could afford an adequate remedy, in suits by and against representative parties, such as the governing committee or officers of a labor union; also what amendments to existing laws would be advisable for the same purpose; and what new and more efficient remedies, if any, could be provided by legislation."

The preamble makes allusion to strikes among men employed by railroad companies, or by other corporations, over which the State has assumed some power of regulation. But the resolution calls for a consideration of remedies, whether existing or to be provided, looking to the prevention and control of strikes, and the determination of conflicting claims between employers and persons employed, in cases where the latter act in combination and not as individuals. It further directs inquiry whether the inherent powers of a court of equity can afford an adequate remedy in suits by and against representative parties, supposing a governing committee, or officers of a labor union, to represent one of those parties.

There are certain incidents of strikes which our laws do not assume to control. Freedom to employ and to seek employment is intended to be preserved to all alike. It is a cherished principle, recognized by the laws, and needing no positive legal enactment for its support. It is in accord with a statement in the Bill of Rights in our State Constitution, declaring that "All men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inherent or inalienable rights," among which are "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." The same statement adds, that to "secure these rights and the proteetion of property, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." The general principle is, that men are supposed to be at liberty to engage in service, and may withdraw therefrom, with the liability to be required to respond in damages for wrongful default or breach of contract. But our liberty is, after all, a regulated liberty, and experience has shown that the good of the body politic is promoted by laws tending to restrain abuses, and fraudulent, rapacious or evil conduct.

The question now is, whether these laws have been sufficiently specifle. But, certainly they have generally commended themselves to the judgment and approval of the people as promotive of the general welfare and safety of the whole commonwealth. It is, however, a well understood fact, that changes in legislation, and to some extent new legislation, may be demanded at relatively short intervals. Therefore, our State Constitution wisely provides for biennial sessions of the General Assembly, the members of which represent a great diversity of interests in business and social life, and pledge themselves to give their best ability to the consideration of what is for the interest of the people collectively, in respect to anything within the sphere of proper legislation on the part of the State. No wiser mode of enacting laws than that which is provided for by our State Constitution, in common with the Constitution of the United States and the constitutions of the various States of the Union, has ever been devised; nor is it to be supposed that the restrictions placed by the constitutions respectively upon legislation should be materially modified, unless grave occasion for such modification shall become manifest.

The observations thus far outlined seemed to be called for by the suggestion of the preamble, that "it is a reproach alike to legislators, the courts, and the legal | rofession, that some adequate remedy for such cases (referring to strikes and their consequences,) has not yet been devised and put in operation;" and the committee think it permissible to add, that it is hardly to be expected that the laws can always provide in advance adequate remedies for complaints and grievances, especially when such troubles happen from unexpected emergencies or peculiar causes. Grievances which are well founded are likely to attract attention in time, and if remediable, a remedy for the same, so far as legal redress may properly be given, shen' be applied; but the proper remedy may not be known in time to be declared in advance. Fortunately, however, the legislature is convened at sufficiently short periods to consider important causes of dissatisfaction which concern the public weal. This is but equivalent to saying that legislation proceeds according to a natural order of development, and that laws can be framed to meet new instances somewhat better when those instances have become marked or defined, than by mere anticipation.

(a.) Strikes, as is well known, frequently result in disorder, and in misdemeanors or graver offences that plainly fall within our Criminal Code, which contains provisions for cases of conspiracy to do illegal acts, and also for the punishment of disorderly conduct, malicious mischief, rout, riots, unlawful assemblies, etc.; and those provisions seem to be substantially adequate for most purposes.

Section 5508 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, though probably intended for a different class of offences, might be taken as an indication of a proper enlargement of the Criminal Code of the State, to protect the rights of citizens.

(b.) In various cases, some of which will readily occur to members of the Association, action taken by courts of chancery during the prevalence of strikes on the part of railroad employes, while the railroads have been in the charge of receivers appointed by those courts, has been effective, when but for such action the operation of the railroads might have been much paralyzed for a time. Such has been the case in respect to some railroads controlled at the time by the Federal courts in this circuit, and in other circuits, in which cases those courts have exercised, judiciously, as your committee believe, the power to attach and commit for contempt. The dignity of the courts, and the benignity and firmness of the judges presiding therein, were powerful factors in preventing serious outbreaks of violence, and had a conservative effect in preventing disorder upon other and connecting lines.

