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dation for charging him personally. The bill was brought upon several patents. In the statements of parties the defendants are described as the “Standard Laundry Machinery Company," a corporation; William G. Lewis, president of said company; and Channing W. Littlefield, secretary of said company. A subpoena was prayed, directed to the Standard Laundry Machinery Company, William G. Lewis, and Channing W. Littlefield, defendants. A subpæna was so issued, but was not served upon Lewis. A solicitor of the court appeared for the defendants without naming them. An answer was filed, stated to be the answer of the defendants, without naming them, and was signed by the solicitor as solicitor and counsel for the defendants, without naming them. The answer was sworn to by Lewis as one of the defendants, the affidavit at the foot stated that he was one of the defendants, and he signed it by his individual name.

The appearance of the solicitor for the defendants would of itself alone be an appearance only for defendants who had in some manner been served with process. They only were at the time, in fact, defendants. On that appearance the bill could not have been taken pro confesso as against Lewis. The subpæna, if it had been served, however, would only have required him to appear and answer the bill. An answer to a bill is made in person.

When Lewis answered this bill he became personally, by his own act, a party to the cause made by the bill. He then became a defendant in court. The appearance for the defendants stood as an appearance for him as one of them, and he was before the court as a party. The bill, after stating the patents, and the exclusive rights of the oratrix to the inventions therein described, alleged that the defendant the Standard Laundry Machinery Company had and the defendants William G. Lewis and Channing W. Littlefield, as the agents and officers of said company, had, with full knowledge of the rights of the oratrix, made and vended machines embodying the invention.

One interrogatory, which Lewis, by note at the foot of the bill, was required to answer, asked how many machines embodying the invention had been sold by the defendants or any of them, and the prayer was that the defendants might answer the premises and be decreed to account for and pay over all profits, and damages in addition. That Lewis was an officer or agent of a corporation would give him no right to infringe the oratrix's patents, or to withhold the fruits of infringement from her, and the statement of that relation in connection with the charge of infringement would not, in legal effect, qualify the charge. Under that allegation, and an interrogatory pointing to him as a defendant charged by it, and required to answer in respect to the charge, and a prayer for relief on account of it, he was not only bound to answer as a party, but as a party from whom relief was sought by decree against him personally. His own testimony before the master shows that he owned the whole capital stock of the defendant corporation; and the report of the master show, that he has used the corporation solely for himself, for the purpose of appearing to be an officer of it, and that its property has been, in fact, his.

The correctness of this finding has been questioned; but as there was testimony tending to establish it, and as it was involved with the question of the liability of the respective defendants in the accounting sent to the master, and he does not appear to have acted in any manner improperly or unfairly, his finding cannot, with propriety, be disturbed here. Bridges v. Sheldon, 18 Blatchf. C. C. 295, 507; S. C. 7 FED. REP. 34. On this finding, Lewis, if an officer or agent, was such for himself, and all he received in such pretended capacity he received for himself. An infringer is liable to account for the profits of the infringement to the owner of the patent, because they are the avails of the property of the owner in the hands of the infringer, which he has no right to detain from the owner. Lewis, and he alone, has these profits, which are avails of the property of the oratrix in his hands, and which he has no right to detain from her. The pretext of doing business in the name of the corporation is too flimsy to shield him from accounting for them. During a part of the time for which the account has been taken he did this business in the name of an individual, for the reason that the corporation had been enjoined. This was equally unavailing to protect him from liability.

Exceptions overruled.

COLGATE V. WESTERN UNION TEL, Co.

(Circuit Court, S. D. New York. April 4, 1884.)

APPLICATION FOR A REHEARING-LACHES OF APPLICANT.

An application for a rehearing, based on alleged newly-discovered evidence, must be denied when it appears that the existence of such evidence was known to the applicant or his counsel at the time of the former trial, and that the evidence was not then produced.

Motion for Rehearing.

Betts, Atterbury & Betts, for complainant; Wm. D. Shipman and Frederick H. Betts, of counsel.

