism upon the act: First, the persons who, acting in behalf of the city of New York, may enter the village of Mount Kisco and cause connection to be made with the sewers at the expense of negligent or defaulting property owners, are in no sense village officers. It may be that, strictly speaking, they are not city officers while in the performance of such duties. It has been suggested that when a sewer is constructed through several municipalities the Legislature might prescribe some special method of joint action. (Horton v. Andrus, 191 N. Y. 231, 237.) It may be that the officers charged with the performance of duties in accordance with the legislative provisions contained in this act are not, while performing such duties, distinctively the officers of either municipality. But the persons who shall carry out such provisions are not designated in the act, and if they should be deemed officers of the city of New York they are exercising police power pursuant to legislative authority to protect its water supply. The fact that they may be called upon to perform functions within the physical boundaries of another municipality does not make the statute under which they act unconstitutional because in violation of the provisions of the section above quoted. (Matter of Mayor, etc., of City of N. Y., 99 N. Y. 569, 583.) Second. If it were the fact that the act did designate officials of the city to enforce its provisions, the officers who may carry out the same in behalf of the city of New York were unknown at the time when the Constitution was adopted, and the powers and the duties of their office were not then in existence and devolved upon other officers. The appointment to such office might, therefore, be made as the Legislature should direct. (People ex rel. Wood v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; People ex rel. Kingsland v. Palmer, 52 id. 83; People ex rel. Metropolitan St. R. Co. v. Tax Comrs., 174 id. 417; Matter of Morgan v. Morgan v. Furey, 186 id. 202.) App. Div.] Second Department, November, 1909. In support of the claim that the proceedings of the village officers which led up to this contract are defective, it is urged, first, that the requirements of the Election Law were not complied with at the time that the special election approving of the plan embodied in the contract was held, and, second, that the provisions of the Village Law relative to the adoption of a plan for a sewer system were violated. The Village Law declares that unless otherwise specially provided the provisions of the Election Law relating to ballots apply to propositions submitted under such law at a special election held as therein provided. (Laws of 1897, chap. 414, §§ 59, 60, as amd. by Laws of 1906, chap. 57.) The Election Law provides, among other things, that whenever any question provided by law to be submitted to popular vote shall be submitted to the people for their approval, if more than one such proposition or question is to be voted upon at such election, such propositions or questions respectively shall be separately and consecutively numbered. (Laws of 1896, chap. 909, § 6, as amnd. by Laws of 1905, chap. 643, § 2.) We do not feel called upon to decide whether at the special election held with reference to this contract the provision above referred to was applicable, for if it was we think that there was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the statute. The proposition to be voted upon was a simple one, namely, shall a sewer system be constructed? It was not necessary that every detail of the plan adopted by the two municipalities should be separately stated and numbered, provided that they were all germane to the main question submitted to the electors for their approval or rejec tion and facilitated its accomplishment. (People ex rel. Devery v. Coler, 173 N. Y. 103; Matter of Clinton Avenue, 57 App. Div. 166; affd., 167 N. Y. 624; Matter of New York & Brooklyn Bridge, 72 id. 527.) The chief criticism made upon the argument of this appeal was that the proposition nowhere stated that a portion of the expense of carrying out this contract should be met by a general tax. But the proposition as submitted contained a statement of the estimated maximum and minimum cost of the improvement, and in express terms provided that bonds should be issued to pay for a specified portion of such cost, to wit, $59,800. When the electors. determined that the village should incur obligation for the construction of a sewer system at a cost not to exceed $100,000, and that a Second Department, November, 1909. [Vol. 134. part of such expense should be met by a bond issue, it was unnecessary to further specify that the residue should be met out of the tax levy. The law provided no other way in which it should be done. Finally, it is contended that the map and plan as adopted is not comprehensive, and does not cover all portions of the village, and that in this respect the requirements of the Village Law were not complied with. (Laws of 1897, chap. 414, § 260, as amd. by Laws of 1906, chap. 278.) The learned trial court has found that the plans and specifications for the said sewer system were in the form required by law. There was no specific finding of fact as to what was comprised in or omitted from the general plan, nor was any finding thereon requested by the plaintiffs and appellants. The evidence shows that the plan proposed provided a system of sewers which would be efficient to drain all portions of the village if connections were made therewith. It is true that upon the map and plan proposed it was not specifically provided that a sewer should be built through every street and road within the village, whether or not houses were built thereon, and in a few instances where houses had been built upon a street or road no immediate connection with the sewer system was provided. In at least one instance