Injunctions have also been issued upon bills in equity, filed by railway and other corporations, against which conspiracies in the form of strikes have seriously threatened continuous and irremediable waste and damage. The Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Company, some time ago, procured injunctions both from the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois and a State court in Cook county, to prevent unlawful interruption of the business of the railway company, in a case in which that interruption had become formidable, in consequence of objection on the part of strikers to the retention in employment by the railway company of certain non-union men; and in these cases action has at times been taken to punish violations of the injunctions.

The case of Bruschke v. The Furniture Makers' Union No. 119, Chicago Legal News, 306, may also be referred to as an instance in which a court of equity has enjoined strikers. In that case a private citizen, whose business was threatened with destruction, was the complainant.

Taking notice of such cases as have been cited, the committee would favor a statutory recognition of the power of courts of equity to entertain bills for the protection of property and corporate rights, by injunction or with the assistance of a receiver, as against strikers, or other conspirators, who have proceeded to unlawful or violent action, or who threaten so to do, provided it shall appear that other legal remedies are likely to be inadequate. The statute should also provide for dealing with voluntary associations when made parties to such bills, without requiring summons or notice to individual members of such associations. The statute might likewise provide for action looking towards the submission of disputes in such cases to a board of arbitration, to be constituted somewhat as in a statute of New York, which will be presently mentioned.

(c.) The legislation in England as to Trades Unions, as embodied in 34 and 35 Vict., c. 31 and 39 and 40 Vict., c. 22, seems to be in advance of our legislation, and presents suggestions for additional legislation here. Such unions are not now criminal in Great Britain, as being in restraint of trade; and registry of their objects is there required.

In the opinion of some members of this committee, there would be advantages in a registry here, giving to the registered body a right to sue for wages of or damages due to any of the members for breach of contract for wages, on assignment by the member of his demand or claim. There might then, also, better than now, be a representative body, as suggested in the aforesaid resolutioń; and in case of any object of the body being unlawful, the registry should, as in Great Britain, be declared to be void. A limited liability clause might discriminate between registered and non-registered unions.

(d.) The Legislature of the State of New York, at its annual session in 1886, passed a statute entitled “An act to provide for the amicable adjustment of grievances and disputes that may arise between employers and employes, and to authorize the creation of a State Board of Arbitration." (Chap. 400, Laws of New York, 100th Sess., 86).

This is a new statute. It does not provide for compulsory submission to arbitration, but does provide for a voluntary submission of any such dispute or grievance to a board of five arbitrators, two of whom are to be selected by each side, and the fifth member of which board is to be selected by the four so chosen. The act also provides for an order from the county judge, affirming the proceedings by which the Board are so constituted. It also provides for an appeal to the State Board of Arbitration. The latter board consists of three members, and provision is made in the act for selecting them from different political parties. It does not seem to be necessary, in the opinion of this committee, to have the latter provision in an act in our own State. A provision requiring the selection of members of such a State Board, with reference to character, integrity and ability, irrespective of party affiliations, would certainly meet the necessities of the situation. The New York statute is commended in the recent annual message of Governor Hill, of that State.

Commendation of the practical working in different European countries, of provisions for the settlement of disputes between employers and employed, have also inclined the members of this committee to favor very strongly the enactment of a statute on that subject in this State.

II.

