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(District Court, E. D. New York. February 19, 1884.)


A loaded boat,the B., bound east on the Erie canal, towed by a cable-boat, met a light boat,the C. P., while turning a bend where the cable-boat must keep close to the inside of the turn, which was the low-path side. The C. P. passed the cable-boat on the outside, and then, in accordance with the rule of the canal, attempted to regain the tow-path side by passing between the cable-boat and the B., over the tow-line of the cable-boat, and in so doing was struck by the B.: In an action against the C. P. for the damage done the B., held, that the C, P., having taken a course in accordance with the rule of the canal, and the B. having done otherwise, the burden was on the B. to excuse her omission to conform to the rule; and that, as the B. failed to do so upon the evidence, her libel must be dismissed.

In Admiralty.
J. M. Mulchahey, for libeiani.
E. G. Davis, for claimant.

BENEDIOT, J. This is an action to recover for damages done to the canal-boat E. M. Blazier in a collision with the canal-boat Curtis Park, on the Erie canal, at Middleport bend. The Blazier was a loaded boat, bound east, and being towed by a cable-boat, No. 8. The Curtis Park was a light boat, bound west. The Curtis Park met the cable-boat and her tow just as the cable-boat was turning the bend, and when, owing to the position of the cable, the cable-boat must necessarily keep close to the inside side of the turn, which was there the tow-path side of the canal. Accordingly, the Curtis Park passed the cable-boat on the outside, or heel-path side. It was then her right, according to the rule of the canal, to regain the tow-path side by passing between the cable-boat and the Blazier, thus going over the tow-line of the cable-boat, the same being slackened for that purpose. This course was taken by the Curtis Park; but before she reached the tow-path she was struck by the Blazier. The collision would not have occured had not the Blazier, instead of keeping towards the berme bank, hauled in towards the tow-path. Her excuse for doing this is that she supposed the Curtis Park would go outside of her, as she had gone outside of the cable-boat. The Curtis Park having taken a course in accordance with the rule of the canal, and the Blazier having done otherwise, the burden is upon the libelant to excuse her omission to conform to the rule.

The assertion in behalf of the Blazier is that the Curtis Park at first hauled to the berme bank, with the intention of passing on the outside, thereby leading the Blazier to haul towards the tow-path side, and afterwards abandoned this intention by direction of the master of the Curtis Park, who came on deck as the boats were passing and directed his steersman to take the tow-path when it was too late to do

1 Reported by R. D. & Wyllys Benedict, of the New York bar.

so without collision. The evidence has failed to satisfy me of the truth of this assertion. There is very positive testimony from several witnesses that the Curtis Park at no time took the berme bank, but passed along the cable-boat close by; and the fact stated by the libelant's witnesses to show that the Curtis Park would be likely to take the berme bank, namely, that a strong wind was blowing off the tow-path, rendering it impossible for a light boat to regain the towpath in the manner attempted by the Curtis Park, is contradicted by the libel itself, where it is expressly stated that the wind was light.

Upon the evidence as it stands, I am unable to find that the libel. ant's boat has proved her excuse for being where she was when the collision occurred, she then being inside of the middle of the canal, instead of nearer to the berme bank, and accordingly I must dismiss the libel, with costs.


(District Court, E. D. New York. December 31, 1883.)


One J. obtained permission from the government of Brazil to extract a cargo of guano or mineral phosphate from R. island, and sent out a vessel 10 get it, but the voyage was broken up. W., learning of this, went to the island with his vessel and obtained the cargo by virtue of a subsequent permission obtained by W. himself. J. filed a libel against W.'s vessel and cargo, claiming as owner to recover the cargo obtained by W. Held, that J.'s right of property could only attach to what phosphate lie might acquire possession of by extraci. ing it and loading it upon his vessel under the permit issued to him, and that, in the absence of proof of false representations on W.'s part in obtaining his permission that he was acting as J.'s agent, the libel must be dismissed.

In Admiralty.
Dan. Marvin, for libelant.
Goodrich, Deady & Platt, for claimant.

BENEDICT, J. It is conceded on the part of the libelant that there can be no recovery in this action unless the libelant's ownership of the cargo proceeded against has been proved. This has not been done. It has been shown that the libelant, one Jewett, had obtained from the government of Brazil permission to extract, for his own use, from Rat island, a cargo of guano or mineral phosphate. He sent out the brig Katie to obtain such cargo, but she was condemned in Rio Grande do Sul, and her voyage broken up. At the time of the condemnation of the Katie, Williams, the claimant in this action, learned of the destination of the Katie and the object of her voyage, and, acting upon such information, proceeded to Rat island with his vessel, the Dauntless, and there obtained the cargo now proceeded

1 Reported by R. D. & Wyllys Benedict, of the New York bar.

against. But this cargo was not obtained by virtue of the permit that had been issued to the libelant, but by virtue of a subsequent permission which Williams obtained for himself. By the permission issued to the libelant, the libelant acquired no interest in any of the phosphate on Rat island. His right of property could only attach to what he might acquire possession of by extracting it and loading it upon his vessel under the permit issued to him. I am, therefore, unable to see any ground upon which to hold the libelant to be owner of this cargo, which was not extracted by him and was never in his possession. If this cargo had been obtained by Williams through a false representation that in applying for the permission that was given to him he was acting in behalf of the libelant, and he had been allowed to take this cargo as the agent of the libelant, and not for himself, his acts could have been adopted by the libelant, and in such case it might not be open to Williams to deny the libelant's ownership of cargo so obtained. But no such case has been proved. The most that can be said is that the circumstances proved are calculated to cast suspicion upon the account given by Williams in regard to his acts in obtaining this cargo. It is not enough, however, in a case like this, to raise suspicion. The libelant's ownership must be proved. That not having been done, the action must fail.

