sonally known to him to be the real persons who subscribed the deed,
and in this respect complied with the requirements of the statutes of
Illinois then in force. Ib.
3. An officer's certificate of the acknowledgment on the 27th May, 1856, of
a deed of land in Illinois by a married woman, showing her privy ex-
amination separate and apart from her husband, and which shows
that she, "fully understanding the contents of the foregoing instrument,
acknowledged," &c., is a sufficient compliance with the statutes of the
state in force at that time respecting the communicating the contents
of such a deed to her. lb.
The question whether either of the counts in an indictment charges an
offence under the laws of the United States, is too vague and general
to be certified in a Certificate of Division of Opinion. United States.
Northway, 327.
EJECTMENT.
See EVIDENCE, 5, 6, 7, 8;
LOCAL LAW, 6, 11, 12, 14.
1. The city of Quincy, Illinois, in 1877 contracted with an Illinois corpora
tion to supply it with gas for four years. Disputes arose, payments
were in arrear, and in May, 1881, the city notified the company that it
would be no longer bound by the contract. A, a citizen of Alabama,
on the 13th August, 1885, filed a bill in equity in the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Southern District of Illinois, setting forth
that the company had a claim against the city recoverable at law, that
he had at different times tried to induce the directors to enforce it,
that he was, and for more than four years had been, a stockholder in
the company, that he had not succeeded in inducing the directors to
institute suit, that his last request was made August 1, 1885, and that
the claims were about to be barred by the statute of limitations, and he
asked for a mandamus to compel the payment of the company's debt.
The respondent demurred, This court sustains the demurrer, on the
ground that the real contest being between two Illinois corporations,
he proper remedy was an action at law by one of those corporations
against the other upon the contract, and that A has rot, by the aver-
ments in his bill, brought himself within the directions prescribed by
Equity Rule 94, 104 U. S. ix-x, respecting suits brought by stock-
holders in a corporation against the corporation and other parties,
founded on rights which might be properly asserted by the corpora-
tion. Quincy v. Steel, 241.
2. At the hearing upon a plea in equity and a general replication, no fact is
in issue but the truth of the matter pleaded. Farley v. Kittson, 303.
3. A bill in equity to enforce a contract between the plaintiff and the de-
fendants to purchase for their joint benefit the bonds, secured by
mortgages, of two railroads, of one of which the plaintiff was receiver,
and of the other general manager under the trustees in the mortgage,
alleged that he performed the agreement on his part; that the defend-
ants purchased the bonds through an agent of the bondholders, and
afterwards purchased the railroads under decrees of foreclosure, and
entered into possession and made large profits, and refused to account
to the plaintiff for his share; and that the plaintiff, pleading the nego-
tiations for the purchase of the bonds, informed the agent of the bond-
holders of his interest, and at all times answered to the best of his
knowledge and ability all inquiries of the bondholders or their agent,
or of the trustees or any person interested in the property, and always
acted honestly and in good faith towards all such persons. The de-
fendants filed a plea, averring that neither the agent nor the bond-
holders had any notice of the plaintiff's interest until after the sale of
the railroads under the decrees of foreclosure, and that the agreement
sued on was a breach of his trusts as receiver and as manager, and did
not entitle him to relief in equity. A general replication was filed,
and at the hearing the truth of the fact averred in the plea was dis-
proved. Held, that the plea must be overruled, and the defendants
ordered to answer the bill. Ib.
4. A court of equity will not assist one who has slept upon his rights, and
shows no excuse for his laches in asserting them. Speidel v. Henrici,
5. If a bill in equity shows upon its face that the plaintiff, by reason of
lapse of time and of his own laches, is not entitled to relief, the objec
tion may be taken by demurrer. Ib.
6. A bill in equity against persons holding a fund avowedly in trust for
the common benefit of the members of a voluntary association, living
together as a community and subject to its regulations, cannot, whether
the trust is lawful or unlawful, be maintained by one who has left the
community, and for fifty years afterwards taken no step to claim any
interest in the fund. Ib.
See EQUITY PLEADING;
LIMITATION, STATUTES OF, 1, 4, 5;
PATENT FOR INVENTION, 2.
1. A bill in equity against husband and wife by the assignees in bank-
ruptcy of the husband, which alleges that the husband before the
bankruptcy transferred a large amount of personal property in the
form of bonds, stocks, &c., to the wife for the purpose of concealing
the same from his creditors, and delaying, hindering, and defrauding
them, and in contemplation of bankruptcy, and which does not de-
scribe the property, but avers inability to do so, and which waives
answer under oath and asks as relief for a transfer to the assignee of
the property in whatever form it may exist, as assets of the bank-
rupt, sets forth no case for relief in equity, and should be dismissed on
demurrer. Huntington v. Saunders, 78.
2. Objections to the equity of the plaintiff's claim, as stated in his bill,
cannot be taken by plea. Farley v. Kittson, 303.
3. A plea in equity, though under oath, and negativing a material aver-
'ment in the bill, is no evidence in the defendant's favor. Ib.
See EQUITY, 2, 3, 4, 5;
ESTOPPEL.
See JUDGMENT, 1.
The refusal of the court to instruct the jury, at the close of the plaintiff's
evidence, that he is not entitled to recover, cannot be assigned for
error, if the defendant afterwards introduces evidence.. Accident Ins:
Co. v. Crandal, 527.
1. In an action by an attorney to recover for services rendered in defending
a suit for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon a tract of land near a
large town, and in preventing the foreclosure, and in bringing about
a favorable sale of the property, evidence as to the character of the
land and its possible value as a future suburb of the town is admissi-
ble. Forsyth v. Doolittle, 73.