The instruction of the Association at its last meeting, upon the motion of Judge Bradwell, that this committee should prepare and report some plan to avoid the laws' delays, and to promote a more speedy administration of justice in this State, has led this committee to make some general recommendations as follows:

(a.) An addition to Section 17 of the Practice Act, as to the order of trials, might be of service. The changes recently made in that section have been in the right direction. But to give an opportunity for conciliation, promote a clear understanding of actual differences between parties, and effect a proper classification of cases, and a due assignment of the same for trial, so far as this may be found expedient by the courts respectively; the committee would recommend that in each action the time for filing an affidavit of merits or a plea, be by statute declared to be a time when the cases respectively shall be subject to be called in order, as nearly as may well be, and that in all new cases the parties thereto, by themselves or counsel, shall at the time, or when required by the Court, state, so far as the Court shall deem it necessary to have a statement, the alleged cause of action, and defence or counter-claim, and that in case such statement be verbal, a short memorandum thereof shall be entered, and it shall be thereupon determined by the Court whether any, and if so, what, special pleadings are required, and whether the cause shall be assigned to a docket of contested cases, to be kept by special notation on the principal docket or otherwise, allowing the Court to have other separate dockets also as at present provided; and requiring the Court to determine whether the particular case is to be tried by the Court without a jury, and further amending the statute as to referees, to give the Court power to refer where it shall appear that a case is one which depends upon the statement of account, or mutual accounts.

A direction to strike cases from the docket, with leave to reinstate on payment of the usual fee as on commencing a suit, might be made applicable to any civil case not ready for trial on the second call of the same for trial after the same shall have been at issue, saving in case of the death of a party, or where good cause for continuance shall be shown; and the statute might provide that such cases shall not be reinstated unless application for reinstatement be made on or before the third day of the next term, but shall be treated as having been dismissed, as in case of non-suit.

(b.) That in all chancery cases three months' time, subject, however, to be restricted or enlarged by the Court, be allowed for the taking of evidence, and that such evidence be by deposition, save when otherwise specially ordered or permitted by the

Court. Also that in all suits in chancery, to be heard upon depositions, a copy of the pleadings, and an abstract of the evidence, be put in print, and placed before the Court at the final hearing.

(c.) That once or oftener at each term of Court a general or special call of each docket be made with reference to classifying the cases, and determining which are to be tried, and whether trial is to be by the Court, with or without a jury, and which, if any, of the cases may be disposed of without trial, or by reference to a referee. Accountants' fees, when allowed by the Court, should be taxed as a part of the costs.

(d.) The statute in regard to the administration of estates, might receive some consideration under the resolution last mentioned. The time for closing estates might perhaps be shortened with advantage. In many cases the estate might be closed probably within a year. It would seem to be advantageous to change the statute as to publishing for the adjudication of claims. It would be better to allow the clerk to publish a notice that claims must be presented within a year from the date of letters of administration, and not to require the administrator to cause such notice to be published, nor have the same posted. The forms given in the statute, of papers required to be recorded, could be considerably abbreviated with advantage. These suggestions are somewhat fragmentary; and perhaps it would not be for the best to amend the statute by mere patch-work, but would be better to revise it with some thoroughness to adapt it to existing and prospective exigencies.

III.

While approving the objects of the resolution which was offered by Mr. Rayburn, at the last meeting of this Association, suggesting a proposed amendment to Section 120 of Chap. 37, title "Courts," Revised Statutes of Illinois, the committee would suggest that it should be further provided that no such indictment be certified to the County Court, when unnecessary delay or failure of justice shall be likely to occur by the indictment being so certified to the County Court.

IV.

The resolution which was offered by Mr. Williams, in reference to providing by statute that the surviving husband or wife shall take the entire estate of an intestate, leaving no surviving descendant, parent, brother or sister, has not met the concurrence of the committee as the best rule for many cases. The proposed change is not therefore advised.

V.

The topics that most naturally suggest themselves to the lawyer in active general practice as fit subjects for legislation, are questions of procedure and practice. And to some that come under this category, it may not be improper to now direct your attention.

(a.) The right of appeal from judgments of the Appellate Courts should be extended very materially. As the case stands now, in a law case no appeal is allowed from an ordinary judgment of reversal and remand. A party is compelled to go back and retry his case perhaps upon an entirely erroneous theory. After he is beaten he may appeal to the Appellate Court, which will, of course, affirm its former ruling, and he then goes to the Supreme Court. If that Court decides in his favor, the result is a venire de novo. Where after a trial in the court below a party has judgment, that judgment, if the amount involved is $1,000, ought not to be finally overturned except by the concurrence of the Supreme Court.