Porter, Lowrey, Soren & Stone, for defendant; Geo. Gifford and Wm. C. Witter, of counsel.

WALLACE, J. This is an application by the defendant for a rehearing in a cause heard in November, 1878, and in which an interlocutory decree was entered in December, 1878, adjudging the validity of the complainant's letters patent, and the infringement thereof by the defendant, and that complainant recover the profits of the defendant derived by such infringement. In January, 1879, the complain

ant applied for a final injunction against the defendant to enjoin the infringement, which was granted as to any further use of the invention, but as to certain uses to which it had already been applied the question of issuing a perpetual injunction was postponed, to await an accounting and application for a final decree. Thereafter the parties entered into negotiations which resulted in defendant's taking a license of complainant and paying $100,000 for a release. The application is made on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, which shows the withdrawal of an application for a patent. At the hearing of the cause the defense of abandonment of the invention was relied on bythe defendant, and was considered in the opinion delivered by the court, and overruled in part upon the view that the application for a patent had never been withdrawn by the inventor.

Upon the hearing it was stated by counsel for the complainant that a letter had shortly before been found by him, in looking over the files of the patent-office, written by the inventor, formally withdrawing the application, and this fact was fully brought to the attention of the defendant's counsel. Whether it was assumed by defendant's counsel that the fact was not of sufficient importance to be incorporated into the proofs, or whether they supposed it would be treated by the court as a conceded fact, is not material, in view of the decision and opinion of the court rendered within a few days after the hearing, by which it was plainly indicated that the fact was a material one, and was not in the proofs. If under these circumstances an application had been promptly made for leave to reopen the proofs, and for a rehearing, it would have been incumbent upon the defendant to satisfy the court that the evidence could not have been obtained by the exercise of reasonable diligence, and introduced before the hearing. Baker v. Whiting, 1 Story, 218; Jenkins v. Eldridge, 3 Story, 299. It is not necessary to search for authorities outside the decisions of this court maintaining the rule that a rehearing will be denied if the non-production of the evidence is attributable to the laches of the party or his counsel. Ruggles v. Eddy, 11 Blatchf. 524, 529; India-rubber Co. v. Phelps, 8 Blatchf. 85; Hitchcock v. Tremaine, 9 Blatchf. 550; Page v. Holmes Burglar Alarm Co. 18 Blatchf. 118; S.C. 2 Fed. REP. 330. But, after the expiration of over three years since the discovery of the evidence, whatever might have been the result of an application if it had then been made, it would have appealed much more forcibly to the judicial discretion than can be expected now, after more than three years have elapsed, after a further hearing has been had, and a perpetual injunction ordered against the defendant, and after the defendant has recognized the complainant's rights by compromising for past use, and taking a license for the future use of the invention, and for a considerable period has been enjoying the use of the invention under the license.

The law of laches, as applied to motions for new trials or rehearings, is founded on a salutary policy. It is for the interest of the

public, as well as of litigants, that there should be an end of litigation, and that efforts to reopen controversies by unsuccessful parties, after they have had a full opportunity to be heard, and a careful bear. ing and consideration, should be discouraged.

A rehearing is denied.

WESTCOTT and others v. Rude and others.

(Circuit Court, D. Indiana. April 1, 1884.)

1. PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS-ACCOUNTING BEFORE MASTER-EVIDENCE.

In an account before a master, evidence of payments for past infringement, for the purpose of ascertaining the amount which should be paid by the de fendant, is incompetent. To admit it is contrary to the maxim, Inter alios

acta, etc. 2. SAME-SALE OR LICENSES-MEASURE OF DAMAGES.

When the sale of licenses by the patentee has been sufficient to establish a price for such licenses, that price should be the measure of his damages against an infringer; but a royalty or license fee, to be binding on a stranger to the

licenses which established it, must be uniform. 3. SAME-SINGLE LICENSE-MARKET PRICE.

Proof of a single license is not sufficient to establish a market price. 4. SAME-SEVERAL CLAIMS-ROYALTY.

