43 Counsel for Petitioner. other cases," and the whole course of the legislation indicates a desire that the same appellate review should be given as in other cases. We think that this customary language requires the uniform use of the writ of certiorari in order to secure that which a certiorari gives—a preliminary examination of proceedings by this Court before review. Unless a special reason in the Act providing for appellate review indicates that the review is to be by technical appeal rather than by the ordinary method of certiorari, the latter method is the right one. This must lead to the dismissal of the present appeal. WHEELER Appeal dismissed. v. GREENE, RECEIVER OF THE BANKERS JOINT STOCK LAND BANK OF MILWAUKEE. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT. No. 39. Argued October 22, 23, 1929.-Decided November 4, 1929. The Federal Farm Loan Board has no power to levy an assessment, nor may a receiver appointed by it maintain suit, for the enforcement of the stockholders' liability created by the Federal Farm Loan Act. P. 52. 29 F. (2d) 468, reversed. CERTIORARI, 279 U. S. 829, to review a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed a decision of the District Court sustaining a demurrer to a declaration in a suit brought against a stockholder of a Joint Stock Land Bank, by its receiver, to collect an assessment levied by the Federal Farm Loan Board. Messrs. Floyd E. Thompson and Joseph V. Quarles, with whom Messrs. Conrad H. Poppenhusen, Lawrence 81325°-30- -4 A. Cole, and Henry J. Darby were on the brief, for petitioner. Mr. Edwin S. Mack, with whom Messrs. Arthur W. Fairchild and J. Gilbert Hardgrove were on the brief, for respondent. Mr. Dean G. Acheson, on behalf of Messrs. Lyman M. Bass and Porter R. Chandler, filed the brief of the Stockholders' Protective Committee of the Kansas City Joint Stock Land Bank, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court. MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court. The plaintiff is the receiver of the Bankers Joint Stock Land Bank of Milwaukee appointed by the Federal Farm Loan Board. The defendant is a holder of stock of that Bank. This suit is brought to collect an assessment equal in amount to the par value of the defendant's stock, which was levied by the Federal Farm Loan Board and which the plaintiff was ordered to collect. The defendant demurred to the declaration that alleged these facts. The District Court sustained the demurrer and ordered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed and the judgment was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 29 F. (2d) 468. A writ of certiorari was granted by this Court to settle the question whether the Federal Farm Loan Board had power to levy an assessment, or the receiver to maintain suit, for the enforcing of the stockholders' liability created by the Federal Farm Loan Act, July 17, 1916, c. 245, § 16; 39 Stat. 374. U. S. Code, Title 12, § 812. The section (§ 29, Code, §§ 961, 963,) of the Federal Farm Loan Act that deals with insolvency of farm loan associations and joint stock land banks provides for the appointment of a receiver by the Farm Loan Board and states his duties and powers. It closely follows the words of the earlier National Bank Act, R. S. § 5234; Code, Tit. 12, § 192, stating the duties of the receiver of a bank that has refused to pay its circulating notes, and giving him power to take possession of books and assets and to collect debts, &c. But whereas the Bank Act goes on " and may, if necessary to pay the debts of such association, enforce the individual liability of the stockholders," the Farm Loan Act stops short and has no such words. When so important a grant of power contained in the prototype is left out from the copy it is almost impossible to attribute the omission to anything but design, or to believe that it left to very attenuated implications what the model before it so clearly expressed. There is a plain reason for the difference. The national banks issue notes that constitute an important part of the currency of the country and that the United States has an interest in seeing paid. It is upon the bank's refusal to pay these notes that the Comptroller of the Currency is to appoint a receiver, and the authority to enforce the stockholder's liability adds a security to the national circulation that is of national scope. But the Joint Stock Land Banks issue no such notes. They are created to make loans on farm mortgages to members of an association in a territorially limited district, and are relatively local affairs. It is contemplated that the bonds that they issue shall be secured by mortgages. There is not the same need that the stockholder's liability should be summarily disposed of behind his back in Washington (Rankin v. Barton, 199 U. S. 228, 232; Casey v. Galli, 94 U. S. 673, 681,) rather than by the usual proceeding of a bill in equity which is brought in the neighborhood, in which the stockholder can be heard, and by which the assessment instead of one hundred per cent. can be adjusted to the specific case. Terry v. Tubman, 92 U. S. 156. The stockholders are to be held only "equally and ratably." And, to say the least, the bill in equity is the most likely way of reaching that result. The establishment in Washington of a bureau “ charged with the execution of this Act, under the general supervision of a Federal Farm Loan Board," c. 245, § 3; Code, § 651, and the putting of the administration of the Act under the direction and control of that Board by § 1, seem to us inadequate to supply the omission of this power from the express statement of what the Board and receiver may do when the bank is insolvent. The receiver had power to collect the assets of the bank, but the liability of stockholders is no part of those assets. It is a liability to creditors which the creditors may be left to enforce. Decree reversed. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. No. 54. Argued October 28, 29, 1929.-Decided November 25, 1929. 1. Power to compel interstate railway carriers to abandon their existing passenger stations and terminals in a large city and erect in lieu a new union station at a new site, is not conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission by paragraphs 18-21 of § 1 of the amended Interstate Commerce Act, giving the Commission authority over abandonments and extensions of lines, or by paragraphs 3 and 4 of § 3, requiring carriers to afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for interchange of traffic and authorizing the Commission in certain circumstances to require that terminal facilities of one carrier may be used by another. Railroad Commission v. Southern Pacific Co., 264 U. S. 331, distinguished. P. 67. 52 Argument for the Commission. 2. Whether power exists to control the Interstate Commerce Commission by mandamus need not be decided in the absence of a meritorious case. P. 71. 34 F. (2d) 228, reversed. CERTIORARI, 279 U. S. 830, to review a judgment of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, which reversed a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District dismissing a petition for a writ of mandamus. Mr. Daniel W. Knowlton for the Interstate Commerce Commission. Since exercise of a power to compel establishment of new union stations in lieu of existing individual stations would vitally affect local interests and would encroach upon authority heretofore exercised by the States, the lower court's decision is in square conflict with the settled rule that federal legislation trenching on state authority must be strictly construed. That decision rests, not on express language conferring such power, but upon various inapt provisions added by the Transportation Act of 1920, or upon provisions of uncertain scope in the early Act, originally put there, and re-enacted in 1920, without thought of conferring any such authority. The decision of this Court in the Los Angeles Station case, (264 U. S. 331,) that the Commission has "means of control over installation of such new station " in that its permission for incidental extensions and abandonments of lines and for issuance of new securities, if needed, must first be obtained, manifests that the Commission's authority is indirect and restrictive and that it is not an authority to order the building of new union stations. The conferring by Congress of a permissive and restrictive authority in this field is in line with its past |