The law, therefore, should be amended so as to provide that an appeal may be taken by the defeated party from judgment of reversal by the Appellate Court in all cases where had the judgment been one of affirmance, an appeal might have been prosecuted

(b.) In actions begun by attachment, as the practice generally obtains, the attachment issue is first disposed of, and then the case is tried upon the merits. It is thought that both issues should be tried together. This is the practice where suit is commenced by summons, and an attachment is sued out in aid, and no good reason is perceived why it should not be the practice in all cases.

(c.) This State has always retained the old common law rule that only he having legal title to the thing in action could sue for its recovery.

It is thought that this rule should be so modifled as to permit suit to be brought in the name of the real party in interest.

The law should provide that an assignment of a chose in action, except negotiable paper, be without prejudice to any set-off or defence existing at the time of the assignment or notice thereof to the debtor. Causes of action arising in tort should not be made assignable.

The effect of this change would be greatly to simplify procedure in actions at law, and to bring it into line with the practice in England and in this country generally.

Again, where a large number of persons having a claim against a common debtor so desired, it would be possible to unite them all in one suit brought by one of their number as assignee, and thus multiplicity of actions and consequent expense and annoyance might be avoided. This would be a matter of no little advantage to workingmen and others having small demands against a common debtor. The expense of prosecuting these claims singly is now so great as in many cases to operate as a practical denial of justice.

(d) It is also our opinion that the power of a voluntary assignee to call in question the disposition of property made by his assignor in fraud of creditors, should be enlarged.

It seems now to be the law of this State that a conveyance, fraudulent as to creditors, cannot be attacked by a voluntary assignee, he being held to stand as does his assignor towards such conveyance.

Strong v. Goldman, 8 Bissell, 552;

Colburn, et al. v. Shay, et al., 17 Brad., 289.

The law should be so amended as to confer on a voluntary assignee the same power in this regard which a receiver appointed in a creditors' bill possesses.

Strong v. Goldman, ubi supra.

(e.) It is thought also that where an attachment is levied upon the property of an insolvent debtor, the plaintiff in the attachment should be permitted to file a bill in aid thereof, and to restrain the fraudulent disposition of assets, although his claim is not reduced to judgment. This bill should be filed for the benefit of all creditors who see fit to come in and claim under it. A case in this State wherein it was held that no such bill would lie. furnishes in its facts appropriate illustration of the necessity for the change suggested.

Shufeldt v. Boehm, 96 Ill., 560.

This procedure is permitted in many jurisdictions. Often in this State a dishonest debtor is enabled for want of some such efficient remedy to encumber his property with fraudulent liens and entirely defeat the just claims of honest creditors.

In this connection, too, it might be well to permit an attachment to be sued out upon a claim not due, upon allegation of a fraudulent disposition of property either consumated or contemplated. Such is the law in some other states.

(f. With a view of facilitating the ascertainment of the truth as to the matters in controversy, many of the States permit either party after suit brought, to examine his adversary as to the matters in difference between them. It is a kind of substitute, efficient and inexpensive, for a bill for discovery. A change of the law permitting this is recommended. Such examination should take place only upon order of the court where the action is pending or of a judge thereof in vacation, upon cause shown,-the cost of such examination to be paid by the party at whose instance it is granted, and the examined party not to be considered as a witness for the party examining.

It is believed that such a practice tends to an adjustment of litigation often, and enable the parties to more fully and truly present the facts upon a trial.

(g.) It is thought that the statute permitting books of account to be read in evidence is not broad enough. It permits such books to be received where kept by any disinterested person, only where the person so keeping them is dead or a non-resident of the State. The books of all large mercantile establishments are kept by book-keepers. Therefore, if these "disinterested persons" are within the jurisdiction where litigation is pending, the books are not competent under the statute. They are not competent at common law because kept by those who as a rule have no personal knowledge of the sale and delivery of the goods.

Stettauer v. White, 98 Ill., 72.