1. WHEN INJUNCTION WILL NOT ISSUE TO RESTRAIN COLLECTION OF TAXES.-
No court of equity will allow its injunction to issue to restrain the col-
lection of a tax, except when actually necessary to protect the rights of
citizens who have no plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. Wells,
Fargo & Co. v. Dayton, 161.

2. IDEM. Before an injunction will be granted, it must appear that the en-
forcement of the tax would lead to a multiplicity of suits, or produce
irreparable injury, or, if the property is real estate, throw a cloud upon
the title of complainant, or there must be some allegation of fraud. Id.
3. IDEM INSOLVENCY OF ASSESSOR.—The mere allegation of the insolvency
of the assessor is not sufficient to authorize the court to grant an injunc-
tion to restrain the collection of a tax. Id.

4. IDEM-PAYMENT OF TAX--REMEDY AT LAW.-Held, that the complainant in
this case had an adequate remedy at law. If the taxes are paid under
protest, and the county received the money, it could have brought its
action against the county, and if the tax was illegal, could have recovered
the money back. Id.

5. MANDAMUS-COLLECTION OF TAXES PROCEEDS OF MINES.-The collection
of taxes solely due to a county is a question of public concern as well as
of private interest, the collection of such taxes involve public duties and
public rights. State ex rel. Piper v. Gracey et al., 223.

6. COUNTY COMMISSIONERS HAVE NO POWER TO RELEASE PROPERTY FROM
TAXATION.-County Commissioners have no power to discriminate as to
the character of the property which should be subject to taxation. That
is a question for the legislature, subject to the provisions of the con-
stitution. Id.

7. PENALTY FOR NON-PAYMENT OF TAXES.-In construing the act approved
March 7, 1873 (Stat. 1873, 169): Held, that the penalty of twenty-five
per centum follows the tax, that five thirteenths of the penalty belongs
to the State, and eight-thirteenths to the county. State ex rel. Hobart v.
Huffaker, 300.

TERM.

AMENDMENT OF RECORDS AFTER ADJOURNMENT OF TERM. (See Amendments,
1.) 76.

SETTING CAUSES FOR TRIAL DURING THE TERM IS WITHIN THE DISCRETION OF
THE COURT. (See Habeas Corpus, 1.) 90.

TRANSFER.

See REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

VERDICT.

VERDICT CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE. (See Criminal Law, 1.) 17; (See Evidence,
2.) 98.

POWER OF COURT TO DISCHARGE A JURY BEFORE VERDICT. (See Jury, 23.)
429.

WILLS.

1. CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS.-The testator, by his will, disposed of his prop-
erty to his wife, "having the fullest confidence in her capacity, judg-
ment, discretion and affection, to properly bring up, educate and pro-
vide for our children, and to manage and dispose of my said property in
the best manner for their interests and her own:" Held, that the devisee
took the property devised as absolute owner, and not upon trust. Hunt
v. Hunt, 442.

2. IDEM.-In construing this will, the court held that the widow had the ab-
solute right to sell and dispose of the estate at her discretion. Id.

WITNESS.

1. CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS-WANT OF CHASTITY.-Defendant asked the court
to give this instruction: "The jury may, and it is their duty, to take
into consideration the chastity or want of chastity of any witness for the
state, in determining the credibility of such witness:" Held, that it was
calculated to mislead the jury, and was properly refused. State v. Lar-
kin, 315.

2. IDEM.—The general rule is that evidence of bad character for chastity,
where such character is collaterally, not directly, in issue, is not admis-
sible for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of a witness. Id.
3. IDEM.-Want of chastity might, in some instances, include a want of verac-
ity, but this is not always the case. In impeaching the character of a
witness the inquiry in chief should be restricted to his general reputa-
tion for truth and veracity. Id.

CROSS-EXAMINATION OF A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE. (See Criminal
Law, 2, 3.) 17.

CROSS-EXAMINATION OF A WITNESS. (See Criminal Law, 13, 14.) 315.