In respect to two or more claims in a patent, each of value and distinct from the other, one cannot equal both or all in value, any more than, in mathematics, a part can equal the whole. A licensee may, if he choose, bind himself to pay the same price, whether he use the entire invention or a part only; but at the same time he acquires the right to use all, and so his agreement may not be unreasonable; but if, as against an infringer, such a license can have any force, reasonably, it must be in the way only of establishing a royalty for the entire invention.

Exceptions to Master's Report.
H. C. Fox and Wood d Boyd, for complainants.
Stem & Peck, for defendants.

Woods, J. The exceptions filed are numerous, but, passing by others, the court will consider only those which bring into question the measure of the damages assessed. Upon this point the master says: “Plaintiffs waive all claims for profits, and rely upon the proofs produced as establishing a fixed license or royalty as the measure of damages;” and, after giving an abstract of the testimony of the four witnesses who were examined on the subject, the report proceeds to say:

“It is very difficult to determine from this evidence whether it makes proof of such an established royalty or license fee as furnishes a criterion upon which to estimate complainant's damages. The owner of a patent is granted a monopoly. He may choose to reserve the right to use his invention exclusively to himself, and to make and sell machines, keeping all other manufacturers out of competition. He may enjoin infringers. He has the right to fix a reasonable license fee or royalty to be paid by manufacturers who use his invention in making machines. And if fixed and reasonable, and paid by those who use the invention, such fee or royalty is a criterion upon which a computation or assessment of damages may be based. It is proved that the Wayne Agricultural Company paid the royalty of $1 for one-horse machines, and $2 for two-horse machines, for four years; a sum which, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, may be regarded as reasonable. Mast & Co. paid between $2,000 and $3,000 in cash, and conceded privileges, which Westcott estimates to have been worth as much more, for infringement. It is true, Westcott threatened suit, and, when money is paid under threat of suit merely as the price of peace, it furnishes no evidence of the amount or value of the real claim in dispute, but the settlement made shows that Westcott was paid some thing substantial for the infringement, and that the fear of litigation was a small element of the settlement itself. Westcott says that he arrived at the amount by his estimate of the number of the machines made by Mast & Co., and other considerations which are explained in Mast's deposition. Mast says no estimate was made of the number of machines. Westcott says he gave licenses, like the one attached to his deposition, to Mast & Co. and to English & Over. Mast was examined, but not interrogated on that point. Mr. English, the active man in the firm of English Over, says he does not recollect whether they took a license or not.

“It is with considerable reluctance that I have come to the conclusion that the evidence furnishes proof of a license fee, which may be taken as a basis for damages. The defendants have undoubtedly infringed complainants' invention; and the machines made by them, which are mentioned in the evidence, were all made after this suit was brought. As to the point made, that the evidence does not show how many of the machines made by defendants infringed one and how many infringed both claims of plaintiff, the master is of the opinion that the terms of the license were the same in either case, and the same fee was charged whether one or more claims were infringed. I therefore report and find that the defendants have made and sold 800 infringing one-horse machines, and that plaintiff's damages on that account are $800, and that defendants have made and sold 800 infringing two-horse machines, and that plaintiff's damages on that account are $1,600, making $2,400, his damages in full."

The clause in the license referred to by the master is of the following tenor:

Third. The party of the second part agrees to pay two dollars as a license fee upon every two-horse drill or seeder, and the sum of one dollar on every one-horse drill or seeder, manufactured by said party of the second part, containing any of the patented improvements; provided, that if the said fee be paid upon the days provided herein for semi-annual returns, or within ten days thereafter, a discount of fifty per cent. shall be made from said fee for prompt payment."

There is probably no reason to question the general principles enunciated by the master in respect to the rights of patentees in their inventions; but the court does not concur, in all respects, with the master's application of them in this case, nor with the conclusion reached. Some of the facts found are not, in the judgment of the court, supported by the evidence. Some items of evidence were considered by the master, which, in the opinion of the court, were not admissible, and which, therefore, should have been allowed no weight whatever.

In respect to the royalty paid by the Wayne Agricultural Company, Westcott, the only witness to the point, testified this:

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