the evidence leaves it in great doubt whether the few houses there constructed fronted upon an opened street or road. But as to all of them the evidence was undisputed that lateral sewers could readily be constructed to connect with the main sewers laid down upon the map, and it well may be that as the trustees seem to have concluded, there was no present necessity for any other provision for these localities. We agree with the opinion of the court at Special Term that the provisions of section 260 of the Village Law should not be so strictly construed as "to require the map and plan to embrace every lateral sewer which may become necessary with the growth and development of the village. It would, indeed, be almost impossible or at least well nigh impracticable to prepare a plan with that degree of absolute completeness." (60 Misc. Rep. 145.) The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs. HIRSCHBERG, P. J., JENKS and RICH, JJ., concurred. Judgment affirmed, with costs. App. Div.] Second Department, November, 1909. BROOKLYN TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee Duly Appointed to Execute the Trust Created in and by the Last Will and Testament of DANIEL MARLEY, Deceased, for the Benefit of MARGARET PHILLIPS, Respondent, v. OCTAVIUS T. PHILLIPS, as Administrator of EDWARD M. PHILLIPS, Deceased, Respondent, Impleaded with SARAH ANN RHODES and Others, Appellants. Second Department, November 19, 1909. Will construed-trust-life estate with remainders over at majority ~ such remainders contingent — effect of death of remaindermen. Where a testator gives money in trust, income to a beneficiary for life, and after her death "then upon trust" to divide the sum equally among two children of the beneficiary "if they or either of them shall have arrived or when either of them shall arrive at the age of twenty-one years," with a proviso that if at the death of the life beneficiary only one of the children shall be living, and he has arrived at age, and if not, then when he has arrived at age, the corpus to go to such surviving child, with a bequest of the entire residuary estate to certain persons absolutely, the remainders of the children of the life beneficiary are contingent. On the death of the contingent remaindermen during the life of the life beneficiary, their interest lapsed and passed into the residuary estate. Where a future estate is not given directly to a person named, but indirectly through the exercise of powers conferred upon trustees, the gift is contingent upon survivorship at the time of distribution. The remaindermen under the will aforesaid did not take a vested future interest by virtue of section 30 of the Real Property Law, which is made applicable to personal property by section 2 of the Personal Property Law, in that on the termination of the life estate during the minority of the remaindermen there would be no person in being having an immediate right to possession. APPEAL by the defendants, Sarah Ann Rhodes and others, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant Phillips, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 4th day of May, 1909, upon the decision of the court rendered after a trial at the Kings County Special Term. Duane P. Cobb [Granville I. Burr with him on the brief], for the appellants. William M. Benedict, for respondent Octavius T. Phillips, administrator. RICH, J.: Second Department, November, 1909. [Vol. 134. Daniel Marley died on December 13, 1872, leaving a last will and codicil which were thereafter duly admitted to probate. The will contained the following provisions: "I give, devise and bequeath unto my said executors and the survivor of them the further sum of ten thousand dollars of like lawful money upon the following trusts, that is to say, to lay out and invest the same at interest in like manner and reinvest the same if necessary and to stand possessed thereof and the said interest upon trust to pay the said interest from time to time as soon as the same shall be received anto Margaret Phillips, now residing at No. 53 Bank Street in the City of New York, for and during the term of her natural life, and after her decease, then upon trust to pay and divide the said last-mentioned sum of ten thousand dollars equally among her two children, to wit: Edward M. Phillips and Daniel M. Phillips, if they or either of them shall have arrived or when either of them shall arrive at the age of twenty-one years, and if at the death of their said mother only one of the said children should be living and he has arrived at that age, and if not then when he has arrived at that age, the whole of the said sum of ten thousand dollars and any interest thereon that may not have been expended shall be paid to such surviving child to and for his own use and benefit. And in the meantime and until both or either of the said children shall arrive at that age the interest on the said last-mentioned sum shall be applied to their or either of their support, clothing, maintenance and education, as it may be required, and as the event may happen. to all the rest, residue and remainder of the proceeds of my said real and personal estate, I give, devise and bequeath the same unto the three daughters of the said Catherine Ann Mayo Tracey, to wit, the said Sarah Tracey, Frances Tracey and Emma Tracey, to and for their own absolute use and benefit forever, the same to be divided among them in equal shares and proportions." But two relatives, a sister and cousin, are mentioned in the will, the bulk of the testator's property being distributed among friends and charitable institutions. Neither Mrs. Phillips, her children nor the residuary legatees are relatives of the deceased. Edward M. Phillips died in January, 1873, at the age of seventeen years; Daniel M. Phillips died in April, 1878, at the age of twenty-three years; Mrs. Phillips, their mother * * And as |