4.In 8/4: 95-88 25-1 HEARING BEFORE THE THE BLACKOUT OF THE ELECTRIC SYSTEM OF THE CON- SOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK ON JULY 13 AND 14, 1977, AND THE ADEQUACY OF VOLUNTARY, STATE, Printed for the use of the COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE HARLEY O. STAGGERS, West Virginia, Chairman JOHN E. MOSS, California JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan PAUL G. ROGERS, Florida LIONEL VAN DEERLIN, California RICHARDSON PREYER, North Carolina RALPH H. METCALFE, Illinois JAMES J. FLORIO, New Jersey ANTHONY TOBY MOFFETT, Connecticut JIM SANTINI, Nevada ANDREW MAGUIRE, New Jersey MARTY RUSSO, Illinois EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts THOMAS A. LUKEN, Ohio DOUG WALGREN, Pennsylvania BOB GAMMAGE, Texas ALBERT GORE, JR., Tennessee BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland SAMUEL L. DEVINE, Ohio JAMES T. BROYHILL, North Carolina Allen, Leon A., Jr., counsel, New York power pool Balet, William J., planning manager, New York power pool Brancato, Carolyn K., Ph. D., staff director, special commission of inquiry into energy failures, New York, N.Y Clapp, Norman M., special consultant in charge of investigation, New York State Public Service Commission Curtis, Hon. Charles B., Chairman, Federal Energy Regulatory Commis- Davis, Evan, special counsel, New York State Public Service Commission. Fowlkes, Ed, Bureau of Power, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Goldstein, Daniel, Assistant General Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory Lindsay, William W., Acting Chief, Bureau of Power, Federal Energy Merrill, Rolland A., Jr., operating manager, New York power pool Millstein, Ira M., chairman, special commission of inquiry into energy Vogel, John R., Jr., executive director, New York power pool Additional material submitted for the record by- Clapp, Norman M., special consultant in charge of investigation, New York State Public Service Commission, letter dated October 20, 1977, to Chairman Dingell, commenting on sections 541 and 545 of H.R. 8444...... Federal Energy Regulatory Commission: Attachment to Chairman Curtis' prepared statement, responses to questions 1 and 2 contained in Chairman Dingell's letter of Sep- Summary of applications filed under section 202(b) of the Federal Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, letter dated September 20, 1977, with attachments, from Chairman Dingell, to Chairman Curtis, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference, review of claims regarding the contribution the Storm King project would have made in avoiding the Special commission of inquiry into energy failures, New York, N.Y., 52 THE NEW YORK CITY BLACKOUT OF JULY 13, 1977 THURSDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1977 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John D. Dingell, chairman, presiding. Mr. DINGELL. The subcommittee will come to order. This is the first of the hearings to be held by the Energy and Power Subcommittee into the blackout of the electric system of the Consolidated Edison Co. of New York that occurred on July 13 and 14 of this year. This is the second of major blackouts in recent times involving that company and that geographic area of the United States which has taken place in recent times. The blackout raised a number of issues of grave importance to this subcommittee and to the Congress as a whole. Because of the importance of New York City as a hub of national and international banking, commerce, communications and transportation, the events that occurred on the evening of July 13 in Westchester County, N.Y. and New York City had a serious national and perhaps even international impact. The subcommittee has had its staff inquire into this matter and the subcommittee is now preparing a detailed study of that impact. The blackout also raised very important questions about the adequacy of voluntary and State and Federal regulatory mechanisms for resolving problems vital to assuring reliability in the Nation's electric power systems. Parenthetically, the Chair will observe that a number of things which occurred in the first blackout were supposed to have been corrected by actions taken. The Chair observes that some of those corrective measures appear not to have gone into effect, and other things which might have headed off the blackout were not attended to by the company involved. There have already been extensive investigations into the facts and, from the point of 20-20 hindsight, it appears clear that the blackout of July 13 never should have occurred; the lessons of the last great blackout of 1965 were simply not fully learned or acted upon. Emergency procedures designed to avert a collapse of the system-and which would have averted it-were not followed. Poorly designed parts of the system which increased its vulnerability were not corrected in a number of cases. Reserve generation 1 |