With respect to the pulpit, it has been a great disadvantage, that the practice of reading sermons, instead of repeating them, has prevailed so universally in England. This, indeed, may have introduced accuracy, but eloquence has been much enfeebled. Another circumstance, too, has been prejudicial. The sectaries and fanatics, before the restoration, used a warm, zealous, and popular manner of preaching; and their adherents afterward continued to distinguish themselves by similar ardor. Hatred of these sects drove the established church into the opposite extreme of a studied coolness of expression. Hence, from the art of persuasion, which preaching ought ever to be, it has passed in England into mere reasoning and instruction.

ELOQUENCE OF POPULAR ASSEMBLIES.

THE foundation of every species of eloquence is good sense and solid thought. It should be the first study of him who means to address a popular assembly, to be previously master of the business on which he is to speak; to be well provided with matter and argument; and to rest upon these the chief stress. This will give to his discourse an air of manliness and strength, which is a powerful instrument of persuasion. Ornament, if he have genius for it, will succeed of course; at any rate, it deserves only secondary regard.

To become a persuasive speaker in a popular assembly, it is a capital rule, that a man should always be persuaded of whatever he recommends to others. Never, if it can be avoided, should he espouse that side of an argument which he does not believe to be the right. All high eloquence must be the offspring of passion. This makes every man persuasive, and gives a force to his genius which it cannot otherwise possess.

Debate in popular assemblies seldom allows a speaker that previous preparation which the pulpit always, and the bar sometimes admits. A general prejudice prevails, and not an unjust one, against set speeches in public meetings. At the opening of a debate they may sometimes be introduced with propriety; but, as the debate advances, they become improper; they lose the appearance of being suggested by the business that is going on. Study and ostentation are apt to be visible; and, consequently, though admired as elegant, they are seldom so persuasive as more free and unconstrained discourses.

This, however, does not forbid premeditation on what we intend to speak. With respect to the matter, we cannot be too accurate in our preparation ; but with regard to words and expressions it is very possible so far to overdo, as to render our speech stiff and precise. Short notes of the substance of the discourse are not only allowable, but of considerable service, to those, especially, who are beginning to speak in public. They will teach them a degree of accuracy, which, if they speak frequently, they are in danger of losing. They will accustom them to distinct arrangement, without which, eloquence, however great, cannot produce entire conviction.

Popular assemblies give scope for the most animated manner of public speaking. Passion is easily excited in a great assembly, where the movements are communicated by mutual sympathy between the orator and the audience. That ardor of speech, that vehemence and glow of sentiment, which proceed from a mind animated and inspired by some great and public object, form the peculiar character of popular eloquence in its highest degree of perfection.

The warmth, however, which we express, must be always suited to the subject; since it would be ridiculous to introduce great vehemence into a subject of small importance, or which, by its nature, requires to be treated with calmness. We must also be careful not to counterfeit warmth without feeling it. The

best rule is to follow nature; and never to attempt a strain of eloquence which is not prompted by our own genius. A speaker may acquire reputation and influence by a calm, argumentative manner. To reach the pathetic and sublime of oratory, requires those strong sensibilities of mind, and that high power of expression which are given to few.

Even when vehemence is justified by the subject, and prompted by genius; when warmth is felt, not feigned; we must be cautious, lest impetuosity transport us too far. If the speaker lose command of himself, he will soon lose command of his audience.

He must begin with moderation, and study to warm his hearers gradually and equally with himself. For, if their passions be not in unison with his, the discord will soon be felt. Respect for his audience should always lay a decent restraint upon his warmth, and prevent it from carrying him beyond proper limits. When a speaker is so far master of himself, as to preserve close attention to argument, and even to some degree of accurate expression; this self-command, this effort of reason in the midst of passion, contributes, in the highest degree, both to please and to persuade. The advantages of passion are afforded for the purpose of persuasion, without that confusion and disorder which are its usual attendants.

In the most animated strain of popular speaking, we must always regard what the public ear will receive without disgust. Without attention to this, imitation of ancient orators might betray a speaker into a boldness of manner, with which the coolness of modern taste would be displeased. It is also necessary to attend with care to the decorums of time, place, and character. No ardor of eloquence can atone for neglect of these. No one should attempt to speak in public, without forming to himself a just and strict idea of what is suitable to his age and character; what is suitable to the subject, the hearers, the place, and the occasion. On this idea he should adjust the whole train and manner of his speaking.

What degree of conciseness or diffuseness is suited to popular eloquence, it is not easy to determine with precision. A diffuse manner is generally considered as most proper. There is danger, however, of erring in this respect. By too diffuse a style public speakers often lose more in point of strength, than they gain by fulness of illustration. Excessive conciseness, indeed, must be avoided. We must explain and inculcate, but confine ourselves within certain limits. We should never forget that, however we may be pleased with hearing ourselves speak, every audience may be tired; and the moment they grow weary, our elo. quence becomes useless. It is better, in general to say too little, than too much; to place our thought in one strong point of view, and rest it there, than, by showing it in every light, and pouring forth a profu sion of words upon it, to exhaust the attention of our hearers, and leave them languid and fatigued,

ELOQUENCE OF THE BAR.

THE ends of speaking at the bar, and in popular assemblies, are commonly different. In the latter, the orator aims principally to persuade; to determine his hearers to some choice or conduct, as good, fit, or useful, He therefore applies himself to every principle of action in our nature; to the passions and to the heart, as well as to the understanding. But at the bar conviction is the principal object. There the speak er's duty is not to persuade the judges to what is good or useful, but to exhibit what is just or true; and, consequently, his eloquence is chiefly addressed to the understanding.

At the bar, speakers address themselves to one, or to a few judges, who are generally persons of age gravity, and dignity of character. There those advantages, which a mixed and numerous assembly af fords for employing all the arts of speech, are not en

joyed. Passion does not rise so easily. The speaker is heard with more coolness; he is watched with more severity; and would expose himself to ridicule. by attempting that high and vehement tone which is suited only to a multitude. Beside, at the bar the field of speaking is confined within law and statute. Imagination is fettered. The advocate has always be fore him the line, the square, and the compass. These it is his chief business to be constantly applying to the subjects under debate.

Hence, the eloquence of the bar is of a much more limited, more sober, and chastised kind, than that of popular assemblies; and, consequently, the judicial orations of the ancients must not be considered as exact models of that kind of speaking which is adapted to the present state of the bar. With them, strict law was much less an object of attention than it is with

us.

In the days of Demosthenes and Cicero, the municipal statutes were few, simple, and general; and the decision of causes was left, in a great measure, to the equity and common sense of the judges. Eloquence, rather than jurisprudence, was the study of pleaders. Cicero says that three months' study would make a complete civilian; nay, it was thought that a man might be a good pleader without any previous study. Among the Romans there was a set of men, called pragmatici, whose office it was to supply the orator with all the law knowledge his cause required; which he disposed in that popular form, and decorated with those colors of eloquence, which were most fitted for influencing the judges.

It may also be observed, that the civil and criminal judges in Greece and Rome were more numerous than with us, and formed a kind of popular assembly. The celebrated tribunal of the Areopagus, at Athens, consisted of fifty judges at least. In Rome, the Judices Selecti were always numerous, and had the office and power of judge and jury. In the famous cause of Milo, Cicero spoke to fifty-one Judices Selecti, and thus bad the advantage of addressing his