2. As the length of hypothetical statements presented to a witness to
ascertain his opinion upon any matter, growing out of the facts sup-
posed, necessarily depends upon the simple or complicated character
of the transactions recited, and upon the number of particulars which
must be considered for the formation of the opinion desired, it must
in a great degree be left to the discretion of the court; and in this
case that discretion was properly exercised. Ib.
3. Evidence, or what purports to be evidence, in a criminal case, printed in
a newspaper, is " a statement in a public journal" within the meaning
of the act of Utah declaring that no person shall be disqualified as a
juror by reason of his having formed or expressed an opinion upon
the matter or cause to be submitted to him, "founded upon public
rumor, statements in public journals, or common notoriety, provided
it appear to the court, upon his declaration under oath or otherwise,
that he can and will, notwithstanding such an opinion, act impartially
and fairly upon the matters submitted to him." Hopt v. Utah, 430.
4. The opinion of a physician, after making a post-mortem examination of
the deceased, who came to his death by a blow inflicted upon his head,
as to the direction from which the blow was delivered, is admissible
in evidence. Ib.
5. Defendants in ejectment having produced a regular chain of title under
a deed from a grandson of the original owner of a lot in Rhode Island,
including the land in controversy, which was executed in 1768 and
recorded soon afterwards in the land records of the town in which it
was situated; and having shown that the ancestors in title paid the
taxes on said lot for twenty years preceding 1805, and that afterward,
up to the trial of the action in 1882, a period of seventy-seven years,
they or their ancestors in title had uninterruptedly paid the taxes on
the lot; and having shown an entry in 1835 by their ancestor upon the
lot under a deed, for the purpose of quarrying a ledge of rock running
through it, and the quarrying of the ledge with occasional intervals
from 1846 to the commencement of this action in 1874, a period of
twenty-eight years, the said entry being made with claim of title to
the whole lot. Held, in an action brought by the heirs of the devisee
of the original proprietor, under a will executed in 1749, and pro-
bated in 1756, none of whom had made any claim to the premises for
three-quarters of a century after the death of the original proprietor,
under whose will they now assert title, nor paid taxes on the property,
nor after that time ever taken possession of the premises or paid taxes
upon them, that the jury might presume a deed to the grandson from
the original proprietor, or from his devisee, to quiet the possession of
the defendants claiming under such grandson; and that in making
such presumption the jury were not to be restricted to consideration
of what they fairly supposed actually occurred, but to what may have
occurred, and seems requisite to quiet title in the possessors. It is
sufficient that the evidence leads to the conclusion, that the deed
might have been executed, and that its execution would be a solution
of difficulties arising from its non-execution. Fletcher v. Fuller, 534.
6. Though a presumption of a deed may be rebutted by proof of facts
inconsistent with its supposed existence, yet, where no such facts are
shown, and the things done and the things omitted, with regard to
the property in controversy, by the respective parties for long periods
of time after the execution of the supposed conveyance can be ex-
plained satisfactorily only upon the hypothesis of its existence, the
jury may be instructed that it is their duty to presume such a convey-
ance, and thus quiet the possession. Ib.
7. Though as a general rule, it is only where the possession has been actual,
open, and exclusive for the period prescribed by the statute of limi-
tations to bar an action for the recovery of land, that the presumption
of a deed can be invoked; yet that presumption may properly be
invoked where a proprietary right has been exercised beyond such
statutory period, although the exclusive possession of the whole prop-
erty, to which the right is asserted, may have been occasionally inter-
rupted during such period if, in addition to the actual possession, there
have been other open acts of ownership. Ib.
8. The assessment of taxes on an entire parcel of real estate to the person
in possession under claim of title, and to his ancestors and privies in
estate, for over a hundred years, is powerful evidence of a claim of
right to the whole lot; and, taken in connection with the exclusive
working of a quarry on the estate for more than twenty years under
claim of title to the whole tract, by virtue of conveyances in which it
was described, may authorize a jury to infer eontinuous possession of
the whole, notwithstanding a temporary and occasional intrusion by
others upon a different part of the tract, which did not interfere with
the work. Ib.
9. If rags sold as clean and free from infection, and fit to be manufactured
into paper, are proved to have been infected with the small-pox, and
to have caused it to break out in the buyer's paper-mill, whereby some
of the workmen died, others were disabled from working, and the
buyer paid certain sums to support those so disabled, and was obliged
to run his mill short-handed, and lost a considerable part of a profit-
able trade; and the seller testifies that he bought the rags in a region
where he knew the small-pox was epidemic, from any and all dealers,
not knowing where they were collected, and that they were assorted
and baled up under his instructions; and falsely testifies that the rags
sold had been baled up in his warehouse for a year before, and had no
disinfectants in them; this is sufficient evidence to be submitted to
a jury of a breach of warranty or a fraudulent representation on the
part of the seller, and of dainages to the buyer. But the court may
properly decline to permit the buyer to testify in general terms what
he estimates the amounts of his damages to be, without stating the
items of damage, or any facts upon which his opinion is based. Du-
shane v. Benedict, 630.
10. The testimony of witnesses, not shown to be experts, that the infected
condition of rags was the cause of a breaking out of the small-pox is
incompetent. Ib.
See ADMIRALTY, 1, 2, 3;
LOCAL LAW, 4, 12, 14;
PATENT FOR INVENTION, 2;
TEXAS LAND GRANTS, 1, 3, 6, 9.
1. A bill of exceptions should not contain the whole charge of the court
to the jury, but should only state distinctly the several matters of law
excepted to. Phoenix Life Ins. Co. v. Raddin, 183.
2. A bill of exceptions cannot be sustained to an instruction or to a refusal
to instruct in matter of law, without showing that there was evidence
to which the instruction given or refused was applicable. Ib.
The authority of the head of an Executive Department to issue orders
and regulations under directions of the President to have the force of
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