Let a decree be entered dismissing the libel, with costs.

The Daunt

See opinion on argument of exceptions to libel in same case. less, 7 FED. REP. 366.


(District Court, N. D. New York. March 28, 1884.)


A vessel which has been detained by a ship-keeper, pending a controversy, must be delivered up to her owner immediately upon the settlement of the suit. The marshal will not be justified in employing a ship-keeper after the suit has been settled, merely because a formal order of discontinuance has not been entered.

In Admiralty.

This is a motion in the nature of an appeal from the taxation of the marshal's bill of costs, by the clerk. The marshal employed a ship-keeper at $2.50 per day to take charge of the libeled vessel. The clerk allowed the bill at $1.75 per day. Various affidavits were submitted by the parties. Some to the effect that the amount was too high; others that it was a very reasonable charge for the work done. It appears from the affidavits that the controversy between the parties has been settled, though no formal order to that effect has been entered. It also appears that since the settlement and the taxation by the clerk as aforesaid the ship-keeper has retained possession of the vessel and has demanded pay for his services.

George N. Loveridge, for motion.
James A. Murray, opposed.

CoXE, J. I have read with care all of the affidavits and papers submitted in this case and have reached the conclusion that the bill of costs and disbursements as taxed by the clerk, February 28, 1884, cannot with propriety be reduced. As the stipulation limits the inquiry to the items of that bill, I express no opinion upon the question as to the right of the ship-keeper to compensation since that day. There should be no delay, however, if the controversy is settled, in discontinuing the action and restoring the vessel to her proper owner.


(District Court, N. D. New York. March, 1884.)


The respondent in a suit for seamen's wages cannot avoid the payment of costs by settling with the libelant without the knowledge of his proctors.

Cook & Fitzgerald, for libelant.
Williams & Potter, for respondent.

CoxE, J. This is a libel for seamen's wages. The simple question is: can the respondent by a settlement with the libelant avoid the payment of costs? I am clearly of the opinion that he cannot. The libelant was compelled by the respondent's refusal to pay his wages to commence this suit. Costs and disbursements were incurred, due not only to the proctors, but to the marshal and clerk. By paying the libelant the respondent admits that the claim against him was a just one. Why should he not discharge all the debts which his own conduct made it necessary to incur? To permit a party, by means of what Judge BETTS sententiously terms "an out-door settlement," to avoid the payment of such obligations would be to encourage practices which the court should be slow to sanction. Courts of admiralty in actions of this character have seldom failed in similar circumstances to grant protection to the injured party. The Sarah Jane, 1 Blatchf. & H. 401, 422; The Victory, Id. 443; The Planet, 1 Spr. 11; Angell v. Bennett, Id. 85; Collins v. Nickerson, Id. 126; Gaines v. Travis, 1 Abb. Adm. 301.

The libelant's proctors are entitled to recover their costs to be taxed by the clerk.

PHELPS v. Canada Cent. R. Co.

(Circuit Court, N. D. New York. April 3, 1882.)


Where, before the removal of a cause, the state court has restricted plaintiff to his cause of action for breach of contract, on which an attachment has been granted, and he has elected to consent to such order, and it is still in force when the case is removed to the federal court, a motion by plaintiff in the circuit court for leave to amend his complaint may be denied, no change in the relative position or rights of the parties having been made.

Motion to Serve Amended Complaint.
Mullin d Griffin, for plaintiff.
Edward C. James, for defendant.

WALLACE, J. Before this action was removed into this court the state court had granted an order restricting the plaintiff from averring in his complaint any cause of action against the defendant other than for alleged breach of contract set forth in the affidavit upon which the defendant's property was attached and its appearance thereby compelled. Although the main point considered by the state court upon the motion which resulted in such order was the right of the plaintiff to incorporate into his complaint a cause of action and prayer for equitable relief, the order made was both broad and explicit in its terms, and confined the plaintiff to the cause of action set forth in the affidavit for the attachment. The plaintiff elected to consent to that order as a condition of retaining his attachment, which would otherwise have been vacated. Whether the state court would have thus adjudged if the plaintiff had complained upon a cause of action at law only, it is not for this court to determine. It suffices that the order, as made, was in force when the action was removed to this court. Undoubtedly, this court has power to modify that order, but it would be unseemly, when nothing has occurred since the removal to change the rights or position of the parties, to disregard the adjudication of the state court made upon hearing and deliberation and consented to by the plaintiff.

Although the plaintiff is entitled, by the Code of Procedure of the state, to amend, as of course, within the time limited by the Code after the defendant has answered, that right was waived, in so far as the exercise of it would involve any departure from the terms of the order, by the election signified upon the hearing which resulted in the order. The motion for leave to serve the amended complaint is denied.

v.19, no.11-51

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